 Good morning. The committee meets today to receive testimony from General Gregory Geo and Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command and General Laura Richardson, Commander of U.S. Southern Command. This is General Geo's first posture hearing as North com commander and we welcome you sir. I would also note that this is General Richardson's last appearance before the committee in her current role. General, I would like to express my appreciation for your decades of admirable service to the nation including your outstanding leadership of our South com forces. Thank you very much ma'am. I would like to take a moment to acknowledge the ongoing crisis in Haiti. The situation is very concerning and I understand the U.S. military forces have been deployed to augment security at our embassy in Port-au- Prince and evacuate non-essential personnel. This crisis involves both of your commands to varying degrees and I would like to know what resources or support you need to respond. U.S. Northern Command is key to our national security as the principal command for protecting the American home line. Indeed the first of the four priorities outlined in the national defense strategy is quote defending the homeland, paced to the growing multiple domain threat posed by the People's Republic of China. As we consider threats from China and other competitors, our very concept of homeland defense must evolve. General Guiyou, I understand North com published the first homeland defense policy guidance to meet this challenge and when asked for an update on the status of its implementation and how it will transform the homeland defense plans of the department. The urgency of this mission has been made clear over the past year with the incursions of a Chinese surveillance balloon and other unidentified aerial phenomenon in our airspace. These events raise concerns that North com and NORAD may have an awareness gap that needs to be resolved. America's skies and seas must be secure to protect our citizens and the department must pursue technologies that provide forward detection. General, I would be interested in your assessment of these potential awareness gaps and what additional tools or resources are needed to overcome them. Regionally, North com also provides support to the U.S. law enforcement mission by helping to counter cartels engaged in drug smuggling, human trafficking and money laundering across the Southwest border. The committee would appreciate your views on the success of security cooperation efforts with the Mexican Army and Navy and what role North com plays in supporting the Department of Homeland Security in border security operations. Turning to the southern command, General Richardson, your command faces growing challenges from China and Russia in Latin America. The political and economic instability in the region presents a situation that our adversaries are seeking to exploit to increase their own influence. China in particular is expanding its presence in the region, including through investments in strategic infrastructure, such as the port of Balboa and Panama, 5G telecommunications and expanding network of space tracking installations. General, I'm interested in your assessment of the challenge from near peer competitors in Latin America and how we might work strategically with our partners in the region to build resilience against these activities. South com, like North com, continues to work closely with the US Interagency to support counternautic and countertransnational criminal organizations, or TCO. I am concerned about the growing threats from TCOs and synthetic opioid trafficking, including fentanyl, which are contributing to more than 1000 overdose deaths each year in the United States. General Richardson, I would ask for an update on South com's work with part the nations and other US government agencies in counternautic and counter TCO efforts, given South com's limited force posture and resources. Finally, we know that insecurity throughout the South com area is contributing to the flow of migrants north of the US border. Economic instability, violence and corruption continue to be a major source of insecurity in much of the region, especially in the northern triangle countries of Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. General Richardson, I would like to know your views on what more can be done to help improve the situation and strengthen border security throughout the region. Thank you again to all witnesses. I look forward to your testimony. And as a reminder to my colleagues, there will be a closed session immediately following this hearing in room SVC 217. Let me now turn to my colleague Senator Whitmer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank our witnesses for being with us here. Our adversaries, particularly China and Russia are actively working to exploit America's vulnerabilities. They're doing so here at home and seeking to expand their influence in this Western hemisphere. The 2022 National Defense Strategy establishes Homeland Defense as its top priority. That was a year and a half ago. But the Biden administration has not matched that goal with action. Year after year, the Biden administration has declined to fund North coms request for the radars and sensors it needs for proper air defense. Numerous bases on American soil remain unable to protect themselves against small drones. This presents a clear and significant vulnerability. On top of it all, our war games continue to ignore crucial domestic resilience problems that would arise in a potential conflict. The Biden administration also refuses to learn from its Homeland Defense mistakes. Last year, Chinese surveillance balloon laps the laps of last year's defenses with regard to the Chinese surveillance balloon is a case at point. Senior Biden administration defense officials responded evasively to congressional oversight and they leaked classified information selectively to deflect blame. The president's staff declined to conduct an internal review of the major air defense failure. They finally did so when this committee mandated it in the NDA as presided over by our distinguished chair. The spy balloon was a significant failure, but the most pressing Homeland Defense crisis is the one at our southwest border. Approximately 70,000 Americans are dying annually from fentanyl overdoses. Most of the supply is synthesized in Mexico using Chinese precursor chemicals. Then it is trafficked to the United States by Mexico's criminal cartels. The crisis can only worsen as more deadly drugs flood the market. The cartels are also executing an unprecedented human trafficking operation across our open border. And it is lucrative. The gangs are charging thousands of dollars for each person they traffic. The human tragedy is severe. And so is the risk of terrorist infiltration. As CNN reported this past summer, a human smuggling network with ties to ISIS helped more than a dozen individuals enter our country illegally. In October, two Iranians who were on a security threat list were caught as they tried to cross the border from Mexico. General Gio, I recognize that many agencies have responsibility at the southwest border. But DoD is one of them. I hope you will explain how DoD's border security contributions could be improved. We also have challenges further south. I remain concerned about the growing Chinese threats in Central America and South America. The Chinese Communist Party continues to use its well-known playbook in the South Com Theater. It aggressively uses predatory economic and diplomatic practices to influence governments. Simultaneously, it sets conditions to enhance its military presence, gather intelligence, and limit US access and influence. Great power competition is happening right here in the Americas. We cannot ignore it. Two quick examples underscore the urgency. Beijing is making Latin America dependent on Huawei for communications technology, something they tried to do in our country. An example of China's economic influence campaign. We see the CCP's military influence in Cuba, where we discovered a large Chinese Intelligence Collection Center. General Richardson, I look forward to hearing how these practices directly impact the stability of our region. We should understand the threat they pose to our national security. How real is it? How important is it? Of course, there are other malign influences in this theater. Venezuelan President Maduro recently has asserted a provocative extraterritorial claim of sovereignty over a large, all rich portion of the neighboring nation of Guyana. This type of instability so close to our homeland is troubling. Even more troubling is the consistent mismatch between the requirements Southcom has and the resources it receives. We need to find cost effective ways to exert influence in this theater. For example, let's explore the use of the Office of Strategic Capital in the future. I look forward to General Richardson's candid assessment of Southcom's most pressing resource and capability shortfalls. And I'm eager to learn what Congress can do to help. General Guillaume, I note that your name rhymes with hero. Is that right? Yeah, yes, Senator does. Okay, good. Well, we we expect both of you to live up to these expectations. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Wicker. And I'll let me recognize General Guillaume, please. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. It's a profound honor to command and represent the men and women of North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command. As we speak this morning, American and Canadian military and civilian personnel from both commands are actively defending our homelands against significant persistent threats from multiple vectors in all domains. Although I've only been in command a few weeks, it is readily clear to me that the United States, Canada and our expansive network of partners are facing in an extraordinarily complex strategic environment. Competitors seeking to diminish our military and economic advantage have fielded advanced kinetic systems designed to strike civilian and military infrastructure in North America, both above and below the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, competitors have rapidly advanced and routinely use non-kinetic capabilities targeting our critical infrastructure and our essential networks. Threats to the homeland are present in all domains and along all avenues of approach to include the Arctic region. As stated in the National Defense Strategy, the People's Republic of China remains our pacing challenge as the People's Liberation Army modernizes and grows at a rapid pace. The PRC's expanding nuclear capability and capacity alongside its development of modern submarines, missiles, hypersonic weapons all present significant challenges for homeland defense. While the PRC's capabilities are growing quickly, Russia remains a threat to the homeland today and is an immediate nation-state concern. Russia retains the world's largest stockpile of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons along with significant capacity to strike inside North America with air and sea-launched precision conventional weapons. Despite heavy losses to its ground forces in Ukraine, Russia has invested heavily in systems that can threaten the United States such as advanced guided-missile submarines, hypersonic glide vehicles, ICBMs, as well as significant cyber and undersea capabilities, as well as developmental systems such as nuclear torpedo and a nuclear-powered cruise missile. Meanwhile, North Korea continues its bellicose rhetoric while test launching increasingly advanced long-range missiles and expanding its ties with China and Russia. While Iran currently lacks the capability to strike North America with long-range missiles, it is investing in that capability. Iran also supports violent militant groups in the Middle East and maintains a worldwide network of operational surrogates. And the most prevalent and growing threats include cyber and small unmanned aerial systems that are being employed inside the U.S. and Canada against civilian and military infrastructure in ways that were