 Thank you all very much for coming My name is Brian Fishman. I'm a counterterrorism research fellow here at the New America Foundation And and I really appreciate you taking the time to be here Usually my my sort of prerogative hosting something like this as the moderator is is to just sort of introduce the issue And get out of the way as quickly as possible For the folks that we have speaking today I'm going to give a little bit more of an introduction in large part because of the sort of sensitive nature of this issue And I think we need to frame it appropriately Part of the sort of question that I have about this entire topic is whether we can have a responsible Conversation about al-qaeda and its interactions with any state in a responsible way in Washington I think in a lot of ways we haven't done that on this issue You Sort of get two sides on this question I See in the political debate in the discourse in Washington on the one side we see sort of the The assertion that al-qaeda and Iran and perhaps mosque and his bala are all part of one large sort of collective And I think that that notion Is fundamentally false and I and I hope that we are we don't sort of drift into a discussion that looks At these issues in that very simplistic way today But on the other hand, there's also a tendency to sort of put blinders on to the fact that groups like al-qaeda and Iran Are very pragmatic They are serious groups trying to accomplish things in the real world And as part of those efforts They oftentimes cut deals And and create arrangements with folks that you might not expect We shouldn't also fall down the rabbit hole of assuming that there is no relationship between these entities because Al-qaeda famously as a Sunni group Sunni jihadi organization and Iran has a shia ideology That is overly simplistic as well so what we really want to do today is Look somewhere in the middle and try to distinguish the Intelligence question of what is this relationship from the various policy questions associated with both al-qaeda and Iran And I hope we can do that and I hope Later on the audience you you guys help us and and have that conversation with us Okay, the the immediate impetus for this event Really was raised in last December with a court decision in New York that essentially found that Iran and Various Constituent agencies Hezbollah the Taliban and al-qaeda were liable for 9-11 And so we've got a situation that is not all that abnormal where There has been an effort to to Essentially get Financial Renumeration from Iran because it was responsible in part for the 9-11 attack Liable for the 9-11 attack and what's interesting about this is that the legal standard in that decision was actually very low There is no assertion that Iran necessarily knew of the attack simply that they provided material support for unlawful deaths Associated and and Dan I think is far better situated than I to talk about that situation and we'll go into it But what that court case does is it raises an issue? Which is what is this relationship with between al-qaeda and ran it similarly late last year the Treasury Department designated? both entities of the Iranian government, but also several previously unnamed al-qaeda operatives that are According to Treasury working in Iran and collaborating with elements of the Iranian government. I use collaborating and Associating with a lot. I don't I don't know the right word here, and that's part of the debate that we're going to have But this is the question in front of us Obviously there are potential policy implications that fall out of this discussion, but I hope that we hold those for after a Really a better understanding from Dan and from Afshan into both how al-qaeda is operating and how the Iranian regime Thinks about these kinds of issues So with that I'll just introduce Dan Byman Dan is a professor at Georgetown Up until between 2005 and 2010 he directed the security studies program there He's also the research director at the Saban Center of the Brookings Institute. Thank you very much for being here And then Afshan Ostavar is a research analyst at the Center for Naval Analysis wrote his dissertation at Michigan on the IRGC and the Kurds force and essentially Iran's ability to operate outside the country I Guess is one way to put it so With that I'll pass it to Dan Dan. You've got 15 minutes or so and and then we'll go to Afshan and then we'll open it up to questions Thank you, and I'm thrilled to be here as Brian mentioned it in his remarks This particular topic tends to get the worst from all sides That this is something that is either There's an unholy alliance that's kind of like the James Bond equivalent of specter where you know all these different enemies Are in one room plotting against the United States Or on the other hand attempt to really whitewash what I feel is quite nasty behavior of the Iranian regime and to me this relationship always was and Is today or an alliance of convenience? But at the same time there there is a there there there is cooperation. There are things going on that are worthy of attention I'll talk a kind of The pre 9-11 era immediately after 9-11 and then today in saying this up before 9-11 there was an Array of cooperation at different times and the first question in some ways is why Al-Qaeda during this period especially early on especially when it's in Sudan until 1996 is really desperate for training That it has training facilities in Sudan But it's not something that's done on an extensive level its instructors are not particularly skilled. They don't have that many and the Iranians especially by his Bala are quite good at this and Arguably his bully even today is pound for pound the world's most capable terrorist group and so their ability to train is quite extensive and During this time period Iran is trying to bridge the Shia Sunni divide It sees himself itself as a revolutionary leader leader of a Anti-American position and representing Muslims not Shia and that message is actually never quite gelled But nevertheless, it's that ambition was there and at the same time in Sudan Early on you had the leadership of Sudan really inviting Every Sunni jihadist group you could imagine to hang out in the cartoon for a while. This changes over time But there's an initial Kind of almost you know, Casablanca sort of sense of all these people gathering under one roof Where we're actually quite different and they're willing to facilitate the entry of the Iranians and we have Some training done largely via his Bala of Al-Qaeda operatives during this time Something to remember is during this early period Al-Qaeda is not really Al-Qaeda It's a relatively small group. It's not terribly strong. It's funding is limited. It's it's there It's present, but it's not the dominant group. It later becomes towards the end of the decade and They have a common enemy and this is fairly obvious, but we have statements from Al-Qaeda leaders as Wahari says in Asaab that Iran and Al-Qaeda in the past worked together on quote Confronting the American-led Zionist Crusader Alliance. So we are fairly openly admitting there is at least some cooperation and Really Al-Qaeda takes a while to focus on the United States, but by 1993 1994 that shift is really there and of course during this time period the Iran and the United States are very focused on each other as enemies and while Al-Qaeda as was mentioned Brian's intro remarks is a hostile to The Shia in general especially many of their supporters Their general view is we have differences with the Shia community But we have bigger fish to fry and we'll handle that after we've taken care of bigger enemies and remember also and Afshan is going to talk about this further kind of the pragmatism of the Iranians During the height of the revolutionary fervor where Homaniously in the country they work with the Israelis Okay, I mean so this is not a crazy case of oh my god the Iranians would never work with someone they don't like Right this is a regime that's quite willing to work with people it sees as avowed enemies All that said the relationship is not particularly close There are overtures that don't seem to go anywhere The training is there, but it's not that extensive and certainly by the end of the decade. You wouldn't say that What Iran is doing is something that is overwhelmingly important to the military effort Probably the most significant help during this period is with travel and this really happens after 1996 when al-Qaeda Relocates back to Pakistan Afghanistan the 9-11 Commission found that Somewhere between 8 and 10 of the 14 Saudi hijackers who provided muscle for the attack Trans-Iran in the year before the attack and so they're going back and forth and there are some reports of travel Facilitation done in Beirut presumably through his Bala as well And it's useful for al-Qaeda not to have visa stamped For members to be able to have clean passports as they go to and from But also important is it's useful to have an alternative route beyond Pakistan You know frankly the United States faces us today logistically right which is it wants to get stuff to Afghanistan and a lot goes through Pakistan, but Pakistan is a difficult partner in a variety of ways and What happened with Pakistan for al-Qaeda is we saw in the 