 Part 4 Propositions 56 to 60 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by OK. The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza. Translated by R. H. M. L. Ways. Part 4 Propositions 56 to 60. Proposition 56. Extreme Pride or Dejection indicates Extreme Infirmity of Spirit. Proof. The first foundation of Virtue is Self Preservation. Part 4 Proposition 22 Corollary. Under the Guidance of Reason. Part 4 Proposition 24. He therefore, who is ignorant of himself, is ignorant of the foundation of all Virtues and consequently of all Virtues. Again, to act Virtuously is merely to act under the Guidance of Reason. Part 4 Proposition 24. For he that acts under the Guidance of Reason must necessarily know that he so acts. Part 2 Proposition 43. Therefore, he who is an extreme ignorant of himself and consequently of all Virtues acts least in obedience to Virtue. In other words, Part 4 Definition 8 is most infirm of Spirit. Thus, Extreme Pride or Dejection indicates Extreme Infirmity of Spirit. Corollary. Hence, it most clearly follows that the Proud and the Dejective specially fall a prey to the Emotions. Note, yet Dejection can be more easily corrected than Pride for the latter being a pleasurable Emotion and the former a painful Emotion. The pleasurable is stronger than the painful. Part 4 Proposition 18. Proposition 57. The Proud Man delights in the company of Flutters and Parasites but hates the company of the High-Minded. Proof. Pride is pleasure arising from a man's overestimation of himself. Definition of the Emotions 28 and 6. This estimation, the Proud Man will endeavor to foster by all the means in his power. Part 3 Proposition 13. Note. He will therefore delight in the company of Flutters and Parasites whose character is too well known to need definition here and will avoid the company of High-Minded man who value him according to his deserts. What erect demonstrates random? Note. It would be too long a task to enumerate here all the evil results of Pride in as much as the Proud or a Pray to all the Emotions though to none of them less than to Love and Pity. I cannot however pass over in silence the fact that a man may be called Proud from his underestimation of other people and therefore Pride in this sense may be defined as pleasure arising from the false opinion whereby a man may consider himself superior to his fellows. The Dejection, which is the opposite quality to this sort of Pride may be defined as pain arising from the false opinion whereby a man may think himself inferior to his fellows. Such being the case, we can easily see that a Proud Man is necessarily envious. Part 3 Proposition 41. Note. And only takes pleasure in the company who fool his weak mind to the top of his bent and make him insane instead of merely foolish. Though Dejection is the emotion contrary to Pride yet is the Dejected Man very near akin to the Proud Man for in as much as his pain arises from a comparison between his own infirmity and other men's power or virtue it will be removed, or in other words he will feel pleasure if his imagination be occupied in contemplating other men's faults. Once arises the proverb the unhappy are comforted by finding fellow sufferers. Contrary wise he will be the more pained in proportion he thinks himself inferior to others hence none are so prone to envy as the Dejected they are specially keen in observing men's actions with a view to fault finding rather than correction in order to reserve their praises for Dejection and to glory therein though all the time with the Dejected Air. These effects follow as necessarily from the said emotion as it follows from the nature of a triangle that the three angles are equal to two right angles. I have already said that I call these and similar emotions bad solely in respect to what is useful to man. The laws of nature have regard to nature's general order where of man is but a part. I mention this in passing lest any should think that I have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men rather than the nature and properties of things as I said in the preface to the third part I regard human emotions and their properties as on the same footing with other natural phenomena. Assuredly human emotions indicate the power and ingenuity of nature if not of human nature quite as fully as other things which we admire and which we delight to contemplate. But I pass on to note those qualities in the emotions which bring advantage to man or inflict injury upon him. Proposition 58 Honor, Gloria, is not repugnant to reason but may arise therefrom. Proof, this is evident from definition of the emotions 30 but also from the definition of an honourable man Part 4, Proposition 37, Note 1 Note, empty honour as it is styled is self-approval, fostered only by the good opinion of the populace. When this good opinion ceases there ceases also the self-approval in other words the highest object of each man's love Part 4, Proposition 52, Note Consequently, he whose honour is rooted in popular approval must day by day anxiously strive, act and scheme in order to attain his reputation for the populace is variable and inconstant so that if a reputation be not capped up it quickly withers away. Everyone wishes to catch popular applause for himself and readily represses the fame of others The object of the strife being estimated as the greatest of all goods each combatant is seized with a fierce desire to put down his rivals in every possible way till he who at last comes out victorious is more proud of having done harm to others than of having done good to himself. This sort of honour then is really empty being nothing. The point to note concerning shame may easily be inferred from what was said on the subject of mercy and repentance I will only add that shame, like compassion though not a virtue, is yet good insofar as it shows that the feeler of shame is really imbued with the desire to live honourably in the same way as suffering is good as shown that the injured part is not mortified therefore, though a man who feels shame is sorrowful, he is yet more perfect than he who is shameless and has no desire to live honourably Such are the points which I undertook to remark upon concerning the emotions of pleasure and pain As for the desires, they are good or bad according as they spring from good or evil emotions but all insofar as they are engendered in us by emotions wherein the mind is passive are blind as is evident from what was said in part 4 Proposition 44 note and would be useless if men could easily be induced to live by the guidance of reason only as I will now briefly show Proposition 59 To all the actions where too we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive we can be determined without emotion by reason proof To act rationally is nothing else Part 3, Proposition 3 and Definition 2 but to perform those actions which follow from the necessity of our nature considered in itself alone But pain is bad insofar as it diminishes or checks the power of action Part 4, Proposition 41 Wherefore we cannot by pain be determined to any action which we should be unable to perform under the guidance of reason Again, pleasure is bad only insofar as it hinders a man's capability for action Part 4, Proposition 41 and 43 Therefore to this extent we could not be determined by it to any action which we could not perform under the guidance of reason Lastly, pleasure insofar as it is good is in harmony with reason for it consists in the fact that a man's capability for action is increased or aided nor is the mind passive therein except insofar as a man's power of action is not increased to the extent of affording him an adequate conception of himself and his actions Part 3, Proposition 3 and Note Wherefore if a man who is pleasurably affected be brought to such a state of perfection that he gains an adequate conception of himself and his own actions he will be equally named more capable of those actions to which he is determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive But all emotions are attributable to pleasure, to pain or to desire definition of the emotions for and explanation and desire definition of the emotions one is nothing else but the attempt to act therefore to all actions where too we are determined by emotion wherein the mind is passive we can be determined without emotion by reason another proof a given action is called bad insofar as it arises from one being affected by hatred or any evil emotion but no action considered in itself alone is either good or bad as we pointed out in the preface to part 4 one in the same action being sometimes good, sometimes bad where for to the action which is sometimes bad or arises from some evil emotion we may be led by reason part 4 Proposition 19 Quadrat demonstrates random note an example will put this point in a clearer light the action of striking insofar as it is considered physically and insofar as we merely look to the fact that a man raises his arm clenches his fist and moves his whole arm violently downwards is a virtue or excellence which is conceived as proper to the structure of the human body if then a man moved by anger or hatred is led to clench his fist or to move his arm this result takes place as we showed in part 2 because one and the same action can be associated with various mental images of things therefore we may be determined to the performance of one and the same action by confused ideas or by clear and distinct ideas hence it is evident that every desire which springs from emotion wherein the mind is passive would become useless if men could be guided by reason let us now see why desire which arises from emotion wherein the mind is passive is called by us blind proposition 60 desire arising from a pleasure or pain that is not attributable to the whole body but only to one or certain parts thereof is without utility in respect to a man as a whole proof let it be assumed for instance that A a part of a body is so strengthened by some external cause that it prevails over the remaining parts part 4, proposition 6 this part will not endeavour to do away with its own powers in order that the other parts of the body may perform