 Welcome everyone I'm Chris Miller and it's my pleasure today to share this discussion on Russia with the question what next as the subtext of our panel. We've got very four distinguished experts on foreign policy issues and policymaking to guide us through this discussion. There's of course been much conversation the last several days on the Russia-Ukraine war. We're going to try to focus our discussion in the next 45 minutes on Russia itself and the developments we expect in that country and between Russia and the other major powers over the coming year. Joining us we have to my left Valdez Dombrovsky's the executive vice president of the European Commission, foreign minister of Poland Vrata Slavsakorsky, foreign minister of Romania, Atabrescu and foreign minister Landsbergus of Lithuania. And when it start by turning the floor over to you Mr. Dombrovsky's to lay the scene for us right now it's two years into a war which has gone on much longer than Russia expected with a much greater response in terms of financial sanctions from both Europe and other Western partners. Can you set the stage for us as to how you see the current status quo? Well indeed next month it's going to be two years since the beginning of Russia's aggression against Ukraine and obviously many things how happen things. So I'll focus on economic situation and implications. So first of all from the European Union side we had come with tough sanctions against Russia. We have put forward 12 sanctions packages against Russia also against its co-aggressor Belarus and all in all sanctions are working. For example in 2022 when Russia started the aggression it was the year of record high energy prices. At the same time Russia's economy was in recession and that's not what you normally expect for economy which is heavily dependent on export on fossil fuels. Also gross rates were quite subdued last year. Russia's foreign currency funds are being deflated. Ruble is losing the value. Russia's central bank is defending the ruble raising interest rates I don't know the latest but somewhere in range of 15 percent which is additional drag on economy so clearly this pressure which we are putting on Russia is being felt. At the same time of course while we are putting sanctions on Russia Russia is actually looking how to find their way around those sanctions and they are diversifying the trade away from Europe from other economies which are putting sanctions on them to other countries like China like India because we know that many countries are not putting sanctions on Russia. They have set their economy on the war footing so it's a war economy and in a sense if you look at the GDP figures it's in a sense shows in GDP figures and is some kind of economic stimulus but it also indicates that with Russia now really working very seriously to ramp up its military production that it's there for the war and for a long war so it's really putting its economy on a war footing so as a western democratic world we need to see what our response to this is going to be and final point of this any sanctions are as good as their enforcement so therefore in the last sanctions packages we had been putting lots of emphasis on fighting circumvention creating also dedicated sanctions and which is dealing with enforcement this sanctions which is working with the countries to minimize this circumvention because clearly that's important part of this work not only to take political decisions but yes we decided on sanctions but also working on their enforcement and that's a tedious work and it's in a sense bit of a race as we are looking how to better enforce sanctions Russia is looking how to better circumvent sanctions so we need to keep this effort and while we are focusing now on Russia another part of the same equation is that we need to continue to provide all necessary support for Ukraine financial military economical support humanitarian support and really need to make sure that Russia sorry that Ukraine can defend itself against Russia and it can win its over well let me ask one follow-up question on sanctions before turning to the panelists one of the most significant sanctions was the freezing of Russia's foreign exchange reserves are largely based in Europe there's been some discussion over the past couple of months about potentially confiscating those reserves can you give us the current state of play in Europe in terms of discussions about the Russian reserves yeah well first of all I would highlight the G7 decision which was taken already several months ago that those Russia's assets should remain frozen should remain immobilized for as long as Russia has not paid reparations to Ukraine for the damage it has created so it very clearly they said that those assets will not go back to Russia like this in between from European Commission side we have put forward a proposal on how to use the proceeds from immobilized Russian first of all providing legal clarity that those proceeds do not belong to Russia and taskings that allow and financial institutions and all security depositories to put those funds aside with a possibility at later stage to take them to the EU budget and then put for the Ukraine's support okay this last stage will still require additional decision to be taken but in a sense we already indicate the direction and just recently indeed those discussions have started on the Russian assets themselves again at the G7 level so what what to do about those assets and in a sense how also to