 Just go to the other side so I'm like the first two yeah so grab that one and then the two Why we just have to my wire you can't Then you have to add more if you have enough space Yeah He has to buy another one for the you know for the receiver so I got the two hardwires Whoever goes first, I mean I'm like George and did not go inside it Yeah And then here Probably can't go all day Almost the same Okay, so you'll unmute it. All right. Thanks. Hey, Modesta Good Oh good, I will do that then Track 1.5. Okay, which administer you worked in one of the So true so much is gonna change Great Good morning. My name is George Perkovich I'm a vice president for studies here at the Carnegie Endowment for international peace My pleasure to welcome you here this morning and to welcome our panel and and moderators quite a distinguished Group from the moderator through through the panelists There are two major at least two major Parts of any negotiation like the one that's going to be pursued with the DPRK one is the Content of the package that you're seeking the technical arrangements and outcome And then the other is the method of getting there the method of getting the other side To agree the method of mutual accommodation to shape such such a package and then the Implementation my colleagues at Carnegie and our nuclear policy program have been working for the last several years on the on the first part the technical package of what could be pursued and we've been doing it with colleagues in Israel China France and the United Kingdom nuclear weapons experts from those countries and the idea is if one assumes that the Ideal outcome from the standpoint of the United States and some of its allies, which would be something like the Libya model Where North Korea hands over all of its WMD capability to be put on a plane and flown Out of the country if that ideal is not going to be achieved Then what would be meaningful that could be achieved and how could you verify it and What we've been elaborating is is something that we call a comprehensive verifiable cap as a first phase in the North Korean Process of mutual accommodation with the rest of the world anyway That's the kind of technical content that one hears Not only here, but around town Less often do we focus on the the main focus of today's discussion with this distinguished group? Which is you know, how would you manage and conduct a negotiation to lead to? an agreement at the end and what insights can be drawn from past experiences with the DPRK which several of our Distinguished speakers have unique experience in doing and so to lead us through that is Mark Landler from the New York Times and Mark will take over now and guide the discussion before we open it up to you all but welcome again George good morning And again welcome. I will very quickly introduce these panelists. They're probably well known to most of you And as George said the added value here is that all four of them have negotiated with North Koreans During one period or another in one context or another so starting on my left You're right is Bob Goluchi who worked in the Clinton administration And and was one of the negotiators in the negotiations that led to the agreed framework Danny Russell worked most recently in the Obama administration as assistant secretary for East Asian affairs and was involved in the formulation of the strategic patients policy among other things Suzanne DiMaggio has the distinction of Probably having negotiated with North Koreans more recently than anyone else As recently as two months ago in a track 1.5 Context she has had a lot of fairly recent interaction with North Korean officials She also saves us from having this not only be a panel but a mantle And since that's become a controversial issue lately in Washington. I'm very glad she's Also bringing us gender diversity and then lastly Chris Hill Who was of course Involved in the negotiations during the George W. Bush administration as assistant secretary for East Asian affairs So why don't I want to just set the stage with a couple of things one is we we have a date June 12th We have a place Singapore And we have some statements by administration officials about the meeting that President Trump and Kim Jong-un are going to hold and I'm sure you may have all seen this over the weekend, but Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made the rounds on the Sunday shows and He made a couple of statements One was we will learn from the lessons of the past. We will not fall into the trap of our predecessors And the second point he made is the chairman Kim who he's now met twice Recognizes that for this to succeed The deal needs to be bigger faster more complete more thorough and in every way better than Any of the deals that any of these people tried to negotiate in the past So I I just thought setting that stage I'd start by asking each of them each of these people for their opinion on what is it in fact an argument one could make that this time is different that this leader With this nuclear capacity facing this American president that we might actually have a different outcome And and and those who say we don't are following into sort of Washington cynicism. It didn't work in the past It won't work now So why don't I start maybe down at the end with Bob and ask that question? I like this setup where you get these Folks who have dealt with the North Koreans before and we can share with all you What it is we did so that these guys make sure they don't do it again I'd be happy now to tell you what we did so that we don't make that mistake again I I do think that this time is some of us were talking beforehand this time is different than other times The thing that immediately occurs to me must occur to you all is that there's nobody quite like Donald Trump and there's nobody quite like Kim Jong-un running countries right these these two guys are different than the guys before them plus now we're looking at a Country North Korea that has the capability or is on the very verge of having the capability To put a thermonuclear weapon on a city almost any city in the United States America So presenting a relatively unique threat directly to the United States, which we haven't seen before 2017 and we haven't had the crisis we have now before 2017 So I think the threat is different I think the leadership is different and by the way we have the experience that these people have had and We know that there were certain things to be worried about what George was talking about before is is It it's it's a Extremely important thing what it is You all expect the president to succeed at in Singapore What is it that denuclearization nevermind what North Korea