1990s Sometimes cooperation Sometimes cracking down so having you you want redundancy in your logistics and travel system For the Iranians this travel assistance is usually done via deliberate neglect So not stamping visas not getting in the way and in some ways this sounds minor But this is tremendously important for terrorist groups, which is before 9-11 the way this organization was so successful was really Staying below the radar screens of government intelligence services and at times government's deciding not to take action and You know in the way one of the big post 9-11 challenges is trying to get governments around the world to take action and With Iranians, it's not so much kind of an obvious direct support in terms of huge sacks of cash or something like that It's more deliberate choices made to not facilitate Right after 9-11 there's a window You have a couple things going on at once One is Iran is very anti-Taliban So when the United States comes in when the Northern Alliance comes in from Tehran's point of view This is largely seen as a positive development There was a brief time period especially before the president's Kind of access of evil to talk of Iran as part of the problem when there seemed like there might be an American Iranian rapprochement and So there's a little hope going on there And at the same time al-Qaeda to its surprise is routed from Afghanistan and There's considerable pressure placed on it in Pakistan not again 100% but considerable So a branch of the organization seems to go to Iran and there the Iranians hold them and It's not a firm You know put him in jail try them sort of thing but at the same time it's not a let him run around the country completely free and do whatever they want and This is more a judgment my part rather than Evan space, but my sense of what the Iranians were thinking at this time was First of all, they believe the United States is Supporting or at least working with an anti-Iranian terrorist group the Mujahideen a called and that's based in Iraq next door and The United States invades Iraq and in fact takes possession if you will of Some of these camps and they want a bargaining chip So you trade, you know the people we want for the people you want Also, they want lack of a bare-word hostages for good behavior and We have correspondence that was published publicized later between Zohari and Zarkawi in Iraq where They're saying you know look we have to be careful with the Iranians because a number of our brothers are in Iran And they hold them and we have to be careful with this But at this time, there's also Iranian cooperation, you know again We have a Zohari statement saying you know all of a sudden we discovered Iran collaborating with America and Iran stabbed the Muslim community in its back So there's a real sense of anger and we have the series of interviews from a relatively senior lieutenant Saif al-Ata Who notes that in 2002 about 70% of their plans in Iran were aborted by the Iranian regime and Ambassador Ryan Crocker who is one of the US Indirect negotiators with the Iranians says that the surrender of al-Qaeda figures in Iran was one of the things on the table During negotiations. So this is clearly a live issue and there's something frankly I've never been able to get to the bottom of which is the possible Iranian role in terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia in 2003 The Saif al-Ata who I mentioned was some people believe supposed to be the leader of Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula and there's one report where basically his bags show up in Saudi Arabia But he's still stuck in Iran which for those of you who have done modern air travel, especially in the Middle East is not terribly surprising and This sort of issue is a real question of is it the Iranians were holding them back There are other reports that he's making that al-Qaeda figures are making phone calls helping orchestrate things in Saudi Arabia And I don't know but this issue flares up and I haven't been able to see subsequent things But there has been subsequent Saudi pressure on the Iranians that meant that Iran certainly tightened house arrest after this period Today The Department of State at least talks about there being a limited safe haven in Iran That Iranian Iran won't bring these individuals to justice. It won't identify who's there So there are reports of individuals here and there, but it's not a consistent List of who's who's present? And that they don't fully curtail their activities For the most part seems that the leaders do not do significant operations from Iran that the kind of day-to-day Orchestration that may have happened in the past isn't happening But very important is family members are safe And this is something that's often neglected when people think about Terrorist groups because there's often this image of this small hard-core of people who commit themselves fully to an organization But that's often not the case terrorist groups have families too and one of the most effective means of gathering intelligence on a terrorist organization is to put pressure on their families and In Iran you have a degree of safety for a number of families Which is very important because it's hard for al-Qaeda to find that equivalent haven today it's hunted around the globe and Talk about Yemen. We could talk about Pakistan talk about all these issues, but having a place where there's more of an assured Assurance that the government is not actively hunting the families. I certainly beneficial to them Why all this today a couple things again, there's a shared enemy certainly a sense of the United States as a shared enemy again in my view from the Iranian point of view the having some ties to the Sunni Islamist community is is seen as beneficial Also, and this is a more kind of jargoni sort of explanation This relationship is useful for signaling. It's useful for Iran to be able to send messages So when Iran's angry at the United States Magically an al-Qaeda figure happens to escape You know and that signaling is very successful a Syria did that recently as well Where you know a senior Syrian jihadist Abu Missab al-Suri escaped as pressure heated up on the Syrian regime But a big one to me is that the Iranian regime always likes options And this is true. I think of weak countries in general It's also true of frankly countries more than the United States I think this is a relative weakness of the United States Which is Iran recognizes that what it needs today in its foreign policy Maybe different from what it needs two years from now And so it's cultivating individuals who may be hostile to it recognizing the landscape may change So what we saw in Iraq what we've seen elsewhere is Iran has funded and armed and trained groups that happen to be shooting each other and It does try to Reduce avoid that but that's not a contradiction in Iranian foreign policy. That's the recognition that you know What's the world gonna look like in five years? You know, I certainly don't know and I think they're more willing to try to create Assets around the world just as flexibility as well Some problems some very important ones One is of course, there are different views on what constitutes Islam and Islamic government and this stems from the Shia Sunni divide It stems from the nature of the Iranian religious system, but there's a very strong ideological difference And on this very basic question You also have some Sunni terrorist groups conducting attacks in Iran And he was to say the Iranian government is very aware of this And in Iraq, I think there's Was some commonality in fighting the United States even though they back different horses But with the departure of US forces the basic question of what should Iraq look like? Which party should be dominant? How should the system work to me? That's really a source of potential division within this I'll close simply saying something very obvious, which is this is an extremely opaque subject Right. I suspect some of what I've told you is wrong. I just don't know which part and as an analyst That's extremely frustrating And there but there are reasons for this Right. The Iranians are very good at operational security This is a country that has mastered it over the years And to me not surprisingly their ability to deflect information to hide it is it's pretty considerable Also for Iran, there are people don't like al-Qaida and They also don't want to bring on additional wrath from the United States or other Saudi Arabia other enemies of al-Qaida So there's a real cost politically diplomatically to Iran if it's seen as deeply in bed with these guys Ironically, that's true on the other side of the fence as well Where for al-Qaida its funders hate Iran You know that you know, there's a real debate in some of these circles of you know Really is it best to kill an American a Jew or a Shia, right? And that's a very live debate and So the idea that the Iranians are getting in bed or the al-Qaida is getting in bed with one of those very negative communities Is quite dangerous just from an organizational point of view Associating themselves and especially some of their lower-level fighters really feel this sense as well and As a result both sides have a very strong reason to try to limit information