 We're still looking at cell on proper names and today I want to begin by going over the points about informative identities and the cluster theory that we were looking at last time so on Cells kind of picture and this is quite plausible You see why he says this that if you've got a name in your vocabulary you understand this name Then what's fixing the reference to the name is typically not what you think But the cluster of descriptions associated with that name by the community So you're not quite in charge of the world You're using the name the same way everyone else uses it and that's obviously so for names of people in in public life for people that you talk about from a The news oh my god Maybe I shouldn't Of course it does these things don't just happen. Let's take it from the top. So this is theory of meaning We're going to do the cell thing and We're talking about how and We're talking about how informative identities have to do with what the individuals take on the objects is and On the other hand the reference of a name on cells picture is getting fixed by the community I mean it's certainly possible that You could associate the same descriptions with two names, but wonder whether the community does That's to say if you take a remark like Tully is Cicero actually, I never heard of Tully and Cicero outside the context of Philosophy examples, I don't wish to seem like some barbarian, but there you go. That's the truth. And If you ask me what I associate with the name Tully, it's some Greek And if you ask me what I associate with the name Cicero, it's Some Greek So I associate I'm sorry to have to tell you this I associate the same descriptions with both of them Yeah, but still in all I can wonder Well, maybe the people who know about these things don't associate the same descriptions of both of them So it's certainly not true that I'd say that's an uninformative identity that Tully is Cicero Really and who you want to say is I know too little about it for that to be either informative or uninformative There's another kind of example that Kripke introduced where You could have just one name There's really only just one name here are Being used by the community and there's a single collection of descriptions associated with that name by the community But you might wonder is that really the same person is that just one person here? So just think for a moment how that might be possible You got a single name like Bill Clinton or something like that You got a single cluster of descriptions associated with it in the community It's the same kind of storm of gossip and use that follows Bill or whatever he goes But you might wonder is it really one person you might think it's not true that it's just one person here I think for example, if you were doing the some political history you might say I Know about the movie star Ronald Reagan And I know about the president Ronald Reagan But it can't be one in the same person. I mean this isn't Renee song citilly. How could there be two people who combined these movie acting abilities and these Presidential capacities in the one frame. I mean in the community is common knowledge There is one in the same person, but you might say How could that be the great movie star can't be the same person as a person who defeated the evil Empire So when you say Reagan starred in that Western and when you say Reagan was president in 1981 You just must be talking about two different people That's not all together irrational You know, that's a question that's caught to many people across the world. How could that have happened? Right, so when you say here's the movie actor and here's the decisive president How could it be one in the same person? It could be not just Informative it could be a bombshell to be told that really is one in the same person right So even although it's a single name with a single cluster of descriptions associated with it circulating in the community When you are using that name it could be informative to you to be told that Reagan the movie actor is Reagan the Politician it could be informative to you to be told is one in the same person So you can't just read off Informativeness or uninformativeness from whether it's a single cluster of descriptions circulating in the community Yeah I mean once you see how this kind of example works is it playing how this kind of example works You could you can start generating more I suppose you think further about the history of California You're thinking about Reagan and you think well what fixes reference will fix his reference for these two signs is the same for both But a single thoughtful individual might find the identity informative and then you think well, what about Schwarzenegger? How could that have happened? It can't be the same person That that couldn't really happen But so it's going to be on informative for you, but I don't know maybe this is going too far into political theory or Californian political theory Okay So there's a kind of disconnect between the way the reference of the name is being fixed and what's informative or uninformative for you so I Think when you bear this kind of point in mind if you look carefully at what Cyril is saying in that article about Informativeness and uninformativeness really none of it actually seems to work and here is a Cereal or an informativeness he says consider your original identity Turley is Cicero a Statement made using this sentence would I suggest the analytic for most people The same descriptive presuppositions are associated with the name But it's right to say that for most people if assuming I'm typical the same descriptive presuppositions Associated with the name because we all associate something very minimal with it like some Greek But that doesn't mean we regard this as trivial or analytic or a priori. Well, that must definitely be true I mean, otherwise all the names of Greek Figures that you've dimly heard you regard all those identities as analytic. That can't be right Yeah So the seller is assuming that the identity is Uninformative when the speaker associates the same descriptions with the two uses of the name That would only work you can see why he says that but that would only work if it was Which descriptions you associate with the name that's fixing reference But the whole point of a social theory is that is not what you