not possible even just a few years ago. With those risks firmly in mind, NORAD and NORTHCOM strive to begin homeland defense well beyond North America. To do so, both commands are working with the services and Congress to improve domain awareness in order to detect, track, and defeat threats ranging from long-range ballistic missiles to small unmanned aerial systems. The defense of North America is an active endeavor that requires NORAD and NORTHCOM to campaign against threats in all domains along all approaches. That effort requires seamless exchange of information with combatant commands, conventional and special operations forces, the intelligence community, and the spectrum of interagency and international partners. The importance of collecting and disseminating information quickly cannot be overstated. I strongly support the department's work to advance the combined joint all-domain command and control concept as we seek to detect and track potential threats and share information as quickly as possible with analysts, operators, and decision makers around the world. Finally, upon taking command, I began a 90-day assessment to inform the department, the Joint Force, and Congress on NORAD and NORTHCOM's ability to execute assigned tasks and make recommendations on where the commands could or should do more. Once complete, I look forward to sharing my findings and updated vision on how NORAD and NORTHCOM will best execute the noble mission of homeland defense. The challenges facing our homelands are real, but there should be no doubt about NORAD and NORTHCOM's resolve to deter aggression and, if necessary, defeat threats to our nation and our citizens. Again, I thank you for the opportunity to appear this morning. I look forward to working with the committee and I'm happy to answer your questions. Thank you, General Gio. General Richardson, please. Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Wicker, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today with General Gio. I'm honored to represent the dedicated men and women of United States Southern Command to discuss the challenges we share with our neighbors in Latin America and the Caribbean. Our national security strategy recognizes the direct link between this region's security and our own security. We are harnessing the power of partnership from Team USA in support of Team Democracy by leveraging all instruments of national power, diplomacy, information, military, and economics, to expeditiously assist partner nations in addressing the challenges that impact our collective security. This region, which is our shared neighborhood, remains under assault from a host of cross-cutting transboundary challenges that directly threaten our homeland. I have seen these challenges intensify since I met with you last year, and this remains a call to action. In almost two and a half years in the command, I've made it my priority to meet partners where they are and to listen and understand the challenges that affect us all. The world is at an inflection point, our partners in the Western Hemisphere, with whom we are bonded by trade, shared values, democratic traditions, and family ties are increasingly impacted by the interference and coercion. I've learned that our presence absolutely matters. The People's Republic of China has exploited the trust of democracies in this hemisphere using that trust to steal national secrets, intellectual property, and research related to academia, agriculture, and healthcare. The scope and scale of this espionage is unprecedented. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, the PRC aims to amass power and influence at the expense of the world's democracies. Here in the Western Hemisphere, Latin America and the Caribbean have the potential to feed and fuel the world. Understanding this, the PRC has already and is already busy extracting and exploiting. Predatory investment practices, construction of mega ports and dual-use space facilities, and criminal cyber activities are just a few of the PRC's malign activities that jeopardize the sovereignty and safety of the region. Russia remains an acute threat and seeks to increase its foothold by bolstering authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. In the last year, China, Russia, and Iran have increased their presence diplomatically, economically, and even militarily in the region. These activities undermine democracies and challenge their credibility. Both China and Russia exploit the presence of transnational criminal organizations and amplify their destabilizing impacts on democratic governments. TCOs, traffic, weapons, drugs, people, gold, lithium, rare earth minerals, commodities, and counterfeit goods while contributing to the surge of fentanyl-related deaths here at home. The good news is, working with our very willing partners leads to the best defense. We must use all available levers to strengthen our partnerships with the 28 like-minded democracies in this hemisphere who understand the power of working together to counter these shared threats. The United States remains the preferred and most trusted security partner in the region. We build trust through investment and security cooperation programs that train and equip our partners, our partner military and security forces, a robust joint exercise program to build interoperability and the development and employment of emerging technologies. Moreover, we maximize the resources allocated by the Department of State's International Military Education and Training Program for military financing, for military sales, to build that interoperability and counterbalance PRC military engagements and investments. As the national defense strategy states, the U.S. derives immense benefit from a stable, peaceful and democratic western hemisphere that would also reduce the security threats to the homeland. U.S. Southcom continues to innovate and adapt putting integrated deterrence into action every day. We remain committed to working across all domains with allies and partners, combatant commands, the joint force, the U.S. interagency, non-federal entities and the U.S. Congress to guarantee safety, security and prosperity throughout the western hemisphere. This is the work and promise of U.S. Southcom as part of Team USA in support of Team Democracy. Thank you for your assistance in resourcing this team. I would also like to recognize behind me in the audience the Inter-American Defense College class that is here today to see how the power of our United States Congress and how the Department of Defense and us as combatant commanders talk about our regions. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. Well, thank you very much. At the suggestion of my colleague, would all the students please stand to be recognized? And on behalf of my colleagues, let me say bien de needles. Gracias. Please proceed. General Geo, we've had widely resorted penetrations of our airspace by unmanned vehicles. Has DOD developed a defined standard operating procedures for individual base commanders in dealing with these vehicles? Because they could show up and be detected minutes before they would be penetrating the space. Do we have a system or SOPs to deal with them? Chairman, shortly after taking command and beginning my 90-day assessment, I realized that the challenge of the large increase in the number of incursions by UASs was something that was going to drive and change probably the direction of my first year in command because of that acute number. The services do have authorities, but work remains to be done to ensure that they're resourced, they're equipped, and then we have standardized operating procedures to address those threats. And also work remains to be done, Chairman, to be able to use, especially the non-kinetic capabilities that can bring down those systems safely without interfering with our airspace structure. At this present time, nor at a Northcom, do not have a designated role in that. But in my recommendations at the end of the 90-day assessment, I will point out ways that I think that nor at a Northcom could and should play a role in bringing that standardization that you mentioned. And this process would involve other agencies such as the Department of Justice, the FBI, the Homeland Security. Will we be working at that joint agency level? Yes, Chairman. They have some authorities now, and then as you alluded to, we would need to bring them all together so we're bringing each capability together against the same incursion threat. Thank you. General Richardson, the situation Haiti is deteriorating rapidly. On March 10th, though, we sent in augmentation forces to the embassy. There's already been some extractions of personnel from the embassy in Haiti. And then on March 11th, the Secretary of Defense increased DOD's contribution of up to $200 million to provide logistic support for a security force to come into Haiti. Could you just give us your sense of the implications of the situation in Haiti for the United States and the region? Thank you, Senator. And Chairman, thank you for the question. And so certainly the U.S. Southcom has a wide range of contingency plans. So we're ready for whatever would be required for a Department of Defense response. And so over the conducted two missions that have been widely publicized of increasing security and its routine actions that would take place for any of our embassies across the globe. And the situation in Haiti has been deteriorating over the past couple of weeks. And so with the announcement that has come and the political negotiations that have been happening and occurring, the violence has been tamped down somewhat over the past couple of days. And so certainly the political solution seems to be working. And hopefully that continues on a positive path. But if not, we have, as I said, the contingency plans ready to respond from U.S. Southcom. Thank you. You pointed out the penetration of your ale by China and Russia. It seems that one of the leading edges of China's activities is economic, buying ports, getting the Belt and Road project underway. And there's one other area, too, that is their willingness or their eagerness to acquire more interest in the Inter-American Development Bank. And I understand that Congress must pass legislation to authorize the United States to buy this year as before the Chinese do. Is that accurate? And if the Chinese beat us out, would that be a problem? That would be a problem, Chairman. And I think through the U.S. Government's initiative with the American Prosperity, American Partnership for Economic Prosperity, APEP, where the administration hosted 11 Latin American heads of state in Washington, D.C. in November of 23. And this would be part of that, that our ability to invest in critical infrastructure through the Inter-American Development Bank and the Development of Finance Corporation, DFC. And so these shares that are coming up 75 million in shares for the U.S. to purchase those shares in the Inter-American Development Bank. And this bank has been established in 1959 to do exactly these things to invest in critical infrastructure within the region. And if we don't do it, the Chinese will. Exactly right, Chairman. Thank you. Senator Worker, please. Thank you. Let's just stay in Southcom. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro took unprecedented steps to establish control over the contested Esaquibo region of neighboring Guyana. This violated an international court of justice ruling. And the region accounts for two thirds of Guyana's territory and extensive offshore oil riches. How has this impacted the security of the region and particularly the fact that Venezuela has deployed like tanks, armored carriers, and missile-equipped patrol boats along the affected border? So, Senator, it absolutely has. And it is in terms of our relationship with Guyana as a very willing partner and a democracy in the region, very important partner. And we see that what the Maduro regime and Venezuela are doing and the activities that are taking against this democracy with an unjustified claim. And so, our support for Guyana, we have shown that from the U.S. government and through all the instruments of national power, the diplomacy, the military, and inserting- Do you have directions from the White House or from your superiors in the department as to what we should do? So, as we work our, my engagements and what we do with security cooperation, we have a very robust plan with Guyana and we've continued on that plan and that's been coordinated with our U.S. government. You briefly described the plan. And so, it consists of visits by folks within my command and the engagements that we do, the exercises, the subject matter exchanges. We've continued with all of those, not trying to exacerbate the situation, but continued on path with our regular engagements that have been scheduled and we have not halted any of that. Is the international community assisting us in that regard? The international community is very, very much assisting and I would say our allies as part of our Western Hemisphere Framework that we signed in U.S. Southcom with our allies that work in the region, the U.K., Canada, the Netherlands, and also France. And so, as we work together to coordinate our activities, they also have activities and engagements that they do in the region and are doing in Guyana. And those are also coordinated. Thank you very much. Let me switch to General Guillaume. Deployment of National Guard troops on the border. I think maybe a lot of Americans don't understand how often we do this. But it's worsen considerably the Department is not the lead agency but it has deployed troops there in 18 of the previous 21 years. They're called temporary deployments but it's beginning to look like permanent. There is a difference in the way we deploy and notify these units, is there not, in the sense that if it's a temporary deployment, they get 180 days notice in advance. If it's a regular deployment, it's a year and a half. So could you discuss that with us and is my understanding correct there, General? Senator, your understanding is correct. The primary difference that we see in Northern Command is we're in support, as you mentioned. So therefore we wait for the request from the lead agency, in this case Customs and Border Protection, and a request for assistance that is reviewed and then has ultimately been approved by the Department of Defense. And then at that point we can start trying to match through the Joint Staff and the National Guard Bureau, the correct unit to support that based on the needs that are in that request for assistance. As you alluded to that. Would it be helpful if we treated it as a permanent deployment? Senator, I think more than treating it as a permanent deployment would be earlier notification of the requirements. Since those change, that allows us to tailor the National Guard Force to meet the changing requirements of the Custom and Border Protection. Whereas if we had a permanent force, we might have permanently the wrong type of unit to support. However, to your point, what we've established and we must maintain is having a permanent command and control structure over there. So we have continuity and predictability in how we present the forces and work with the Customs and Border Protection. Do we need to give you different authority in that regard? Or is it just a matter of the Department? Senator, I think we have the, I'm sorry. Senator, we have the authorities that we need. The thing that we would most benefit from, as you alluded to, is time. Time to pick and train and prepare the National Guard units that are going to go down there and support the CVP. Well, to both of you, tell us what you need. We'll try to get it for you. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much, Senator Worker, Senator King, please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my note, since you've been talking, I've written word gap about five times. So I'm going to talk about gaps. General Gale, do we have a sensor gap at NORAD? We learn more from failures than we do from successes. What did we learn from the balloon incursion about the adequacy of our sensors, which is essentially the basis of NORAD? Senator, we learned a great deal. To the gaps, what we have is we had some gaps in the layered approach where we wanted to be able to detect with domain awareness from satellites down to traditional air sensors. One of the problems is low altitude, isn't it? That's right, sir, all the way down to the surface and then even in the undersea. We were able to address many of those on initiatives that were started by my predecessor, General Van Herk, by changing the sensitivity of the radars that we do have. And that has allowed us to have better domain awareness in that regime that you mentioned. However, there are some gaps that will be manifesting in the near future. Those are currently scheduled to be addressed by the Over the Horizon radar, by the HBTSS, which is the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space system. Those capabilities are essential to fill gaps that are growing because of the increased capability of the adversaries. I would suggest that that's an urgent need given the experience that we've had, but also given the incredible militarization of the Arctic coast by Russia and the development of drone technology, all those things added together create a significant risk. I hope you can come to us with what you need because this is something we need to do in a hurry. We can't wait five years to develop this capacity. We also have an icebreaker gap in terms of our ability to operate in the Arctic. As the Arctic Ocean opens up, it's becoming, as I mentioned, more militarized by the Russians and a much more important body of water. It's like we've suddenly discovered the Mediterranean Sea. Talk to me about icebreakers. Icebreakers, we only have one and a half icebreakers, heavy icebreakers in the Arctic. That's correct, Senator. And that is a work we're severely outnumbered. We appreciate the Coast Guard. I'd say 40 to 1 is outnumbered. That's the approximate number that the Russians have. Yes, Senator, and the Chinese declaring themselves a near Arctic nation. I notice when the Chinese declared themselves a near Arctic nation, my position is that Maine is a near Caribbean state. I share your view, sir. We do appreciate that the Coast Guard is procuring more icebreakers, but even with those, we'll be severely outnumbered. And that does limit our freedom of maneuver in that region. Basically like not having a road to get where you need to get. General Richardson, let's talk about another gap, drugs. Since we've been sitting here about 10 Americans have died of drug overdoses. Just since we began this meeting 45 minutes ago, one person a day is dying in my home state of Maine. Do you have the capacity to interdict drug shipments coming in by sea that we know of? I've asked this question every year for about the past 10 years, and I'm afraid I know the answer. And Senator, so in U.S. Southcom we have the detection and monitoring mission, and that is to gain the intelligence for drug shipments. I shouldn't have said that you have the capacity. Do we, does the country, you have the terrific capacity for intelligence and identification. My concern is once we know about a dangerous shipment, then do we have the capacity to interdict it? And so we pass that intelligence over to law enforcement or our partner nations, and it depends on who's close enough to do that. And so in terms of the capacity we anticipate that we're able to of what we know is out there interdict about 10% of the known problem, and with the resourcing and capabilities that we currently are given. I would emphasize that figure to our colleagues. We can interdict 10% of what we know of. That's inexcusable. I don't mean it's inexcusable for you, but one of the problems it strikes me is when everybody's in charge, nobody's in charge, and you've got yourself, DEA, DHS, the intelligence community, and the problem is Americans are dying. In about every 10 days we have September 11th. 3,000 people die in this country every 10 days, and you use the word in your testimony, assault. And that's what it is. It's an assault, but we're treating it as a kind of domestic law enforcement problem when it's an assault, and most of it is coming from outside of our country. So I hope that you will work with your colleagues perhaps form a task group to get after this problem of interdiction. And if we don't have capacity, if we don't have enough Coast Guard cutters or DHS doesn't have the capacity, tell us. Tell us, because we can't solve a problem if we don't know what it is. We know the general shape of the problem, but you're in a position to tell us what's missing and what you can do in order to help protect this country. And Senator, I would offer that we can't interdict our way out of this problem and we've got to be able to go after the networks. We've got to be able to go after the drug labs. We've got to be able to follow the money and the money laundering, which is fueling this very rich environment that the transnational criminal organizations. We agree and we have to talk about the demand side here and treatment and prevention. I totally agree with that, but this is a discrete problem that I think we do have some capacity to deal with. Final question. This isn't about a gap, but what is your overall assessment of the Chinese incursion into Latin America? Specifically, they've been doing this for some time, doing infrastructure projects. In other parts of the world there's some development of buyer's remorse that the Chinese haven't performed as they were expected, that the debt colonialism is becoming a problem. Is that occurring in Latin America in your view? Absolutely, Senator. My concern as a combatant commander for the region and 22 of 31 countries in the region have signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative, but it's all investment, a lot of investment in critical infrastructure where the big money projects are. That's Deepwater Port, 5G, Space, Safe City, Smart City, Technology to be able to spy on the populations. With these state-owned enterprises from the PRC, and my concern is being able to use those for military application if required, and it's in all of the critical infrastructure. Thank you. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Fisher, please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for being here today. General Geo, I've appreciated our discussions on the challenges of detecting, characterizing, and tracking potential threats to our homeland. And most Americans are fully aware of the incident with the Chinese balloon, but North Com has other responsibilities as well, especially with protecting the homeland from the more advanced threats that are out there, which would include ballistic and cruise missiles. Why is having that improved domain awareness, which is the ability to detect and track the threats, and also to provide a clear threat picture of what's out there, and to be able to discriminate what you're seeing. Why is that so important to defending our homeland? Senator, it's important because it gives us time, time to inform leaders, make decisions, and enact defeat mechanisms to defeat these threats that are coming in. You mentioned the discrimination capability as the threat becomes more advanced, and they can put out decoys. We could needlessly shoot interceptors at objects that are not a threat, but having the discrimination radar makes sure that we can actually shoot and kill the warhead that would be a threat. And the other thing I would quickly say, Senator, is the capabilities are growing so much by the adversary that domain awareness you mentioned needs to push out further away from our shores, detect earlier, characterize them earlier, as you mentioned, so we have more time to employ the defense capabilities that we have. Are we moving quickly enough? Senator, we're right on the edge. I think that we're moving quickly, and I appreciate all the support from this body and the services, but we can't pause at all because the adversaries and multiple adversaries, not just one, are growing very, very quickly, and it really is at an alarming rate. I'm concerned about what we're seeing in the President's