on this relationship and That's so you know to quote of a very famous man in a very different context You know the absence of evidence is not always evidence of absence and here we have scraps of evidence here There we have logics we can apply But there's a lot that can slip through the cracks when that's your date That's your data and so this is something that I hope gets more attention because as it gets more attention I think more information may come out, but it's still something. I think we need to watch closely. Thank you Thank you Dan have some Well, I just want to thank Brian and Dan and New America Foundation for having us over here And thank you all for taking time out of such a beautiful day to attend a talk on Iraq or Iran and al-Qaida Freudian slip there perhaps But I wanted to expand on some of the things that Dan was saying especially towards the end of his talk on Where al-Qaida may or may not fit within Iran's own sort of strategic calculus vis-a-vis the United States the region al-Qaida itself Pakistan In other factors and I want to do that by explaining a little bit sort of the history of the Islamic Republic's Relationship with outside actors. Sometimes we call them proxies. Sometimes we call them terrorist groups. Sometimes you call them insurgents I will probably slip into the term proxy myself, although I think that's sort of a A poor term because it it tends to suggest a stronger relationship between the two Then actually exists, but for the lack of better terminology We'll see what we get first of all Iran's first foray into working with outside groups happened very early Within the revolution the revolution itself was what I call sort of a third worldest revolution It was part of the awakening of the third world that you saw all over the place not just the Muslim world But also places like Vietnam Cuba Latin America, etc. The Iranians were of the same mind and for that They were inspired by an anti-imperialist agenda. They viewed the United States and other powers especially the Britain as the problem in the world and they had a real sort of nativistic Response to it, but part of that also Believed that Iran itself after achieving a revolution had sort of the the duty to help other groups Inspire their own change in their own locations And initially in the revolution this included groups far and wide African-Americans blacks in South Africa Eritreans Bahrainis Kuwaitis Afghanis everybody But very quickly the Iranians realized one that their government was not necessarily Fond of the idea of messing around in all of these different places and two Iran really didn't have the wherewithal to get anything done in these places one It was a poor country. It was a fractured country. It was a country that was In 1980 fighting its own war against Saddam Hussein that lasted for eight years and three It wasn't entirely unified in what it wanted to do and how it wanted to do it the real radicals in the 80s Actually lost favor in the Islamic Republic They are now the reformists and and their sort of Supporters they lost out because the conservatives in Iran actually sort of gained the upper hand and when the conservatives gained the upper hand Iran's foreign policy really took a step back from the ideological Impoliticized fashion that it had been sort of run through the 80s and took on a far more pragmatic sort of Iran first In some ways sort of strategic and deterrent focused foreign policy And Iran's first and foremost relationship that it cultivated in the 80s was with Lebanese Hezbollah a group that it in some part helped Create and helped establish out of various other smaller Islamic groups in southern and eastern Lebanon But the relationships that that forged Hezbollah Were actually established in the 70s and even earlier than that in the late 60s by various Iranian activists and clergy who had lived in Lebanon off and on during the 70s And to some extent had some activists had trained With the PLO and Fatah during that time and it was during this time that they had made the relationships For what became Hezbollah? This becomes important later on to the second most important groups that they that Iran was able to cultivate Were Iraqi groups and this came as a direct result of the Iran-Iraq war and were focused mostly on Iraqi refugees And political dissidents who had left Iraq and sided with the Iranians in that war The most famous was the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq And its military component the barter Corps the barter organization as it's now called The barter organization and skeery the Supreme Council Were also groups that were trained by Iran's Revolutionary guards and security services were in part armed by The Iranian security services and operated alongside Iranian security services up until the in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 when most of these guys were able to go back and we know the history of what they were able to do since then they were able to become in some sense the heart of of Maliki security services over time now When we talk about Iran's success in its proxy support or the support of its outside or exoterritory operations We tend to really think about Hezbollah and what happened in Iraq Over the last decade and the reasons why these were so successful were one they were dealing with Shia Muslims Who? Had forged Relationships with Iran's own clear clergy, so they had sort of similar networks similar religious networks and they had shared sort of a long history of of Communicating of similar activism and whatnot But to they also had a long time to cultivate these relationships I mean if you think about it the reason why the Iraqis were so successful the Shia sponsored Iraqis the Iranians sponsored Shia Iraqis were so successful in After the US invasion was because they had a long time with the Iranians Working with Iranians learning Persian training with the Iranians those relationships were so tight that it's it's hard to sort of Extract them and look at them sort of in a vacuum I mean really Iran was successful because it was basically Iranians going to Iraq and able to join the security services in a certain way What Iran did with Hezbollah was very similar. It was based on decades of relationship building Where Iran failed was in every other respect for the most part most significantly Afghanistan Afghanistan was also an area in the 80s which had had a war between the Soviets and and the Mujahideen The Iranians were very interested in gain involved Tried very hard to find groups and individuals that it could work with Was were successful to an extent in creating small Groups among the Hazars among the Tajiks Which which with it could work, but ultimately completely failed to gain traction among the Mujahideen The Mujahideen had better suitors. They had the Saudis. They had the Pakistanis. They had the Americans And the Iranians had very little to offer Secondly the Afghanis even though a lot of them spoke Persian were not Shia did not share for them with the exception of the Hazars did not share for the most part the the clerical networks that had Really laid the foundation for the Iraqi and the Lebanese experience And thirdly just were not as interested in what Iran had to offer because it again Wasn't that significant so Iran wasn't able to get anything done in Afghanistan virtually at all until let's say the last six seven years when Iran has found an ability to funnel weapons especially explosives to Various Taliban linked groups in Afghanistan. They've been used against US forces but still these are as as Dan put it relationships of convenience the Taliban That Iran supports and other actors that Iran supports are not allied with the Iranians They simply are able to take what the Iranians want to offer And the Iranians are happy to do that so long as they can continue to put pressure on US forces there As part of a larger strategic agenda, which is deterring a US attack against Iran, which is in my opinion Iran's sole focus and has been for at least the last 20 years if not since the revolution Iran is absolutely paranoid that the United States Will work to overthrow the regime either militarily or through domestic activities as by supporting pro-democracy groups by supporting ethnic insurgencies And much of their decision-making is driven by this idea of preventing the United States from going forward in this one by giving the US reasons not to by threatening US forces in the Persian Gulf in Iraq or in Afghanistan or elsewhere and to by playing another game diplomatically by having certain assets That are of interest to the United States, which is where I think al-Qaeda fits in al-Qaeda is in some ways a Double-edged sword to the Iranians Or maybe a three-edged sword if you can think of it that way. I mean on the one hand al-Qaeda is absolutely In inherently anti-shia Brute I keep wanting to call you Bruce Dan spoke I think eloquently about the problems within al-Qaeda and within al-Qaeda supporters Regarding how much the Shia are an enemy. Are they a greater enemy or a lesser enemy than the United States or Jews? Are they? Are they an enemy that they should be targeting now or later? Within the jihadist literature that the Shia are a problem if not if not the biggest problem because they are