think about the reference of the name that matters It's what's going on in the community from which the language comes This is socially determined cluster of descriptions that is fixing the reference so two terms could have two Differently socially different socially determined clusters associated with them like Tully and Cicero Maybe the Greek scholars all think they're very different and maybe nowadays it's thought actually they were different people But I as an individual might be associating the same descriptions with the two names Okay, so that's just to walk through some of the points that we were talking about last time about How difficult it is to have both the socially determined character of reference fixing and An account of meaning that's going to explain informativeness versus on the formative in Informativeness versus uninformativeness of identity that play this day Other seats right over here. Yep No, yeah, the Reagan is Reagan kind of thing is not settle, right Right, I'm putting that forward as a point about how difficult life is for cell So I'm putting this forward as a criticism of cell really because How should I put this okay, so you've got the individual here. This is how I think of it That's what matters. Well, drop here is the individual Here is the cluster of descriptions associated with the name in the community. Yeah So that's the cluster associated with the name in the community The individual tries to tap into that cluster of descriptions tries to take on board as much as they can Um, so what do you say about when an identity is uninformative? Well, there are two things you could say one is is uninformative that a is B If I associate the same descriptions with a is with B Well, that's one possibility That would be the wrong answer What about that you see that that's first of all that's one possible answer if you've got this fragus puzzle When is in his is an identity uninformative? Let me take this lonely When is an identity informative or uninformative, right? So I raise that question about this a is B That's okay Yeah, happy with that Here is one answer is Uninformative for me if I associate the same descriptions with a as I do with B right That must be the wrong answer Because of what are we saying about tully and Cicero? I associate the same descriptions with tully as I do with Cicero some Greek But I don't regard that at all as meaning that the identity is uninformative Yeah, I'm no guy deal whether it's true or not the tully Cicero. I mean someone I mean I read it in the books, but That's informative Yeah, that's okay So, what are you going to do? Well, you could say The identity is uninformative if it's the same cluster of descriptions Fixing the reference of a as fixes the reference of B but that's The Reagan is Reagan example those two uses of the name Reagan are both associated with the same cluster of descriptions in the community Out there in the real world Political commentators and journalists and so on don't make a distinction They just use the name Reagan Indifferently for the movie actor or the politician Yeah, I mean for any of us with richer complex lives Our names have got this rich collection of descriptions associated with them But that identity Reagan is Reagan can be informative for an individual Even though it is same cluster of descriptions fixing the reference in the community So how are you going to explain when I did when an identity is Uninformative you can't do it. There aren't any pieces here that would let you explain that It's a really hard question Yeah Yeah, you could say the Greek call well in that case if you make it like that then There probably aren't any definite descriptions I associate with Tully and with Cicero. I mean, I don't Suggest uniqueness, right? And I don't think I know anything that would be unique about them Maybe they weren't even called Tully or Cicero. You see what I mean? Maybe the Greeks called them something quite different You know, I don't wish to completely destroy my credibility here, but I have no idea Frankly what the Greeks called them or that those names were invented in the 19th century or something Yeah, so in that case I'd have to say well, I associate with Tully zero definite descriptions I'm a Cicero zero definite descriptions. So that's the same Doesn't make it uninformative that Tully a Cicero Yeah, or even if there is something, you know One the battle of Xerxes Then Even if I got one definite description I associate with each that's not going to mean I regard the identity as Informative if it's the same if it's different definite descriptions Because these might be just two straight things that everybody who knows anything Our ancient Greece knows that it's actually one in the same person. These are just notational variants these two names There is really when you trace it back. There's different ways of spelling the same thing. That could be it could really be a Trivial thing that Tully a Cicero For all for all you can tell looking at what descriptions I associate with the name Yeah If it's an a priori truth It's that's right. If it's an a priori truth, it doesn't really depend which individual it is yeah, but my point is Informativeness seems to it is known if it's noble a priori Knowledge is a characteristic of an individual It's the individual that knows or not so in that sense. It's a property of individuals Whether because you are you're talking about whether an individual can know this a priori Yeah, and my point here is that whether an individual can know this a priori is not Determined by what's going on in the society at large Because what's going on in the society at large is one thing and what's going on in my head is another But for knowledge what's going on in my head. It seems to be very important well I'm sure sir would say it doesn't make it like The trouble is sir is trying to explain Freg is puzzle of our informative versus uninformative identities And you know when you look at the as you go through the the article if you you also look quite carefully But you will find various remarks there about How this approach in terms of socially determined clusters of descriptions fixing reference allows you to Explain which identities are informative and which identities are uninformative and my point is it doesn't Because looking at the level of the whole socially