its office for this it would be necessary for it to have a force or power of doing away with its own powers which by part 3, proposition 6 is absurd the said part and consequently the mind also will endeavour to preserve its condition where for desire arising from a pleasure of the kind of force say it has no utility in reference to a man as a whole if it be assumed on the other hand that the part A be checked so that the remaining parts prevail it may be proved in the same manner that desire arising from pain has no utility in respect to a man as a whole called erot demonstrandum note as pleasure is generally part 4, proposition 44 note attributed to one part of the body we generally desire to preserve our being without taking into consideration our health as a whole to which it may be added that the desires which have most hold over us part 4, proposition 9 take account of the present and not of the future end of part 4, propositions 56 to 60 recording by OK part 4, proposition 61 to 65 of The Ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by OK The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza translated by R. H. M. Ellways part 4, proposition 61 to 65 proposition 61 desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive proof desire definition of the emotions one considered absolutely is the actual essence of man insofar as it is conceived as in any way determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself hence desire which arises from reason that is part 3, proposition 3 which is engendered in us insofar as we act is the actual essence or nature of man insofar as it is conceived as determined to such activities as are adequately conceived through man's essence only part 3, definition 2 now if such desire could be excessive human nature considered in itself alone would be able to exceed itself or would be able to do more than it can and manifest contradiction therefore such desire cannot be excessive proposition 62 insofar as the mind conceives a thing under the dictates of reason it is affected equally whether the idea be of a thing future, past or present proof whatsoever the mind conceives under the guidance of reason it conceives under the form of eternity or necessity part 2, proposition 44, corollary 2 and is therefore affected with the same certitude part 2, proposition 43 and note where 4, whether the thing be present, past or future the mind conceives it under the same necessity and is affected with the same certitude and whether the idea be of something present, past or future it will in all cases be equally true part 2, proposition 41 that is it will always possess the same properties of an adequate idea part 2, definition 4 therefore insofar as the mind conceives things under the dictates of reason it is affected by the same manner whether the idea be of a thing future, past or present note if we could possess an adequate knowledge of the duration of things and could determine by reason their periods of existence we should contemplate things future with the same emotions things present and the mind would desire as though it were present the good which it conceived as future consequently it would necessarily neglect a lesser good in the present for the sake of a greater good in the future and would in no way desire that which is good in the present but a source of evil in the future as we shall presently show however we can have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of things part 2, proposition 31 and the periods of their existence part 2, proposition 44 note we can only determine by imagination which is not so powerfully affected by the future as by the present hence such true knowledge of good and evil as we possess is merely abstract or general and the judgment which we pass on the order of things and the connection of causes with the future determining what is good or bad for us in the present is rather imaginary than real therefore it is nothing wonderful if the desire arising from such knowledge of good and evil insofar as it looks on into the future be more readily checked than the desire of things which are agreeable in the present time see part 4 proposition 16 proposition 63 he who is led by fear and does good in order to escape evil is not led by reason proof all the emotions which are attributable to the mind as active or in other words to reason are emotions of pleasure and desire part 3, proposition 59 therefore he who is led by fear and does good in order to escape evil is not led by reason quadratic demonstration note superstitious persons who know better how to rail advice than how to teach virtue and who strive not to guide men by reason but so to restrain them that they would rather escape evil than love virtue have no other aim but to make others as wretched as themselves where for it is nothing wonderful if they be generally troublesome and odious to their fellow men corollary under desire which springs from reason we seek good directly un-evil indirectly proof desire which springs from reason can only spring from a pleasurable emotion wherein the mind is not passive part 3, proposition 59 in other words from a pleasure which cannot be excessive part 4, proposition 61 and not from pain where for this desire springs from the knowledge of good not of evil part 4, proposition 8 hence under the guidance of reason we seek good directly and only by implication shall be evil quadratic demonstration note this corollary may be illustrated by the example of a sick and a healthy man the sick man through fear of death eats what he naturally shrinks from but the healthy man takes pleasure in his food and thus gets a better enjoyment out of life than if he were in fear of death and desired directly to avoid it so a judge who condemns a criminal to death not from hatred or anger but from love of the public well-being is guided solely by reason proposition 64 the knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge proof the knowledge of evil part 4, proposition 8 is pain insofar as we are conscious thereof now pain is the transition to a lesser perfection definition of the emotions 3 and therefore cannot be understood through man's nature part 3, proposition 6 and 7 therefore it is a passive state part 3, definition 2 which by part 3, proposition 3 depends on inadequate ideas consequently the knowledge thereof part 2, proposition 29 namely the knowledge of evil is inadequate quite how it demonstrates them corollary hence it follows that if the human mind possessed only adequate ideas it would form no conception of evil proposition 65 under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils proof a good which prevents our enjoyment of a greater good is in reality an evil for we apply the terms good and bad to things insofar as we compare them one with another see preface to this part therefore evil is in reality a lesser good hence under the guidance of reason we seek or pursue only the greater good for the evil corollary we may under the guidance of reason pursue the lesser evil as though it were the greater good and we may shun the lesser good which would be the cause of the greater evil for the evil which is here called the lesser is really good and the lesser good is really evil therefore we may seek the former and shun the latter corollary end of part 4 proposition 61 to 65 recording by ok part 4 proposition 66 to 70 of The Ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by ok The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza translated by R. H. M. L. Ways part 4 proposition 66 to 70 proposition 66 we may under the guidance of reason seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future proof if the mind could have an adequate knowledge of things future it would be affected towards what is future in the same way as towards what is present part 4 proposition 62 wherefore looking merely to reason as in this proposition we are assumed to do there is no difference whether the greater good or evil be assumed as present or assumed as future hence by part 4 proposition 65 we may seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future quod erat demonstrandum corollary we may under the guidance of reason seek a lesser evil in the present because it is the cause of a greater good in the future and we may shun a lesser good in the present because it is the cause of a greater evil in the future this corollary is related to the foregoing proposition as the corollary to part 4 proposition 65 is related to the said part 4 proposition 65 note if these statements be compared with what we have pointed out concerning the strengths of the emotions in this part up to proposition 18 we shall readily see the difference between a man who is led solely by emotion or opinion and a man who is led by reason the former whether will or no performs actions whereof he is utterly ignorant the latter is his own master and only performs such actions as he knows are of primary importance in life and therefore chiefly desires wherefore I call the former a slave and the latter a free man concerning whose disposition and manner of life which will be well to make a few observations proposition 67 a free man thinks of death least of all things and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life proof a free man is one who lives under the guidance of reason who is not led by fear part 4 proposition 63 but who directly desires good part 4 proposition 63 corollary in other words part 4 proposition 24 who strives to act to live and to preserve his being on the basis of seeking his own true advantage wherefore such a one thinks of nothing less than of death but his wisdom is a meditation of life quod erat demonstrandum proposition 68 if men were born free they would so long as they remained free form no conception of good and evil proof I call free him who is led solely by reason he therefore who is born free and who remains free has only adequate ideas therefore part 4 proposition 64 corollary he has no conception of evil or consequently good and evil being corollative of good quod erat demonstrandum note it is evident from part 4 proposition 4 that the hypothesis of this proposition is false