budget request for FY 2025. The administration decreases spending for the glide phase interceptor program, and it's stating it's going to be delivered in 2035, yet in the NDA of FY 24 in section 1666, that requires the Missile Defense Agency to achieve an initial operational capability of that program by December 31, 2029. How do you respond to my concerns? Senator, my response is that I view hypersonics as perhaps the most destabilizing threat that we have out there because of the fast speed, and more than that, the maneuverability and the unpredictability on where it will impact, as opposed to a ballistic missile, which is fairly predictable. I've worked very closely in my short period of time with the MDA. I'm pleased with some of the efforts that they're doing to intercept in the glide phase and then also using existing systems such as the SM-6 to adapt against that threat. And then I'm also very pleased with what MDA is doing with the HBTSS, the satellite capability to detect and track hypersonics. You know, just yesterday we heard from a senior analyst with the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. He told Congress that, quote, China now has the world's leading hypersonic arsenal. So given the pace that we're seeing with Russia and with China as they advance their hypersonic weapons programs, should the department accelerate the development of those hypersonic defense systems really when it is technically feasible to do so? Senator, I support moving all of our capabilities against the strategic threats that you mentioned as far left as possible based on the growing and consistently growing capabilities of our adversaries. Thank you. General Richardson, thank you for all the work that you have done and your service to this country. When we talk about China and the Belt and Road initiatives, you answered Senator King on that. But when you're looking at the longer-term strategies that China has in the bind that they continue to do in your area of responsibility, how serious a threat is that? I look at it as a serious threat because of the ability of these state-owned, controlled by the government companies. If I just take the Panama Canal and the five state-owned enterprises that are along either side of the Panama Canal, and that's a very important strategic line of communication. And so there are a lot of large implications there in terms of in all the critical infrastructure, the bottom ports, the 5G space, safe city, smart city technology. So very concerning. Thank you and thank you, General Geo. You made comments, I think it was yesterday before the House Committee, or two days ago, before the House Armed Services Committee about seeing or the possibility of seeing in the very near future of Chinese aircraft in closeness to our homeland. I thank you for bringing that to our attention. Thank you, Senator Fisher. Senator Hirono, please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here. General Geo, I remain concerned about the DOD's missile defense posture, yes you can call it, and that the DOD does not have a plan to address the current and future missile defense needs of Hawaii. And it's an issue that I have brought up with just about everybody who comes to testify from the DOD. And the 2024 NDAA directs a plan for the missile defense of Hawaii, which Indo-Paycom is leading. General, your predecessor told me last year that Northcom is responsible for protecting Hawaii against ballistic missile threats from North Korea. But of course, we also need to concern ourselves with the missile threats, cruise missiles, and hypersonics. Have you been coordinating with Indo-Paycom regarding the development of the missile defense plan? Senator, I have. We work very closely with Indo-Paycom on all defense of our entire homeland. And I also agree with the characterization that General Van Herk did on our specific role in that. So I have some concerns that there are so many different commands involved in the missile defense of Hawaii, missile defense in general. So we have you, we have, well we have Northcom, Indo-Paycom, Spacecom, Stratcom, missile defense agency. Do you have some concerns about how all of you are coordinating and coming up with the kind of plan that we need for missile defense? Senator, I think that we communicate very well with each other. I think that we all understand the priorities. And so I haven't seen any place where having multiple agencies responsible for a common area, presenting a seam or a challenge. But I'm very acutely aware of the potential and I watch for that very closely. The 2224 NDAA, as I mentioned, directs a plan from Indo-Paycom. So that plan is going to be presented to us, I hope by next month, which is the timeframe for that plan. So I assume that that plan will reflect the coordinated input from all of you. General Richardson, China is building a deep water port in Peru that is expected to open this November and will be the first South American port controlled by China. And this is just one example of China's growing influence in Latin America through economic ties, controlling critical minerals, and establishing port and space facilities. This presents unique strategic risk to U.S. national security and global order. General, what changes are you seeing in the region as a result of the growing influence of the PRC? And what steps are you taking to counter China's influence in Latin America? So thank you, Senator. And we have doubled down and with the increase of funding last year from the United States Congress, us in Southcom and AFRICOM received some funds funding that went to security cooperation programs and then also with flexible authorities. So that was extremely helpful. And it allows us to be very responsive in terms of being able to help our partner nations to counter the influence of China. And so I want to thank you for that. And our ability to be able to respond and be responsive, these heads of state are generally in the seat for one term of four years. So they're working on a stopwatch, not a calendar, and they're trying to show progress within months, not years. And so really appreciate that resourcing. Do you have so you mentioned that we have provided additional resources. Do you think that we are doing enough to counter? Because China is, from my perspective, everywhere. And especially, of course, in the Indo-Pacific area, we know what their influences are with the Pacific Islandations, for example. So now they're in Latin America. Are we doing enough to really address all of the kind of long term focus that China has throughout your part of the world? So, Senator, through all of the instruments of power of Team USA and bringing those together, and synchronizing and integrating better, the chairman brought up the APEP, the American Partnership for Economic Prosperity, and the IDB Invest program that through that initial program to invest in the western hemisphere is huge. And it's just a start, and I would recommend that that is something very similar, this program, to the Economic Recovery Act of 1948, which was so instrumental in terms of the economic recovery. And I see that this economic recovery for the region due to the impacts of COVID, what it did to the economies of the region, and now the transnational criminal organizations taking advantage of this. And so this is a first start with these 11 heads of state from Latin America that were here in Washington in November of 23 for this program that was rolling out billions of dollars for critical infrastructure investment by the U.S. government. So we are on a very good path with a third of our Latin American leaders with this economic investment. And I would say that national security rests on their economic security. And we can do more. And through this program, if we can build this out, we would be on a good path with our partners in our shared neighborhood so close to our homeland. Well, that aspect of working with our Latin American allies, I think is really critical because that's what we're doing in the Indo-Pacific area. Could I just ask one more question relating to some questions from Senator King? Keep it short. You mentioned that regarding that the interdiction of drugs that it requires us to really pay attention to some other aspects such as going after these criminal forces. Is there an intergovernmental task force of some sort that you're all working together would include DOD, DOJ, Coast Guard to counter the drug threat? We are working together. I would say that we need to there needs to be more focus, more resourcing on this particular grouping to get after the problem sets. And I would say from the money laundering to the drug labs and following where not just the small semi submersible that has it's loaded with counter narcotics but actually getting to where it's produced and getting in there. And so the work that we've done in Columbia has been very effective but the amounts are only increasing. And so we've got to figure out we've got to follow this money and we've got to get after these TCOs as a holistic, more filled out robust program. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Rounds yielded to Senator Budd. Senator Budd, please. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you, Senator Rounds, for yielding. Senator Aguio, thank you both for being here, by the way. It's my understanding there have been a lot of drone incursions along our southern border. How many drone incursions have we had? And what are they doing? Senator, the number of incursions was something that was alarming to me as I took command last month. I don't know the actual number. I don't think anybody does, but it's in the thousands. I have talked to Customs and Border Protection who are responsible for the UAS incursions and in the border along with DOJ. And they put the number at thousands. Over what period of time is that thousands? I would say in the probably over a month we could probably have over a thousand a month. General, do they in your view represent a homeland defense threat? Senator, they alarm me from being the person responsible for a homeland defense. I haven't seen any of them manifest in a threat to the level of national defense, but I see the potential only growing. General, continuing on with a different topic. Do you consider the F-15E strike eagle to be a capable aircraft? Are there particular characteristics for the F-15 that make it ideal for homeland defense? Senator, I think the F-15E strike eagle is a phenomenal aircraft. What makes it applicable in our theater is the same thing that makes it applicable around the world is its versatility. It's in many ways unmatched air to ground and in many ways it's unmatched air to air. It has a phenomenal radar that can be, it's an AESA radar, electrically scanned, which allows it to pick out low, slow moving and also low radar cross-section, such as drones or other threats like cruise missiles. So the strike eagle is a fantastic aircraft. Thank you. So in its fiscal year 25 budget, the Air Force plans to divest 26 F-15 strike eagles at the same time that it's buying less than expected F-35s, F-15EXs and other fighters. So it's got me very concerned, not just for homeland defense and the descriptions that you shared a moment ago, but including potential conflict with China and also for responses to crises and other geographic combatant commands. So if we, you would agree to keep your eye on that and share with us concerns as they arise related to the F-15. I will, Senator. Thank you. So changing topics, General Richardson and General Guillaume, both, you mentioned TCOs just a minute ago, General Richardson. Like the Mexican drug cartels, they often move not just drugs and lethal fentanyl, but they move people. So many of these activities proceed without interruption in both of your areas of responsibility. Section 1068 of the fiscal year 2024 NDAA requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a plan for coordinating with defense partners in North and South America and supporting inter-agency departments and agencies to counter human trafficking, including human trafficking by these TCOs. So have either of you been consulted on developing that plan? General