 Okay, so this is a paper with a former student of mine, Saifu, and this is, okay, the title. Okay, so what we do is basically distinguish between two types of exporters within the same industry. And export behavior of manufacturing have been, they sell either directly, the firm selling directly to a foreigner, foreign market, or selling through intermediaries. Okay, so that's a fact and I'll come to the data later, later, where does it move, okay. And so very few actually examined export behavior which involve intermediaries, okay. And so in our model there will be both, the coexist, both will coexist. And there's a literature, so it's scanned in total exports, share of high intermediaries can be as high as 41% in a particular sector, in a particular country. So wide variation between sectors and between countries. But those are not sort of insignificant, that's what I'm trying to say here. And there are other studies which says about 25% a quarter. So it's still the direct exporting is the dominant force, okay. But indirect exporting through intermediaries are not insignificant. So this is more data, okay. And this is even more to just, I'm trying to skip, this is a slide written for a long presentation and it depends on the industry as well. Okay, not only country, but industry, there's a lot of variation. And of course the cost, as we know with the new literature international trade. The efficiency level of firms, and we are talking about our data will be firm level data, so the efficiency level of firms also play a significant role. And the medium, as you would expect kind of things, small firms tend to export through intermediaries, large firms directly. Although surprisingly also find that for the African case, our data, about 20% of the large firms. And large firm meaning firms with employ more than 100 people also sell through intermediaries. And also about 17% of the small firms sell directly. So you find both, the mixture of both in terms of the size of the firm. And in past studies, people kind of analyze the export via intermediaries, export via direct exports. And also when you talk about policy, that export promotion policy, we kind of very rarely will find policy make a distinguish between the two different types of exporters. Okay, so there's a one policy for the whole sector. And as we'll see kind of it may make a difference. And okay, we have done, this is with a different author. We've done a paper with, it's purely a theoretical paper in Canadian Journal. We distinguish between producers and sellers. And we find interesting results, I'm not going to bore you with here. And this is more literature, I'll skip. There are studies which deals with intermediaries. I'll skip all these things, I'll be running out of time. Okay, so what do we do? So we, a clear distinction between two types of firms within industry. And this will be a partial equilibrium model. Firms are assumed to already decided the mode of export. So this is not endogenous, we do another paper where what they do is endogenous. Okay, here there are two groups of firms and one group is direct exporter, one group is indirect exporters. But they are selling in the same market, okay? So it's a kind of oligopolistic model with two types of firms. And we are, okay, so I've already said extensive margin to it. And analyze the interdependence. If you subsidize one group, how does it affect the other group, okay? And because it's an oligopolistic model, we can do that, okay? And then, for example, what is the role of competition among exporters? If it's the industrial policy, if you increase competition in one group, how does it affect the other group, okay? These are the kind of issues that we examine. What is the socially optimal subsidy for the direct exporters? That's usually the policies directed towards direct exporters. Indirect exporters are mostly sort of unorganized group of people, okay? The government subsidy only, we'll talk about the government subsidy only to the direct exporters, it's the most sort of, and the similar analysis just the opposite will happen if we consider subsidy to the indirect exporters, okay? But we don't consider subsidies to both groups, it is discriminatory. And we also see, do lots of comparative settings, which will be later tested in the empirical part. And we do so for two cases where the subsidy is endogenous, that is optimally decided, and in one case where it is exogenous, okay? And in the endogenous case, if we do, for example, a comparative statistics of efficiency level of a firm, so it will affect directly the export performance. And it will also affect via changes in subsidy. It will affect subsidy, then subsidy will affect export performance, okay? So that will be the two parts. So this is a brief, I'll not go through the whole model and all the comparatives, detailed. There are n number of identical direct mode exporters. Competitive indirect mode exporters engage in the same product, okay? But there's a intermediary, one intermediary in our case we assume. Act as a sole intermediary for the indirect mode producer. So there's a vertical relationship between the intermediary and the producers, okay? So that's a vertical relationship between the producers. And there's the same homogeneous good indirect demand function. The total demand is total sales, is there a button here? This is the total sales by the direct exporters. This is the total sale by the indirect exporters. And this is an exogenous sale by outsiders, okay? So that will be exogenous in our model. And each firm, exporting firm, receives a subsidy as the rate of S per unit of export. And this is the, each one will maximize profit, I'll not, the cost is quadratic, but the two groups of firms may have different costs. So the efficiency levels may be different, these are the profits. By the way, the indirect producers, this Q is the kind of a transfer pricing. That is the price that the intermediaries give to the producers of intermediate for the indirect exporters. And Q is the price, okay? Received from the intermediary. And for the profit of the intermediary, of course, I've written somewhere possibly, the last one. The PIM is the profit of the intermediary. So it's a two-step process. First, this is the profit, the usual, first of the condition for the direct exporters. This is indirect exporters, of course, price takers. So they are marginal cost equal to the price they