 I want to thank you so much for coming this evening and, before I introduce our third distinguished speaker for the evening, I want to introduce you to this lecture series of telling stories about law and development. I'm Diamond Dashie Agor and I'm a Professor of Labour Law at Seilhaffs University of London. My co-organiser for this lecture series is Dr Ann-Tara Helder in the Faculty of Law here at Cambridge. Mae'r myfyrdd y cyfnod yn gyntaf ar gyfer y Llywodraeth Llywodraeth Cymru yn ymwneud hynny wedi'i i fynd i'w wneud ar gyfer y Llywodraeth Cymru yn ymwyaf. Mae'r myfyrdd y Llywodraeth Cymru i'r myfyrdd y Llywodraeth Cymru yn ymwyaf, ond mae'n bwysig iawn o gan ymwneud yn bwysig iawn. Y cwestiynau pob dda o'r gwir, fy oedau – a'r tyvell ar gyfer myd i'w gwrthodol, ychydig yn settings, yn cozred faln o ddisgwm, ac y rheswer amweithio i ddweud i ddweud o'r parodydd ei dda i'w awdurdod, yna'w gweithio i ddweud o'r qesio, o'r ddweud o ddweud i ddweud o'u cyfwyr, gweld o'r ddechrau refugees, gyda'r ddweud ymddangos iaethod, i ddweud i ddweud o'r ddweud i ddweud o ddweud a'u ddweud o'r eineis которую, Llywodraeth, ydych chi fel sicrhau thymol, ym Mhwyafolol eich cwmysgyr. Y mae'n fwylo'r hyn yna yn ei lechynyddau i fynd. Felly mae gennym yn pwysig ar gynnwys wrth ysgolod, yn eich beth o'n fel cyfnodau ym ymwylo fel cyfnodig. Rydym i'n edrych, ymy'r ysgolod, os yw yng Nghefwc hanfydli, hefyd am y byddli, ym mwyn hwn ym mwyafol, fyddwn i'n cael ei gael eich gael eich personnel na'r edgesoedd, mae yna ei gael. Mae'r ddweud ystod. Mae'r ddweud o'r cyfrifogwyr a'r ddweud. Dwi'n ddweud, ysgolig ystod, mae'r ddweud ystod yn rhoi'r gwirraith. Mae'n ddweud ond mae'n oes iawn, ond mae'n oes iawn yn y cadmwy. Mae'n ddweud os ystod, mae'r ddweud o'r ddweud o'r ddweud. Mae'n ddweud, yn ddweud, oedd eich llwyddoedd yma o bobl yma o bobwysig a'r ddweud, Ieidwch i siwethaf ysgolwyddau o ffordd, sy'n laid y ddechrau. Fawr ymgyrch ar y llawd cyfwladau cyrraedd, ar hyn, o'r hynny i'r bywch ymbylch yn llwylo ymddangos ynghyd. Felly, mae'r bwysig yn bywch ymddangos o'r cyfrannu gwir. Ymddangos yma, mae'r bwysig yn ychydig ar fynd i'r bwysig mewn mynd i'r bwysig. Felly, mae'r busg sydd, mae'r pwysig yn cyfwladau o'r bywyd, Wais i'w prifueth o sydd y bod, a hynny'n dweud fel ymwneud ymlaen o brydy, yn bobl, o brydy, o brydy, o ddull, o bryddiol, o bryddiol. Ac mae'r adithio那就 yn ad hyd i weithio y llwyddoedd bwysig yn cydnod i ddim yn mynd i dweud o bryddiol yn adill y brif Weinbydd o'r llwyddoedd heb ymwneud, ac mae'n ddwy'n cyff90rwyr ar deulu sy'n sydd ymgyrch yn ymgyrch. Rhyw ydych chi'n ddwylau gyda'r cyfnod hynny yw'r cyffredigau ddysgu. Rhyw'r dros yw Simon Dickey yw'r dros yw'r dros yw'r ddweud yng Nghymru a'r dros yw'r dros yw Amgyrch ar hyn sy'n ddwylau gynnig fel rhan o ffrathau ydw i. Fy hoffi'r ar y ddweud yw around just the four-seven o'clock. Sorry, I saw it interrupt, you'll see. Yeah, yeah. I prefer not to have the first question. Well, thank you very much for that very kind introduction, and I like disruptive. I'm usually not introduced that way, but I really I think I have been disruptive and I've paid a price for it. I'm really very happy to talk to you. A lot of the issues that I deal with are one way of putting it is they operate at the fuzzy edge of paradigmatic knowledge, not at the centre of paradigmatic knowledge. Can you hear me? Is there a mic here or do I need to shout? Can you hear me in the back? Okay, great. And it seems to me that from the interactions that I've had with little scholars that fuzziness is one zone in the law that of course generates some interesting debates and interpretations and reinterpretations. My fuzzy edges are very different from your fuzzy zones, but still I hope that there is some kind of dialogue that we can have. The work that I want to talk about is exploratory. Basically the argument is that our existing conceptual categories fail to capture extreme conditions of extreme versions of familiar conditions. So long-term unemployment is a very simple example to give. Long-term unemployment, our statistics capture it up to a certain point. And then after a certain amount of time it varies in different countries, the fact disappears in all its materiality, all those unemployed people. They become invisible, conceptually speaking, statistically speaking. In this book I explore a whole variety of these sort of systemic edges. And I wind up with an argument that when we see such a multiplication of expulsion, so I call that systemic edges moment of expulsion, not exclusion, not the category social exclusion, which is a far more familiar one, which has been worked over and over in different countries, different versions, different contents. And which is one that functions inside the system, and so far as the notion is, I'm now talking, I repeat about social exclusion, that there's kind of a hope of reincorporation. What I'm talking about is a set of systemic edges once cross your truly in a different zone, or it is truly in a different zone. So, for instance, I talk also about dead land and dead water. I confess that the chapter that I got most engaged with in this book, and this book is a little book, was the chapter where I explored how does this type of analytics work to explain the environmental condition. And so one of the arguments that I make, for instance, is, you know, once land is truly dead, once water bodies are truly dead, they also become invisible. You know, it's like we don't deal, and I argue a bit as a provocation. I say we should make a special kind of jurisdiction that captures that