and inconceivable except insofar as we look solely to the nature of man or rather to God not insofar as the latter is infinite but only insofar as he is the cause of man's existence this and other matters which we have already proved seem to have been signified by Moses in the history of the first man for in that narrative no other power of God is conceived say that whereby he created man that is the power wherewith he provided solely for man's advantage it is stated that God forbade man being free to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and that as soon as man should have eaten of it he would straight away fear death rather than desire to live further it is written that when man had found a wife who was an entire harmony with his nature he knew that there could be nothing in nature which could be more useful to him but that after he believed the beasts to be like himself he straight away began to imitate their emotions part 3 proposition 27 and to lose his freedom this freedom was afterwards recovered by the patriarchs led by the spirit of Christ that is by the idea of God where on alone it depends that man may be free and desire for others the good which he desires for himself part 4 proposition 37 proposition 69 the virtue of a free man is seen to be as great when it declines dangers as when it overcomes them proof emotion can only be checked or removed by an emotion contrary to itself and possessing more power in restraining emotion part 4 proposition 7 but blind daring and fear are emotions which can be conceived as equally great part 4 proposition 5 and proposition 3 hence no less virtue or firmness is required in checking daring than in checking fear part 3 proposition 59 note in other words definition of the emotions 40 and 41 the free man shows as much virtue when he declines dangers as when he strives to overcome them Quadarat demonstrandum corollary the free man is as courageous in timely retreat as in combat or a free man shows equal courage or presence of mind whether he elect to give battle or to retreat note what courage animositas is and what I mean thereby I explained in part 3 proposition 59 note by danger I mean everything which can give rise to any evil such as pain, hatred, discord, etc proposition 70 the free man who lives among the ignorant strives as far as he can to avoid receiving favours from them proof everyone judges what is good according to his disposition part 3 proposition 39 note where 4 an ignorant man who has conferred a benefit on another puts his own estimate upon it and if it appears to be estimated less highly by the receiver will feel pain part 3 proposition 42 but the free man only desires to join other men to him in friendship part 4 proposition 37 not repaying their benefits with others reckoners of like value but guiding himself and others by the free decision of reason and doing only such things as he knows to be of primary importance therefore the free man lest he should become hateful to the ignorant or follow their desires rather than reason will endeavor as far as he can to avoid receiving their favours note I say as far as he can for though men be ignorant yet are they men and in cases of necessity could afford us human aid the most excellent of all things therefore it is often necessary to accept favours from them and consequently to repay such favours in kind we must therefore exercise caution in declining favours lest we should have the appearance of despising those who bestow them or of being from avaricious motives unwilling to requite them and so give ground for offence by the very fact of striving to avoid it thus in declining favours we must look to the requirements of utility and courtesy end of part 4 proposition 66 to 70 recording by OK part 4 proposition 71 to 73 of the Ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVax recording all LibriVax recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVax.org recording by Diana Meilinger the Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza translated by R. H. M. Alves part 4 proposition 71 to 73 proposition 71 only free men are thoroughly grateful one to another proof only free men are thoroughly useful one to another and associated among themselves by the closest necessity of friendship part 4 proposition 35 and corollary 1 only such men endeavor with mutual zeal of love to confer benefits on each other part 4 proposition 37 and therefore only they are thoroughly grateful one to another note the goodwill which men who are led by blind desire have for one another is generally a bargaining or enticement rather than pure goodwill moreover ingratitude is not an emotion yet it is base in as much as it generally shows that a man is affected by excessive hatred anger, pride, avarice, etc he who by reason of his folly knows not how to return benefits is not ungrateful much less he who is not gained over by the gifts of a courtesan to serve her lust or by a thief to conceal his theft or by any similar persons contrary wise such and one shows a constant mind in as much as he cannot by any gifts be corrupted to his own or the general heart proposition 72 the free man never acts fraudulently but always in good faith proof if it be asked what should a man's conduct be in a case where he could by breaking faith free himself from the danger of present death would not his plan of self-preservation completely persuade him to deceive this may be answered by pointing out that if reason persuaded him to act thus it would persuade all men to act in a similar manner in which case reason would persuade men not to agree in good faith to unite their forces or to have laws in common that is, not to have any general laws which is absurd proposition 73 the man who is guided by reason is more free in a state where he lives under a general system of law than in solitude where he is independent the man who is guided by reason does not obey through fear part 4 proposition 63 but in so far as he endeavors to preserve his being according to the dictates of reason that is, part 4 proposition 66 note in so far as he endeavors to live in freedom he desires to order his life according to the general good part 4 proposition 37 and consequently as we showed in part 4 proposition 37 note 2 to live according to the laws of his country therefore the free man in order to enjoy greater freedom desires to possess the general rights of citizenship quote Eredemonstrandom note these and similar observations which we have made on man's true freedom that is, to courage and nobility of character part 3 proposition 59 note I do not think it worth while to prove separately all the properties of strength much less need I show that he that is strong hates no man is angry with no man and with no man is indignant with no man despises no man and these default things is proud and all that relate to the true way of life and religion are easily proved from part 4 proposition 37 and part 4 proposition 46 namely that hatred should be overcome with love and that every man should desire for others the good which he seeks for himself we may also repeat what we drew attention to in the note to part 4 proposition 50 and in other places apparently that a strong man has ever first in his thoughts that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature so that whatsoever he deems to be hurtful and evil and whatsoever accordingly seems to him impious, horrible, unjust and base assumes that appearance owing to his own disordered fragmentary and confused view of the universe therefore he strives before all things to conceive things as they really are and to remove the hindrances to true knowledge such as our hatred, anger envy, derisen, pride and similar emotions which I have mentioned above thus he endeavors, as we said before as far as in him lies to do good and to go on his way rejoicing how far human virtue is capable of attaining to such a condition and what its powers may be I will prove in the following part End of Part 4 Propositions 71-73 Part 4 Appendix of The Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org Recording by OK The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza Translated by R. H. M. Ellways Part 4 Appendix Appendix What we have said in this part concerning the right way of life has not been arranged so as to admit of being seen at one view but has been set forth piecemeal according as I thought each proposition could most readily be deduced from what preceded it I propose therefore to rearrange my remarks and to bring them under leading heads 1. All our endeavours or desires so follow from the necessity of our nature that they can be understood either through it alone as their proximate cause or by virtue of our being a part of nature which cannot be adequately conceived through itself without other individuals 2. Desires which follow from our nature in such a manner that they can be understood through it alone are those which are referred to the mind insofar as the latter is conceived to consist of adequate ideas the remaining desires are only referred to the mind insofar as it conceives things inadequately and their force and increase are generally defined not by the power of man but by the power of things external to us wherefore the former are rightly called actions the latter passions for the former always indicate our power the latter on the other hand show our infirmity and fragmentary knowledge 3. Our actions that is those desires which are defined by man's power or reason are always good the rest may be either good or bad 4. Thus in life it is before all things useful to perfect the understanding or reason as far as we can and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness consists indeed blessedness is nothing else but the contentment of spirit which arises from the intuitive knowledge of God now to perfect the understanding is nothing else but to understand God attributes and the actions which follow from the necessity of his nature wherefore of a man who is led by reason the ultimate aim or highest desire whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows is that whereby he is brought to the adequate conception of himself