 Okay it's last call. If everybody could come in and take their seats please that would be great. Good evening and welcome to the Center for Strategic International Studies. I'm Andrew Schwartz and I work here in External Relations. When the summer began I remember telling one of our new interns that they shouldn't be upset if things slowed down a little bit in the summer, you know, because not much happens in the summer in D.C. or in the world, but needless to say events around the world have intervened to make their summer a much more productive one and today is certainly no exception. Thank you for joining us tonight for what was supposed to be a very timely discussion on Iraq, Syria, ISIS or IS or ISIL and the future of the Middle East which I'm sure now will expand to include some of today's breaking news stories. I'm also sorry to inform you that CNN's the least lab it won't be able to join us tonight because of the multitude of breaking news stories that are transpiring but the good news is we've got CSIS's Heather Conley and we're going to talk through some of these great issues and what's going on. I'd like to welcome Bob Schieffer who has been so amazing. We've done over 50 of these together and Bob is just, you know, our partner in this and we thank him so much and we thank the Schieffer School, the Schieffer College of Communication at TCU. I hope everybody's wearing their purple. If you come to future Schieffer series you have to wear purple because that's the color of the horned frogs. We're very appreciative of our colleagues down at TCU and of course none of these discussions would be possible without the generosity and support of the Stavros Niarchos Foundation whose commitment to CSIS is really unwavering and I'd like to welcome my friend Basili who's here from the Foundation and thank you Basili for all of your support and all of your help over the years. We also have the Iraqi ambassadors here tonight and I'd like to welcome him as well. With that ladies and gentlemen please join me in welcoming Bob Schieffer. Well thank you all and thank you for coming. Where do you see Iraqi ambassador? I'm sorry, I didn't see him come in. Oh okay, good. Welcome Mr. Ambassador. Glad to have you. Let's, I want to just introduce the panel and it's really good. Kathleen Hicks, Senior Vice President, the Kissinger Chair here at CSIS, Director of the International Security Program, Veteran Diplomat Scholar, all of the above and Dr. Hicks, glad to have you. Dr. Kimberly Kagan is the Founder and President of the Institute for the Study of War Affairs. She is a military historian. She has taught at the Academy at West Point at Yale Georgetown American, author of The Eye of Command and The Surge, Military History. She spent time in Afghanistan. How long were you there? 15 months. 15 months and also then of course down at this end, our good friend and who's filling in today because to see an end reporter, Elise couldn't, could not show up and that is Heather Connolly who is developer, I mean director of the Europe section here at CSIS. So we've got and is also a veteran diplomat and scholar. We have a lot of expertise here and so we'll just get right to it. This was supposed to be about ISIS. What is ISIS? What is happening in Iraq? But with all that's happening today, I thought we needed to broaden this number. The second thing that's happened today is the Israelis have, as they said they would have to do, have launched the ground invasion into Gaza. That began just as we were assembling here and then earlier today, I'm sure most of you have heard about the plane that was shot down over Ukraine. Heather, do you have any late information about the plane? Right now it's really focusing on the missile, the anti-aircraft missile that brought down the aircraft. Obviously all sides are denying who was responsible. There's a sense of reports and again this is right now, it's speculation we don't know but there seems to be pointing to last month the pro-Russian separatists had overtaken Ukraine in military installation where there actually were some photographs of these buk missiles that were there. So there is a sense that the separatists had possession of missiles that had the range to bring down that aircraft. Interestingly, some of these Facebook postings that the separatists had done have been taken down very quickly. It sort of led a trail. Again, this is speculation. Interestingly, right as the story was breaking that the aircraft had been shot down, President Putin and President Obama spoke. This was at President Putin's initiative to talk about the sanctions that were announced yesterday and so we understand they did speak a little bit or at least informed about the aircraft. Right now obviously we're trying to understand and our hearts go out to the families of this unbelievable tragedy. How many Americans are bored? We know there are substantial numbers of Europeans because the flight originated in Amsterdam. This is an unspeakable tragedy and it speaks to me of the consequences of when you allow a conflict and this is I think going to be the stories you talk about the Middle East. You allow a conflict to escalate to a point where it becomes out of control and the unintended consequences of what happened today. So this is going to be a major story. The investigators, we hope they can get on the ground. The plane fell in rebel control territory so this is going to be very difficult. But hopefully this is the wake-up call to have Putin really begin to reign in these separatists but quite frankly it's unclear whether he's able to at this point and that's really the question. Well to quite the contrary, as I understand it, he has now put out a statement and he said it is all the fault of Ukraine because it happened over their territory and he says it would not have happened had they not re-armed. Again, we've had four Ukrainian aircraft shot down to military transport planes, a jet fighter just this morning. It's unclear to me that the Ukrainian government actually controls its airspace so I think again both sides are going