particular condition so as to make it visible. You know, and I argue, for instance, that, you know, we should have when we teach our kids in elementary school in kindergarten, when we throw the maps of the world, we should show them dead land and dead water. They should be present and visible, and we can add, we made that, you know, we made that death. So that is a bit the argument, you know, it's a call for making visible that which now becomes so extreme that it falls off the cliff of our theorizations, of our analytic categories, and of the instruments that we have developed, if you want state instruments, private sector instruments, to deal with what we need to deal with. Now to do this kind of work, I sort of need a zone where I can operate that I call the zone before method. It's not a rejection of method, but in the social sciences method is a disciplining condition, and sooner or later you have to enter that zone. I think we enter it typically far too quickly, and hence we wind up with very conventional analyses, we wind up with multiple replications of familiar conditions and find little wrinkles that need additional elaboration. I really think that there is a vast zone that requires an analytic, you know, an analytics if you want to capture it. So in that sense, the zone before method is one where I deploy, if you want, analytic tactics. So it's not a rejection of method, it's not a rejection of the heart of the paradigm, it is something different, something that is preoccupied with what is not forcefully present at the heart of the paradigmatic body of knowledge. So among these analytic tactics, these are very simple. One is, what don't I see when I invoke a very powerful category? And I would be curious to know in the law how that works, if that is also sort of a, if you want a strategy, you know that you take some very powerful categories that say mark a field, a specialized domain within the law. And if that is also a question that people ask themselves, what don't I see when I deploy this category? So the question is not to reject that powerful category, the question is precisely because it's powerful, it has had to sort out a lot of aspects. In other words, it eliminates, it eliminates, it becomes conceptual, it becomes theoretical, theoria and the original Greek seeing. But it has eliminated a lot of stuff. So we need such categories, but we can't, we don't need to throw them out of the window, we really can't easily throw them out of the window. But we can ask, what don't I see when I use that category? So I deploy that with all kinds of very elementary concepts or which have become categories in a way. Immigration, the middle classes, the state, when I invoke those terms, there are invitations in my view, not to think. Because you know, we just, we assume we know. And so a bit one of my sort of methodological practices is to operate in that level. The second one is the need to actively destabilise, stabilised meanings. Again, what I was saying about the state, the middle class, etc. Which is a bit of a different practice from asking what don't I see. The destabilising a category also winds up enabling you to see something. So I interrogate these categories. For instance, when I deal with the city, which is one of my subjects, I, if I really want to do serious work on a subject that has to do with the city or the city as a category, I have to remove myself far enough from the city that I've lost it. That I have found a definition that is the non-X. I always, you will hear me say this thing about the X and the non-X. If the city is the X, if I really want to define it and to recover the complexity of it and the overwhelming variety of elements, I just want to remove myself. So I say the city is a complex but incomplete system. You might not immediately think about the city when you hear that. But if I apply that to understand the city, I discover things about the city. And one issue, for instance, to give you a very quick, is that the city, if it is complex and incomplete, it means that density by itself as a marker is not enough. An office park has density. Secondly, but it's not a city. Secondly, you can argue that a lot of what we are doing when we talk about the urbanisation has to do with building density. Does it have to do with city? No, these are mostly closed, often privately owned, like an office park conditions. And so why does it matter, one might then ask, why does it matter to recover what the city is? And so one of my answers is, the city is a space where those without power get to make a history, a culture, an economy. And then it matters. It matters to understand that density by itself is not the same as city. That the city is a very particular space. And the city, of course, as you must have read in some places, is being bought up. I'm now working with the data set of 100 cities, the 100 cities that I have received most of the investment in the last two years. And London, of course, as you know, is a key destination. So is Oxford, Cambridge less, you may also know that. And so what happens when you have all this corporate buying, mega projects that eliminate ambiguity, that privatise, you lose the street. I think the street in my reading, street, a necessary but indeterminate space. That indeterminacy is so easily lost nowadays with mega projects, et cetera. So that is sort of one way of going about it. Now another sort of practice, another zone that I like, and it sort of relates to what don't I see, is to sort of a synthesising image, if you want, is that my zone for research, for actually empirical