get, which is Q. And then this, the intermediary will take this as a reaction function, and then maximize the profit and we get, sorry, the welfare, I should say. Because we'll be considering optimal subsidy, total profits of all three parties minus the subsidy payments. Consumer surplus is not here because we're assuming that everything is exported, okay? So all products are again, so all profits minus the subsidy cost, okay? And the usual results, I'll not bore you with competition. If you increase the number of direct exporters, it will reduce the output of each firm of both types, okay? This is one of the kind of interdependence. But, of course, N has gone up, so the total output of the direct exporters will go up, and it is the indirect exporters which will suffer, okay? So the more competition among the direct exporters will actually hurt the indirect exporters, and subsidies effects are standard as well. And when we optimal subsidy, we find that to be negative. And so the policy would be to actually, the government, optimal government policy in our model, would be actually to tax the direct exporters. I mean, in other words, subsidize the, or that what it means is to subsidize the indirect exporters. So a better policy, more help to the indirect exporters, and taxing the direct exporters. So there are arguments and all. How much am I doing with time? I've taken five minutes. I have left with five minutes. I have left with five minutes, oh dear. Okay, so I'll just give, okay. I'll skip all of that. Okay, so we have the two kind of equations that we estimate. And the data, I have not talked about the data yet. The export of Ith firm in the jth country, sorry, kth country, firm I sector J country K, okay? That's IJK. And the variables are the efficiency level of the firm, okay? And also, this is remember the first equation for the direct exporters. So efficiency level of the direct exporters and also the efficiency level of the indirect exporters in the same firm, because they're all interdependent, okay? And the way that we calculate our competition is a kind of this is the BEEP data, the business enterprise data. So they're actually asked about the competition. The firms are asked. They're also asked about the tax. Are they paying too much tax, too little tax? They're about categorical variables, okay? So there are all these details. They're all in the paper. This is how we actually calculate the data. So there are two exports of, so identify the firm as a direct exporter, indirect exporters, and the two export equations. This is the log sales, by the way, because there is no quantity data, it's the sales data, and we estimate these equations. And there is also a sector level estimation that we have the tax variable, that the firm, the sector J in country K, and this is the mean. So each firm is asked, is the tax too low, too high? There are about five categories, okay? We take the median in that industry from each firms, okay? So the median tax burden of the firm in that industry. So the tax equation is sector level because the taxes are never kind of discriminately charged to each firm. So the tax is the same, actual tax is the same for all firms. And we do all that. This is the World Bank Enterprise Survey for about 39 sub-Saharan African countries. This is a, unfortunately, this is a data collected over a period, but we have only one observations. For, it's not a time, it's not a panel. Sorry, it's a panel in the sense of firms and countries, but there's no time element in the data. So there are about 200 and 2,300 roughly firms, 14 different industries and all the industry class, they're all in the paper, which you can find. So we only, there are a small section of firms, they do sell directly and indirectly to both. Each firm is doing both. Some selling directly some, a small one, okay? So we exclude those firms from the sample. Okay, about 22% in our sample are indirect exporters, 78 are. So we do also things to define with the efficiency variable is actually relative efficiency within an industry of the different firms that we need to correct for the prices because they are kind of cost and sales figures. We'll go quickly to the regressions. We do all sorts of other country specific and sector specific variables, okay? Like the regulation and all sorts of variables. Industry specific, country specific, and firm specific, of course, there are, there are all these regulation variables. And country specific variables are collected from the WDI. These are some of the variables. So this is some sort of sample characteristics. I'll skip, I'm going to go to the table. This is us telling you about the distribution of firms across the size, about ownership, okay? So this is, yeah, this is the script, two minutes, okay? Okay, one minute each table, okay? So this is for the direct exporters. This is remember the left-hand side is the level variable, total log sales. So sorry, exports, direct export, total exports. And we also have another sales variable just to total sales of the firm. And this is the left-hand side is the export, direct exports, okay? Just to keep on level variable. And there are all the competition variable, cross efficiency, own efficiency, ownership, the technology level, whether they have website or not, age of the firm, the credit constraint that the firm faces, the country specific variable and all these things. And more or less the results are consistent with what we find in the theoretical part, which I haven't discussed. And if we do that the same thing for the indirect exporters, there are all sorts of diagnostic thing at the bottom, which I could not squeeze into my Pima presentation. And similarly, we also get results like that. And the tax burden on direct exporters, this is remember, since the tax variable is a category variable and we take the median. Just for robust next take, we also do the order logit or OLS and the results kind of similar. And the competition, the interesting theory is the competition variable, which is positive and we have an interaction term, which is the interaction between competition and efficiency level. And the part I skipped in the theory that the effect of competition on the optimal subsidy dependent on the level of efficiency of the firm. And so that we have an interaction term, which is also consistent. I think that's roughly what we do. I ran out of time, have I not? Okay, I'm done, yeah.