to argue that denying the responsibility but we'll let the investigators hopefully do their work but again between the sanctions and if Putin does not take clear steps to de-escalate this. I think we're now entering a very new phase. This is going to be concentrated urban warfare potentially in Donetsk and Luhansk and this is going to get more serious potentially. One thing I think both, well I think everybody is now reporting and quoting sources out of the Pentagon that the plane was indeed shot down. There was some question and speculation about that. Nobody has yet decided who fired the missile although there's every indication that it came from these rebels. There was one report being put out by the Ukraine government just as I was coming here that they had heard the rebel, somebody on the rebel side talking. They claimed to Russian intelligence and admitting they had shot it down but it seemed to be suggesting that they thought they had shot down a military plane that maybe this was, do you know anything about anything more? I heard exactly the same reporting and Heather's been tracking this more closely today but the same which is that they had some belief that it was a military aircraft. That's a little hard to believe given the difference in signature and the altitude but I think as Heather said it's too early to really speculate too much on exactly how this happened and how intentional it was in terms of it being an airliner as opposed to a military craft. It really does underline though the uncertainties when these things start rolling down the track and the next thing you know it's something totally out of control as we have seen happen in Israel during this latest episode. Let's talk a little bit about Israel because we now know that Israel has decided to launch the ground invasion. There were more than 100 rockets fired out of Gaza into Israel after the ceasefire ended this morning. Israel had said they had hoped and at one point had announced yesterday I believe it was that they had actually agreed to a ceasefire that would start sometime tomorrow but then that quickly fell apart and once this brief ceasefire this morning was over they were bombarded again by rockets from the Gaza and Netanyahu had said if there is more violence after this ceasefire we'll probably have to go in and so they have cleared the way. What do you see happening here? I think the key question for the United States and the broader region right now is how surgical is this ground invasion? How much early reports are there focused on these tunnels that are coming in under the fence line from Gaza and Israel? If it's limited to that and it's short duration that's one set of outcomes that I think the United States will continue to stress the importance of no civilian casualties where the administration has been very clear about its disappointment, horror, etc. about the killing of children in particular in Gaza and the need for Israel to be surgical. But the United States overall message is defense of Israel is critical and important. So I think if that's one scenario and I think it's the most plausible scenario what we don't know yet is if the Israeli ground invasion goes beyond that and starts to have a much more significant effect on the entire region's politics essentially which would not be helpful right now. But again the United States stand behind the defense of Israel and so there will have to be a conversation about what Israel believes it needs if it tries to go beyond that point. How much of that is necessitated by the immediate attacks from Hamas? The ones most recently. Heather do you think there's any chance we know that President Abbas apparently is in Cairo along with other people in the Palestinian Authority? Apparently there are some people from Hamas that are there. Do you think there is any chance that anything can come of those talks here? Well I think again the Egyptian role here has been critical, has traditionally been critical. We were hoping that that ceasefire, that initial ceasefire which the Israelis accepted and unfortunately how it was responded to by Hamas was more rockets into Israel than we can, they can see that now this is again according to reports Air Sea Land electricity has been cut off from Gaza City. This is a serious incursion. We don't know the length of time and so I think it would behoove the Palestinian Authority to certainly try to see where they can stop this quickly and get back to the table immediately. Again to Kat's point we'll have to see in fact how far these Israelis are going to take this and again world opinion here we know again from Europeans we're trying to see how they could offer their good offices and try to get a return back to the negotiating table but I think this is going to be yet another area where we're going to have to work very closely. Well let's bring this now to what we originally came here to talk about and that is a rock and what's going to happen there. Dr. Kagan, what do you, do you see any of all of what we've been talking about here impacting on what's happening in Iraq? I do see that there is a trend in our discussions about Russia and Ukraine and in our discussions about Iraq, Syria and indeed the wider region. There are states and non-state actors that are actively seeking to shift the borders, the state borders that have come into existence and grown over the course of the 20th century. What we're seeing inside of Iraq in the Islamic state of Iraq and Shem now self declared as an Islamic caliphate is a force, an organization, a military organization that has organized itself with into an army that has capabilities to fight hybrid warfare like a terrorist group like an army and shift between those two capabilities. Why is it doing this? What are its strategic objectives? Well, to break down the state system for at least six months and possibly longer than that, ISIS has been running a Twitter campaign, hashtag Sykes Pico. Why? Because in fact redrawing the boundaries of the Middle East is at the top of their strategic priority list because it is in