research, is in the shadows of very powerful categories. So there I go digging. Now in the shadows you don't see very well, you don't have, you know, you need special tools, and those are the analytic tactics then, right? So that is, and one of the questions I have, I hope somebody is taking note of my questions to you. These are questions that I have for you and I hope to have a chance to re-discuss that, is do you have equivalence? So the fuzzy zones, I think, I just recently gave a talk at the Columbia University Law School where I teach and I talk quite a bit about fuzzy zones. And all the profs, this was just profs, they then began to give all kinds of examples about the fuzziness, you know, especially if Anglo-American law. That is a source of so many debates. But anyhow, so the other one is, do you have, you know, a question to you in a way, do you have zones in your conceptual zones, whatever the useful term for you? Where you actually, you know, you have to go digging, you have to discover because they are ambiguous. I had the impression, for instance, when the global systematicity emerges, that a lot of legal scholars had to enter. I spent a lot of time with legal scholars at that, that was like 10 years ago or something, that they had to enter a zone where they were not fully armed with concepts, you know, to capture that. That was a major transformation that unsettled a lot about national law. So anyhow, those are some of the questions. Now, what I want to start out with is this notion of making, which is another one of my analytic tactics. And I find myself in this current period, given what is happening in the research that I'm interested in, especially with this subject of expulsions, that the category making is very important. So I want to insist that that dead land, that dead water, we made it. That's exaggerated. That's not totally correct. The we is ambiguous, making is, you know. So it is a partial account, but it is a violent way almost to enter a subject, to enter an issue. And so, for instance, just this is entertainment moment, though it is about tragic stuff. So we make, we made this. This is the internally displaced people. That is not just something, oh my God, there it happened. No, we made it. So when I, as a social scientist, begin to deal with some of these, can people see in the back? It's a very simple curve, right? But look how it grew. It keeps growing. Now it's even bigger, right? So when you say we made that, you've got to bring into the explanation a very broad zone of agents, not just the fact of the miseries of these people. Right? And so by the way, a transversal element here that I discussed somewhere in the book, but I'm not going to focus on that here, is that some of these displaced people camps, you know, as they call them, internally displaced, I mean those people are never going back home. Home is either a war zone, a new private city or a plantation. And so why the language of displaced? Don't we need another language to capture this? And secondly, when they've spent so much time, sometimes two or three generations, and now there's a whole debate, I'm part of a big network around this question where they are actually studying in great detail these camps, these camps are ready to be cities. And that would enable. But guess who doesn't allow them to become cities? It's the international system that tries to help them, to protect them, but that reduces them to clients, to victims, et cetera. You go into some of these camps, they are already little cities, but there are all kinds of constraints instead of taking the next step. So this is another issue. And also the land on which they sit, if it becomes a city, it's going to be more difficult to displace the displaced from what might at some point emerge as desirable land. And so there is a whole bundle of issues. Now I also love this one. Again, this is like entertainment about very tragic situations. This, you know when I'm talking about the RLC, 20 years reduced to a sliver. I stand back and I say I am witnessing an extraordinary capability to destroy such a huge body of water in such a short period of time. That's a capability. Clearly I'm not using capability the way Amartya Sen or Martha Nussbaum use it. Also because historically speaking I think capability X, time A may have been very good, benign at least. Time B, it may really be a difference. So this notion that a capability must be positive to me comes with far too much of a baggage. So I open it up into a variable. Negative capabilities that might become positive. I doubt that one would. And then here is another one. This is another accomplishment. And this is like at long distance effect. You see what I'm talking about here, right? You can, can you see the, in the back there you see, well, okay. In a few years we managed to destroy a massive. And of course the origins line our industrial society is not in that area of the world. So these are very exaggerated instances of what I'm trying to get at by emphasizing, by using this very partial account, this partial, brutal account that goes right in there and leaves out all kinds of other things that are of course part of the picture. Now, given that a lot of what I'm doing in this project really concerns the current moment with all the problems that brings if you are a researcher that, you know, you can't deal with everything. But one of the questions for me is, you know, what are synthesizing images or whatever phrases, concepts that allow you to capture. So, so one of them that I like to ask, you know, what is the steam engine of