sort of the The wolf and sheep's clothing there. They are sort of destroying Islam from the inside As they would put it so on the one hand Iran knows this and Iran has great fears of What they call Wahhabis In what we call jihadist, but that is militant Sunni fundamentalists Iran has Sunni minority communities that live mostly on the margins of the Iranian state you have Kurds Turkmen and Baluchis, and you also have Sunni Arabs near the border with Iraq and Iran is terrified Of these communities rebelling against the state, but but especially doing so along religious lines Which has been taking place and has been taking place since the revolution itself And took place actually before the revolution in some ways, so Iran is Is worried that al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda link groups could stir up trouble within its own borders To they are worried About the United States and what the United States might do And I forget what my third point was but at any rate those Those are those are two points there. They're actually also worried about Pakistan That's not my original thought, but there's your third point Pakistan also proposes a problem to Iran. They have tense relations and Pakistan Has supported The Baluch insurgency at least in Iran's southeast Even if they don't admit it and Iran doesn't necessarily blame them, but Every significant figure that Iran has arrested has been Arrested in Pakistan or given to them by the Pakistani authorities. So, you know, there's there's some logic there The Iranians are able to deduce that the Pakistanis are in some way Allowing this thing to go on But al-Qaeda affords Iran theoretically at least I'm not speaking as an Iranian decision-maker But the way that I read it as an analyst is that Iran sees an al-Qaeda one a Convenient hostage for both the United States and for al-Qaeda itself as Dan already stated the United States They know want these people and tried in vain to get them in earlier discussions in 2003 Or was it 2001? Multiple times multiple times right but to they also know that al-Qaeda is Obviously willing to target Iran and Iranians as they saw Or Shia in general as they saw in Iraq So holding hostages holding family members makes sense just from sort of a hostage standpoint now in terms of a proxy standpoint You know, what could al-Qaeda do for Iran? What would al-Qaeda do for Iran and does it Iran even want al-Qaeda to do anything for it? in my opinion probably not because if Al-Qaeda were to attack the United States say again, and were the United States able to link that back to One of the al-Qaeda members in Iran Iran has two very clear examples on either side of it to know that the US would likely take Military action against that And that is something despite its bravado and despite its belligerence that Iran really does not want it does not want a US military attack however, if Iran can play this game and allow the idea of Iran Supporting al-Qaeda to attack the United States if the United States were to attack Iran or its nuclear facilities this may be to the Iranians a Threat that they could make subtly even just by signaling In order to ward off or at least give some trepidation To to American military planners that such an attack could have these adverse effects Thirdly Iran just likes to play this game of having multiple cards to play you have You have other US hostages in Iran right now probably in Iran the former FBI agent I forget his name who was kidnapped from quiche Island several years ago You also have the Iranian American military contractor That was tried for espionage in Iran sentenced to death and that was reversed You had the hikers before that Iran has these cards to play and it plays them when it can And I think it only gets rid of them when it views that these hostages Are spent force or that it could actually get something out of them and and as we saw with the hostage crisis and not The hostage crisis that everybody's thinking of but the the hostages that were taken from Beirut in the 80s They can last a long time, you know, they don't need to make these decisions very very quickly They can hold on to these guys indefinitely. And so if if Iran helps Facilitate some money to al-Qaeda central helps some people pass through its borders It's gaining some good will with al-Qaeda al-Qaeda promises not to attack Iran not to fund the Beluc In in the southeast this may be a good enough deal For the Iranians to allow them to play out and to continue to hold this card But I would suggest that if Iran were to get its grand bargain with the United States, which is what it wants It would gladly turn over these guys I don't think without hesitation It's never gonna get that grand bargain. So it's sort of a moot point But I think that's what they're all hoping for and finally I'll I just want to end with one comment Which is how Iran perceives its own security right now and the the use of of terrorist groups and Proxies Against Iran itself As Dan stated the Mojahedin al-Khalk, which are Iran's al-Qaeda if I can put it that way Have been in Iraq since the late 80s and are still in Iraq now Iran blames nearly all domestic violence In upheaval Against the Mojahedin in one way or another They're always part of the the list of operators in Iran whether they are or not It doesn't really matter the Iranian see them that way The recent assassinations of Iranian scientists for instance or something that that the Iranians have pointed to as the Mojahedin being involved and as If there's any truth to the recent reports that were leaked to NBC News that the Israelis were working with the Mojahedin al-Khalk to To To do these assassinations, which who knows if that's true or not. I don't know But for the Iranians it might as well be true I mean if the American press is saying that the Iranians will just point and say you see NBC News is saying it if Dan rather believes it then Then why not? I know Dan rather is not with NBC News anymore Secondly you have Jonda law in the southeast which maybe has spent force On its own since Iran has been able to kill its leaders But there was also a report in foreign policy, which again like the NBC News report cited Unnamed American intelligence sources that said that Israeli Mossad was working with Jonda law Supporting them funding them whatsoever. So from Iran's perspective They are already being targeted by terrorist organizations supported by the West so You know if it's okay for them to do it Why shouldn't it be okay for Iran and Iran is this type of thinker if you see Ahmad Azad give any speech All of his speeches are well you do this stuff. So why can't we do this stuff? That's the case with the nuclear program That's the case with international relations. That's the case with the economies He will their logic is is always framed in that way. And so I think for them. It's really not as Problematic as we see it the real danger for them is getting in bed too much with al-Qaeda that it becomes a Reason for the US to invade or to attack you on Okay, thank you very much. That was great I'm gonna use the moderators prerogative to ask a couple of questions before we before we go to the audience but You know one question that I think this raises is obviously the you know We are having this conversation at a sort of unique moment. It's a moment of heightened Tension with Iran open discussion of the possibility of either an Israeli or even an American attack on Iran There's lots of advocates around town that say that should be the case How do we place this conversation in a conversation about al-Qaeda in Iran Next to or I don't know. I don't know if I want to say within but in that context And and what I mean is that on the one hand. This is obviously Disturbing relationship right al-Qaeda has very rightly been The a focus of American foreign policy for the last decade anybody that supports al-Qaeda is Obviously seen with a lot of suspicion but on the other hand This also portrays the Iranian regime in a more pragmatic light to a certain extent This isn't the sort of ideologically driven regime and that you you're talking about a relationship with al-Qaeda that is That is driven by pragmatism and sort of the any enemy enemy of my enemy is my friend sort of Framework does that should any light on how we should think about their Conceptualization of this tension with the United States in the West more generally now I'll take first crack There's this is a good news or a bad news story depending on how you want to spin it It does show the enmity is quite real and to me stems from a variety of sources This is a very serious thing frankly to get in bed with these guys and and should be treated as such But the constraints are also real as we've seen on the relationship one reason people have raised for concern about the Iranian nuclear program is the possibility it would be transferred to terrorist groups and The relationship with the Lebanese as well as mentioned in this context, and I would think al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda is of particular concern because unlike his bala. I think it actually wants a nuclear weapon It's never been particularly close to getting one, but you know unusually for a terrorist group. It has that objective The point here though would be that