and of all things within the scope of his intelligence 5. Therefore without intelligence there is not rational life and things are only good insofar as they aid man in his enjoyment of the intellectual life which is defined by intelligence contrary wise whatsoever things hinder man's perfecting of his reason and capability to enjoy the rational life are alone called evil 6. As all things whereof man is the efficient cause are necessarily good no evil can befall man except through external causes by virtue of man being a part of universal nature whose laws human nature is compelled to obey and to conform to in almost infinite ways 7. It is impossible that man should not be a part of nature or that he should not follow her general order but if he be thrown among individuals whose nature is in harmony with his own his power of action will thereby be aided and fostered whereas if he be thrown among such as are but very little in harmony with his nature he will hardly be able to accommodate himself to them without undergoing a great change himself 8. Whatsoever in nature we deem to be evil or to be capable of injuring our faculty for existing and enjoying the rational life we may endeavor to remove in whatever way seems safest to us on the other hand whatsoever we deem to be good for our preserving our being and enabling us to enjoy the rational life we may appropriate to our use and employ as we think best everyone without exception may by sovereign right of nature do whatsoever he thinks will advance his own interest 9. Nothing can be in more harmony with the nature of any given thing than other individuals of the same species therefore 7. For man in the preservation of his being and the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful than his fellow man who is led by reason further as we know not anything among individual things which is more excellent than a man led by reason no man can better display the power of his skill and disposition than in so training men that they come at last to live under the dominion of their own reason 10. Insofar as men are influenced by envy or any kind of hatred one towards another they are at variance and are therefore to be feared in proportion as they are more powerful than their fellows 11. Yet minds are not conquered by force but by love and high-mindedness 12. It is before all things useful to men to associate their ways of life to bind themselves together with such bonds as they think most fitted to gather them all into unity and generally to do what so ever serves to strengthen friendship 13. But for this there is need of skill and watchfulness for men are diverse seeing that those who live under the guidance of reason are few yet are they generally envious and more prone to revenge than to sympathy no small force of character is therefore required to take everyone and to estrange oneself from imitating the emotions of others but those who carpet mankind and are more skilled in railing advice than in instilling virtue and who break rather than strengthen men's dispositions are hurtful both to themselves and others thus many from too great impatience of spirit or from misguided religious zeal have preferred to live among brutes rather than among men as boys or youths who cannot peacefully endure the childings of their parents will enlist as soldiers and choose the hardships of war and the despotic discipline in preference to the comforts of home and the admonitions of their father suffering any burden to be put upon them so long as they may spite their parents therefore although men are generally governed in everything by their own lusts yet their association in common brings many more advantages than drawbacks therefore it is better to bear patiently the wrongs they may do us and to strive to promote whatsoever serves to bring about harmony and friendship 15 those things which beget harmony are such as attributable to justice equity and honorable living for men brook ill not only what is unjust or iniquitous but also what is reckoned disgraceful or that a man should slight the perceived customs of their society for winning love those qualities are especially necessary which have regard to religion and piety see part 4 proposition 37, notes 1 and 2 proposition 46 note and proposition 73 note 16 further harmony is often the result of fear but such harmony is insecure fear arises from infirmity of spirit and moreover belongs not to the exercise of reason the same is true of compassion though this latter seems to bear certain resemblance to piety 17 men are also gained over by liberality especially such as have not the means to buy what is necessary to sustain life however to give aid to every poor man is far beyond the power and the advantage of any private person for the riches of any private person are wholly inadequate to meet such a call again an individual man's resources of character are too limited for him to be able to make all men his friends hence providing for the poor is a duty which falls on the state as a whole and has regard only to the general advantage 18 in accepting favors and in returning gratitude our duty must be wholly different see part 4 proposition 70 note and proposition 71 note 19 again meretricious love that is the lust of generation arising from bodily beauty and generally every sort of love which owns anything say freedom of soul as its cause readily passes into hate unless indeed what is worse it is a species of madness and then it promotes discord rather than harmony see part 3 proposition 31 corollary 20 as concerning marriage it is certain that this is in harmony with reason if the desire for physical union be not engendered solely by bodily beauty but also by the desire to beget children and to train them up wisely and moreover if the love of both to wit of the man and of the woman is not caused by bodily beauty only but also by freedom of soul 21 furthermore flattery begets harmony but only by means of the vile offence of slavishness or treachery none are more readily taken with flattery than the proud who wish to be first but are not 22 there is in a basement a spurious appearance of piety and religion although a basement is the opposite to pride yet is he that abases himself most akin to the proud part 4 proposition 57 note 23 shame also brings about harmony but only in such matters as cannot be hid further as shame is a species of pain it is not concerned the exercise of reason 24 the remaining emotions of pain towards men are directly opposed to justice equity, honor, piety and religion and although indignation seems to bear a certain resemblance to equity yet is life but lawless where every man may pass judgment on another's deeds and vindicate his own or other men's rights correctness of conduct modestia that is the desire of pleasing men which is determined by reason is attributable to piety as we said in part 4 proposition 37 note 1 but if it spring from emotion it is ambition or the desire whereby men under the false cloak of piety generally stir up discords and seditions for he who desires to aid his fellows either in word or in deed so that they may together enjoy the highest good he I say will before all things strive to win them over with love not to draw them into admiration so that a system may be called after his name nor to give any cause for envy further in his conversation he will shrink from talking of men's faults and will be careful to speak but sparingly of human infirmity but he will dwell at length in human virtue or power and the way whereby it may be perfected thus will men be stirred not by fear nor by aversion but only by the emotion of joy to endeavor so far as in them lies to live in obedience to reason 26 besides men we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship therefore whatsoever there be in nature besides man a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities and to adapt to our use as best we may 27 the advantage which we derive from things external to us besides the experience and knowledge which we acquire in preserving them and from recombining their elements in different forms it's principally the preservation of the body from this point of view those things are most useful which can so feed and nourish the body that all its parts may rightly fulfill their function for in proportion as the body is capable of being affected in a greater variety of ways and of affecting external bodies in a greater number of ways so much the more is the mind capable of thinking part 4, proposition 38 and 39 but there seem to be very few things of this kind in nature wherefore for the due nourishment of the body we must use many foods of diverse nature for the human body is composed of very many parts of different nature which stand in continual need of varied nourishment so that the whole body may be equally capable of everything that can follow from its own nature and consequently that the mind also may be equally capable of forming many perceptions 28 now for providing these nourishments the strength of each individual would hardly suffice if men did not lend one another mutual aid but money has furnished us with a token for everything hence it is with the notion of money that it is grossed nay it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure which is not accompanied with the idea of money as its cause 29 this result is the fault only of those who seek money not from poverty or to supply their necessary wants but because they have learned the arts of game wherewith they bring themselves to great splendor certainly they nourish their bodies according to custom believing that they lose as much of their wealth as they spend on the preservation of their body but they who know the true use of money and who fix the measure of wealth solely with regard to their actual needs live content with little 30 as therefore those things are good which assist the various parts of the body and enable them to perform their functions and as pleasure consists in an increase of age to man's power insofar as he is composed of mind and body it follows that all things which bring pleasure are good but seeing that things do not work with the object of