redrawing those boundaries that it can create the kinds of political vacuums in which the Islamic caliphate can and may be able to flourish. So as we look at separatist movements sponsored perhaps by other states in Europe, as we look at what is happening in the Middle East, I think that we're looking at our fundamental world order changing and we need to have the strategic imagination and vision to project that ahead and understand what that means for each and every one of us. You agree with that, Dr. Hicks? No, I largely agree with that. I think the United States, the crux of the problem with the United States right now, the real paradox for Americans is there are domestic interests at home that are very important. We have an almost endless list of woes in the world we've just gone through today. It took us 15 minutes to get through, if you will, today. Every day there's more that loads on and it's more than we can bear as a single nation and we risk overstretch if we try to take on everything everywhere. The paradox is you can't then swing the other way and it takes this careful calibration of power in all its elements to include hard power to figure out where to act and how. I completely agree with Kim that if you leave the Middle East to its own devices at this point, you very much risk the growth of these ungoverned areas, of which there are some already, but the growth of them, you risk credibility issues. We certainly saw that with Syria and the continuation of the humanitarian crisis in Syria now overspilling into all the rest of the region with Iraq being most notable in terms of its immediate and profound effect, but not the last place where this could happen to be clear. Jordan is a significant worry for us. So I think for the United States the real challenge is how do you calibrate all this and that's where it becomes important to hone those tools that we have to not think every discussion about engaging in the region means that we're talking about a large-scale American ground incursion or ground force, and I for one think the administration on Iraq proper now at this point has been responsible to date in thinking through how to begin to engage the Iraqi government on the political side and on the security assistance side to develop a program way ahead. The problem is it doesn't end at the borders of Iraq and that's where we need a broader regional strategy and that's really the challenge today. What is our strategy? Where and what? That's a great question. I love Kim, your point, you mentioned about Sykes-Picot, so that colonial British-French agreement of how the Middle East would be carved up, it's ironic to me this is the 100th anniversary of the First World War and any of you have not read Professor Christopher Clark's Sleepwalkers book. In some ways are we just sleepwalking into it, we can watch as these events unfold but we feel like we can't influence them, we can't control them or maybe our influence and our role is counterproductive to what is going on and I think we're really ending this era, and this is what in some ways President Putin is telling us, he's basically refuted the post-Cold War order. He said that was the greatest catastrophe, that's not my order and we're seeing this regionally, this profound challenge, we're going back to balance of power where there's not a unipolar power of the United States, even the bipolar era of the Cold War were two powers and you could sort of isolate and contain these regional, now there are regional powers with a multitude of agendas and influence, non-state actors, we see in Ukraine hybrid warfare where people take off insignia, they're trying to have deniable plausibility, this isn't me, oh you're confused, you can't prove that, where's the United Nations Security Council and all of this, our institutions are failing because they're not well-equipped for this balance of power, regional dynamic and I would argue quite frankly, US diplomacy and a whole range of tools in the toolkit, we aren't geared for this, we, the unipolar will deal with this conflict, this is today's message, this is today's theme, but when you've got five, six regional crises that demand strong diplomacy, the demand, all the tools of state, we feel like we can't catch up, we can't engage in that, so I would say we need to start decentralizing and this would be my message to the White House, you can't have a small group of people, they can't manage all of these crises, you need to empower your talented diplomats and bring in, the private sector has a piece of this, the non-governmental, the civil society and we have to be much smarter, much more adept at these regional challenges and right now I feel like we're clumsy, we're catching up, we're reactive and that is where it feels like, where's the US, where's the strategy, we're playing catch-up. Well it does what certainly appears so, I mean as we watch, but I think you bring up a very interesting point here and that is, is there too much of the power, too much of the decision-making now centered in the White House and should some of that be delegated out into the bureaucracy? I mean should the State Department be playing a bigger role here than it's playing? Should the Defense Department be playing a bigger role? Well I think when we feel like things are out of control, it's a human instinct to sort of grab it and say I'm going to control it, I'm going to do message control, it's going to be how I want it and I think what we're seeing again, this is social media, when I'm watching today's events in Ukraine, I'm getting Twitter feeds and this is, they're laughing government response, they are, which is going too far ahead of it. How are we in this dynamic information age able to get messages out and so the instinct is well I'm going to control it so I'm going to have a few people control that message and some ways you have to let go and you have to say look, we have very talented diplomats that are in the field, we have a lot of instruments of influence and power, we've got to let go and allow them to engage and not be afraid, they