determined cluster Means that well in the case of Reagan or Schwarzenegger You've got one socially determined cluster fixing reference, but the identity could be informative Yeah And if you look at the level of the individual What's going on with things like telly a Cicero then the person associating the same descriptions with the two names Doesn't make the identity informative. I'm sorry uninformative Yes So he doesn't have enough pieces there to explain the distinction between Uninformative and uninformative identities. It was all right so long as you thought There's a we're just thinking in terms of the language of a single individual and the descriptions associated with a name By that individual as fixing reference Then you could say if I associate the same descriptions with two net with two uses of a name Then it must be the same thing and otherwise the identity is uninformative Yeah, at one level that works just fine that picture, but once you go social You really are caught Yeah, I wouldn't want to deny I mean it does go back to the question because I was saying well knowledge is something the individual has Yeah, but when people are talking about Scientific developments. Well, we now know that the Higgs boson exists and you're not talking about the knowledge any one individual has They are talking about the knowledge of the community as a whole has Yeah, so something like that then you might be indeed be able to say Well, we know this or we know that And talk about knowledge is something that the collective has We now know that Tully is Cicero or a Tully was not Cicero Yeah And the thing is that was not how Frega stated it. Yeah Frega's problem was about the knowledge an individual has It hadn't occurred to me I'd actually to think of working through these puzzles about informativeness and uninformativeness at the level of the community It's a little bit difficult to say what would be a priori at the level of the community. I mean For most people was it a hard one discovery that this Successful politician was indeed the movie actor, you know where most people like gas tune that was pointed out or Wasn't pretty generally known the whole time. They're going to be difficult questions. Yeah with Tully a Cicero Was the community of ancient historians? I'm enthralled by the discovery that Tully is Cicero or was it something that everybody has known since work on ancient Greece began Yeah, it's going to be a little bit difficult to know how these distinctions work out at the level of a community But anyway, Frega's puzzle was not pitched at the level of community knowledge Frega's puzzle was pitched at the level of the knowledge an individual has is this a priori or not? But it's worth thinking through Oh Hey, you see her. Yeah. Yeah That's right. That's right I mean if I'm going to use a name like Bill Clinton and tell you all kinds of scandalous stories about Bill Clinton If at the end of the day it suddenly turned out I was using Bill Clinton as a name for my next door neighbor I could I could still be sued It really wouldn't help I don't have that right you just associate any description. I like with the name That's right. You do your best That's right. That's what you're trying to do. You're trying to take on board as much of this as you reasonably can That's right Yeah, that's right. Well, I mean if you're going to be responsible in your use of language That's what I mean about that Bill Clinton example I just gave you're going to be responsible in your use of language and that is a matter of Trying to tap into what's going on socially but In a way the question about informativeness or an uninformativeness comes up after you've done that After you've acquired a mastery of the name Which identities are going to be informative and which are going to be uninformative? But it's important to think about the mechanics of the process you're describing. Okay Okay, well for just a minute now I want to kind of pan back and look at the kind of framework in which we're thinking about language here So this is a really important idea that for the moment is guiding everything we do That knowing the meaning of a statement is knowing what has to be the case for it to be true I'm genuinely puzzled as to how much planar I can make that and I really don't know if that seems immediately plausible as it stands or if it seems kind of like a baffling remark and you think why did he say that? Can you put your hand up if that seems reasonable enough? Put your hand up if that seems kind of baffling Yeah, I mean, so can you put your hand up if that seems kind of baffling knowing the meaning of a statement is knowing What has to be the case for it to be true? It may be a mark of great intelligence to find it baffling. I'm not It's not you're not getting something. Yeah Okay, I'm very glad that some many of you find this intuitive enough Well, I gave this example you take some statement. You don't know the meaning of at all Lanage, well, let's suppose Lanage a blanche And then I tell you What it takes for that to be true? That would be true just in case snow is white Now do you understand that remark? That's right. I'm just talking about the meaning of a statement. I'm not talking about the meaning of an individual That's right. The meaning of a statement and the meaning of a word must be connected That's that's the second sentence. I'm going to come on to it, but right now. I'm only talking about the meaning of a whole statement Yeah Okay Wonderful Okay, we will come back to this. I just want to touch base on how intuitive that is But if knowing the meaning of a statement Is a matter of Knowing what has to be the case for it to be true. Well words have their meanings By contributing to the truth values of statements right, I Mean a statement has got lots of individual words in it and You understand what the meaning is of an individual word when you know What difference is making to the truth or falsity of the whole statement? Yeah, I Mean that's really just what the last commenter said that there's got to be a connection between the meaning of a word and the Meaning of a statement and this second sentence here is just saying The meaning of a term is what contribution it makes to determining the truth or falsity of a sentence containing it There's no more to I'm using semantic value there. That's not a term