giving us pleasure and that their power of action is not tempered to suit our advantage and lastly that pleasure is generally referred to one part of the body more than to the other parts therefore most emotions of pleasure unless reason and watchfulness be at hand and consequently the desires arising therefrom may become excessive moreover we may add that emotion leads us to pay most regard to what is agreeable in the present nor can we estimate what is future with emotions equally vivid part 4 proposition 44 note and proposition 60 note 31 superstition on the other hand seems to account as good all that brings pain and as bad all that brings pleasure however as we said above part 4 proposition 45 note none but the envious take delight in my infirmity and trouble for the greater the pleasure whereby we are affected the greater is the perfection where to we pass and consequently the more do we partake of the divine nature the pleasure can ever be evil which is regulated by a true regard for our advantage but contrary wise he who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil is not guided by reason 32 but human power is extremely limited and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes we have not therefore an absolute power of shaping to our use those things which are without us nevertheless we shall bear with an equal mind all that happens to us in contravention to the claims of our own advantage so long as we are conscious that we have done our duty and that the power which we possess is not sufficient to enable us to protect ourselves completely remembering that we are a part of universal nature and that we follow her order if we have a clear and distinct understanding of this that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence the better part of ourselves will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us and in such acquiescence will endeavor to persist for in so far as we are intelligent beings we cannot desire anything save that which is necessary nor yield absolute acquiescence to anything save to that which is true wherefore in so far as we have a right understanding of these things what we are doing to protect ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole end of part 4 appendix end of part 4 recording by ok part 5 preface and axioms of the ethics by spinosa this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anno Simon the ethics by benedictus spinosa translated by rhmls part 5 preface and axioms part 5 of the power of the understanding or of human freedom preface at length I pass to the remaining portion of my ethics which is concerned with the way leading to freedom I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason showing how far the reason can control the emotions and what is the nature of mental freedom or blessedness we shall then be able to see how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant it is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended as to be capable of the due performance of its functions the letter question lies in the province of medicine the former in the province of logic here therefore I repeat I shall treat only of the power of the mind or of reason and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions for their control and moderation that we do not possess absolute dominion over them I have already shown yet the stoics have thought that the emotions depended absolutely on our will and that we could absolutely govern them but these philosophers were compelled by the protest of experience not from their own principles to confess that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them and this someone endeavored to illustrate by the example, if I remember rightly of two dogs the one a house dog and the other a hunting dog for by long training it could be brought about that the house dog should become accustomed to hunt and the hunting dog to seize from running after hairs to this opinion Descartes not a little inclines for he maintained that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain namely to that part called the pineal gland by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body and also external objects and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways he asserted that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain that it could be moved by the slighted motion of the animal spirits further that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners as the animal spirits can impinge thereon and again that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland as there are different external objects which impaled the animal spirits towards it once it follows that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another the gland in its turn reacts on the sad spirits driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland he further asserted that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland for instance whenever anyone desires to look at a remote object the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate whereas if the person in question had only thought the dilatation of the pupil the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result in as much as the motion of the gland which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects lastly he maintained that although every motion of the aforesaid gland have been united by nature to one particular thought out of the whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life yet it can nevertheless become through habituation associated with other thoughts this he endeavours to prove in the passion de l'homme 150 he then concludes that there is no soul so weak that it cannot under proper direction acquire absolute power over its passions for passions as defined by him are perceptions or feelings or disturbances of the soul which are referred to the soul as species and which mark the expression are produced, preserved and strengthened through some movement of the spirits passion de l'homme 127 but seeing that we can join any motion of the gland or consequently of the spirits to any volition the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers if therefore we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher in so far as I gather it from his own words it is one which had it been less ingenious I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man indeed I am lost in wonder that a philosopher who had stoutly asserted that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premises and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities could maintain a hypothesis beside which occult qualities are commonplace what does he understand I ask by the union of the mind and the body what clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter truly I should like him to explain this union through its proximate cause but he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two or of the mind itself I am obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe that is to God further I should much like to know what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland and with what force can it hold its suspended for I am in ignorance whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits and whether the motions of the passions which we have closely united with firm decisions cannot be again disjoint therefrom by physical causes in which case it would follow that although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger and had united to this decision the motions of boldness yet at the side of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away in truth as there is no common standard of volition and motion so there is no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other we may also add that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain lastly I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom in as much as I have abundantly proved that his premises are false therefore, since the power of the mind as I have shown above is defined by the understanding only we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions which I believe all have had experience of but do not accurately observe or distinctly see and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions which have regard to the mind's blessedness axioms axiom 1 if two contrary actions be started in the same subject a change must necessarily take place either in both or in one of the two and continue until they cease to be contrary axiom 2 the power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause this axiom is evident from part 3, proposition 7 end of part 5 preface and axioms part 5 propositions 1 to 5 of the ethics by Spinoza this is a LibriVox recording all LibriVox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org recording by Anna Simon the ethics by Benedict Spinoza translated by RHMLs part 5 propositions 1 to 5 propositions proposition 1 even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind so are the modifications of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body proof the order and connection of ideas is the same part 2, proposition 7 as the order and connection of things and vice versa the order and connection of things is the same part 2, proposition 6 corollary and proposition 7 as the order and connection of ideas wherefore even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the body Part 2, Proposition 18 So vice versa, Part 3, Proposition 2, the order and connection of modifications of the body takes place in accordance with the manner in which thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind. Quote erat de monstrandum. Proposition 2 If we remove a disturbance of the spirit or emotion from the thought of an external cause and united to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions be destroyed. Proof? That which constitutes the reality of love or hatred is pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Proposition of the emotions, Proposition 6 and 7, wherefor when this cause is removed the reality of love or hatred is removed with it, therefore these emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed. Quote