may make mistakes, but right now we're trying to control it and constrict it and we're not able, I think, to take opportunities of when situations begin to evolve in the regions, we can nip them early and not have them go into full progress. What should our strategy be, Kim? I really think that the United States has vital national security interests in the Middle East that include actually the preservation of states in the Middle East. We haven't really gotten or we haven't really had to say that for an awfully long time, but it is a core interest of the United States to maintain the state system as it is. It suits us, this world order suits us. It is changing, however, in ways that are not conducive to U.S. national interests. I believe that the United States is struggling actually not only to control a message, but to control the environment around it, or to try to shield itself from having to make decisions in an environment that is rapidly changing. In truth, the environment will continue to change rapidly and will deteriorate without U.S. leadership. What does the United States actually need to do? Well, for one thing, the United States actually does have to decide that it is a problem for there to be an Islamic state in the Middle East. We probably ought to have decided that back in 2012 or 2013, but that doesn't matter. We cannot actually hit the strategic pause button and then the strategic rewind button and go back and face those decisions. What do we do now? Well, first, we do have many instruments of power that need to be brought to bear. They are diplomatic, they are military, and they also include engagement not only with the government of Iraq, which is, of course, important, but with the tribes and the people of Iraq, and with the moderate opposition inside of Syria, which is the only bulwark that now exists between ISIS and really having an Islamic state that goes, frankly, from almost Baghdad, all the way over to, well, today, actually ISIS took over an oil field near Palmira in Homs province, and I think that they mean to go down to Jordan and I think that they mean to attack Saudi Arabia, okay? That is the kind of perspective that we need, and we still have a chance to nip in the bud those further attacks, those further assaults on the state system that are coming. So you paint a very dangerous situation. Well, let me just add, I just think it's important without in any way defending the actions of the United States and its foreign policy overall to date, there is a lot of blame to go around on the Middle East, and so I think that's worth saying, and thus the solution, obviously, is not a U.S. solution, it can't be. Again, we don't have the resources, but more importantly probably, we don't have the tools, and Heather's point about the regionalization of foreign policy, I agree with that fundamentally, but I think the key piece of that is what's going on in different regions varies, and so in a place like Asia where our traditional tool set, hard power, economic, statecraft, state-based ways of dealing with issues is still very applicable, the Middle East is a whole other ball game. So it's important to acknowledge that when it comes to Iraq, Iraq itself bears a lot of responsibility, but so do the Gulf States, Turkey, the U.S., Russia, Iran, I could go on, and of course the terrorists themselves, ISIL, ISIS, the Islamic State itself, and Syria. So there are a lot of parties that have to be brought to the table here to make a good solution and way forward. I think it was a positive sign that the U.S. met today with the Iranians. I don't know if that progressed in any way, but the fact that there was at least a conversation acknowledges the reality that it's not just Iran, but there are a lot of parties that have to be brought to the table. But fundamental to that, and where I agree with these two, is U.S. leadership is critical to that. It is unfortunate for many Americans that it's required, but we have to acknowledge that it's required, even if there are limits to what we can do with it alone. Did the three of you agree that an Islamist state such as you're describing, ruled over by ISIS in that particular place where it is between Baghdad and Damascus? Does that pose a direct threat to the U.S. national security? I would say so, certainly over the intermediate term. One of the things that the Islamic State is actively doing is recruiting English speakers from the United States, from Canada, from Australia, and other places in the world. I think that what we have seen develop, especially since January of 2014, when the Islamic State actually took over the city of Raqqa in Syria in a way that was uncontested, is the creation of a model sanctuary that has an element of its military power, an element of its civic power, and an element of its religious authority that it is trying to test. Raqqa is a center, a hub to which the Islamic State has been recruiting foreign fighters from around the world, has explicitly asked them to immigrate to there, and the continued publication of magazines in English aimed at an English language audience that publications such as one recently released called Dabik, which is about the place where Armageddon will come between Iraq and Syria. I certainly think that we might want to take them seriously a bit in their intention actually to bring a conflict that will harm directly U.S. national security interests, and we'll do so in part by recruiting English speakers and Americans for future conflict. Heather, what do we do about it? I could not agree more, and the foreign fighter question is absolutely paramount. We're seeing where European foreign fighters are there learning, they are returning back to the communities. This is not going to be contained even though to many Americans, this is far away and the Middle East, and if they're just killing one another, what does it have to do with us? We don't need to be involved in it. This will come home to us. I think Eric Holder and others have been very explicit in that. That is the challenge. Bob, your question of what