that's used in the literature that we're looking at but This is just a definition of semantic value Semantic value of a term is a contribution it makes to determining the truth or falsity of a sentiment containing it So take for example suppose you take Sally Is there a singular term or a general term? Singular is tall General very good So what is what difference does Sally make to the truth or falsity of a sense statement containing it? How does Sally have a semantic value? The answers here are very very simple In what is this and what is a semantic value going to be of is tall? How does it is tall make a difference to the truth or falsity of a statement containing it? You have a shot No, it is a shot. Okay. Yeah, you're probably thinking the answer to think I would like you to think about this for just a second What is a semantic value of Sally? What is a semantic value of is tall? How do these terms make a difference to the truth or falsity of statements containing them? Okay, in the case of Sally a Singular term has a semantic value a singular term makes a difference to the truth or falsity of a statement containing it by Standing for an object. I mean that's The reason you're not thinking of this is it's so obvious once you spell it out at least I think it is what I mean is if you take a statement Sally is tall Sally Sally is wearing a coat then What are the truth or falsity of those sentences depend on? They depend on how things are with that concrete thing Sally The truth or falsity of those sentences depends on whether Sally's tall whether Sally's wearing a coat. Yeah The way I'd explained it so far having a semantic value and having a meaning are the same thing Yes, that's right. I try to learn the word more. Okay. Yes Right, that's very good. Okay. Let me put that into a little bit of context There are lots of things you can do with words besides saying how things are You can say well, how is bill? Or if you just meet see someone you say Sally Right, these things don't have truth values. Yeah, if you come in you say good morning. What's the truth value, right? But the a background idea here is note that There's something basic about the fact stating use of language so that if you take a Something like a command to shut the door Yeah, or stating the door is shut Or if I say if you put the lights on well Take the assertion are the lights on Suppose I explained to you what the meaning of that is in terms of Sorry, suppose I explained to you the meaning of the lights are on Yeah, so now you know what all those words mean now, you know how to use them in a statement and then you say And now I say to you well, could you put those lights on? And you say but if no idea what that means All I understood you all you told me about was how to use those words enough to assist or a command Or if I say to you are the lights on Yeah, but I only know about the fact stating use of words Yeah, I don't know about How do how they're using in our questions? There's something crazy about that. I mean that once you know how the words figure to fact state Then you know how to use them in questions or commands that Come back I don't want to get to your more example because it's a great example So you got a child saying more Yeah, then the child can keeps it what can say more and that's like a requester a command. Yeah, and You gave the child more. I mean this is not theoretical You give the child more and the child says more and you say that is more. I just gave you more right and You can certainly have a child at a level where it knows to say more Where it wants more But it doesn't have it the fact stating thing that is more you get plenty there That's more And that's how I mean there's some sense in which the child doesn't really understand More it doesn't know what it is for her to be more there Until it's got it when it can say yeah, no, I've got more or now I'd still don't have more You see what I mean, but come back. I'm not trying. I just wanted to get to your more example. I don't want to yeah more Good choice It was only wanting you yes, right Yeah, that might well be true That might well be true that you kind of bootstrap your way into language by getting the requests first Yeah, but getting your negotiations about what you what you need or want first But still and all the structure that you're getting in the language is defined Ultimately by what's going on at the fact-stating level. There's how you get in that's one question And that's what you're getting into is another and Excuse me is with that is with that second question what you're getting into that was you see the appeal of the fact-stating level being basic Okay Okay So if that's semantic value okay, so the semantic value of Sally was a semantic value of Sally How does Sally make a difference to the truth of falsity statements containing the name? By referring to something right? That's what reference is it's when you're making a difference to the truth of falsity of the Sentence by standing for an object if Stanley stands for one object That's going to make one contribution to the sense of the to the truth condition of the sentence Sally stands for a different object that will make a different contribution to the truth condition of the sentence What about is tall? Well not to make a mystery of it I don't want you to talk too much over this but is tall doesn't stand for an object It has a semantic value quite in quite a different way And what you really need for a general term is that is some kind of map from objects to truth values So that you put in Sally there That's that's the name of one object And the is tall maps that onto true You put bill in there and the is tall maps that onto false You see what I mean? This is a very simple idea But it's a really basic idea that the meaning of a general term is a map from objects onto truth or falsity Okay, what I'll tell you in a minute why I'm saying all this Okay, but that's that's about the general framework We're using here so the general question we are using you were raising here It's all about how singular terms get tied up to objects and there are all these Different kinds of singular terms that we've been looking at and Frig is saying the way it goes is that The sign gets hooked up to the reference by the sense Whatever exactly that is but it's getting on to the reference that's