the constraints the suspicions mean transfer is not likely And in fact the analogy I always say is Iran has had chemical weapons for over 30 years and Got that right. Yeah since the late 80s of my math is fuzzy in my mind right now and Hasn't transferred them to a terrorist group. So a nuclear weapon is obviously a quantum leap From chemical weapons yet even there we're seeing cautious on the chem side And the pragmatism does suggest deterrence, right? And it doesn't mean deterrence is necessarily easy With Iran tied to groups like this it suggests risk-taking and That makes deterrence harder, but not crazy risk-taking not a rationality Suggests that they're pushing the envelope but not ripping up the envelope and so that has implications for deterrence But the hardest thing for me and something I don't know in the in my own mind in the end is Given the importance of the nuclear issue given the attention it's gotten from the policy community given the diplomacy devoted to it Given the economic pressure devoted to it What do you do about al-Qaeda on top of that? Is really hard because you're trying a hundred percent on an issue of great importance And then if someone says oh, by the way, there's this other issue. We should do more about that I Can nod my head and say sure but I don't know what you add that you're not already trying very aggressively to do on nuclear issue And so to me the policy question of what to do next is actually quite confused because you're trying very hard on another Issue that I think most people would say is of greater importance Mm-hmm. Yeah, I would agree. I mean, I think It's it's troubling. It's problematic I don't think it's a danger to the US at least immediately And we have bigger fish to fry with Iran as is and I think if treated In the best case sort of diplomatic solution with Iran I think this al-Qaeda relationship could be settled pretty easily I just don't Think that that diplomatic solution is at least Close and I don't know what it would take to get there But I think the problem really just becomes okay What happens if the diplomatic solution doesn't work if we do end up going? To war with Iran or at least attack in Iran then it's something that the US does have to consider Because how Iran response from there is So one of the one of the interesting elements here though is that raising this issue for the US administration is also a form of signaling You know, we've seen one of the things that allows us to have this conversation is the Treasury Department's Designations of various entities that draws this connection. That's not just Treasury Department's sort of stating facts That's a that's a that's a form of signaling How should we think about from an American perspective? using this in a way that is Productive that is measured that sends the right signals if if because I think you know, we are we're looking in on that process right now and and How should we judge it and now should we think that it should be improved on the road? Why I think you have to play a very fine line obviously, and I think that's what we're trying to do here today You can't ignore it It's just it's important enough and it's known. It's not It's not something that anybody's sort of There's no yellow cake here in this relationship But I think the problem becomes How do you use it for signaling? You know, I mean Iran already should know that it's engaging a risky behavior I mean not just with al-Qaeda, but everything it's doing and I think for Iran at least given sort of its perhaps Recent attempts in India or Thailand or Georgia if Iran was indeed involved in those things which it seems they were but I don't know I think you're seeing in Iran that is starting to feel this pressure And is trying to find at least some way to let the pressure out Whether that's driven by hawks in Iran that want a greater say in what's happening Or whether that's sort of the regime in general coming to a consensus that they need to respond To aggression. I mean in Iran's mind. They're already at war with the United States and it is real it is a Cold war of sorts that has hot moments But it is a war nonetheless. They view the protests in 2009 as Perfect example of the US sort of engaging in an attempt to overthrow the regime. I mean, that's how they see it We see it obviously very differently But how would the US use al-Qaeda in that respect and I think is pretty much sort of how the administration has been doing it by Putting it out there Not ignoring it Iran knows that we know now. We're talking about it Iran obviously knows what it has meant to Iraq and Afghanistan to be involved or even not involved with al-Qaeda So It would be difficult to amplify any more than that for the Iranians. I mean, I think they know what's going on I think the problem is more domestically that The more you go down the road sort of promoting the Iran al-Qaeda relationship the more you begin to at least open yourself up to accusations of parroting the same narrative that was used against Iraq, which Really, I think detracts from what? You in the end would want to get across And it attracts from actually holding Iran responsible for the things that it does as opposed to sort of making a mockery of Any relationship the Iran and al-Qaeda might have so I think that's the real risk is not making too big of a deal of it that it sounds like Call them power going to the UN And it gets you know thrown back in your face a few years later. You you don't want this I guess in my opinion, this is not a reason to go to war with Iran I don't think this should be a building block for The pathway to war with Iran I think it's just a problem with us Iranian relations And I think we have the same problem with other countries perhaps Pakistan perhaps Yemen I don't think Iran is necessarily unique in this regard I think what's unique is that we already have such a strained Relationship with Iran that this comes at least is another inconvenient issue I'll add only briefly Ironically this sort of Publicity may actually be one of the more effective things from a policy point of view If you accept my argument that Neither Iran nor al-Qaeda has constituents that favor this That their own people oppose it their financial backers and so on Then simply bringing it to light on a regular basis shining publicity I'd makes both sides more cautious because they could lose internally it is actually a form of pressure Unusually for the most part naming and shaming doesn't work on most foreign policy issues because Regimes aren't necessarily trying to hide what they're doing and at times drive political benefits from it But in this case when the parties are trying to hide what they're doing the name and shame function does have some value So to me this is you know mildly useful. I don't want to exaggerate it, but it does play a role I know that Seth Jones of the ran corporation makes this point in a recent foreign affairs piece and and Dana actually just to Plug it has a piece in foreign policy that was published two weeks ago or something like that looking at some of these issues I guess now's a good time to sort of throw it open to to questions I don't know Jen. Do you have the oh Eric's got the mic? So what I'd like you to do is is wait for the make sure you wait for the mic introduce yourself name where you're from and Eric, why don't we start right there next to you? Alexis I'm sure representing here myself. My question is don't you think that United States could pursue more aggressively this cousin between Shia and Sunni and this way For example Instead of making so much focus on Iran. I think that if we would let it Be the Iran would have much more trouble with its Sunni neighbors than now Russians according to BBC since 2000 we're asking on every official meeting Why do we care so much about Iran? Let's say not about Pakistan, which is much in the long run Will be much bigger trouble for us than Iran so in Iraq the same story we could have let them Let them Figure out be among themselves instead we intervene and help them to to Mitigate the conflict among them and as a result they turn both Shias and Sunnis against our troops Do you think it could have been done differently? Thank you. So there was two questions. They're right one Why doesn't the US sort of play the she and the Sunni off of each other? That was the first question, right? And then The second part was Why didn't it work in the past? How okay, well, I'll tackle the first one Or at least attempt to give an answer to it one My own personal view is we should absolutely not engage in that I don't think any more creating any more divisions or or Encouraging greater divisions in the Middle East is in any way good for American security or is any way good for the security of the Middle East? It may work on a real politic level to some extent, but I think in the end it only ends up biting us in the back side Because already you have severe divisions In the Middle East between Shia and Sunni at a cultural level and at a political level there are areas of of of course interaction and and An overlap, but if you go to The Arab countries in the Persian Gulf for instance and you talk to people In restaurants or at cafes if you talk to the locals the Arab locals there They already have a pretty clear cut for