erat de monstrandum. Proposition 3 An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof. Proof? An emotion which is a passion is a confused idea by the general definition of the emotions. If therefore we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion insofar as it is referred to the mind only by reason. Part 2, Proposition 21 and Note, therefore, Part 3, Proposition 3, the emotion will cease to be a passion. Quote erat de monstrandum. Corollary An emotion therefore becomes more under our control and the mind is less passive in respect to it in proportion that is more known to us. Proposition 4 There is no modification of the body whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Proof? Properties which are common to all things can only be conceived adequately. Part 2, Proposition 38, therefore, Part 2, Proposition 12 and Lemma 2 after Part 2, Proposition 13, there is no modification of the body whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. Quote erat de monstrandum. Corollary Hence it follows that there is no emotion whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body by the general definition of the emotions and must therefore, by the preceding proposition, involve some clear and distinct conception. Note Seeing that there is nothing which is not followed by an effect, Part 1, Proposition 36, and that we clearly and distinctly understand whatever follows from an idea which in us is adequate, Part 2, Proposition 40, it follows that every one has the power of clearly and distinctly understanding himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part, and consequently, of bringing it about that he should become less subject to them. To attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly direct our efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct knowledge of every emotion in order that the mind may thus, through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clearly and distinctly perceives and wherein it fully acquiesces, and thus that the emotion itself may be separated from the thought of an external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts, whence it will come to pass not only that love, hatred, etc. will be destroyed, Part 5, Proposition 2, but also that the appetites or desires which are one to arise from such emotion will become incapable of being excessive, Part 4, Proposition 61. For it must be especially remarked that the appetite through which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to be passive, is one and the same. For instance, we have shown that human nature is so constituted that every one desires his fellow man to live after his own fashion. Part 3, Proposition 31, Note In a man who is not guided by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition, and does not greatly differ from pride, whereas in a man who lives by the dictates reason, it is an activity or virtue which is called piety. Part 4, Proposition 37, Note 1, and Second Proof. In like manner, all appetites or desires are only passions insofar as they spring from inadequate ideas. The same results are accredited to virtue when they are aroused or generated by adequate ideas. For all desires whereby we are determined to any given action may arise as much from adequate as from inadequate ideas. Part 4, Proposition 59. Then this remedy for the emotions, to return to the point from which I started, which consists in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent being within our power can be devised. For the mind has no other power save that of thinking and of forming adequate ideas as we have shown above. Part 3, Proposition 3. Proposition 5. An emotion towards the thing which we conceive simply and not as necessary or as contingent or as possible is other conditions being equal greater than any other emotion. Proof. An emotion towards a thing which we conceive to be free is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary. Part 3, Proposition 49. And consequently, still greater than one towards what we conceive as possible or contingent. Part 4, Proposition 11. But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action. Part 2, Proposition 35. Note. Therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply is other conditions being equal greater than one which we feel towards what is necessary, possible or contingent and consequently it is the greatest of all. Quote era demonstrandum. End of part 5, Propositions 1 to 5. Part 5, Propositions 6 to 10 of the Ethics by Spinoza. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Anna Simon. The Ethics by Benedictus Spinoza, translated by R. H. M. Elles. Part 5, Propositions 6 to 10. Propositions 6. The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto insofar as it understands all things as necessary. Proof. The mind understands all things to be necessary. Part 1, Proposition 29. And to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes. Therefore, by the foregoing proposition, it thus far brings it about that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and Part 3, Proposition 48, feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Quote era demonstrandum. Note. The more this knowledge that things are necessary is applied to particular things which we conceive more distinctly and vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the emotions, as experience also testifies. For we see that the pain arising from the loss of any good is mitigated as soon as the man who has lost it perceives that it could not by any means have been preserved. So also we see that no one pities an infant because it cannot speak, walk or reason, or lastly because it passes so many years as it were in consciousness. Whereas if most people were born full grown and only one here and there as an infant, everyone would pity the infant because infancy would not then be looked on as a state natural and necessary, but as a fault or delinquency in nature, and we may note several other instances of the same sort. Proposition 7. Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent. Proof. We do not regard a thing as absent by reason of the emotion wherewith we conceive it, but by reason of the body being affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing. Part 2. Proposition 17. Wherefore the emotion which is referred to the thing which we regard as absent is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power. Part 4. Proposition 6. But is, on the contrary, of a nature to be in some sort controlled by the emotions which exclude the existence of its external cause. Part 4. Proposition 9. But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things. See the definition of reason in Part 2. Proposition 40. Note 2. Which we always regard as present, for there can be nothing to exclude their present existence, and which we always conceive in the same manner. Part 2. Proposition 38. Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains the same, and consequently, Part 5. Exeoma 1. Emotions, which are contrary thereto, and are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to adapt themselves to it more and more, until they are no longer contrary to it. To this extent, the emotion which springs from reason is more powerful. Part 5. Proposition 8. An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused. Proof. Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few. Part 3. Proposition 7. Therefore, Part 4. Proposition 5. In proportion to the increased number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, an emotion becomes stronger. Quote erat demonstrandum. Note, this proposition is also evident from Part 5. Exeoma 2. Proposition 9. An emotion which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto, and less affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes, or to a single cause. Proof. An emotion is only bad or hurtful in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think. Part 4. Proposition 26 and 27. Therefore, an emotion whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects, or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else. This was our first point. Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power, Part 3. Proposition 7. Consists solely in thought. Part 2. Proposition 11. The mind is less passive in respect to an emotion which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object. This was our second point. Lastly, this emotion, Part 3. Proposition 48. Insofar as it is attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. Quad Erat Demonstrandum. Proposition 10. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order. Proof. The emotions which are contrary to our nature, that is, Part 4. Proposition 30. Which are bad, are bad insofar as they impede the mind from understanding. Part 4. Proposition 27. So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things. Part 4. Proposition 26. Is not impeded, and, therefore, it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another. Part 2. Proposition 40. Note 2. And Part 2. Proposition 47. Note. Consequently, we have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order. Quad Erat Demonstrandum. Note. By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications, we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. For Part 5. Proposition 7. A greater force is needed for controlling the emotions when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order than when they are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand. Footnote. Continuo. Rendered constantly by Mr Pollock on the ground that the classical meaning of the word does not suit the context. And Footnote. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life Part 4. Proposition 46. And Note. That hatred should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not required with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness. We shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us. Part 2. Proposition 18. If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships and common fellowships. Further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life, Part 4. Proposition 52. And that men, no less than everything else, act by the necessity of their nature. In such case, I say the wrong or the hatred which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome. Or if the anger which springs from our grieve is wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. S is indeed evident from Part 5, Propositions 6, 7 and 8. We should, in the same way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear. The ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them. But we must note that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing. Part 4, Proposition 63, Corollary and Part 3, Proposition 59. In order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end for which it should be pursued and the means whereby he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse and its emptiness and the fickleness of mankind and the like, whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition. With thoughts like these do the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after and in thus giving vent to their anger would feign appear wise, wherefore it is certain that those who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the vanity of the world are those who most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all who are ill-used by fortune and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vises of the rich, whereby he merely torments himself and shows the world that he is intolerant not only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So again, those who have been ill-received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock-folds of the fair sex, all of which they consign to oblivion directly there again taken into favour by their sweetheart. Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives as far as he can to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them. He will in no wise desire to dwell on man's faults or to carpet his fellows or to revel in his false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently observe and practice these precepts, which indeed are not difficult, will verily, in a short space of time, be able for the most part to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason. End of Part 5, Propositions 6-10 Part 5, Propositions 11-15 Proof In proportion as a mental image or an emotion is referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be aroused and fostered, all of which, by hypothesis, the mind contemplates simultaneously in association with the given emotion, therefore the emotion is more frequent or is more often in full vigor. End, Part 5, Propositions 8 Occupies the Mind More Proposition 12 The mental images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand them with others. Proof Things which we clearly and distinctly understand are either the common properties of things or deductions therefrom see definition of reason. Part 2, Proposition 40, notes 2, and are consequently, by the last proposition, more often aroused in us. Therefore it may more readily happen that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with these than the conjunction with something else, and consequently, Part 2, Proposition 18, that the images of the sad things should be more often associated with the images of these than with the images of something else. Quodoro demonstrandum Proposition 13 A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images. Proof In proportion as an image is associated with a greater number of other images. So, Part 2, Proposition 18, are there more causes whereby it can be aroused? Quodoro demonstrandum Proposition 14 The mind can bring it about that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God Proof There is no modification of the body whereof the mind may not form some clear and distinct conception Part 5, Proposition 4, wherefore it can bring it about that they should all be referred to the idea of God Part 1, Proposition 15, Quodoro demonstrandum Proposition 15 He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions Proof He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure Part 3, Proposition 53, and this pleasure is, by the last proposition, accompanied by the idea of God Therefore, definition of the emotions Proposition 6, such an one loves God and for the same reason so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions Quodoro demonstrandum End of Part 5, Propositions 11-15 Part 5, Propositions 16-20 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is the LibriVox recording. All the LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Bettina The Ethics by Benedict Espinoza Translated by R. H. M. Alves Part 5, Propositions 16-20 Propositions 16 This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind Proof For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body. Part 5, Propositions 14 and is fostered by them all. Part 5, Propositions 15 Therefore, Part 5, Propositions 11, it must hold the chief place in the mind Quodoro demonstrandum Propositions 17 God is without passions. Neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain Proof All ideas and so far as they are referred to God are true Part 2, Propositions 32 That is, Part 2, Definition 4, Adequate And therefore, by the general definition of the emotions, God is without passions Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection Part 1, Propositions 20, Corollary 2 And therefore, by definitions of the emotions, definitions 2 and 3, he is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain Corollary Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone For God, by the foregoing proposition, is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain Consequently, definitions of the emotions, definitions 6 and 7 He does not love or hate anyone Proposition 18 No one can hate God Proof The idea of God, which is in us, is adequate and perfect Part 2, Propositions 46 and 47 We, for and so far, as we contemplate God, we are active Part 3, Propositions 3 Consequently, Part 3, Propositions 59 There can be no pain accompanied by the idea of God In other words, definitions of the emotions, definitions 7 No one can hate God Cordero demonstrandum Corollary Love towards God cannot be turned into hate Note It may be objected that, as we understand God as the cause of all things, we, by that very fact, regard God as the cause of pain But I make answer that, in so far as we understand the causes of pain, it, to that extent, Part 5, Propositions 3 ceases to be a passion, that is, it ceases to be pain Part 3, Propositions 59 Therefore, in so far as we understand God to be the cause of pain, we, to that extent, feel pleasure Proposition 19 He, who loves God, cannot endeavor that God should love him in return Proof For, if a man should so endeavor, he would desire Part 5, Proposition 17, corollary That God, whom he loves, should not be God And consequently, he would desire to feel pain Part 3, Proposition 19 Which is absurd Part 3, Proposition 28 Therefore, he who loves God, etc. Cordero demonstrandum Proposition 20 This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy Contrary wise, it is the more fostered in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined to God by the same bond of love Proof This love towards God is the highest good which we can seek for under the guidance of reason Part 4, Proposition 28 It is common to all men Part 4, Proposition 36 And we desire that all should rejoice therein Part 4, Proposition 37 Therefore, definitions of the emotions Definition 23 It cannot be stained by the emotion envy nor by the emotion of jealousy Part 5, Proposition 18 See definition of jealousy Part 3, Proposition 35 Note But contrary wise, it must needs be the more fostered in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to rejoice therein Cordero demonstrandum Note We can in the same way show that there is no emotion directly contrary to this love whereby this love can be destroyed Therefore, we may conclude that this love towards God is the most constant of all the emotions And that insofar as it is referred to the body, it cannot be destroyed unless the body be destroyed also As to its nature, insofar as it is referred to the mind only, we shall presently inquire I have now gone through all the remedies against the emotions, or all that the mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them Once it appears that the mind's power over the emotions consists First, in the actual knowledge of the emotion Part 5, Proposition 4 Note Second, in the fact that it separates the emotions from the thought of an external cause which we conceive confusedly Part 5, Proposition 2 and Part 5, Proposition 4, Note Third, in the fact that in respect to time the emotions referred to things which we distinctly understand surpass those referred to what we conceive in a confused and fragmentary manner Part 5, Proposition 7 Fourth, in the number of causes whereby those modifications Note, Affectionous, Camerar reads Affectus Emotions End of note Are fostered which have regard to the common properties of things or to God Part 5, Propositions 9 and 11 Fifth, lastly in the order where in the mind can arrange and associate one with another its own emotions Part 5, Proposition 10 Note and Propositions 12, 13 and 14 But in order that this power of the mind over the emotions may be better understood it should be specially observed that the emotions are called by us strong when we compare the emotion of one man with the emotion of another and see that one man is more troubled than another by the same emotion or when we are comparing the various emotions of the same man one with another and find that he is more affected or stirred by one emotion than by another For the strength of every emotion is defined by comparison of our own power with the power of an external cause Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only It therefore follows that that mind is most passive whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities On the other hand that mind is most active whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas so that although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue than by ideas which