 John, you have the floor. Everybody knows you, and we are suspended to your lips. Jean-Claude, you're too kind. Thank you very much. There are so many things that we could talk about. I'm going to try to limit myself to just two. One, my good friend Akinari Hori has described an outlook that I think is quite congenial and quite plausible. And what he has said is that there are reasons to think that the outlook may be somewhat more benign than the consensus. If I understood you correctly, it's not saying that worse outcomes are not impossible. They are possible, but that the consensus is a little bit too pessimistic for the reasons that you laid out. And I find myself in broad agreement, but I thought I would step back and remember there's been so much focus on monetary policy recently for good reason. But I think it's worth going back and noting that this comes after a long period in which monetary policy has demonstrated that it is less powerful in controlling the economy than had been thought. Or to put it another way, that in the wake of the global financial crisis, that we've had a series of unexpected developments, especially in the advanced economies, that were not anticipated. And we still don't understand completely, but has been much more powerful in shaping the financial and economic environment than policy has been. We've had a period of slow growth, of low investment, of a lower than anticipated labor force participation, and at the same time, unexpectedly strong corporate profits. A combination has been associated with sustained unexpectedly low real interest rates. That has produced the unexpected result that despite the very rapid growth of public debt in the context of the global financial crisis, that for advanced economies, that debt service as a percentage of public sector revenues in the advanced economies actually fell did not rise. So a kind of amazingly benign period that also was associated because of this combination of lack of pressure on public finances despite the rapid rise in debt. And the unexpectedly strong corporate profitability produced very strong performance of asset prices, especially equity prices. So to me, this lays out, and what we saw, of course, that despite the generalized agreement on a inflation targeting format for central banks, an agreement on universal agreement, essentially on 2% as a target, no central bank seemed to be capable of hitting that target. And virtually all persistently had inflation below, below target. Then have come the shocks that were also unanticipated, the effect of COVID and the war that resulted in this rapid increase or this dramatic increase in inflation that caught central banks by surprise and demonstrated that since their models failed to anticipate, that suggested underneath that, as I said, these factors that appeared important in the wake of the global financial crisis have been incompletely understood. And therefore their incorporation into models produced models that didn't produce the accurate forecasts. So it leads us with some important questions. Clearly what we saw in inflation was a combination of strong support for demand through fiscal means and otherwise in a context of constricted supply. What, and I think what Dr. Norrie Horry told us is what we're going to see now is recovery of supply and a waning of the effects of stimulus that is going to correct the imbalance that produced the inflation. And what we don't know is how quickly it's going to come back, how quickly inflation will come back. What we have seen is that the run-up in long-term interest rates has been less than had been anticipated. Either this would be interpreted as that investors expecting recession is coming, they anticipate, and therefore that it's going to be an unhappy road to low inflation. And I would say this is still uncertain. And if we need to look at some aspects that will be critical in determining this outlook, one is, of course, the obvious performance of wages. So far wages have lagged behind inflation. Either you can take that as an end. The consensus view tends to say there's going to be catch-up and that wages are going to accelerate and that we are going to end up with a wage price spiral that will be truncated only by conventional means of monetary policy action. That will produce a downturn. But that's just a surmise based on the notion that what happened before will happen again. What we don't know is what has happened to expectations after a decade of unexpectedly low inflation. But obviously, the formation of inflation expectations, including in the labor market, is going to be critical. It will be critical to see if corporate profits will prove to be resilient, which means that asset prices also should be more resilient than is anticipated. And the course of long-term interest rates, real long-term interest rates, is going to be very critical for the outlook for fiscal policy in the near term. Because if long-term rates stay high or go higher, there's going to be tremendous pressure on the fiscal accounts in the advanced economies. Because we're going to start to see a rise in debt service costs as a percentage of revenues. So big unknowns. I end up also a little bit more optimistic than the consensus, but that may just reflect my own personality rather than analysis. But there are critical things to look at, and it strikes me that what I think are most important seem not to be at the forefront of discussion. Let me just add two other remarks. And that is what we can see coming almost certainly, and this is something that is not a new insight, is that developing country debt is going to be a problem. We can see it coming. We know the outlines of the problem of the solution, which is that there is big change in the composition of the creditors of the developing economies that has rendered the Paris Club ineffective in dealing with the problem. And requires new cooperation. Recognizing that the Paris Club was no longer the appropriate venue, the G20 created the common framework. I'm repeating what I said yesterday. The common framework so far has been notable by its sluggish progress not to be more critical than that. This is an issue that I posited yesterday is a litmus test for the outlook for cooperation at a global level. And in essence, to a certain degree, the relevance of the G20. The framework, the G20's replacement of the Paris Club, the common framework for debt treatment, must be made to work. There needs to be a compromise that makes it work. Otherwise, it will be not the biggest issue for the global economy, but for those worried about global inequality, there needs to be a solution. Thanks. I've talked too long. Thank you. Thank you very, very much indeed, John. John, you are confident with a lot of nuances, if I understood the way.