how proper legal base for making sure that those assets eventually are used for supporting Ukraine in well one mechanism or another we had mentioned of China is one of Russia's partners in circumventing sanctions and of course one of the impacts of the war has been a closer Russia-China relationship ministers of course if I could turn to you to look forward in the Russia-China relationship what do you see developing over the coming years and who has leverage in that relationship what are the implications for Europe it seems to be going back to what the norm was until the end of the 18th century which is Russia being a subordinate partner in that relationship in that sense the 19th century second half changed the paradigm Russia took part in the western colonial ventures in China treaties of Vargun and of Beijing under which Russia gained the territories of what the Chinese called Hanschen Bay and the Russians called Vladivostok out of Manchuria with parts of Mongolia and territory north of that and then Russia was still the the senior partner under Mao and Stalin and now it's flipped back it is masked to some extent by Chinese protocol respect for Russia but it's clear that Russia needs China much more than vice versa and that if you look at those energy deals Russia is selling its energy to China at much lower prices than the lucrative European market she has she has lost and and she's clearly the junior partner in that relationship which I think highlights the difference between the interests of Russia and the interest of the president of Russia my friend of me and mentors Big Brzezinski used to say that Russia's choice is to be either an ally of the West or a vassal of China Russia made the choice and we can have an opinion about whether it's a good one they they've even developed a whole ideology around this choice Alexander Nevsky is now praised for having continued with subjugating to the Mongols because that supposedly preserved Russia's independence from the West as if that was the the highest prize that any country could have as if the goal of state activity shouldn't be the welfare of its people you know when I worked in Washington I once did a calculation of what the Russian economy would be today if she just developed at the rate of Canada since 1913 similar you know northern countries resources on the current population Russia would have the economy of half the United States but of course without Bolshevism and without the Second World War Russia would have doubled the population it's tragic that you know the largest territory country on earth craves other people's land they don't have enough land and I think I'm speaking not only for myself because Western has always suspecting us in Eastern Europe of being too sensitive to Russian threats well first of all it's experience if you're Israeli in Iran threatens you you believe them if you're Polish or Lithuanian and the Russians threaten you it's usually credible it's it's 500 years of experience but when I was previously in my job I tried to normalize relations with Russia as long as they were negotiating with the EU the partnership corp and cooperation agreement too they were interested in in having a normal and association agreement with the EU and all but name we were encouraging that you know we're actually criticizing Poland for having done our own rest reset with Russia Putin came to Gdańsk thereby acknowledging that that's where the Second World War started which was a departure from the Stalinist a version of history which we thought was a good thing Putin came to cut in the site of the murder of the Polish officer called by by the Soviet Union we had a commission on the establishment of facts between Polish and Russian historians which was successful Russian local authority officials came and were amazed at how Polish local government worked and you know we were encouraging them in that direction but you can only do it while they refrain from invading neighbors once you start doing that you know you can't have a normal relationship but I just think that Putin has has passed the point of no return he's now an indicted war criminal and I think these colonial wars only ever ended by a different team than had started them well I want to get back to that question over the course of our discussion but just to just to hone in on the Russia-China point you've argued that the relationship is now as close as it's been in in some centuries what are the implications for the West some people argue that it might be possible to separate Russia from China do you see any scope for that no because both leaders find it ideologically and in simple terms of regime survival to collaborate with each other and they they have they both have the same ideology actually which is to make Russia and China great again and by similar methods namely to recover so-called renegade provinces which is why which is a somewhat unsung reason why Ukraine needs to win because if Putin succeeds in conquering Ukraine then she will be encouraged to do Taiwan and we can't have that well maybe zooming out to the the global picture we've we've thus far used Europe and the West somewhat interchangeably assuming a shared sense of interest but of course in the United States over the past couple of months there's been more skepticism about supporting Ukraine and its war against Russia so I'd be interested to hear how if that sentiment develops further will transatlantic unity that we've seen around Russia potentially