this apple? By this apple can mean the last 30 years in much of the world. It starts out in certain parts of the world, especially Europe and North America. It moves on. By now it is quite a bit of the world, still not the whole world. But it is a history that begins 30 years ago with very specific combinations of elements that I, oh, I brought a book for your library. It's a public access book, I hope, where I describe, all of this is my territory book, where I describe, you know, this combination of elements that produces this foundational transformation without, by the way, altering everything. The organizing question in this book is, how do complex systems change? And they don't change simply by some revolutionary thing that everything goes. But they change often by using existing capabilities. But they make them, they get located in different organizing logics. So one of the issues that I did there was to look at certain legal capabilities and how they are, say, the rule of law. Very important to justify the emergence of the national state in a history, you know, where the sovereign was the king, et cetera, et cetera. And a secularizing project, you know. And in a way that becomes critical to justify the neoliberal, if I may use that term for shorthand, the neoliberal global system, the rule of law. But it really jumped that same capability, the language, it jumps organizing logics. And it becomes part of a, if you want a mixture of rules and constraints and freedoms that strengthen the corporate sector and weaken several features of national law. To protect citizens, to protect national industry, you know, the whole sort of deregulation and privatization bit. So that is sort of an example. Now back to this. So I want to look at this period and ask myself what is the steam engine of this period. Now when I ask this question, I mostly talk to very large audiences where I don't get to hear an answer. But when I speak to a small group like this, I'm just very tempted to ask I don't know if you can sort of give me an answer. What from your perspective is the steam engine of this epoch? Can anybody, you know what I mean by steam engine, something that is present directly and indirectly that has multiple ramifications that go way past the original item, so to say, right? Can anybody think? But actually this is not about thinking. This is about sort of a spontaneous, nobody has a spontaneous answer. The internet? Everybody with the internet? Exactly. That's not my answer by the way. But that is what I always get when I get a chance and I assume that when I'm speaking to a large audience that that is in their mind, you know where I don't. But partly as a provocation, partly as a wake up call, I say no. It's not. These digitised capabilities, et cetera, they are present everywhere directly and indirectly. So it's a very good answer to say the steam engine. So can anybody guess what it is that I'm going to say? What would be the number two? What would somebody, if it's not that, what, yeah? Consumption is a good answer too. It says that consumption is a shrinking domain vis-à-vis what feeds economic growth today. You see there are other modes that are done, yes? From a product of the financial economy? Yes, exactly. It's the financialising. It's not so much finance. It's the financialising. So in here I should say that again to make a distinction, traditional banking, which we all need by the way, we all need banks, a little community to advance, if you want to buy a bike to be green, people need loans, little loans. So I don't have anything against traditional banking. Little banks, especially if there are local banks, they recirculate whatever the interest payment capacity that a community has. Nothing wrong. Finance is very different. So when we are putting it is that the traditional bank sells money it has. Finance sells something it does not have. Therein lies its danger, if you want, to all kinds of sectors. And secondly, its extraordinary creativity. I use it with a bit of irony, but it is truly creative. Because it has to invent instruments that allow it to invade sectors that are as varied as the financialising of commodities, grains and I don't know what, the financialising of fantastic real estate, the financialising of used car loans and in other words very low or very modest mortgages. So that is a capacity. And it is dangerous because without invading other sectors, it doesn't, you know, it's nothing. So one for me always an indicator is to take the value, I take the value of finance as measured by outstanding derivatives, which is the basic measure at different periods, and compare it with two things. One is if you take currency as issued by the central banks of countries, what is the amount of actual currency? And that, you know, that is a very mushy figure usually because there is inflation, there is government that change, you know, whatever it is, you know about that. I don't need to elaborate. But if there is a lot of difference, then even if it is a variable measure, the actual currency and circulation at a given time in the world, you still have a measure there, right? And so I'm going to show you this, how many of you have seen this graph, this is a famous, this comes from the credit default swaps thing. You know, so it's there, this is official from the financial system. So, oh, I don't have a pointer. So what I want to, what I want to, a microphone I'm still talking to you, okay? So is the growth curve, you don't need to see. So from less than 1 trillion in 201 to 60 to the high point, 62 trillion in 207. Can you