Richardson, we'll start with you. So, Senator, we work migration every day in the United States Southern Command and for this past year with the trilateral agreement that the United States government signed with Panama and Columbia. So we're very aware of the migration. General Guillaume, beyond just general awareness, Secretary of Defense is required to submit a plan for coordinating with defense partners. Are you working on that plan? I am not specifically working on that plan for the Department of Defense. The OSD and the joint staff would be working on that plan. Thank you. General Guillaume. Senator, the same answer. We are not working directly. We're in support of the Department. Not to you, but to the Department of Defense and the Secretary. That's disappointing. So I'd like to follow up with both you and the Department on this to make sure that that begins to get implemented so we can begin stopping the illegal flow of deadly fentanyl and other drugs and the tragic trafficking of humans. You know, that's big business for the cartels and it's contributing to instability in countries across our hemisphere. So what efforts beyond that plan, since that's not yet being developed, what efforts are already underway with you or your partners to address human trafficking? General Richardson. Thank you, Senator. And I'm not aware that the report is not, the report could very well be well along its way. We're just not actively working on it from our levels. And a lot of times the joint staff and the OSD will work those things to allow us to continue to execute our daily missions. But we are working very closely because I have the Darien in my AOR, which is a huge human trafficking area. And you're exactly right, in terms of the transnational criminal organizations have only gotten more powerful, over $300 billion annual revenue business. They traffic humans, drugs, gold, lithium, all kinds of counterfeit goods, and so only getting more powerful. And so the work that we do, the Colombian military and their operation, Hifesto, to go after the criminal networks that are doing these criminal activities, as well as the Panama, centerfront and Sinan border forces that are going after the criminal networks in Panama. In the interest of time, Chairman, I'll yield, but I would love to continue discussions, perhaps offline, about your efforts in regards to human trafficking in Northcom. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Bud. Senator Kelly, please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Gio, General Richardson. Great to see both of you. General Richardson, yesterday we're talking a little bit about Haiti, and the situation on the ground, being chaotic gangs running rampant in their capital. And this week the Prime Minister of Haiti announced he would resign, and then Kenya paused the agreement to send 1,000 police officers until a new government would be put into place. Southcom has successfully airlifted embassy staff out of the country but a number of Americans still remain in Haiti and some may be looking to leave. Some are concerned that the U.S. has not initiated a non-combatant evacuation order, a NEO, to get Americans out of Haiti. General, have you been tasked to operate an evacuation? So, Senator, as part of the wide range of contingency plans that U.S. Southcom has, we are ready for a NEO activation, if required, and have other plans ready to go, as we always do, and keep those plans refreshed over and over. So, we're ready at any time for any type of crisis. And are you doing, so you say you're ready now, but are there any additional preparations in the event that this becomes a necessity? I think the two missions of increasing the security at the embassy and a little bit of my capability as well, expanding that, is the platform that we would use if we need to expand from there. And so, we put in all of the necessary measures that are necessary for any of the plans to be activated. So, it would be true to say that there's mission planning currently underway in case you have to do this? Senator, we always do mission planning in the military, so absolutely. Well, thank you. Thank you, General. General Guillaume, just on Monday morning, I got back from a trip to the Arctic, where I was able to see firsthand some of the efforts by the Navy to pursue our Arctic strategic objectives. And the Arctic is a real, an area of concern and a great example of the intersection between defense policies, climate, and strategic partnerships. Melting ice is making the Arctic more accessible to everyone, including Russia and China. It's rich with oil, minerals, fishing, other natural resources, and we have to ensure that a free and peaceful Arctic benefits the United States and our partners and allies. Russia seeks to use the Arctic as a staging ground for power projection, in addition to its being a critical defense and deterrent for their homeland. But they also seek to control the region. We've made real progress in combating Russian influence in the Arctic over the last year, with Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Now every country with a border on the Arctic is part of NATO, with the exception of Russia. And we must not miss this opportunity to advance our interests in the Arctic, while Russia is focusing on their illegal and brutal invasion of Ukraine. General Guillaud, I'd like to hear in more detail what you think the U.S. and NATO strategy should look like in the Arctic. Senator, first thanks for visiting our forces up there during ice camp, as you alluded to. It's an extremely important operation that demonstrates our capability up there with the submarines and LC-130s and all the other aircraft and forces. As far as what we could do or should do with NATO in the Arctic, you described exercises that we're doing on the, I'll call the Alaska side, or the 10 o'clock approach. We've also had some success working with NATO and European command on the 2 o'clock, the Northeast approach, just last week for the first time in over two years, the Russians sent two bear bombers down along that avenue through what we call the GEI-UK gap. Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom approaching the Canadian and the United States air defense identification zones. I haven't seen this activity in over two years. We were able to track them the entire time thanks to the radar network and the information sharing between countries within UCOM. Norway is one that I'll point out, and Northern command. So we were able to track this activity. Or did you, what range were you able to intercept them? Senator, we didn't have to intercept them because we had aircraft flying to the point where we would intercept them before they crossed the identification zone and the Russians turned around prior to reaching that zone. So we had aircraft, both Canadian and U.S. fighters postured along the line, which I think is probably disheartening to the Russians to fly all that way to find out that we're waiting for them. That's due to NATO cooperation. So the Russians are pretty good operating in the Arctic. Have you seen advancements by the Chinese? What I've seen, Senator, is a willingness and a desire by the Chinese to act up there. We've seen them in the maritime. We've seen them under the cloud of a technical or scientific research, but we think it's certainly multi-mission to include military. And then I expect to see air activity in the Alaska part of the Arctic as soon as this year, potentially. It's a very big concern of mine. All right, thank you, General. Thank you, Senator Kelley. Senator around, please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Guille, General Richardson, first of all, thank you to you and your teams for your service to our country. I'd like to follow up just a little bit with what Senator Kelley began talking about with regard to Haiti. And so General Richardson, it seems to me that it rather surprises me that there may not have been any advanced notice requesting additional or follow-up with regard to the possibility of a neo-operation in Haiti. Wouldn't that seem to be kind of an advisory that would be appropriate if you receive something, at least from the administration, indicating that it's a possibility and that wouldn't that maybe give you the opportunity to notify those individuals responsible for providing you with the resources necessary to do your duty to be ready to go? Or, I mean, it doesn't seem to me that they can be on high alert all the time. Could you just expand on that a little bit, please? So, Senator, I didn't mean to give the perception that we're not ready or that nobody's asked us to be ready or anything like that. We have been discussing that and talking about that. And I have been talking with our joint staff, our chairman and our Secretary of Defense over the past two weeks about all of the range of plans that we might have to do, an evacuation, a neo-mass migration, all of those things. And then so those missions of extracting some non-essential personnel from the U.S. and the states. It's not just a matter of being ready to fight tonight as much as, yeah, we are aware of it and we are doing some pre-planning just in case the call is made. Absolutely, Senator. We are ready to go. We have all of our plans ready to go. Okay, thank you. And then also, I noted with regard to discussions earlier here about the transnational criminal organizations, the drug cartels and so forth, south of our border. Both of you have some responsibilities with regard to whether it's in other parts of the nor'eid command or SOCOM. Just a reminder once again that under the NDAA, we've already authorized the use of our cyber teams to be able to find out in advance and to know who these people are, where they bank, how they communicate, and so forth. So hopefully we will not just authorize, but now we will fund that part of the operation so that we can assist those countries who want our expertise in finding out more about these organizations that that is available to them and simply that it is available to you for your use. Let me also just, General Gio, with the potential investments of fighter aircraft by the Air Force, there are concerns about how the Air National Guard, who shoulder a significant portion of the burden of homeland defense, how they will be able to continue to support you in that capacity, while also fulfilling their obligations under the National Defense Strategy. I bring this up because the resourcing of the Air National Guard that the resourcing that the Air National Guard receives appears to be incongruent with their mission assignments, which include both the aerospace control alert defense strategy using the same resources and then also supporting the joint force in that national defense strategy. I'm just curious, are you involved in any planning or discussions with Secretary Kendall and General Low as they discuss the plan for long-term Air Force fighter force structure? And if not, I would encourage your involvement. Could you share just a little bit about your communications with them? Yes, Senator. And first, thanks for pointing out the outstanding contributions to the Air National Guard. We cannot conduct our air defense mission without them. They're not only the cornerstone, they provide at 20 different ACA sites that you mentioned, our 24-7 capability to respond. Because of their importance, I have talked directly with the chief of staff of the Air Force, General Alvin, about the commitment of the Air Force to that mission and then also what is going to happen with the future as we draw down some capabilities and bring on new capabilities to include the collaborative combat aircraft, the next generation air dominance. General Alvin was very clear that he fully supports our mission and he understands the no-fail nature of our mission. And then he invited me to be a part of the future discussions on how they incorporate these capabilities. Excellent, because we have to be able to incorporate the Air Guard and they've got to have the resources to do that successfully. General Richardson, we discussed China's growing footprint and the influence throughout South Com and how important it is that the U.S. remain engaged in the region. One of the main tools that you have at your disposal as we discussed in my office is section 333 of Title X, which lets the DOD help build the security capacity of friendly nations. Unfortunately, section 333 requires you to navigate a ponderous bureaucracy in both the Department of Defense and the Department of State before you can make use of this authority. It is not agile and it clearly is not very, very quick. Ironically, the Chinese Communist Party is not bogged down by the same bureaucratic inertia. How important is section 333 authority to your mission and how can it be improved? It is my main lever in security cooperation, Senator. And so the 333, as we call it, and the ability to be able to, I have a 333 package in right now that's navigating all of the wickets that it needs to go through for a counter PRC effort on port scanners, for example. And the stealing of data that the PRC does and to be able to put a U.S. company in there to be able to do the scanning for in and out cargo is extremely important because, again, it's about the data. And so the 333 and flexible authorities and being responsive is extremely important. And so I appreciate the help and the assistance on those authorities. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator Arround. Senator Peters, please. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and General Geo and General Richardson. Thank you for your service and all the men and women who serve along with you. We appreciate that. General Geo, you mentioned the importance of the challenges or I should say the significant challenges we face in the Arctic in a previous question and how we need to seek ways to address that, make additional investments in the Arctic resilient platforms as well as cold weather training, which is essential for our troops. And a key portion of CONUS cold weather training is completed every winter during northern strike at the National All-Domain Warfighting Center in Michigan. We are blessed with cold weather during the winters and it provides a great training opportunity. So my question for you, General, is that while the summer training portion of northern strike is extensive, we believe that the exercise winter interation of that training that we conduct there has some great expansion opportunities to provide cost effective cold weather training for men and women who may be tasked to serve up there. So my question for you is how can we grow CONUS Arctic training through exercises like northern strike to support the priorities of our national security strategy? Senator, I would be a strong proponent of doing exactly as you stated. One of the concerns I have as I visited Alaska about a week into my command to assess many of the areas that you just discussed was that the forces up there are extremely well trained and equipped with the right equipment to operate in the Arctic but the backfill forces are probably very well trained but they're not equipped and they haven't trained in that environment. So anything that we could do for the supplementing forces or the backfill forces that would go into the Arctic training them in in either in the Arctic environment or in something as you described that would replicate that will be very important not only to give them those skills but to identify what are the pieces of kit and equipment that we need to develop and issue so they could seamlessly operate in that strategic environment. Very good, thank you. General Richardson, as you know the National Guard State Partnership Program links our state National Guard units with global partners and the program certainly has been invaluable I believe in strengthening our relationship with partner nations including Southcom's 29 active SPP participants but as part of the state partnership program U.S. embassies ideally have a bilateral affairs officer as working as a conduit between the state as well as the partner country but despite what I believe is a critical role these these billets these BAO billets unfortunately often say sit vacant forcing the co-com commanders to use their assigned billets to pay for these BAO so my question for you General is first on what role do bilateral affairs officers play in successfully implementing the state partnership programs and how can we address the gaps that exist in the billets to ensure that they're filled and we can get the maximum utility out of these partnerships. Thank you Senator and the I would say that the SPP program I have the largest SPP program amongst all the geographic combat commands and we're very grateful for that program it's a huge enabler we've got to keep those BAO slots filled with those officers they organize and and synchronize the activities of the National Guard SPP program with the operations activities and investments that I have in U.S. Southcom so it's a critical role and we've got to keep those filled and with the theater maintenance partnership initiative which is a program that we're rolling out with to put nine centers of excellence in the region and this is partnering with the partner nation militaries and their military academies with program of instruction to teach and train maintenance and the culture of maintenance but it's a tactical level program all the way up to an operational level into the ministries of defense where you can anticipate logistics and teach logistics and that culture of maintenance to keep equipment ready and increase the readiness of capability for these partner nations Appreciate that and a question I have for you as well General Hutchinson is that my understanding is that right now that the Chinese military is training about five times more Latin American and Caribbean military officers than the United States and I have some concerns that these Chinese professional military education exchanges may have an outsized impact on our allies particularly in South Com so my question for you is what are the risks associated with continuing to allow Chinese education exchanges to outpace what we are providing and how can Congress support your command in countering this challenge So the PRC is using our playbook against us in terms of these exchanges and these all expense-paid training exchanges for a year to two years to China and the each is that we are able to provide through the IMET program for professional military education but the difference that it makes when they come to our schools in the United States for example when you don't speak the language or speak in the language and I would say there are several three ministers of defense and about 15 chiefs of defense that have been to our United States schools and so you have already built the trust I don't have to build the trust over a year with these leaders and so if they've been to our US schools I would say that we need to continue to sustain that and even increase our IMET program Thank you General Thank you Mr. Chairman Thank you Senator Peters Senator Scott please Thank you Chairman Before I begin my remarks and questions for each of you I want to say something about what Majority Leader Chuck Schumer is saying on the Senate floor right now The Majority Leader on the US Senate floor is calling for a new Israeli government this is coercion it's dangerous it's undemocratic If Chuck Schumer doesn't like Netanyahu it doesn't matter we should respect the Israeli government should be respected by the American government Americans should stand strongly with Israel's elected leadership not threaten it as it fights terrorism I personally hope I hope the Israel destroys kills every Hamas terrorist there is First off thanks for both of you for your service so I want to say a few things before I ask you a couple questions Protecting international security interests means that the military must be laser focused on the cold hard facts and not only what our adversaries are doing but what they are capable of doing The violence and unrest in Haiti is heart breaking It is a symptom of political unrest that has only continued to grow under this administration Not only has the Biden administration taken an active role and destabilized in the region by appeasing Cuba Venezuela and Nicaragua but it appears that the White House is totally unprepared to deal with the consequences of the political unrest these regimes create and support The policy of the United States could not be that we just let everyone in our country totally unvetted anytime there is trouble around the world That is what President Biden has done at the border with 8 million people pouring across and after the Bosch withdrawal from Afghanistan with 90,000 unvetted people coming in Not only does this administration open the flood gates for people who don't know anything about anything about what we believe in to come to our country President Biden and Democrats at every level of government then give these individuals cash, phones, lawyers, and everything else paid for by the U.S. taxpayer The entire Biden administration can be summed up as this Biden creates a magnet for illegal immigration here a piece of evil regimes then forces the American people to pay for the unrest, humanitarian crisis, and mass border crossings that result It doesn't work and it can't be our answer to the chaos in Haiti It's also worth knowing that all of this works to the benefit of our adversaries like China, Russian, and Iran Our enemies thrive on our chaos These evil regimes are working every day to expand their foothold in the Western Hemisphere and increase the ability for their proxies to threaten the U.S. and destabilize the region For Southcom we see Iran infiltrating the region and Communist China using initiatives like Belt and Road to spread their influence in saddle poor countries in Latin America with massive debt For Northcom we see Russia and Communist China using unconventional warfare especially cyberattacks going after our supply chains or taking advantage of the open border We are even seeing our adversaries undermine U.S. security while expanding their reach in places like the Arctic bringing their militaries closer to the U.S. So I have a couple of questions General Richardson Let's start with Haiti The people of Haiti have reached a breaking point Florida families we have a lot of Haitian families in our state are compassionate but they are worried about how this instabilling the region to not only include Haiti but all of Southcom theater capacities stroke a mass immigration event in my state I spoke with the Coast Guard last night I'd like to hear from you what is your plan to address the possibility of a mass migration event which might not only impact Florida but also our bases within the Caribbean what are the options built to us with DOD assets and capabilities So in terms of the mass migration we did a we have our contingency plan at U.S. Southcom and we did a train walk last summer on Naval Station Guantanamo Bay and that was with all of the interagency to walk through all the processes and ensure that all the steps that are necessary to take place are actually in place everything is refreshed the equipment everything is ready to go and so as we work through all of our contingency plans I assure you that U.S. Southcom the Department of Defense are ready to go Second question for General Richardson I have a we I worked on and a lot of us worked on getting a dual use amendment for Homestead Air Force Base in the fiscal year 23 NDA this base allows us to project power in the hemisphere where enemies China, Russia, and Iran as proxies are present and they're active I ask Air Force leadership about the future of Homestead and having a permanent flying mission at the base General Brown assured me he was committed to having a platform operate out of Homestead can you talk about the strategic value of the base and why we need it So Homestead Air Reserve Base actually is a is a great staging platform when I was in Northcom and my previous job as Army North Commander we staged out of Homestead for the response into the Bahamas for the damage that was done by Hurricane Dorian we launched our missions my special operations my theater special operations command is at Homestead Air Reserve