 I'm delighted to be here. I don't have much time so there is a paper that I hope you can look at it at least but I'm going to spend my time trying to convince you of a few things. One of the things that I will try to convince you but since you are there maybe I don't have to is that despite the very small size of these war-torn countries they are a they have an incommensurate weight in the political and security areas. For instance, when I started working on Afghanistan my economist friends would say why do you want to get involved in Afghanistan since it's only 0.02 percent of world economy and this country has had tremendous implications. It has been at the top of the US foreign policy agenda as it has been in many other countries and it has been the main recipient of aid for many years. So Afghanistan and Iraq, the two of them, they account for only a third of 1.3 percent of the world economy and for the US this has cost the two wars have cost so far 1.6 billion dollars plus all the non-budgetary expenses in terms of pensions, liability, disability, liabilities and other contingent liabilities. So these shows at the same time I mean Russia and the US have been very close to a new Cold War as a result of Africa and some very small war-torn economies so we cannot think of them as important to the world economy in economic terms but they are very very important to other ones. I want to convince you of two things. First that the international community has been using the wrong recipe and that the results are really awful not only in terms of what happens to these countries themselves but in terms of the cost to the international community and the consequences in terms of everything that Omar was saying earlier. So I want to, the recipe basically has been to transform these economies which are very insecure destitute and polarized coming out of internal conflicts into mirror images of developed countries. So we want liberal democracies and perfect free markets overnight. We want to do that overnight and it is, why? I mean some people think it's the dogmatic belief that without being a liberal democracy with free markets you can't have peace and maintain the peace. Others think it's just to create opportunities for donors, countries, companies, contractors, experts, etc. But the recipe irrespective of these very different countries the recipe has been basically the same. We want centralized government, the international community, the foreign interveners have pushed either in the peace agreements or otherwise for centralized government with relatively free elections keeping the peace through very expensive peacekeeping operations and insurgency operations to give you an idea in Liberia. Liberia is one of the countries that have managed to keep some kind of peace but the peacekeeping operations cost two-thirds of Liberia GDP for the three years I started which was 2009-2011 and they were going to close the peacekeeping operations then and it's still going on. So the tremendous cost for the international community and the recipe has been to save lives basically through humanitarian assistance with very little thought of how to make those lives worth living. Finally, the international community has pushed these countries into higher productivity projects which is fine. I mean we economists that's what we long for but not in economies coming out of these very protected civil conflicts. We destroyed economies where a large part of the population 80%, 70-80% of the population or more live on subsistence agriculture and so forth. So they have ignored that area to push for few productive projects that require large infrastructure that would take time to to build. Therefore these kind of policies have benefited foreign investors and a few domestic elites and they have neglected the large majority of the usually rural population as a result of lack of inclusive and conflict sensitive policies. In fact the policies have usually made it worse in the sense that some of these investments in in concessions either agriculture or mining they have displaced some of these communities and they have deprived them of their lives and livelihoods. So definitely the wrong the wrong recipe and the the results are really awful. I take a sample of the countries that have embarked in multi-pronged transitions to peace involving peace, security, economic and social transformation. Roughly 50% of them relapsing to conflict and the others have been unable to stand on their feet and become highly aid dependent. The ones that haven't become highly a dependent in part is because they had an income per capita on average that was beyond the threshold to have access to aid. The other thing is that I don't want to go over it that this has had tremendous impact in terms of what Omar was talking earlier. I know you can't see this graph but it's an incentive for you to look at the paper but I just want to tell you what the purpose of the graph is. I selected all the operations since the end of the Cold War in which the UN had major multidisciplinary operations and I chose the 10 first years of of that operation and basically I calculate the aid and it's very interesting. In the in the second part I make an average of the first three years, the first five years and the first 10 years and what I find is that countries for the first 10 years they have they on average they get something like 15% to 35% of GDP in aid but they are countries like Afghanistan and and Liberia that for 10 years they got over 50% in aid and this includes this includes a debt relief but I mean tremendous amount of aid given that many countries like El Salvador and Guatemala for instance they had a threshold income per capita above the the the one that entitled them to concessionary financing and therefore they got very little you can see El Salvador they only got 4% and 2% of GDP on average on for the first 10 years so so the tremendous indebtedness also this country some of them had peace agreements others had military interventions the issue is that how many of them relapsed and you know the the secretary generally in 2005 said that over half I did it first I did it using just my information from from the from the UN for each operation when there was a conflict recurrence and so forth and I came basically to the same amount even though two countries were different but I also use the the the the how do you I forgot the name of the UCDP prior index of conflict recurrence but