think of anything that has had that growth rate? That's a very strong growth rate. Very few conditions in the real world have that kind of growth rate. And second point, if you take global GDP, the GDP of all the economies in the world at that point, it is 54 trillion. That is to say less than the 62 trillion. Third point, if you take the total value of financial, of finance, this is just one important instrument like credit default swaps, but there are many other instruments. And so the standard measure, these are also derivatives, right? The standard measure is the value of outstanding derivatives. Well, the value of outstanding derivatives, which includes swaps, right, was at that point 630 trillion. That is 15 times the value of global GDP. Then if you take the value of the actual currency in circulation as issued by central banks, in other words, not bitcoins and whatever at that point, it was about 200 trillion. That tells you something about finance. That tells you something that indicates that you can't just think of finance as money. We use money because it is our standard measure. It's an indicator, et cetera. But what it also tells you is the extraordinary creativity of this sector. Now, I want to illustrate the central argument that I'm trying to make is that the steam engine of our epoch, so to speak. I'm using this because I'm speaking to you. I would not put this in a book, but it's like a way of covering a lot of material with one image, the steam engine. The reason I argue that this is the steam engine of our epoch is because one of the reasons that it takes all these extraordinary values is because it has developed instruments to invade all sectors. We all know who are the key makers of these brilliant instruments. They're physicists. I say at one point because that is when I was actually doing the field work. At one point, the back room, the space that used to be the space of the secretaries, the back room at Goldman Sachs, one of the big firms in Wall Street, had 100 physicists. One of them became my buddy, so he told me a lot. He's now some kind of prophet at Columbia University. But 100 physicists developing brilliant instruments. The core math has nothing to do with microeconomics. Now, in England, you know, I know in the UK microeconomics isn't this dominant thing that in the United States you say economics. And the only serious economics for a long time was microeconomics. Now finance has gained a certain finance at that in that time was seen as second class economics. But the algorithm, of course, is an open structure. You put in stuff, it gets mixed up and then some outcomes something. The algorithm is the basic sort of structure for this type of sector finance. Whereas in banking, you know, it's sort of more traditional. So in that sense, a big difference. Now I want to illustrate this as capability with a particular event, a particular micro history that is a real one. But I could illustrate it with a lot of stuff, all right? But, you know, this is just, this is a good, oh, I forgot about this. This is another feature, I'm sure you have heard of this, the dark pools in the United States. So most financial trading today, you never hear about it because it happens in these dark pools. When Bernanke, our formal head of the fed, retired, he said, and all the other things he said, he said, well, in about 70% of trading is probably happening in dark pools and we don't know what's happening there. He used the language dark pools, not high as a lefty or whatever, you know, I may be. So I think that is also indicative. So these are sort of estimates, but they're not, they're not stupid estimates, they are well informed estimates. And as you can see, Europe has much less of that. So that when we talk about high finance, there is a whole world that is very difficult to get a handle of. Outcomes make it possible to get a sense of total value at play. How they get to that is difficult. Now I want to illustrate with a very sharp contrast, very, very modest assets, very modest assets that can be used by high finance, very complicated process to make very modest assets work for high finance, which is also an interesting observation, you understand. Brilliant minds, all the physicists to work. How do I make a little modest little thingy work for who, for the high investment circuit, right? Because and there are interesting temporalities in this period. So one very interesting period comes right after this thing here but already before, which is that the high investment circuit is asking the financial sector, which is a kind of intermediary, although they have also become their own actors, please give us an asset-backed security rather than a derivative based on an interest, based on another derivative, these long chains. Do you understand what I'm talking about, right? So that is the subprime mortgage, you must have heard of this. You have had some of that too, by the way, it's still going on. Anyhow, so very, very quickly you can read those two sentences. The question is how do we introduce this as asset, as we can sell it as asset-backed security. And secondly, and they go absolutely together, one can't work without the other, how do we camouflage the low value of the asset. That was the complexity. A dear colleague of mine at Columbia University, he showed me the six, seven, it varied a lot, but a lot of steps in between steps to make that transformation. So the back room for physicists is truly a kind of Silicon Valley for finance. They are inventing and innovating, etc. It's a technical problem. I think you all know