we do about it, this is where we're running out of options I think very, very quickly, and how do you contain it? When we have ISIS taking over major refineries, they're going to have the economic tools. When they seek funding, it's no longer now for us stopping the banks and tears and fines and they just rob the banks. They take over the banks. How do you stop this? And again, to Kat's point, regionally we have states in the region working opposite sides of this problem. It's going to be incredibly difficult. This is where it's going to take an enormous amount of American time and attention when other issues in the world are getting our attention, Afghanistan, Asia, Ukraine. Nigeria, the Sahel, we can keep going on here, and focus and try to bring a coalition together to try to prevent work with moderate Sunnis that do not want to be under ISIS and try in some ways, like the awakening that we did many to work locally. They don't want this, but it was so much better than obviously what they perceived that was coming from Baghdad, which is such an extraordinary statement. We have to get involved, but we have to fundamentally believe that America has a positive role to play here. And I think in some ways in our own mind we don't think we have a positive role to play because of Iraq, because of our experience in 2003. Do you think there's a perception in that part of the world that we are somehow stepping back, that we are withdrawing? Oh, there is absolutely a perception, particularly I would say in the Gulf, I think in the Levant. Well, Syrians I think would certainly tell you that they're unhappy with America's response. I think the Jordanians, we work very hard. And the Lebanese and certainly the Israelis work very hard to try to reassure, but it is a message that is failing. You know, the Syrian crisis, if the de facto US policy was to contain the Syria crisis, that has failed. And that was essentially at least the unspoken strategy. So the pieces, putting the pieces back together again involves everything that Heather just mentioned on the Iraqi side, US Iraqi side. It involves fundamentally the governance of Iraq. At its core it's about strengthening the capability of Iraq to govern itself in a way that is pluralistic and is inclusive to the point where you can let the security institutions be respected and vested in the future of the country. But it's also about that training and equipping on the Syrian side because you've got to get an end to the Syrian crisis. And at this point I think the only realistic near-term end is just a ceasefire that allows some amount of humanitarian assistance to get in. I think the goals have to be very modest, but we have to put some effort there. The President's indicated we're going to put effort there, but we need to start seeing those results. And what happens if the Iraqi government, and I hope to ask the... Well, let me just ask the ambassador right now. Mr. Ambassador. Absolutely, we have the authority here. You're here. What's the latest news from Iraq? Is there a chance that this government can do the kinds of things that the US government is urging right now, and that is to be a more inclusive government? And where do you think all that is right now? Thank you very much Bob for giving me the opportunity. Well, we recently had the election. 60% of the people participated. In worse areas of unbarred 40% participated, and it was considered as a fair election by all standards. However, the situation has changed on the ground. What we have recently was the speaker of the parliament, which was a major handle, or hurdle, which was passed. We anticipate by tomorrow a nominee for the presidency will be within the Kurdish bloc, and within four weeks or so after that the premiership. So where previously it took six months and then nine months, now it looks like within six weeks or so. So in a way there's a great deal of momentum being created by all the parties for the formation of the government. As to how inclusive it will be, I think that's for time to tell. The politics is not clean, it's not quick, and certainly it's zero sum. That has to change, and that's where everybody is trying to work on. Well, what about the threat that ISIS is posing right now? The integrity of the state is in question. That's how the threat we're taking it. We're not looking at it likely. The ramification of that on Jordan and Saudi Arabia is a... I mean, you called it intermediate. I will say sooner than intermediate. I will say it's a short-term situation. We're looking at changing the map of the region within 18 to two years. That's how soon it is. Yes, I would agree with that. I actually think that as we take a look... Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. As we take a look at the situation in Iraq and on the ground, what I deeply hope is that the government that is created will actually be capable of governing Iraq. I worry, and I worry very much because the government of Iraq has been losing control of parts of Iraq frankly since about October of last year when we first saw the Islamic State actually enter into Mosul and silence journalists by assassinating them so that the Western media and the local media did not really have full situational awareness of what was going on. The reason I bring this up is that I think that we as Americans do want to go back to tools of state in a region where indeed we hope tools of state will work. But we may be in a situation where the United States needs to find ways to engage social leaders, tribal leaders, local communities in order to stop the spread of ISIS and create the conditions in which over the longer term a government of Iraq should it be inclusive and should it be able to regain territory can actually govern. I don't think though that Americans have fully digested the idea that as soon as we get a government of Iraq and I hope it will indeed be soon we do not actually get change on the ground. The drivers of change on the ground right now are first of all ISIS and we have to consider them a player. I do not think they wish to