the most part if I can generalize across several countries At one point they already have a pretty Strong opinion of Iran and of the Shia that I don't think is Something that was created outside of that. I mean you have lasting cultural antipathy at the very least Why we would want to play that up? I don't know because it's already there The second thing is that Iran is already very isolated regionally, I mean Iraq is friendly with Iran Iran interacts with Turkey and Pakistan and Turkmenistan and other countries But when you talk about just across the Gulf with the Arab countries, although Iran interacts with them There are severe tensions with Saudi Arabia with the United Arab Emirates and with Kuwait and Bahrain Qatar and Oman have have more favorable relationships with Iran But the relationships with the other countries are already very tense as well as they are with Jordan and as they were with Egypt that may be changing I don't know and as Iran may or may not be losing the Assad regime in Syria. It's possible that a future Syria is also going to be antagonistic towards Iran Certainly the resistance the Sunni resistance in Syria is so I think that's already there and I don't think I Don't think Encouraging that division will help us in the long run personally Just to comment on one aspect of your question To me Pakistan actually is a much bigger issue than Iran Certainly in relation to support for terrorism But also more importantly on questions of stability control of nuclear weapons and so on if you look at kind of high-impact Scenarios and relative probabilities to me. They're they're of much more concern in Pakistan part of the problem with Pakistan is It's half an ally half an enemy and that makes for extremely difficult policymaking that when If they're on one side or another you have a standard menu of options when they're neither or both it's exceptionally confusing and I the joy of where I sit as professor and as Think tank person is I can criticize whatever Pakistan policy you want to present and tell you why it won't work And I urge you to do so because I could write another op-ed I but it's In the end you need a policy, right? But to me that issue that dilemma is actually much more acute for Pakistan what to do about how much how dangerous it is and so On I see as much harder and deserving of much more thought than on the Iranian side Eric why don't you come there and then we'll work forward? Yes, the name is John Mueller from Ohio State and at Cato Institute Issue for Dan. It seems to me that Dan Rumsel was the first person to say absence of evidence is not evidence of absence Only because Hans Christian Anderson didn't think about it when he was writing the emperors new clothes I'd like to ask the two would it be a reasonable summary of what you just said that there is no evidence that al-Qaeda and Iran Ever had do have now or likely ever have in the future any kind of relationship that is of significant of really substantial significance I would I would disagree with that. I think that the relationship has Limited significance is how I put it which is I think the limited Haven that All kind of figures have enjoyed in Iran has mattered there. It's a relatively small group So having a certain percentage of the organization have some shelter has mattered I think the transit assistance was useful having another line and out of Afghanistan Pakistan None of this is overwhelming and if I were kind of ranking around support among Well significance a tough issue. It's significant in keeping the organization Alive and able to do some degree of operations at different periods in its history I would say it has been significant, but not overwhelmingly so not How would I put not sufficient And there are other countries and relationships I would place ahead of Iran on the list My name is Lee young independent TV program producers I just want to if you can analyze from the characteristics of Those the population or ethnic group That we are trying to compare with the United States if they want to target Somebody and employee For discrimination. Maybe this can be to say by ethnic group But they can also target it whether they are weaker like black and brown. They are divided them up or for maybe Elder group because they are alone nobody taking care of them or maybe by They say patient Association group maybe they are culture is different. Maybe they are sort of more thinking rather than more talking so instead of fight they rather to say Make some soon resolution talk to the employer rather than complain right away or shout right away so I just wonder if you can talk about cultural background or characteristics of those group Iran or Pakistan or Okay, that's why the U.S. policy will divide them up or sudden stand down or you take in their resources away And then we send them to jail rather than allow them to communicate to their family member or to their group leaders There the divisions are quite real and I see them less as cultural and more as just ideological as difference in how the world should work and However actually playing on these successfully is an exceptionally difficult thing to do Because you have countervailing pressures. You have common interests. You have a degree of necessity And so it's the sort of thing that that can be done through propaganda and so on but in reality to me You don't expect this to work particularly. Well, you're often one thing That's always hard to remember is for the most part we're dealing with an exception exceptionally small number of individuals that are living under very unusual circumstances and So these kind of big targeted efforts often when you get down to that micro level don't really work particularly well, so Notially that idea should be in the back of the mind as people decide decide policies the importance of culture But in practice, I find it hard to apply it to this particular situation Mark Katz from George Mason University. I'd like to thank both speakers for a very careful nuanced Presentation that the Iranian al Qaeda relationship. It's not a grand alliance. It's not nothing, but it's a limited pragmatic Relationship, but what I found a fascinating is that both of you Emphasize that in many respects the Iranians are fearful of al Qaeda and yet the support Continues anyway. Therefore. I'm wondering. Do you think that it's simply motivated by this? Enemy of my enemy is my friend logic or does it involve a degree of appeasement on Iran's side? In other words, are they working? giving some support to al Qaeda to give al Qaeda and its friends a reason not to target Iran, thank you Oh Well, it's a good question I'll say this upfront. I have no idea. I mean, I really don't know. I don't know what they're thinking But the way that I see it Is it's probably a little bit of both? I mean, I don't think that Iran is Actually afraid of al Qaeda itself Al Qaeda doesn't seem to have wanted to waste its time attacking Iran for instance as opposed to you know Europe or Saudi Arabia or the United States That's not to say that al Qaeda wouldn't and there's been plenty of talk in jihadist forums about that What Iran is afraid of is the larger Sunni extremist movement and that sort of Snowballing in certain provinces in its area and especially from taking hold and that is something where If al Qaeda is seen as influential by the Iranians Within its own sort of communities then then any then al Qaeda could be seen as a threat so there has been suggestions that the grand bargain between Iran and al Qaeda is that they allow al Qaeda a modicum of these certain operatives a modicum of Ability to conduct business In exchange for a promise that Iran is not going to be targeted. The Iranians are not going to be targeted I don't know if that's true. That's plausible. I wouldn't be surprised if it was But I think for Iran I Would like to think that it's less about appeasement of al Qaeda and more about having a piece of leverage over the United States Especially but also over Saudi and Pakistan and everybody else. I mean that's one thing that we tend to forget is that Iran has complicated relationships with everybody there as does al Qaeda and for Iran to have one hand, you know in that cookie jar Gives it a seat at the table in these conversations the same way that it's being involved with Hamas has below and Islami jihad allows it to be at the table at least In theory with the Palestinian Israeli conflict They know that if they can sort of get their foot in the door that they can gain more leverage by being part of important problems And so that's that's more how I see it than appeasement, but I don't know Dan I've got a one of those questions specifically for you. I'm going to read you a quote from The autobiography of harm fossil who was al Qaeda's emissary in East Africa for Decades and really wanted sort of the original cadre In his autobiography he talks about I'm in al Zawahry who This was published in 2010 But he also talks about some of the his what he calls the historical leadership Of al Qaeda referring specifically to saitha lotl And and what he says is kind of interesting. He says quote Speaking of Zawahry, he is called the number two man in the organization But I've never once taken orders from orders from Zawahry Although he became the deputy of