fade to some degree and if so how will the Kremlin respond to that minister to Russia can I turn that question to you and hear how you're thinking about that issue well before maybe to add something about our relation with Russia as well because Romania in Romania we had direct historic experience with with Russia in its various incarnation and we have no illusion about today's Russia and we have seen it with the war in Ukraine but we have seen it also directly in Romania because we had since the beginning of September 5 incidents with Russian drones which fell on the Romanian territory so speaking about Russia we knew Russia all along and if one still needs a proof just to look at the frozen conflict all around the Black Sea region or the occupation in Crimea in 2014 so and now we are facing a full-scale war of aggression against our neighbor and this is not about only Ukraine it's also about us for us the facts are very clear Russia is bringing back revisionism in the international relation Russia is violently contesting the international order we created after the Second World War Russia uses this credited concept like the sphere of influences which have no place in the current century and this is as I said it's not about Russia about Ukraine sorry it's also about the Eastern countries and it goes even beyond and in order to shift the attention or the perception Russia started to portray the war of aggression as a kind of civilizational war against the collective West but this is a lie because the West was not forging forging any war against Russia it's vice versa so this is why the question we we have today is what we as responsible actors what should we as responsible actor do about this and in any answer the starting points are very clear for for us at least for Romania we have to stay firm of our values and principle democratic principles to continue with our or remain committed to our unwavering support for Ukraine and as I said this is not about only about Ukraine it is about Europe security and Russia should strategically failed failed in Ukraine if not it may might not stop at the Ukrainian border because the war in their case it's ideologically and geopolitically driven but I think this question of where do Russia's ambitions and is fundamentally important for Western strategy the follow-up is where do Russia's capabilities land today I think in the early stages of the war we of course saw the Russian military underperform how do you assess the current status and it would be plausible if Russia were to win a new crane for Russia to continue to threaten other neighbors well it's a very good question and this is why it's so important for us to continue our support for Ukraine as long as it takes I mean we just look at the economy of Russia of course we have seen the figures in terms of militarization of the economy in terms of spending in terms of other like-minded partners helping Russia like Iran or North Korea in there but we have to continue to stay firm or Russia to continue our diplomatic containment to as the vice president underline to continue to apply the sanction but also to think about new sanction targeting the critical area for the war efforts or and also targeting the person persons responsible for the war crimes including crimes of aggression we continue to reach out to all our partners all around the world including the emergent power to insist on the accountability including on the crime of aggression so I think and you know at the beginning of the war the big surprise for Russia was our stance our unity and our strong coordination transatlantic unity and strong coordination this is we have to continue to stay firm on this because strength is what Russia respect coordination unity is what Russia respect anything less it is not in our favor but I'd like to ask for Mr. Landsberg is what we've learned about what Russia assesses in the West West of course failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine there's been much discussion about trying to manage escalation from different Western capitals what lessons have you drawn about Russian behavior in Russia's responses to Western behavior over the past two years well I think that first we have to agree that Russia had a different plan that the plan was to take even three days to capitulate the government most likely occupy the whole country maybe apart from you know certain Western Western parts it was surprised and Ukrainians won the first battle you know with minimal assistance that they've got from the West they surprised the second time with ability to use incredibly effectively and very fast the equipment that was sent later mostly the high mass the tanks that you know that they were able to use not not Western tanks but old refurbished Soviet tanks but the issue is that and at this point I would like to touch upon about the Western reaction that we somehow stuck on those two victories we imagine that this is it this is this is our victory this is we put it in the in the bag and you know it's ours is there to stay and I hear so many times like look we managed to do this we managed to do this yes but there are so many battles up ahead which we still don't have any strategy for and this is what's what's most more and from Putin side he was shocked because of a loss of first first two encounters but then he adapted then he adapted he started gaining and then hoping for fatigue for democratic processes that will somehow get in the way maybe just slow