probably the little book, The Technical Problem, how in many, many domains you have very worthy scientists working on a technical problem that eventually becomes a disastrous machine for. Now here is the result very quickly put for closures, you know, is a notice. According to Bernanke, there was another thing he said, most of these people, 14 million of these households out of their homes. So he said by the end of 2014 this process, this is a process with, I don't want to go into the details. But this is just to show, and here you have the very clear image that this is the high point, right? But it keeps on going because these are these, you know, these offers that I have for five years that you don't have to pay anything, you can own a house. The aim was how do we get this household to sign a contract. That is all they wanted. Whether those people could pay or not the contract. The people, the intermediary agents had to get about 500 contracts a week to make it work. Over 15 million of these contracts were issued. Now these 14 million households that are sort of out, those are households and in terms of their rentals and all of that, I mean, you know, it's a mix, but mostly they're households. That is about 30 million people. Now, I'm Dutch. I like to make it Pythagorean. My country has 16 million people. So what this meant was a voice from up there saying the equivalent in the Netherlands. Okay, all the people in the Church of the Netherlands out. Where you go, I don't know, but you're out. And then now we repeat the exercise. It's a lot of people and they're invisible. Again, my play with this, the invisibility bit, no matter how material, if you cross a certain edge, I call them systemic edges, it becomes invisible. Because we not not because it's invisible, but because our categories don't allow us to capture it. So what do we have? We have fast stretches of empty neighbourhoods. We have using the same tents as the international refugee system, nice blue tents. We have thousands and thousands of people living in tents cities outside municipal governments, nice municipal governments. I mean, this is a world that is invisible. I have videos of all of it and when I show it to people, they can believe it. They can believe it is the United States. So to me, this is part of my expulsions argument. And a lot of these people are not the poorest of the poor, you know, though we also had the biggest, it's now being evacuated. The biggest, and I'm just curious to know if you know, the biggest encampment for the homeless up to now. Now it's being that emerges after 208, a crisis. Where do you think it was? Does anybody know? Silicon Valley. Silicon Valley is a very beautiful valley. It has hills and if you stand on top and you look down, you wouldn't have seen it. Again, I have video of it. You would not have seen it if you come from below, you see it. And it is, you know, they have carbs and etc. But I checked in great detail because I was reading something into this. These were a lot of young men and they had top quality footwear, how do you call them? Sneakers and great bikes. Guess who they were? They were these techies who thought, you know, the party would go on forever. Suddenly they're homeless. And why were you sneakers? You have to use sneakers. And the bike is the way because in California you need some wheels. I mean, these are micro. I have a whole series of videos of these encampments that I was describing. And I take it early in the morning and then, you know, before anybody's out and so I show them to my students and I say, who do you think is going to come out of there? They always think either an African American or a Latino, an outcome Anglo, Anglo after Anglo after Anglo. And they can't, you know what I mean by Anglo? This is one way in which we immigration people used to speak about the Anglo. So these are true stories. Now in Europe they think this is not happening. It is. And I in the book I have quite a few more figures, but anyhow what I like here, and if I had a pointer I would point is that Germany is among the top. Now a lot of these foreclosures, as you know, is a notice. The problem is that it winds up being an effect, you know, a real thing in the sense that people just have to leave. They can't manage it. Now the numbers, as you can see, these are actual numbers, by the way, you understand this is not a growth curve, right? These are individual numbers that belong to each year. And among the lowest foreclosures, you even have nice countries, so to speak, Denmark, Netherlands, you know, you wouldn't expect that. Hungary is a disaster, a million households now. This is just three years that I'm showing you here. The story continues. And these, again, these are sort of invisible stories. What is left is the evidence, the empty space, but nobody goes to those neighbourhoods. So they are also de facto invisible. By themselves none of this is invisible, but the intermediations of our social existence, etc., make them invisible. Now, here is another. The image that I want to leave you with is a lot of empty space and a lot of displaced people. So this is from my data set. This is what, oh God, yes, right, I don't have it. Anyhow, this is national and foreign investment volumes. This is one year mid-2013 to mid-2014. This is corporate investment. The lowest property is $5 million, a variable quantity depending on the country, etc. And as you can see, New York is at the top, London. This is just one year. This is on some level a very old history, clearly. But this is a new phase in that old history that starts after