negotiate. I think that they wish to fight because it is critical to their image and to their ability to continue the expansion of the Islamic State. We have players on the ground that include Iraqi Shia militias that have returned from Syria. We have Iranian forces on the ground. We have Russian pilots and Russian equipment. We definitely have a situation that is no longer in the box of a government. Kathleen, what do you think that Iraq will stay Iraq as we know it today or will it eventually break into three sort of separate places? One thing I have learned from long government services whatever answer I give you I will be wrong. So I choose not to answer that directly. I will say the risk is significant. I think well stated by the ambassador and Kim we are at significant risk of Iraq falling into a partitioned set of actors. We obviously have that I think already with the Kurds and I think this is where the United States has to do its best to try to build back the state for all the reasons that have been laid out but I think it is possible that will not succeed and we need to be thinking now about how you deal with the region. Again, it is not just Iraq. This is about a minimum Syria Iraq but well beyond that. You need to be thinking about it in that way and the borders may be more fluid than one would like. What do you think? I fear that we are already entering almost a fragmentary position now which already speaks to the severity of what is going on and I think you are already seeing the Kurdish regional government taking advantage of this fragmentation. We have to understand that that has very important implications for Turkey which is for a European and NATO watcher. I watch very closely any instability in Turkey because that has direct implications for NATO and for the United States. I grow increasingly concerned if both for Syria and Iraq where the oil wealth is held is where the economic power and the longevity comes in here and that is so distressing about as we are seeing these gains in the economic power of both Iraq and Syria. So it is deeply troubling. I hope we are not at that tipping point where things begin to slide to a point where it is very difficult and I certainly hope that the U.S. power and influence working with the region can help do this but to Katz's point on Syria we cannot wait three years to do this. Facts on the ground change so much. This is the problem with our delay and our waiting and our hesitation to support those moderates and the Syrian opposition that we could have helped and I fear almost now it is too late. We waited too long and the strategic hesitancy is really a problem. You do believe that had we helped that moderate opposition it might have made a difference here. Well we know by not helping them what has happened so that we can conclude. It may not have been it may not have made an enormous difference but I would have felt as if we would have tried to give this a chance and to see President Assad today you know the film of him deal the third time around what happened to Mr. Assad must go. So we have to be very careful with our rhetoric if our instruments are not there to help support our rhetoric. You feel that way. I do actually feel that the United States could have made a difference in the crisis in Syria really and through last summer through August 2013 by supporting the moderate opposition. I would actually call your attention in particular to the moment at the end of 2012 in the beginning of 2013 when the Syrian regime had actually run out of manpower and was completely dependent on aerial resupply for sustaining its forces. The reason I bring this up is that at that moment of weakness I do think that a change in US policy toward the Syrian moderate opposition would have and could have made a huge military difference. The lesson I draw from this as a military historian looking now at Iraq and Syria is that we need to understand that circumstances on the ground will create windows of opportunity that will go away. If in fact we see ISIS consolidating its state further on the ground through military gains in Iraq, we will have much, much, much more to do in order to displace it. And it just brings home to me the urgency not of taking drastic military action of sending hundreds of thousands of troops to Iraq or tens of thousands of troops to Iraq. But military situations are delicate and action using military and diplomatic instruments can make a change only at certain times. We're in one of those periods and when ISIS actually consolidates we will have lost an opportunity and it will have gained one on us in the way that the Syrian regime was able to gain an opportunity created by delay to replenish its forces, to rely on Iran and Hezbollah, to reinforce, to reconfigure its command and control structure and actually to go not on the offensive in a way that definitively and decisively defeated the opposition but that was a major step change in its capabilities over the span of six months. How does all this relate to the talks with Iran on trying to rain in their nuclear capabilities? Which influences what? It's all interconnected. U.S.-Russia policy is heavily influenced by the desire to have a common approach to Iran, has been heavily influenced by that. That certainly has affected, I think, and I'm not putting judgment on this, but it certainly affects how the U.S. has approached Russia to be Syria over the past several years. And so I guess the way I would say it is that the highest priority, if you're just looking at actions, it appears that the highest priority for the United States in its Middle East policy really has been to get a negotiated way ahead on Iranian nuclear capability. And for that goal, other goals were tempered, and certainly Syria, I think, is one of those where the U.S. chose not to push Russia as hard as it might otherwise because of Iran. I think going forward, let me first say on Syria, just I want to comment on the same point that Heather and Kim commented on, I think I would just frame this going forward as chances are low, risks are there, but