basically in the two different very different ways of it's 57% and and you know it could be much more if for instance I change a some of the dates which I could justify then it would be even but but it doesn't matter the figure doesn't matter what matters is that these countries that start this multi-pronged transition what people call a state building or or or nation building a large part of them a very large part of them recur into conflict and then you see using other index and and it has nothing to do with growth I mean growth in some countries it's very high so the IMF and the World Bank congratulate themselves for instance of all these of these 21 countries you know even though there was no daytime some of them five of them had annual growth for the first decade between 7 and 11 percent so it has nothing to do with growth is the lack of inclusive policies and basically the the development as usual approach that I will discuss later what matters in terms of the different index is that some countries like Mozambique for instance that receive an enormous amount of that of aid more about 40 percent the first decade and about 20 percent the second decade you know there is still at the bottom 10 worst countries in the human development index so something is wrong I mean it's it's it's not possible to have such bad results so here I have other indices and we see that many of these countries are among the main money lenders and there are a some of the most corrupted countries so basically what I have been arguing for for a 25 years actually when I was I was economist in the in butros galis office at the at the beginning of the 90s but at the when when we started at the UN with El Salvador it was the first time that the UN had a multi-dimensional operation after it had negotiated the peace agreement and then it had to not only monitor but also facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement at that time at the beginning we thought oh well this is a very a country at low levels of development we should let the the UNDP and the World Bank lead in the economic area and then soon we realized that that's not possible because countries first to move from the economics of war to the economics of peace they have to carry out of course many of the development activities that were interrupted during the war but they also have to carry out all peace related activities that are very expensive I mean Keynes dictum after the the the Versailles treaty was that you know peace has economic consequences and in the in the aftermath of the Cold War the IMF policies of tight monetary and fiscal policies trumped over Keynes dictum so these countries were following a very today we heard of the neoliberal Washington consensus policies and all that so these countries were on the one hand having those policies and at the on the other hand they were trying to implement peace agreements that had fiscal and financial consequences and that created for instance nine months after the signature of the Salvadorian peace agreement the the agreement was close to collapse because the arms for land program could not start because of lack of resources so basically my argument is that these economics of peace or economic reconstruction or economic transition whatever you call it it's it's something intermediate it's it's a transitory phase it's an intermediate phase in which you have to be very careful to have conflict sensitive and inclusive policies to ensure that the the country does not relapse into conflict and therefore you cannot have you cannot expect to have optimal a first best economic policies from an economic point of view and this was highly rejected by the World Bank at the time we had and even and the IMF and there were lots of problems because of our work with the Salvador de Soto between the IMF and the UN and all that but since then we've been arguing that this to to have optimal first best policies was not even desirable not nor possible under these situations and this is something that finally Zelleck the the World Bank president accepted in 2008 saying yes we thought this was harder we thought that the the this was harder cases of development but now we realize that you know this is more than harder cases of development this is a totally different situation because unless you have this set of policies which are peace relate peace reinforcing then you are likely to go back and if you go back you know you cannot have development sustained sustainable development without peace which means that the peace or political objectives should always prevail over the economic or development objective when they took clash for resources which is normally the case so basically one one extra minute okay so basically this is my what I what I want to do but let me and I said all that but basically what I do in the paper I discuss the four different aspects of the transition and I think it's very important because for instance all these aspects the security the political the economic and the social social meaning a reintegration of these former combatants and other militant groups into society and into productive activities all these things have been discussed separately and it's been a big problem because for instance you know these US policies of peace through a military it hasn't worked you know the expeditionary economics and all that it's been extremely costly and it hasn't worked so basically what I argue in this paper is that after following the the when they adopted the Marshall plan there was a very wide-ranged debate on how reconstruction should take place so what I do in this paper I said well you know it's been 25 years and it hasn't worked so we have to change and this requires a comprehensive debate on how to move forward or how to make this new paradigm that it's not development as usual how do we make it operational I mean it the countries have to change but also the organizations that support them have to change so so basically I present a number of questions that on which we should have a debate and the debate should not based on these silos that you know the economies discuss with economies and military people with military people but there should be integration because all these aspects of the transition have been extremely interrelated and those inter the reverse causality that we economists call has been ignored in much of the not only the the analytical work but also the policy in these countries thank you very much