the you know this the support or maybe you know shift it all together he opted for disunity and he's seeing that obviously I mean you know half a year already that Europe cannot agree on the Europe you know continuation of European peace facility meaning that we are unable as a union to continue financing Ukraine's war effort we managed to do that at the beginning no longer so if we would expect that Putin took the first two lessons and said okay this is it you know I'm losing you know hands in the air I am no longer able to fight this is completely false hope I think that he is now hoping that you know with with a little bit of time with a little bit more fatigue from our side with a little bit of less coordination from our side that this is his chance and honestly he does have a chance this is this is the worst thing and I think I see two possible realities you know and we're in this Schrodinger's cats situation because now we're in this superposition where both things are still possible one is that yes you know Davos helps us all you know we start you know we go back home relighted reinvigorated you know go to back to our governments and say look you know this has to stop you know we really have to push it this is this is about you know the security of NATO this is about as as Minister Sikorsky said this is about Indo-Pacific this is about Middle East is about all of us is about global security and stability and we have to win this right we have to have a strategy equipment money all of it we push it we win Ukraine wins you know we go back home yes this is a very dire scenario for Russia most likely instability would start all the oligarchs that now we're contained by the you know waiting and then suspecting something but you know we're in this waiting mode they will be extremely unhappy maybe they would go after the government I don't know it's their deal they will be care of it but there is another scenario which is completely likely as well that we're unable to to agree on the goal that we are unable to agree on the money that we will pat ourselves on the shoulder with you know with what bits we can still send send to Ukraine but nothing substantial that we change the strategy from winning the war to trying to freeze the war why put in with freeze the war what what's his interest in in freezing something when he has when he would think that he has an upper hand I have no no answer in this and this scenario is a very dire scenario first of all for Ukraine and when somebody asked and I've heard this question asked and I was here you know why the counter offensive failed I would ask ourselves why we failed to help Ukraine win the counter offensive and unfortunately we might have done more first of all for Ukraine secondly for the Eastern flank and you know big big part of Eastern flank is sitting here for all of us really we're feeling this and lastly for the whole global community this is it we would see every tyrant every autocrat emboldened to act because they would count not the first two lessons of winning Kiev and her son and and and pushing Russians Russians further to the east but the last lesson that West can get tired and this is the moment to wait for well I think there's there's there's two explanations that I sometimes hear among those who would prefer to reduce the amount of aid to Ukraine one is the desire to freeze the war as you described the others are a fear of Russian escalation that if we give more Russia will escalate in dangerous ways so I'd love to hear the panelists reflect on whether that's a risk that will not be concerned with I know ministers Korsky you wanted to jump in as well I just want to add a footnote to what minister of the best concept because indeed Russian media and the Russian regime I have this message of Russia fighting all of NATO and they think that they've been doing it for 10 years which reminds me of a wonderful anecdote that president Zelensky tells about two elderly residents of Odessa once is to the other have you heard Russia is fighting NATO here in Ukraine really really and how is it going well for Russia 300,000 dead and wounded 3,000 tanks destroyed the Russian economy feeling the pinch not too good and the other guy says and what about NATO oh NATO hasn't arrived yet yeah well first of all I'm always puzzled about this talk of Russia's escalation Russia has already escalated and it's and that's part of this problem in a sense okay as a collective West we have in a sense probably done more than we have expected and indeed in terms of support in terms of military deliveries but still it's always bit kind of too little too late all we cannot give Ukraine tanks Western tanks horrors horrors all we cannot give longer range rockets all we cannot give fighter planes but this all costs Ukrainian lives it all costs moments when Ukraine could take more advantage of the military situation like as like it was when it was taking offensive in Kharkiv region and in Herson while we were hesitating Russians were not wasting the time they were digging in so and from that point if you didn't so break through of the same time now during this Ukrainian summer counter offensive because in a sense by delaying those weapons applies we gave time Russians to dig in in occupied territories and in a sense change the nature nature of the war and Russians are not wasting the time they are also now ramping up their military production in a very substantial ways so from that point of view it's clear that we