the sheik Osama bin Laden after unification And followed the same management style the number two man in the mother al Qaeda organization Is brother saitha lotl after the killing of sheik abu hafs the commander And we do not take orders from anyone but our historical leadership So the question It's been pretty clear after the death of bin Laden Zawahry has really assumed this leadership role But I'm wondering if when you have a cadre of folks that has existed And and fazl talks about this in other settings where there's members of the sharia committee There are members of the operational committee that seem to be in iran is that a Another sort of weight in the organization that potentially pulls al qaeda itself apart because they're You know the folks in iran are dealing with something that's very different a very different operational environment than the folks in pakistan Absolutely, I mean this is This is why for the most part you don't want a global organization That's on the run because you're In different countries the organization in yemen is different from the organization pakistan is different from the organization of gassed as different from the organization in iraq And they can go in different directions. They can discredit one another Strategically, it's very hard to get a coherent framework and some of them have Semi-friendly relations with governments. Some of them have quite adversarial relations with governments and so This has always been both to me one of the greatest strengths and biggest weaknesses of this organization Is it was able to patch together a global alliance in part by taking on lots of enemies And having a number of different organizational styles But by taking on lots of enemies and having a number of different organizational styles You inherently limit your strategic effectiveness It doesn't mean you can't kill people Okay, but it does mean you actually it's very hard to get things done So you compare al qaeda to a group like hamas to a group like his bala These are very effective groups. I mean hamas is the government of gaza right now It went from a relatively limited terrorist group to a government Right, we don't call it that because we don't like it. But it's a government, right? His bala is part of the government of lebanon and has a large apparatus within lebanon It is the most important political actor within lebanon Again, we don't like it But it's very successful in a in a political and sociological sense Al qaeda because it's trying to do so much and because of its different organizational structures never is able to quite achieve those results and They're they haven't resolved some fundamental issues, you know questions. We talk about such as what's their strategy of victory You know, I can give you about five strategies of victory they have but they don't go together particularly well And so they have these dilemmas And I think the global nature the difference in command structures really accentuates them rather than brings them together Eric, why don't we go to the back Hey, jennifer quigley jones from the center for american progress I was actually going to build on that point and despite the fact they're different command structures There's been lots of talk recently about geographical global shifts with al qaeda like the somali people well kenyan Kenyan commanders have said people are moving to yemen. There's lots of talk about al qaeda Moving from iraq into syria and I was wondering how you saw that as affecting al qaeda's presence in iran That's a good question. I I don't It depends how much you believe the presence in iran is communicating with the outside World and my sense is they are communicating but not controlling So information goes back and forth, but that's not the same as strategic direction And so I think it's largely independent But this is something brian raised which I should have mentioned before which is there aren't that many people With the stature of having been with the organization for decades And ironically because a number of the people in iran have kind of been frozen there As opposed to in most cases killed And in some cases arrested you have a certain number of leaders who have a credibility and who have an organizational Context that others lack But so much of what's happening whether it's yemen or algeria is being done at the affiliate level And to me that's really where most of the action is for this organization at the time This affiliate again is a two-edged sword For the organization because it greatly expands their operational reach It means they're active in countries where they wouldn't otherwise be active But at the same time it's hard to have a coherent strategy that Spans the globe as well as continues local as a local context to it So I don't see the iranian Cadres having a huge role in this necessarily But I think should they be released and become much more operationally fluid as has happened for some They as individuals they could certainly at least possibly play a role Eric one in the back very far back Elaine serer for uh franklin fellow I thank you very much for this presentation to go to a couple of points that you've made earlier and then Throughout the mixed messages that are iran sends to various organizations and and countries us pakistan so on Recently with the It's come out that the there's been discussion that the Wives of Osama bin Laden may have had a hand in tipping the balance um The the senior wife for he for he had I've mispronounced her name. What do you think about the issue of her release? In exchange for iranian diplomat in being held in Peshawah by the pakistanis and her immediate arrival in 2010 At the compound in Abadabad as a maybe a way of Helping the us in you know by signaling that the pakistanis obviously knew because she knew where to go Right away. Do you have any thoughts on that? Uh, I don't really The one thing I'll say is this this rumor about there being a deal between al-qaeda And iran to gain the release of an iranian diplomat that was kidnapped in pakistan, and I believe given to the haqqani network It's possible, you know, that's what's been reported I have no reason to doubt it, but I have no reason no evidence to confirm it either. So I guess the way that I would see it is that for iran This wife of bin Laden Gained iran little by keeping her there And gained iran more by releasing her whether that more is getting its diplomat back or not. I don't know But I will say that the iranians of course Never talk about anything like that. They they see the release of that diplomat as A rescue mission undertaken by their own security forces Um So for them it would be a great insult to say that they did a deal with with al-qaeda Because that's one of the great victories of their security forces in the last couple years. So, um, I don't know To be honest, uh, but uh, it's plausible I'll just I'll just say the the wife reports are You know, they're both vague and as journalists say, uh, too good to confirm, right? And so, uh, you know to say I don't know I think is certainly true, but I'd even go beyond this which is I would I would read the evidence on this one a few times over Before I would kind of go too far with it I work for a couple of journalists, so I'm not going to make too many cracks about them Eric right here with a hand up Thank you very much for your presentation What I'm so curious about is with all this speculative fiction about iran And they get blamed for everything, uh, that happens, uh, whether they're responsible or not Why isn't there some discussion about the 15 who hijacked the planes and And created 9 11 And why isn't there any discussion about the wahhabis and the money that pours into the different extremist groups in afghanistan Pakistan the madrasas and all of that Um, it seems like the saudi's get a just a free pass where So much of this comes right out of that selfish wahhabi Kind of a very informed of islam And I like for your comments on that I think Initially the saudi's got slammed after 9 11, right? I mean it was Incredible vitriol against saudi arabia Where in a way they were blamed for for many many things some of which to me were were wrong or Grossly overstated. Uh, I think the difference is that Really starting in 2003 Saudi Arabia became extremely aggressive Going after al-qaeda linked organizations And has cooperated on fundraising and so on. So all these issues that US government officials are usually the first to say, you know Significant progress needs to be made, you know, these kind of euphemistic things But they also say, you know, boy, saudi arabia has really flipped. It's really devoted energy to it It's put high-level attention. The security services went from being lackadaisical to being very aggressive so if you look at the The uh Some of the bombing attempts from yemen, you know, they were stopped because of saudi intelligence You know, that was the key The key piece of information So I think part of the reason saudi arabia is not I'm criticized as much as that even though saudi arabia in a number of ways is still You know far from perfect on this it's seen as really moving in the right direction While the iranians are seen as remaining hostile Um, so it's uh, I think we function of government intent and action as well