tell of human infirmity Again it must be observed that spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love for something which is subject to many variations and which we can never become masters of For no one is solicitous or anxious about anything unless he loves it Neither do long suspicions, enmities etc arise except in regard to things where of no one can be really master We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct knowledge and especially that third kind of knowledge prior to proposition 47 note founded on the actual knowledge of God possesses over the emotions If it does not absolutely destroy them in so far as they are passions Part 5 propositions 3 and proposition 4 note At any rate it causes them to occupy a very small part of the mind Part 5 proposition 14 Further it begets a love towards the thing immutable and eternal Part 5 proposition 15 Whereof we may really enter into possession Part 2 proposition 45 Neither can it be defiled with those faults which are inherent in ordinary love but it may grow from strength to strength and may engross the greater part of the mind and deeply penetrate it And now I have finished with all that concerns this present life For as I said in the beginning of this note I have briefly described all the remedies against remotions And this everyone may readily have seen for himself if he has attended to what is advanced in the present note and also to the definitions of the mind and its emotions and lastly to propositions 1 and 3 of part 3 It is now therefore time to pass on to those matters which apprehend to the duration of the mind without relation to the body End of part 5 propositions 16 to 20 Part 5 propositions 21 to 25 of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Diana Meilinger The Ethics by Benedict Espinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elves Part 5 propositions 21 to 25 Proposition 21 The mind can only imagine anything or remember what is past while the body endures Proof The mind does not express the actual existence of its body nor does it imagine the modification of the body as actual except while the body endures Part 2 proposition 8 corollary And consequently part 2 proposition 26 It does not imagine anybody as actually existing except while its own body endures Thus it cannot imagine anything for definition of imagination See part 2 proposition 17 note Or remember things past except while the body endures See definition of memory part 2 proposition 18 Note Quote or a demonstrandum Proposition 22 Never the less in God there is necessarily an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity Proof God is the cause not only of the existence of this or that human body but also of its essence part 1 proposition 25 This essence therefore must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God Part 1 axiom 4 And be thus conceived by a certain eternal necessity Part 1 proposition 16 And this conception must necessarily exist in God Part 2 proposition 3 Quote or demonstrandum Proposition 23 The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body but there remains of it something which is eternal Proof There is necessarily in God a concept or idea which expresses the essence of the human body last proposition which therefore is necessarily something appertaining to the essence of the human mind Part 2 proposition 13 But we have not assigned to the human mind any duration definable by time except in so far as it expresses the actual existence of the body which is explained through duration and may be defined by time that is part 2 proposition 8 corollary We do not assign to a duration except while the body endures Yet as there is something notwithstanding which is conceived by a certain eternal necessity through the very essence of God last proposition this something which appetises to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal Quote or demonstrandum Note This idea which expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity is as we have said a certain mode of thinking which belongs to the essence of the mind and is necessarily eternal Yet it is not possible that we should remember that we existed before our body for our body can bear no trace of such existence neither can eternity be defined in terms of time or have any relation to time But notwithstanding we feel and know that we are eternal for the mind feels those things that it conceives by understanding no less than those things that it remembers For the eyes of the mind whereby it sees and observes things are none other than proofs thus although we do not remember that we existed before the body yet we feel that our mind in so far as it involves the essence of the body under the form of eternity is eternal and that thus its existence cannot be defined in terms of time or explained through duration thus our mind can only be said to endure and its existence can only be defined by a fixed time in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body thus far only has it the power of determining the existence of things by time and conceiving them under the category of duration Proposition 24 The more we understand particular things the more do we understand God Proof This is evident from Part 1, Proposition 25, Corollary Proposition 25 The highest endeavor of the mind and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge Proof The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things See its definition, Part 2, Proposition 40, Note 2 And in proportion as we understand things more in this way we better understand God by the last proposition Therefore, Part 4, Proposition 28 The highest virtue of the mind, that is, Part 4, Definition 8 The power or nature or Part 3, Proposition 7 Highest endeavor of the mind is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge Cordera demonstrandum End of Part 5, Propositions 21-25 Part 5, Propositions 26, Disarity of the Ethics by Spinoza This is a LibriVox recording All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain For more information or to volunteer please visit LibriVox.org Recording by Diana Meilinger The Ethics by Benedict Espinoza Translated by R. H. M. Elves Part 5, Propositions 26-30 Proposition 26 In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge it desires more to understand things by that kind Proof This is evident For insofar as we conceive the mind to be capable of conceiving things by this kind of knowledge We, to that extent, conceive it as determined does to conceive things and consequently, definition of the emotions, one, the mind desires so to do in proportion as it is more capable thereof Cordera demonstrandum Proposition 27 From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence Proof The highest virtue of the mind is to know God Part 4, Proposition 28 Or to understand things by the third kind of knowledge Part 5, Proposition 25 And this virtue is greater in proportion as the mind knows things more by the said kind of knowledge Part 5, Proposition 24 Consequently, he who knows things by this kind of knowledge passes to the summit of human perfection and is therefore definition of the emotions, two, affected by the highest pleasure such pleasure being accompanied by the idea of himself and his own virtue Thus, definition of the emotions 25 From this kind of knowledge arises the highest possible acquiescence Quote Eredemonstrandum Proposition 28 The endeavor or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first but from the second kind of knowledge Proof This proposition is self-evident For whatsoever we understand clearly and distinctly we understand either through itself or through that which is conceived through itself That is, ideas which are clear and distinct in us or which are referred to the third kind of knowledge Part 2, Proposition 40, Note 2 Cannot follow from ideas that are fragmentary and confused and are referred to knowledge of the first kind but must follow from adequate ideas or ideas of the second and third kind of knowledge Therefore, definition of the emotions, one The desire of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first but from the second kind Quote Eredemonstrandum Proposition 29 Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity Proof In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body it to that extent conceives duration which can be determined by time and to that extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time Part 5, Proposition 21, Part 2, Proposition 26 But eternity cannot be explained in terms of duration Part 1, Definition 8 and Explanation Therefore, to this extent the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity but it possesses such power because it is of the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity Part 2, Proposition 44, Corollary 2 and also because it is of the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity Part 5, Proposition 23 For besides these two there is nothing which belongs to the essence of mind Part 2, Proposition 13 Therefore, this power of conceiving things under the form of eternity only belongs to the mind in virtue of the mind's conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity Quoter of Demonstrandom Note Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways either as existing in relation to a given time and place or as contained in God and following from the necessity of the divine nature Whatsoever we conceive in this second way as true or real we conceive under the form of eternity and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God as we showed in Part 2, Proposition 45 and Note which see Proposition 30 Our mind in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God Proof Eternity is the very essence of God in so far as this involves necessary existence Part 1, Definition 8 Therefore, to conceive things under the form of eternity is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God as real entities or in so far as they involve existence through the essence of God wherefore our mind in so far as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God and knows etc Quoter of Demonstrandom End of Part 5, Propositions 26