the crisis of 208, is now escalating, etc. So I told you I have 100 cities that are the top cities. And so what you see here, just as an image goes on and on, you have a few cities that capture most of it, and then you have a very, very long tale that includes a lot of cities. And now, what I care about the story is not really, by the way, I should, before I say that, this is foreign investment. Foreign investment, London is number one, and you must all have heard the one bit that, and by the way, what I'm going to tell you, I used to say gentrification is not adequate language. Many people say, oh, that's gentrification. Well, it is also gentrification. So the stinger I want to tell you, and you probably know this, is that the Quartare Royals own more of London than the Queen of England. Now we know that the Queen of England is not the main owner of London, but still, you know, I thought that. I always say that when I'm not in the UK, just to mark the notion that gentrification doesn't capture the process. There is something deeper that we need to capture. And so for me, this is about really buying urban land. And that is why I give you this brief explanation in what way the city matters a lot to me. You know, because it's this complex space, incomplete, where those without power can get to make a history. Something they will not make in a mega project or in an office park. They may be employed, but they don't, you know. So I have a whole bunch of research that I've done on cities and asymmetric wars, cities and inequality, cities and the poor. So it comes out of that, and this is not the moment to develop that. But anyhow, here you have some figures. Now I want to move on. What I'm trying to show you is how finance directly and indirectly makes itself present where you might least expect it. Now here's another one, which is that, and finance again had to build this, but the bridge into even the most modest household. Now here we deal partly with banks, partly with financial firms. And so what I'm going to show you now, don't bother about all the numbers and all that. Just look, for instance, just let's start with the title of it. I just want to isolate a few numbers. The title ratio of household credit to personal disposable income. You understand that measure, right? And by the way, this is IMF staff papers. I work a lot with the IMF staff papers. That's a lot of good data that doesn't become part of the IMF report. And often it's a lot of negative data. There you have it. So ratio of household credit. Credit sounds very pretty. Credit is debt. All right. So to me that language bit is also interesting. Look at Hungary. And this is, by the way, a critical year. Same thing with the subprime mortgage, 2000 to 2005. Hungary starts with 11%. That's incredibly low. Look at the United States already over 100. I don't have the UK here, but anyhow. And then five years later, it's almost 40%. That's a very rapid growth rate. Spain, a country, of course, which suffered a massive, you know, the battle there with the mortgage is also 65%, ruby goes up to 112. Germany, on the other hand, you see Germany, 70, 70, 70. To me it's almost like a comic opera. I must say about the Germans that incredible stability. No other country managed that. But so, as I said at the beginning, you know, if a small bank or a credit union owns your debt, your capacity to buy a loan and to pay interest rate, in other words, the interest payments that you make, chances are we'll recirculate in your town or in your neighbourhood or whatever, you know. If a foreign bank owns your debt, who knows, it's a franchise system. It takes it out, who knows where it goes. Chances are it will not recirculate, you know, in your town. And so I looked for these countries again, IMF staff papers, all the data are there, it's amazing. Look at Hungary, 40% of that debt is foreign owned. It's foreign banks, it's big Swiss, Austrian and Swiss banks. So I'm in German, thanks. So that is not good. Now here, oops, this is the same. I'm sorry, this is repeat. Oh, you know what, I'm sorry. I'm just pushing the wrong button. Now I wanted to show you just as information. Who's going to tell me when I have to shut up? I have a lot more to do. How much time do I have? So I just wanted to emphasise one thing. This is just a curiosity item. So look at the top there you see London. That's for the UK. So the price is the price of housing, price to income ratio. We're talking serious stuff here. It's not just price. And then London, I mean the UK is much lower. Look at the United States. This is the United States down here. And there is New York. So that is a familiar story. But these charts are amazing and you can sort of play with them. You know you can bring in different combinations. I couldn't help but share that with you. Now there is an issue that I, and this relates to the larger question of development. The talk of the Troika. Can I use that term for shorthand? Is that Greece has a problem, Spain has a problem, et cetera. I pushed very hard in my expulsion's book to make the argument that we're dealing with a systematicity that affects all these countries. It's just that other elements come into the picture. So this graph for me is very important. All these countries, and I have many more countries that I don't have. They all suffer a fall, including Germany. It's just that Germany, the red line on top, manages to do much better after that. Partly because it has a very strong manufacturing sector, intermediate manufacturing, you know, machines that make machines. They are the best in the