need to do more and to regain this initiative and while Europe should know already from the history of 1930s that appeasement of the dictator appeasement of the aggressor is not working so I try to try to repeat the same mistakes and when when we are asking okay but what what where is Russia heading what is Russia want to do it's written on the wall literally in Russia's presidential so-called elections Putin is campaigning with a slogan Russia's borders are ending nowhere and those are the posters on the wall let's read them let's understand that's what it's about it's about in perilous expansion it's about rebuilding empires that's that's what it's about and we need to react correspondingly not only by providing all necessary support to Ukraine but also ramping up our own defense capacities in Europe I'd like to bring in the audience in just a couple of minutes but I'd like to return before that to the question of potential instability inside of Russia which was mentioned of course last June we had Yovgeny Progosian surprising most people and marching on Moscow of course was a presidential election coming up in Russia probably not going to be that much of a nail biter but what is the prospect of some sort of unexpected political uncertainty in Moscow minister well my point was always to say that look Russians so far have solved Russia you know Yeltsin was not an outsider even Gorbachev who some in in the West think as a you know a great great person not not so many of those people in the Baltics but still he was not an outsider that the point is that Russians do solve their problems themselves just the conditions need to be right and we don't need to plan it we don't need to be part of it we don't need to actually even worry about it we have to worry about ourselves we have to be strong enough and prepared for any eventuality because it might happen and as as you know Progosian happened it could happen again we don't know and honestly I am not you know I'm not very much interested in in whatever's happening there the point is to you know to assist Ukraine to help them as much as we can to the victory whatever it takes and then and then to secure those who are vulnerable closest closest to Russia and that would be probably the the main goal and aspect of what we should be thinking well let me see if there are questions from the audience if so please raise your hand and we'll get a microphone handed towards you question up from please introduce yourself yes I'm Marjorie Krauss with Apgar worldwide we have over the years worked with a number of the Russian companies that have been impacted in this and some of them have gotten settlements against the Russian against the Russians in international courts and with the effort to confiscate assets to apply to Ukraine they could be allies in doing that or they could be adverse to it because they already have legal settlements that have never been paid so I just wondered if there was any point of view on that I have a view that you won't like I've been encouraging doing western business to invest in Russia for 30 years on the grounds that you will only ever learn anything when you lose your own money any other reactions to that question let's gather one or two more from the audience please thanks Michael R and I'm a former UK diplomat and to ask minister Sikorsky I'm not a Russia expert at all but I sat in the Security Council in the mid 90s shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union and Russia actually initially was extremely cooperative in the Security Council they didn't they supported or at least didn't veto resolutions on the Balkans on Iraq and so on which certainly five years before they definitely would have vetoed so we were cooperating with them but in by the mid 90s and particularly when Lavrov was permwrap in New York and I think a lot of his current attitude is based on that period we treated them like a defeated enemy we didn't embrace them they were they were not you know we didn't bring them into the fold we didn't treat them as fellow Europeans we continued to see them as other or as a you know as I say as a defeated enemy do you think we missed an opportunity at that time would it have been possible to have brought Russia into the fold of western or northern or whatever it is nations that kind of work together and building a or am I being you know totally naive and it was yes you are and and and but but more importantly you forget the facts and the facts are that we bent over backwards to include Russia as you say they were on the Security Council by what right it was the Soviet Union which was invited to the security yes and actually Ukraine and Belarus were separate members of of the United Nations even in those days and there was a vote in the UN to pass on the Soviet Union seat to Russia like there was a vote to pass Taiwan's seat to mainland China but this was one of the instances of us embracing Russia making it easier for them to become a normal nation state but there were so many others Germany paid billions to resettle Russian soldiers being withdrawn from East Germany the United States through the IMF sent billions upon billions in support of the ruble and in support of the economic reforms most of the money was probably stolen we invited Russia into the Council of Europe even though the state of their prisons they still you know they didn't really fulfill the criteria we invited Russia to the G7 but if you are invited into these institutions you have