as I think they both well said, we've seen the outcome of the other approach and we need to invest ourselves a little bit in a different kind of outcome. And as I said, I think if we keep the goals modest, which are still great, which is to get ourselves to a ceasefire, to get some form of governance back into Syria, some ability for the international community to provide aid, some ability to get the moderates strengthened, a little bit of battlefield capability for them to help to persuade Assad to the table. That may be all we can do, but that alone is better than where we are today and will help. On Iran, Iran's a key piece of that outcome. It's a key piece of the outcome on Iraq, and of course we don't want Iran to have nuclear weapons, so we want to continue on the path with Iran itself, with Russia and other actors, the Gulf in particular, to get the Iranians to be a responsible actor to the extent that we can inside the region. Let's go to the audience here. Here's one right here. Tell us who you are, please. Hi, my name is Basam. I'm a former Syrian diplomat. I just want to talk about ISIS. I think the media here, they over exaggerate of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In a sense, in Iraq, what's going on is Sunni revolution and Taiteshiyat control, and ISIS is a small part of the big revolution, big Sunni revolution and Taitemaki. And when you talk with any leader of the tribes who are well connected to the U.S. government, they will tell you that we are willing and will fight ISIS when we have our rights back from the government, political reconciliation. When you talk about Syria, six weeks before the resort fallen into ISIS, the group of Syrian, Free Syrian Army, they met American officials, and they gave them what they need in order to cut the roots of that ISIS used between Iraq and Syria, and Americans said no. And the ISIS, when it went to the resort, they spent for a week, every day, one million dollars to give free food for the people, so they didn't go by force. They went by money, because people, they don't think. My point is that the ISIS in Syria doesn't have the social network that protected, but at the same time, there's no other side to support the moderate. In Iraq, it's the opposite side. The Sunni are majority. ISIS taking the lead in the media by Twitter, by social media, whatever. And the people are, both people are looking for U.S. to get support. Thank you very much. I throw that to Kim. I think that as a framing issue, we need to understand that ISIS is a fragment of the global al-Qaeda movement, which has been in a struggle, a fitna, as we have seen, essentially, two franchises of al-Qaeda, the former al-Qaeda in Iraq, now we flagged as ISIS, now we flagged as the Islamic Caliphate, and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria compete, not only militarily inside of Syria, but compete with one another about which vision of Islamic revolution is actually the correct vision. So what we are watching here is a competition between ISIS of an heir to Zarkali, thinking that, in fact, the right way to create an Islamic state is by force and by conquest, by accelerating sectarian war, and by creating political structures soonest, whereas you have in Jabhat al-Nusra a very different idea, it's a wider idea, that in fact we need to have an approach that is slower, that waits for the people to accept the Islamic revolution, and that will become the groundwork of the global insurgency that is al-Qaeda. As a result, when we look at groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, we actually see that they are better embedded into the social structure and social fabric of Syria, whether we are looking in Aleppo, for example, is a great example, or whether we are looking in western Syria, they embed themselves in existing social structures, they work through existing governing bodies that they then fund, that they then appoint their people to, and it is a much more gradual and insidious revolution. I think we need to be aware that we have these two different visions of revolution going on, and frankly both now have had some success, and so one of the most dangerous outcomes that I see is that we can find ourselves in a situation whereby we defeat ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra comes in, or we see Jabhat al-Nusra lose its capacity and ISIS comes up, or we see that we actually see them violently competing to harm the United States, western powers, and lay the mantle of global leadership before them. That's a dangerous situation, but I'm afraid it's one that we have to recognize and cope with. All right, how about right here? Ed Berger, let me indulge in a bit of heresy. We've toppled, we have directly or indirectly had a hand in toppling a number of leaders over the last several years. One can argue that in fact in each case, that has led to a vacuum of power in the sense of informing our judgments in the future. Should we reconsider this issue of leaving the dust pits in place for the purpose of avoiding the vacuum of power? That's a very interesting question. Who would like to answer it? I'll start. I mean, there's no winning on that one. I'll start. I think every country situation is its own context, so I don't think there's an answer to that that is global. What I would say is the United States has always maintained however articulated differently from administration to administration as a national interest, some form of values. For some administrations it's a very activist approach, let's just say in terms of spreading democracy or spreading universal values, and in some it's more muted, but it's there and it's part of who we are as a nation and it's part of what makes us great, is that we have a fundamental belief about human rights and rule of law and the role of the individual in society. I don't think the United States of America should give that up. Now, the question is how do you weigh that in a specific context against let's just call it generally security concerns with regard to how the United States interacts in a