as the level of activity Yeah, I would just I mean I I understand the perspective, um But I I guess The way that I would phrase is iran hasn't done itself any favors iran has had a lot of opportunities Uh to counter this message with action Uh, and iran just does it, you know, uh, I know that this is how the iranian regime sees it as well um, but there are very simple concrete steps that iran could have taken over the last decade Uh, that would have severely mitigated any narrative Regarding iranian and trans trans agents, uh, iran support for uh outside groups, etc But you know, you have to It's fair I think to blame, uh, us media for having let's say a bias against, um The united states as enemies, uh, and one, you know, uh, that that favors iran's or the united states as allies I mean, I I think certainly there's there's part of that But in the end, uh, I think you also have to fault the iranian regime I mean if they wanted to correct this issue, they could do it Afshan, I have a question for you, which draws on some of the things actually that dan wrote in his foreign policy piece he references the treasuries treasurer department's designation of, um, the ministry of intelligence security mois in iran um as having a relate the treasurer department says that and And asserts that my has had a relationship even with al-qaeda in iraq, which is Perhaps the most virulently Affiliate of al-qaeda We know that other Elements of the iranian regime most specifically irgc the kudz the kudz force The supportive area shea militants that sort of fought on the other side of the sectarian divide in iraq Is there a reason to think that there are bureaucratic divisions within the iranian regime that are driving some of these behaviors And it's not sort of a top-down policy Uh, I think there are reasons to believe that I'll say as i've said with everything that I have no idea what iran is doing in this regard. I mean the real problem with with You know being a an analyst of covert, uh, organizations Or opaque regimes is that they don't give you much To go by and so what I understand of iran's government intelligence service mois And the irgc special forces the kudz force Is that for the most part mois has more jurisdiction domestically Than the kudz force does the kudz force still is able to do things domestically, but Traditionally their whole purpose has been outside of iran's borders, but that's increasingly changed the last few years So it's not surprising to me that mois would let's say be the handlers for al-qaeda in iran Vice kudz force Now regarding what was happening in iraq. I mean it it's surprising to think that mois or kudz force or anybody Would necessarily have a relationship with zarkawi's group Um, or even post-ark howie But I assume that comes from somewhere and I don't know what I can't imagine that that the relationship was Was very strong very consistent or lasting Um, but if one existed who knows, you know, it was an ugly time in 2007 2008, you know, I don't know um, but whether these two Different organizations Have a different sort of perspective on how to handle iran. I think that's a much tougher question to ask I would like to think that given the various sort of public knowledge of al-qaeda iran and The the sensitivity of al-qaeda that It would probably be an issue that was handled at least in terms of strategy if not policy by the supreme leader's office And it could go through various intelligence organizations dealing with al-qaeda and whether mois is that service or not I don't know but Because of the consistency that iran And the very conservative nature that iran has with al-qaeda at least that we've seen I would I would venture to guess that it is a top town decision Questions Yep Um, I want to my name is tima. I'm from the national iranian american council Um, I wanted to know what role al-qaeda plays in syria especially recently with The violence between the rebels in syria and the government and what how that affects the relationship with iran um, and or how iran views Their role in syria Can I interject and actually ask brian to take a first come at this because I think he's Someone's done some very serious work on this. So I can I I could talk a bit about al-qaeda's relationship In syria, but I this is a question. I wanted to ask you as well um al-qaeda clearly intends to Play a role in the syrian rebellion. It's public statements About syria are very very different than those about other other Sort of uh, arenas where there have been revolutions over the past Year and a half two years In north africa the message is essentially coming not only from al-qaeda leaders specifically but from the wider sort of jihadi intellectual community Sort of say hey, let's wait and see how this goes and sort of bite our time in syria. It's all hands on deck Let's let's get in on the game and that's a reasonable I think the most reasonable explanation there is that al-qaeda has more operational Capability in syria than it does in some of these other places. We know You know, this is one of the few instances where we actually have reasonably good data A bit dated at this point that shows that al-qaeda has been able to operate networks inside of syria And and those networks exist now. Many of them are not ideologically driven networks. They are Networks that are criminals or smugglers But some of those networks had relationships with elements of the syrian security forces to You know and some of that is just buying people to look the other way But there's no reason that if al-qaeda in iraq was able to Import foreign fighters into iraq. It's not going to be able to turn those networks around and export people into syria There's been a number of statements now From on jihadi websites by organizations Claiming to be jihadi networks in syria and claiming to do suicide attacks in fact in syria so The way i've been thinking about it is there's so much smoke of al-qaeda in syria that i don't know For sure if there's any fire down there, but the smoke is so thick You almost couldn't see it anyway So with that assertion i don't want to say that al-qaeda dominates the rebellion in any way al-qaeda is Generally speaking a fringe group, but it's a very dangerous fringe group Because in part it can harden the views of a regime right if you are going to try to Buy off or persuade al-awaits within the syrian military regime that they should support the overthrow of Assad That's much easier to do if you know that your family will survive if you've got a deeply sectarian militant group Tied to al-qaeda in iraq that would kill you based on who you are and what you believe based rather than the regime that you support Just makes things worse as to whether that will impact a relationship between al-qaeda and iran I'm not sure. Um, we know that iran sits on the other side of this fence supporting the Assad regime. So i'll leave that question Yeah, i think that's basically that i've never read anything in the iranian press for instance that where iran comments on Al-qaeda specifically they may have they may have referred to terrorists. I don't know Um, but I think clearly iran has a vested interest in the Assad regime continuing Uh, if Assad falls and the resistance Takes over iran. I think is is the biggest loser in in uh outside of Assad, uh in that whole experience so Iran is going to want to continue, uh The Assad regime as long as possible and if al-qaeda is involved in the resistance I think this is only you know added motivation for iran in that regard but Whether that that complicates iran's relationship with al-qaeda Uh, the few guys that are in iran right now Are that we think we're in iran? I don't know. Um, probably a little bit, but not necessarily Iran has been able to keep these guys um within its borders You know despite what zarqawi was doing uh in iraq So I think they already know that you know these al-qaeda guys are bigoted against shia And I think they're okay with that I'll only add that Initially iran's response to the arab spring Was a sense of You know look these kind of corrupt dictatorial pro-american secular regimes are all crumbling So ben ali salla mubarak And you know a sense of gloating But as it's happened in syria, it's it's quite different of course because this is an iranian ally And it openly puts iran against the wishes of the vast majority of the arab people And so there's wider anti iran sentiment because of this as a result and that's true certainly in the Kind of salafi jihadist community But it's also true well beyond that and that's because you know iran's on the side of the bad guys here And openly so And so you're seeing you know in syria itself, but also elsewhere. I think an increase in anti iranian sentiment it's not necessarily you know going to be the dominant shaper of uh policy towards iran in the region, but it's clearly a negative In my view so iran's kind of doomed either way, which is either its best ally leaves Or you have the situation where it's on the wrong side of history for questions All right. I think we'll wrap up there. Um dan afshan. I really very much appreciate you coming in and spending the time on a tricky subject I think we managed most of that reasonably well And to the audience as well. Thank you for the questions and thanks for being here