to abide by the rules I don't know what club you are a member of in London but if you start breaking the rules they'll kick you out and that's what they started doing breaking the rules of the club yeah this is the dilemma that Brzezinski that who am I quoted you can be an ally of the West but that carries certain responsibilities you know not to kill your own citizens our mass not to conduct genocidal wars like in Chechnya not to interfere say in the Balkans not to send assassins to our capital cities you should know about that they broke all those rules and then you can't treat them like they are a gentleman because they are not yeah as I was saying we were trying to have a normal relationship even with Putin's Russia as long as was possible but but but but there is a limit eventually you have to say enough is enough I'll make a phone coming I was just remembering Viktor Yushenko the former president of Ukraine in 2007 the one who was poisoned by Russia knocking at the door of NATO we don't know but it smells like that knocking at the door of NATO knocking on the door of you know the European Union asking for a place a seat at the table almost 15 years are gone by why does the European Union about to do right now to accelerate incorporation of Ukraine I know there's going to be very difficult but Mr. Zelensky two days ago never mention again the word victory if you remember his speech last year did you have a question you'd like to move towards yes my question is Mr. Dombrovsky what is going to do the European Union regarding the incorporation of Ukraine into the Union well indeed this is a one question which we have already answered that we have given a Ukraine EU candidates country status and last month we decided to start accession negotiations with Ukraine and also engage on this European integration pass with Moldova and Georgia so and as I was mentioning we need to provide all necessary support for Ukraine financial economic military but we also need to provide political support and we need to provide perspective for Ukraine and Ukrainian people where do they belong what is their future after the war and we have responded to this question that Ukraine's future is European Union we have given this perspective we know it's a long and complicated journey accession negotiations it's tedious all representatives of all the countries here how gone through this process we know how complicated it can be but it provides also for Ukraine a clear policy anchor they know their headings they know what they need to do so it's a question about doing this and engaging so they know they know where their future is and do you think that that will change Russia's calculus in the long run is that part of the rationale I don't think that is changing Russia's calculus because Russia's calculus is whether or not it can take Ukraine and by the way other countries by military force and from that point of view it's now not changing something in in in the situation of war it's still Russia needs to be defeated militarily it's it's not that just we give EU candidates country status to Ukraine and Russia is backing off not nothing like nothing like this it's more really about giving this clarity and perspective to Ukraine and also giving this policy anchor for Ukraine but I would add to that that if Russia is defeated militarily then we'll have liberal reforms in Russia every time Russia lost the war there were reforms Crimea war Russia Japanese war the big losses in World War one and and Russia self-collapse in the Cold War there are reforms better successful unsuccessful but only then do they try are you willing to speculate in how long that might take well these colonial wars usually take about a decade look at the British in North America and elsewhere I don't know if that's the exact right comparison we're going for yeah but but there are certain certain parallels look at the French in Indochina and in Algeria look at the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola it usually takes a deck why because the metropolis has to come to the conclusion that number one the decision to launch the war was a mistake and number two that the objective of winning the war is not worth the current expenditure in blood and treasure that is being sustained and only then do they make peace and usually it's a different team because the team that started it can very rarely admit to the mistake and that's why it takes a decade and that's what should be our base scenario I think it's a very sobering conclusion for most people who are hoping for a shorter conflict please because this is about Ukraine Republic Moldova Georgia future it's up to them we took as you a very important historic decision we act as a big geopolitical actor last December and we also have to underline with the war of aggression in Ukraine with the very difficult economic situation in Republic of Moldova they took in a very short period of time tremendous reform reforms and they are committed to continue this is also important because they we are speaking about people in these countries and this and also the war it's about people of Ukrainians so we have to put everything in this context thank you we've just got a couple minutes left let me collect a final round of questions and I'll give each of our panelists a chance to respond please thank you very much Galen Hines Pierce I'm just curious to know what you all think about the economic sanctions what have been more or less effective and where