region? And I think that's something that is being struggled with, it's been struggled with in every administration I can think of. I think Egypt probably is the clearest example where we have struggled with that most recently, which resulted in my opinion in a pretty muddled way ahead, which is we don't quite know. We've essentially said security matters the most, but we're going to talk about the human rights piece, but we're not quite sure which of these. But I would say generally speaking, I don't agree in this administration, the United States has been a party to toppling governments. We certainly haven't been activists on that role, with the exception perhaps of support in Libya. But I do think it's fair to say that we work in each of these cases in the United States. We've been working on how do you exactly balance these interests that are fundamental when they compete, and my view is security typically has been winning out. Right over here. Nick Farmer. Could the panel speak to how Putin sees Russia's interest in this area and whether there's any likelihood that Russia would like to cooperate with the U.S. or whether in fact because of its oil and gas interests and others, it would like to see the U.S. continually bogged down with the nuclear issue in Iran, with Syria, with Hezbollah, with Hamas, and so forth. Very good question. Heather, why don't you? Thank you. Well, we need to take Vladimir Putin at his word, and he's been messaging to us that his vision for Russia and the neighborhood is what he calls Novorossiya, new Russia. But the concept is not new. It's actually 15th century Russia that extends Ukraine, Moldova. Some could even argue, you know, back up to the Baltic states and elsewhere. This gets back to, I think, again, Putin's profound refutation of the post-Cold War settlement, if you will. And he would like to recreate a Eurasia Union. It's not a union like we think of the European Union of independent states, but they're ceding their sovereignty to a greater power. This is a union where Russia controls the Union and the countries that accede to it would support Russian objectives and aspirations. What is existential to President Putin and his regime is that he cannot have a different model on his border. So he cannot have a Ukraine that embraces the West, whether that's trade and his greatest fear, which would be his immediate neighbors, the former Soviet states, joining NATO. So he must prevent this alternative model, because his model, and this has been, you know, as we've been all watching events in Ukraine, I think we have underappreciated the domestic consolidation that Putin has in his own country. We have not seen the control of media and the crackdown on opposition since some of the deepest days of the Cold War. This is truly a regime that is now taking complete control of society. And now he was able to do that using very powerful nationalistic themes, and that was really... So he could not lose Ukraine, and when Ukraine decided, when Yanukovych fled the former president, and Ukraine was going to join the West, was going to sign on to this trade agreement with the European Union, it was a complete failure of his own policy of making sure preventing the states from joining the West. So how do you avoid a strategic loss? You try to take a tactical victory, and the tactical victory was Crimea. It happened rapidly. There was no resistance to it, and quite frankly it all shocked us. I think it even shocked some of Putin's closest advisors that he actually went so far to annex it. I always use the word Anschluss, because I want that historical resonance that this was... This is exactly for the same purpose, right? The protection of ethnic Russians wherever they live. Well, that's a powerful message to Estonia and Latvia that have 35, 40% ethnic Russian populations within their countries. So he got Crimea, and that was a success in his view, and his popularity increased dramatically, and even though sanctions and the markets didn't like it, this was okay, and everyone's very popular. But then he took a tactical misstep, supporting these pro-Russian separatists. He created a problem that did not exist in Eastern Ukraine. Yes, there was great sympathy for Russia, but they didn't want to separate from themselves. They want to be part of Ukraine, but they do want to have a stronger Russian identity. This conflict began by support of these separatists, and now this thing has spun out of everyone's control, and we see what happens today. I predict, and I hope I'm really wrong, I predict a prolonged period of instability in this region. We are seeing asymmetrical and hybrid warfare that should concern us greatly. The cyber warfare, the information warfare, we have not seen this type for a very long time, and we don't have a very good response to it. Mr. Putin has changed the entire security environment in that region. It has reawoken NATO. NATO is going to take a more robust role, and the U.S. is going to be a part of that. So while we're dealing with extraordinary events in the Middle East, we cannot lose sight of this instability. This isn't going away. I wish it was, but it's not, and we're going to have to be very strong and purposeful in dealing, because Mr. Putin's not going anywhere either on oil and gas, and I don't know what today's the price of oil and gas is today. It was probably 115. He can sustain himself for quite a long time. This regime can sustain. So I'm extremely concerned. This is, again, getting back to Sykes-Picot. This is saying this is not, I don't accept the system that has been forced upon me. I'm going to change it, and we can either allow him to do that or fight for the system, and that's going to take a lot of resolve. Would you like to add anything? No, I think that's just right. I agree. Folks, I think we've probably come to the end here, and it's always good when we still have people wanting to ask questions when we're at the end. So we've managed to hold your interest this far. I want to thank this extraordinary panel that we had today, and thank you all for coming.