the important thing because it's by having a reference that the name has a Semantic value now If you had a simple view Where you don't have the sense you just got the reference then you couldn't have meaning without reference If you had only No level of sense, but only the sign in the reference you couldn't have meaning without reference But the way I've just been describing it you can't have meaning without reference anyway Fraga says in grasping a sense You're certainly not assured of a reference if you take descriptions like the celestial body Most distinct from the earth or the least rapidly convergent series. You can have meaning without reference But if meaning is truth condition, it's very hard to see how this works So let me give an example suppose I Okay, so here we go. I'm going to give you a practical demonstration I'm going to make some chalk marks on the board and I'm going to give them names okay, so Here is one chalk mark Let us call this line Right Okay That's okay So now you know what line means if I say well I guess line is over a foot long or line is white You know that these sentences are true or false If I say to you line shows a rare graphic ability You might say well, I guess Yeah, that's true Okay, so you understand line perfectly well, you know what contribution is making to the truth or falsity sentences containing it Okay, let me do it again. Suppose you take this series of dots Anyone give it a name Does anyone want to be the one to give this a name? Dash very good Okay So now the name dash now explain the meaning of the name dash Okay Shall we do it again? Oh, okay, very good. Okay, so you understand the meanings of all those names, right now Let me do this just one last time so Here is Smudge, okay Smudge to take the statement smudge is circular You know what that means? You understand that all right? Smudge is rectangular Smudge shows rare philosophical insight in the part of the author Well, what I've done here is I've got a sign Without a reference Right because of nothing here It's not that you're missing something that actually isn't anything there right So I've explained the meaning of the name smudge in just the same way I explained the meaning of oval or dash or line. I just subtracted the reference With oval and dash and line. I explained the meaning by saying low line low dash low oval and I would smudge I do just the same way low smudge But there's just nothing there But in that case, it's not that I have meaning without reference You know perfectly well what the meaning is It's just that the name happens to not refer to anything. You have no idea what I'm talking about. I mean Even more than usual You really in this case you really just have no hope I mean there's really nothing I'm saying when I say smudge is these characteristics Yeah So how can a sign have meaning without reference if The way a sign has meaning is by making a difference to the proof of falsity of a sentence containing it Then meaning without reference doesn't make any sense Yeah, yeah, Frank has this example of the the reslap of the rapidly convergent series Yeah, you can understand that That's right Yeah, you look at all with Convergent series and for every series you find there is another one that is more rapidly convergent Yeah, it's like the idea of the biggest number For every number you find there is number bigger than it. So there's no such thing as the biggest number Yeah Okay, so there you have meaning without reference. All right So one question is how can that be happening? Because references how the sign contribute to the proof of falsity of sentence containing it But here you've got a sign that seems to have a meaning without having a reference So how did I mean the real puzzle is this one? How did that happen? How come you've got here a sign that has meaning? But in this case, how should I say In that case the stage setting for the reference seems quite substantial if you see what I mean You've got this big description here And in the case of these names, I'm just saying law Oh That isn't enough stage setting something about that is That's the intuitive problem There wasn't enough stage setting here for you to have any idea of what the meaning is Yeah, you mean you have some kind of associations in your head something like that Yeah, yes, the reference is just a concrete object. Yeah. Ah Ah Joy No reference, yes, I I would argue Of course, they have a reference. Yeah, but the thing is Concrete object will quote a concrete object. There is such a thing That's probably the right way to put it. There is such a thing I Know that example is more like the biggest number. There is no such thing as the biggest number Yeah, and rapidly least urgently convergent series is like that. There is no such thing as at least roughly convergent series So the concrete object I think that this actually goes back to what we're talking about with ideas the associated ideas when I write down smudge You may have a whole bunch of free associations Yeah, but the thing is that We wouldn't take your free associations or my free associations to either of them be definitive about the truth or falsity of the statement Yeah, so if I say well what I imagine something shaped like a concertina Well, all right, but that doesn't mean I'm right and you're wrong Yeah, there really isn't any factor the match up here Is that mean doing that to result something else? I see okay, so no Okay, yes, I Think pie is a little bit different. I mean there is such an Well, no, there is such a thing as infinity too In fact, there are lots of infinities That's all right It's not a number, but that's a natural number, but that's a different thing. That's a different point Yeah, yeah when I think it doesn't exist is the biggest natural number You see what I mean Okay, yes Okay, I'm sorry It's a perfectly reasonable question. It's like that question about love. What are you talking about an object? Yeah and For present purposes An object is something which if you refer to it and make sentences containing that name Determinately true or false Okay, so that goes around in a circle, but it's kind of an illuminating circle But actually we're not going to just go away from these topics. I don't want to We're going to go on into the much in much more depth the next couple of times looking at Russell Okay, thanks very much