Base Sock South and so being able then we staged our two missions that that we conducted into Haiti this past week from Homestead and so the ability for the Department of Defense to have Homestead as a staging base in South Florida to be able to jump to respond to humanitarian assistance and disaster response type activities is very hugely helpful Thank both of you Thank you, Senator Scott Senator Cain please Thank you, Mr. Chair and thanks to our witnesses for your great service General Guilla I want to begin with you my colleagues and I on this committee have recently discussed installation security from with respect to drone threats at bases in the United States recognizing that we're in an unclassified setting what can you tell me about how Northcom is addressing this issue and with what partners are you working this challenge Senator Northcom as part of my 90 day assessment to tell the truth the counter UAS mission has dominated that so far in the first month of course I knew it was an issue coming from another combatant command where we faced that threat in a very different way because of the environment but I wasn't prepared for the number of incursions that I see gone into the events at Joint Base Langley Eustis and I'm using that as a the centerpiece of my 90 day assessment to see where nor at a Northcom can and should do more as this merging capability outstrips the operational framework that we have to address it and can you talk about other partners that you're working with because obviously there's sort of a law enforcement component of this so who else is working with you on this problem so yes sir absolutely so primarily department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice along the border have the primary responsibility that's who I'm working with there in the interior it's the services that have the responsibility for defending their bases so working with each individual service and then also again Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy for specific critical infrastructure locations those are the primary ones that I'm working with thank you for that now a question for both of you about FMS the importance of FMS was mentioned by General Corrilla last week General Guilla you mentioned it in your written statement General Richardson you and I talked about it a little bit last week when we were together the FMS programs not only increase interoperability and strengthen partnerships but can help reduce our partner's reliance upon strategic competitors as well what are you hearing from your counterparts about FMS and I want to particularly direct at the General Richardson recognize in General Guilla's short tenure that's been dominated by other issues but General Richardson could you talk about this so FMS is a critical enabler and obviously with being able to have our equipments have up-to-date equipment and then having U.S. equipment and being interoperable and that sort of thing is an imperative and so what Secretary Austin and the Chairman have instituted to speed up the processes within FMS over the past two years have taken place but I would say that we've got to streamline that through the interagency because it's not just the Department of Defense that has a stake in that and that approves things and so we've got to streamline that process a little bit better and speed it up we talked last week in my office about the potential synergy between the state partnership program that Senator Peters was discussing in the theater maintenance partnership initiative could you talk a little bit about that and whether it could support or compliment the FMS priorities that we have well it absolutely I mean that's the whole reason for it where we have we have U.S. equipment in these countries and so maintenance is hard for our U.S. military and it's hard for our partner nations as well and so with turnover we always have we always in our U.S. military have people coming in and going out and leaving the military and so there's a constant turnover so you have to have a really good training teaching and training program at the tactical level and so the TMPI program the Theater Maintenance Partnership Initiative that you mentioned the nexus with the National Guard State Partnership Program there's tons of maintainers in the National Guard and so this makes a very simple easy way to teach and train fits right in line with the institutional capacity building as well. Last question I'd like to ask you General Richardson one of the best advantages we have in your region is the Women, Peace and Security agenda you have made this a real priority in your travel can you speak on the impacts that the WPS initiatives are having within our partner countries? Huge impact so thank you for the question senator you on Security Council Resolution 1325 for Women, Peace and Security and so in every every visit I do in the countries we have a Women, Peace and Security event the great thing is that we have a we get a what I call a twofer with our Enlisted Leader Professional Development Program as well we have many women enlisted leaders that are in our military formations in the in the region and so that dovetailing nicely with with our different programs they're both rockstar programs if I must say and our partner nations doing that and seeing the diversity and the ability to increase readiness within their forces they have realized that and they continue on a really good path thank you very much I yield back thank you Senator Kanson talk real please thank you Mr. Chairman thanks for both of you being here today and your service to the most important combatant commanders everybody's important but one of you guards are front door and one guards are back door and well how important that is in this day and time General we've seen the change in the government in Canada maybe the direction that they're going which is very important should be very important to all of us have you seen any change with the military in terms of how they're helping us you know in Northcom Senator on the first day of my command I met with the minister of national defense minister Blair and the chief of the defense staff general air in Colorado Springs and we talked about Canada's commitment to NORAD and NORAD modernization and they told me at that time that they were committed with funding aligned for over the horizon radar F-35, P-8 and MQ-9 all those systems will immediately have benefit to us in the homeland defense mission that we share in NORAD and so since the first day I've seen nothing but strong commitment from our Canadian partners for modernizing NORAD and working together to defend our homelands great that's that's good news what about the border you get any pushback from the border northern border and we hear a lot about the southern border but northern border is very important we hear a lot of people are coming especially terrorists to the northern border northern border if you had any conversations with any of your counterparts there Senator I have although the customs and border protection and homeland security have not requested DOD or NORTHCOM support on the north border it is something I watched very closely for a number of reasons one is the potential threats entering our country through the north and I have frequent discussions with CBP and with the intel community to see if there are any threats that are coming through and then of course it's a shared border with a strong partner like Canada so on the from mill to mill with Canada we talk about it so something I watched so you're getting cooperation absolutely getting cooperation and keeping a strong sense of situational awareness on the activities of the northern border thank you General Richardson Panama Canal is one of the most important resources for us in Central America give us an update right now on that if we had some kind of conflict all over the world would we be able to use the Panama Canal we have a very strong partnership with Panama and that only continues to improve but my concern are the PRC state-owned enterprises that are along either side of the Panama Canal the five and so just that strategic sea line of communication the Panama Canal I would be extremely concerned about that and M and I as a result we watch that very closely Senator do you think the security there's adequate above and beyond where we would be able to use it again I my concern is being able to use those state-owned enterprises for military application if required and so the proximity that that has to the Panama Canal is a concern to me I have no doubt in Panama's ability to secure that and our ability to help defend that if required is the expansion on target I know the last time I was down there there were doing a lot of work at the Panama Canal I don't know whether you keep up with that or not and that is the PRC senator yes yes and they're building a fourth bridge across the canal and so we absolutely track everything that that is done with the Panama Canal and work with our Panama Panamanian authorities and our partners as we watch all of this activity that takes place and continues to take place have you or any of your staff visited the Darien Gap where we have all the immigrants coming from South America to North America senator I visited the Darien several times both on the Colombian side and on the Panama side and I've been to the binational base that Colombia and Panama share together and conduct joint operations where's the funding coming from for that for the Darien sir yeah so in terms of the the operations that Colombia that conducts comes from Colombian resourcing that they have for their military the ones for Panama come for the Panama security forces our activities OAIs that we operations activities and investments that we do with Panama are from my security cooperation funds and in south com yeah I saw your budget and there's no doubt both of you are so important to the protection of the American citizens and in our country you know we just we're we just voted to give sixty billion dollars to Ukraine I wish it would have gone to y'all I'm sure y'all could have used it and I've seen your budgets and your things that you use for to work in both of your north and south com and what you do is amazing but we need to help you we really do thank you very much thank you senator Toverville senator Rosen please thank you chairman Reed of course ranking member wicker for holding this hearing I'd like to thank general Gio and general Richardson for testifying today and of course for your service to our nation really appreciate it I'm going to hit a little bit on countering Chinese and Russian forces because as Russia continues its war on Ukraine and China acts with increasing aggression in the Indo-Pacific both countries are also taking steps that pose a direct threat to our national security right here at home and so general Gio how can north com adapt its force posture to proactively proactively deter and respond to the increasing presence and capabilities of Russian and Chinese assets off our coast and actually within North America senator the the best way for us to counter them is to have presence of our own so the execution of exercises patrols in all domains extremely important off all of our coast primarily focusing right now in the region of Alaska because of the number of incursions by Russian aircraft and then the number of maritime the strong presence that both the Chinese and the Russians have there and the same thing applies on the what we call the two o'clock approach off on the the northeast making sure that we have presence there that's what I think is the best way to counter and then part of that presence being exercised a strong exercise program multinational a lot of partners showing that we have the resolve to defend that most strategic area thank you I'm going to move on again general Gio on talking about cybersecurity because this is a big part of our homeland security system as well so can you talk to us about how north com is currently addressing a cybersecurity threats to the homeland you're talking about other kinds of posturing and in your opinion could the creation of a new subordinate unified command