world, which is in itself a tale, by the way, an interesting tale that manufacturing, you know, that is solid stuff. And then of course Greece has the oligarchs. Spain had its absolute abuse of the construction syndrome, et cetera. But there is a deeper systematicity in chapter two of expulsion's. I make a very, I think, strong argument that what we today call the need for austerity politics, I mean look at the moral language, austerity, is really the equivalent, systemically speaking, of the restructuring programmes for the global south. The effect of those restructuring programmes was devastated economies and predatory elites, you know, it couldn't have gone worse. The second point, the debate now that the Germans especially, saying Shoibela, saying no Greece has signed the contracts, we cannot change the contracts, well the IMF, at some point, decides that 46 countries that were subject to its policies are never going to pay their debt, and it starts the IHPC programme in the highly indebted poor countries, I'm sure, and many of you know what I'm talking about. So yes, hell yes, they can change a contract. A contract is made. I have a whole line of analysis, you know, that is based on the notion that we made these things, and hence yes, we can change them. I mean the conditions of course under which we can change them matter. I'm going to jump some of these curves, but I want to dwell on two, I have a whole set of these. Look at this, so this is corporate profits, there comes the fall, you know, the crisis, a crisis that lasts about two hours, literally speaking, after that it gets, it's even higher than before the crisis. All kinds of things happen in between. That was made, that didn't fall from the sky already made, that the curve goes even higher. You understand what I'm saying, right? And of course when I say two hours, I hope you understood, it's a few years, but it was like nothing. In the meantime the rest of society is still suffering the crisis. So the real disjuncture, here you don't even see the crisis, but look at that curve, here is the crisis. You have like a slight bump that literally doesn't happen now probably, and then it goes higher than ever. And so a question is what happened, a couple of things happened when one of them is an amazing amount of pumping, what they elegantly call quantitative easing, pumping of cash, currency, real money, which is like pure gold, you understand, in a highly speculative system on which they could build extraordinary profit rates. No conditionalities are touched to the banks getting this money, not even you have to make loans. These financial firms so-called often refer to as banks, they're not in the business of making loans, loans does not make you money. If it brings you in cash that you can then maybe, but it doesn't so they don't. So these are a series of abuses. I'm going to end up with something, here's more the other version of land grabs in the global south, probably I should have dwelt a bit more on, this is a massive, I'm sure that people are aware of this, right? So the best source of information I think is a land matrix, which is a global network of people who really collect the data, it only includes properties that are above 200 hectares. Europe is becoming a destination for land grabs. French who want to be farmers like their parents were because the job market is not very good, they can't buy land, it's bought up. By the way in Cambridgeshire, part of the land has been bought up by a foreign investor. Do you know this very nice environmentally oriented, genuinely environmentally oriented Swedish firm H&M or something like that, HMS? The owner of HMS, very nice person, has bought a huge stretch of land in the north of England. England proper. So this stuff again, and so you begin to put all of these stories together, these three stories that I have talked about, the Supreme Mortgage and all these expulsions, the buying up of the city and the buying up of land, land has become a very important element. It's a safe investment, you can store your money, but it's also that too much land, I have images here that show too much land is dead, I'm not going to go there, hence land becomes super important to extract water. For many scientists the real crisis we face is water. Though they have discovered beneath the bottom of the ocean there is a whole other world, huge amount of water so that you know, I'm talking about nobody, this was seen here. So anyhow, so I want to end with an image which is given all these negatives, who are we, the citizens? Because we are being really treated rather poorly by a lot of this stuff. And so I wanted to ask you, who among you has seen this map? This is in the public domain. This is a map that shows the 10,000 buildings where full-time data gathering for surveillance purposes is taking place. And very few people have seen this map. I've been showing this map for a few years, I always emphasize it's in the public domain. And after Mr Snowden of course came out, people could begin to connect to this map. And so that to me is the ultimate sort of thing about who are we, the citizens, as formal subjects in the law. We have been losing rights. One of my projects is the rights that we have lost. And I have a colleague here in the UK, I will not mention his name. We're trying to sort of nail down all the rights we have lost. What I have been showing you is a massive loss, not a formalized right, but of the underpinnings of livelihoods, et cetera, et cetera. And this is but the most extreme version. So who are we, the citizens? Thank you very much.