that might be headed over this next decade my name is Etlana Tikhanovskaya and my question about Belarus dictator Lukashenko is selling our independency to Putin piece by piece and dragged our country into this war meanwhile Belarus and people spoke clearly for democracy and in support of Ukraine so my question is how to drag Belarus out of the war and what the West can do not to leave Belarus as consolation price to Putin got one final question in the front row and then a lightning round of responses please my name is Marcus Price I'm working with ARD German TV in Brussels I have a question to Minister Sikorsky concerning Trump a Trump reelection would spell bad news for Ukraine but also perhaps for NATO since Poland is one of the big countries in Europe and one or a country that says it wants to have the biggest land army in Europe what would you do at that moment how would you coordinate with France with Germany whomever do you have any ideas what starts at that moment thanks thank you it's a great question which I would have answered you clearly in my previous capacity as member of the european parliament in my current capacity I I'll have to tell you that Poland will work with every american president and we all want to have the best possible transatlantic relations any final responses to the other questions so economic sanctions maybe briefly I think that they gave an effect and maybe while this can can add to this to this more it definitely gave an effect but the effect is not as strong as it was in the beginning but look I mean if we're preparing for the long haul and if we're preparing for Ukraine and victory we need to find new instruments and Europe is a trading union first and foremost we still do have extremely preferable trading regime with dictatorships such as Russia Iran and even North Korea if we are admitting to ourselves that we're entering a new stage where the trade with anybody is in our interest is no longer the mantra we have to change our outlook basically we have to look at the handbooks of cold war how did we operate back then and unfortunately relearn and reapply the lessons from from there on very briefly on Belarus since we're talking about history quite a lot to hear there is a historic example 1943 then Nazi Germany had an ally in Italy and it decided to quit the war because it was not going very favorably favorably to it so my assumption is that Belarusian future and geopolitical direction is very clearly tied with the war in Ukraine if Ukrainians are winning if the war is not favorable for for Russians if we see you know Russia retreating back deciding to solve its own problems then links between Minsk and and Moscow will deteriorate and this would be the best opportunity for Belarusian to reclaim their freedom and thank you for your work but don't jump the gun yeah maybe on this question on sanctions well there are many different sanctions which are enacted arguably probably what what are the most important ones ones are on the main Russia's revenue source which is export of hydrocarbons where we have imposed oil embargo and also agreed on g7 price cap where we have also imposed embargo on Russian coal supplies by the way we're not able to agree as an EU on putting embargo on Russian gas supplies but somehow gas pipelines were blown up and in any case those volumes have down substantially and we have found alternative supplies but one is hydrocarbons because that's the main revenue source of Russia's budget okay we see they are finding alternative markets but also price conditions are so not so favorable it's not very sweet deals for Russia which are making this China or India for example so but that's clearly one pressure point as regards financing second all things concerning technologies military technologies dual use technologies high technologies again those sanctions are imposed question is convention question is substitution so enforcement is import as important part of those sanctions as as political decisions and we are doing the monitoring of what we call also Ukraine battlefield items so what are the items in Russian military equipment which are finding in Ukrainian battlefields where they come from and and how to stop it so that's obviously there are all kind of other sanctions on financial sector personal sanctions and so on and so forth but if if I was to highlight I would highlight those two areas but in any case now enforcement is key and on Belarus I agree also what Gabriel also already said let me give our final word on Belarus I fully agree with what Gabriel you said on the sanction maybe because Russia has a lot of resources we have the impression that the sanctions are not working so and but and or the sanctioned sanctions don't have an immediate effect but we believe that the sanctions are working why how else to explain the Russia ask its partners to supply to supply it or to help it with critical military equipment including ammunition so of course we have to work together with the Commission with the member states to better implement the sanctions through fine tuning targeting the critical area to articulate them with the sanction taken taken by our partners or to work on the conventions on on on this so it's it's for sure but in our assessment the sanctions are working and we have to continue thank you on this point I would just ask you one question would you now fly a russian passenger jet let me please ask the audience to join me in thanking our panelists for this discussion