specifically responsible for defensive cyber operations could ensure a better comprehensive and actually a cohesive defense posture against our cyber adversaries senator in my previous response I should have mentioned cyber because it is the most prevalent and consistent threat that we see on a daily basis you know sure we see the maritime in the air occasionally and they're important but every day we have state actors including russia and china that are attempting to get on our department of defense networks the strength that we have through cyber command and detecting and defeating those threats is what's keeping us operational northern commands role is first and foremost to protect the systems that we use inside our NORAD and north com to operate and we have four different networks that we protect beyond that is anything with the department of defense nexus we work with cyber command to make sure that all of those are addressed and then the third thing that we do we work with the FBI and CISA strong partnership with both of them and in my short command I've already met with both of their leadership about how do we help other members of the critical infrastructure community and if they need DOD support it is synchronized presented through north com to protect them for your question about a separate command I would need to look into it but my initial responses would be that in the two combatant commands in which I've served the relationship and support from cyber command has been phenomenal and I would really hesitate to do anything that bifurcated or separated them from their seamless ability to do operational offensive cyber and defensive cyber under the same leadership because it's worked really well for us in my previous job in central command and certainly working well for us in northern command so always looking to improve but it's something I'd look very closely because cyber command in my opinion has been a tremendous partner in this in this realm well thank you that's really valuable input I appreciate it I'm going to move on to you general Richardson and talk a little bit about linguists and with the department of defense increasingly making investments focused on countering people's republic of China do you have concerns regarding a lack of language expertise for countries in the south com area of responsibility or is this gap sufficiently addressed by the diversity of the force that we recruit I think with Spanish predominantly and Portuguese with Brazil and the we have enough linguists senator but the because a lot of a lot of our linguists will speak Spanish as well as other languages as well so it's just a matter of making sure that we register our personnel demand and our requirements all the time that this region is important and that we've got to kill we've got to keep these positions filled well you speak about the Panama Canal and the PRC investments around there so it is important to have possibly more than Spanish and Portuguese even in that area because we know our adversaries are also there as well so thank you I appreciate my time is up thank you very much senator Rosen we anticipate that senator Schmidt will arrive shortly and I will take this opportunity to ask questions but general Gio as you know Congress has been considering taking S bands which is now exclusively in military for military use and begin to share or sell it to private entities can you tell the committee the impact that would have on your operations senator sharing or yielding the spectrum between 3.1 and 3.45 gigahertz would have a significant impact on our homeland defense systems and is there a possibility of sharing I know some folks have come back and said they that we can use it mutually is that something that you could do senator excuse me chairman I would say that in our initial review I haven't found a way that we could share especially because with northern command the 24 seven on alert responsibility for defending the homeland I would need full access to that for all of the various systems which are sea based land based and air based systems that use that that frequency range and I would assume too that in any sharing range that there would be a period of time where some of your systems could not effectively operate as they modify themselves is that fair as we as we negotiate the potential to share we've made it very clear that that we would need 24 seven access to those frequency ranges and general Richardson the Chinese influence and Russian influence degree in your area of command is focused on many things but one of the things they're focused on is the strategic minerals which could in fact be the oil of the next generation as we move to more electric powered the vehicles homes et cetera have you seen a noticeable concentration of focus but the Chinese on trying to identify and control the strategic mineral yes chairman and especially in the with our the work that I've done to partner with our US ambassadors in Argentina and also Chile and the as we know that lithium triangle is in the is in comprised of Argentina Bolivia and Chile and so 60% of the world's lithium is in in that region and so the aggressive nature of which the PRC works to extract that lithium as well as gold and copper from the region too and as we spoke before resources and the inter-american and development bank could help non-Chinese companies acquire these mines and begin processing is that accurate this would all be part of that that initiative similar to what I mentioned before chairman on the economic recovery act of 1948 which was the Marshall plan and and that APEP initiative American partnership for economic prosperity through the IDB Invest program at the Inter-american Development Bank and also Developmental Finance Corporation and the infusion of billions of dollars into critical infrastructure clean technology our clean energy and digital technology oh thank you very much ma'am I will recognize Senator Schmidt and if Senator King has additional questions I'll recognize him after Senator Schmidt thank you Mr. Chairman thank you general I wanted to ask about the the increase and by some accounts a tenfold increase in the number of Chinese nationals that have come across our southern border um it's a 50 times I mean whatever account there's a lot of Chinese nationals coming across in the last year and you know flying in and out of China is not like getting out of DCA back home to St. Louis it's a it's a much different ordeal and I guess I just want to ask and you know in 60 minutes had a report about what's having some content that's being pushed through social media channels of vulnerabilities with the border I'm certainly concerned about espionage operations what information do we have about who these people are what activities are taking place when they cross our southern border it's just it seems like this is this is happening now at a rate that just doesn't it doesn't feel natural to the extent that any of this is what's happening our southern border makes any sense but certainly the number of Chinese nationals coming across is of great concern to me and I wonder if you could speak to that Senator the number of Chinese that are coming across the border is a big concern of mine in fact in the short period of time that I've been in command I've gone down to the southern border to talk to the agents and leadership about that and then I've also spoken with the acting commissioner of the CBP on the subject what concerns me most about specifically the Chinese migrants is one is that they're so centralized and one location across on the border and two is while many may be political refugees and other explanations the ability for counterintelligence to hide in plain sight in those numbers so therefore we have a very strong and robust relationship with the interagency intelligence community and I receive frequent briefings in the headquarters on the the disposition of who has been apprehended and the potential of that threat that you described do we have any and if some of this is in a closed setting I'm happy to pick but what what kind of coordination is taking place here because you're right it's you know I think there were 21,000 just in the last four months in California alone there's the numbers that I've seen recently so there seems to be a concentration it seems to be coordinated again getting in and out of the People's Republic of China is a is a different deal what have you heard about sort of coordinated activities and are we aware of specific efforts on their part to you know be in parts of the interior United States with sensitive military locations Senator I had some of the same questions that you brought up what I've been told by our partners and CBP is that the reason the California is the focal point is just simply ease of flying from China into into Tijuana and then and then across I am concerned I think you were alluding to is the and I've talked to our partners about this is how the the whole the surges seem to be coordinated and command and controlled using social media primarily by the cartels to drive the migrants to areas where where we might not be similar analogy to squeezing the balloon where we squeeze down they with command and control usually primarily through social media I'm told know to go to the other areas so our role in Northcom is we're in support of the customs and border protection for detection and monitoring along the site with about 2,500 military members primarily from the army and the Marine Corps and they work very closely to to pick up where those surges are as well as where the gaps are with the monitoring equipment to alert the law enforcement side of border protection to make the apprehensions I look forward to working with you on that and and continuing that dialogue about what's happening because I think it's a dangerous potentially very dangerous situation and then with my limited time one last question as far as the drone activity that we see at the southern border presumably being coordinated by the cartels maybe other actors what information can you share about what what is it they're doing are they are they tracking border patrol agents what's what is what is sort of they the drone activity what are they what are they seeking to to discover with these drones that are coming across Senator again I had that asked those very same questions to the to the commissioner he said the overall majority of the activity that they see the incursions are spotters trying to find gaps finding out where we are so they can be where we you know where we aren't that's the over that's the majority there's a smaller number that are probably moving narcotics across the the border and then the drones themselves that's right senator and then the last thing I would say there is a lot of activity that's our own that's doing the same thing to to try to find where that activity is and and make sure that we're prepared to stop it thank you thank you Mr. Chairman thank you Senator Schmidt Senator King you have another question just one brief question to follow up General Richardson on our conversation about coordination I understand there's an interdiction committee that's led by the by the Coast Guard could we follow up together on upgrading that to a task force to include all the other agencies and really talk about how to better coordinate our response at the border is that something you're willing to work with us on absolutely senator the interdiction committee is meets regularly and actually the meeting is coming up and that includes all of the interagency well I I hope we can I'd like to meet with you to talk about the activity and to further operationalize the activity of the committee thank you Mr. Chairman thank you Senator King thank you to the witnesses here excellent testimony I will adjourn the open session and we will reconvene an SVC 217 let us say 1140 we'll give people the time to rest and recuperate but again thank you for your service General Richardson is particularly you're a remarkable service over career has really sustained this nation and set an example that we admire thank you thank you thank you ma'am with that I will adjourn the open session