thinks it is or even with Donald Trump thinks it is What it ought it be? What should it be? What should verification look like and how do you transition from that to the deal? What is it that? Negotiators like us would work out to make sure that happens I Think each of us would probably have nice things to say about our own experience It's not all stuff to be avoided, but I'll spare you that for now. Okay, Danny Well, I agree with Bob. This time really is different. I mean for one thing It's the first time in history that a mentally deranged dotard has met with a short fat rocket man And there's a reason that the two leaders are prepared to overlook the volley of insults Because normally they're both pretty thin-skinned. It's that they're both getting some major political benefit out of a summit meeting for President Trump, it's presumably a Nobel Prize one up on Obama it's positioning himself in the midterms good luck to the Democrats to To run against peace It's the dip low attainment the high ratings that he'll get not at 3 a.m But whatever time the summit takes place in Singapore and for Kim Jong-un. Look he is on the cusp of being Treated like Gorbachev or like Mao Zedong. He's About to get peer treatment from the world's super power. That's not nothing from in his political world He has already gotten a de facto sanctions lift when it comes to Implementation not only by China, but around the world you see the level of intensity and vigor in Implementing the provisions of the Security Council resolution have been dropped And he's also pretty much mooted the risk of a of a bloody nose There's not no talk of fire and fury and no likelihood either of getting back to that point So the they're they're both getting something political But I think the big difference is that one of the two of the leaders will walk into that room having prepared having a plan having clear understanding of the vocabulary and of the background and the history And that leader has which is unfortunately not the leader of the free world Has already succeeded in lining China up largely behind and getting South Korea to be pretty compliant Has gone from being a pariah to being mr. popularity who now world leaders are buying to to meet with Having turned maximum pressure into minimum pressure And having reinvented himself No longer is he the brutal totalitarian dictator who uses chemical weapons to murder his half-brother anti-aircraft guns to murder his uncle. He is a very honorable guy. I'm reliably informed So That is what a month. Those are among the things that make it different Well, it's a pleasure to be here at Carnegie. Thanks for having me. Let me clarify. I was never a negotiator Okay, my interactions with the North Koreans has been informal in what's called track 1.5 settings So it's more a policy oriented, but not actually negotiating that being said my last interaction with the North Koreans was about a few days before Pompeo's secret visit to Pyongyang and at the time we were meeting I certainly didn't know about it But I have to say the North Koreans tone was quite different than previous meetings They made it clear they didn't care whether or not we continued with joint testing with the South Koreans Which was quite different from what I've been hearing over the past three years And also they made it quite clear that they're not going to do any more testing that they were finished But getting back to the specific question I think what's different is you know, we really don't know but this is the time to test it I tend to agree with Bob that it is leaning towards different. We have in Kim Jong-un a leader who was not his father He's not his grandfather He's 34 years old when he looks ahead. He sees decades of rule ahead of him And I think he knows that in order to sustain the Kim family dynasty over these decades He's got to do something to address the economic woes that the country is facing So this is what we need to test his motivation What he says is that and what the North Koreans have been telling me is that once they attain their nuclear Completion of their nuclear force. They would then turn their attention to economic development From the Jung Jin line these two parallel developments the nuclear and economic So in a lot of ways Kim Jong-un is very different from his grandfather and father Because he has staked his credibility on that robust nuclear program but also on delivering economic benefits to the country and this is where I think we have to fully test his intentions and Also, by the way, this is where we have our greatest leverage If indeed he is sincere about this and the reality is this if he isn't sincere We will know soon enough and if he isn't sincere, he's made a drastic mistake Because you can see what will happen if he is playing the game and we come to that conclusion Well, guess what between mr. Bolton and others Talk of military strikes will certainly raise their heads again and this time I don't think I'm not so sure we'll be able to pull back from that break So this is a real critical moment. I think for a fully testing. Oh For fully testing the music to go The other way it's different I do think and with all the negotiating experience on the stage I really do think this is the best opportunity we've had in the early 20 years To pursue a full diplomatic Initiative with the North Koreans in our allies course So in that case it's different too Chris well first of all, I'm very pleased that the president has followed up on this I have my qualms with having the president meet Kim Jong-un rather than a sort of staged Approach to the question. I would like to see some effort at drafting a joint Communique so that the in effect the summit will be a success even before they meet So there I have a lot of technical concerns about how they're doing this but I think it's right to for our president to to Pursue this seriously. It's right for a number of reasons and I would agree With the other speakers to the effect that I I think there is something new in Kim Jong-un I think there is something new and the way the North Koreans are talking about this But ultimately, I mean this is going to come down to a very fateful day on June 12th. Now, we've heard the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, we've heard vice president. We've heard the president. Well, not the president but the these other two Speakers talk about CV ID complete verifiable irreversible denuclearization. So You know, now you can argue. Oh, there's some Definitional differences in what denuclearization is and I would tell you based on my experience There's not a definitional difference The North Koreans knew fully well when we negotiated in 2005 the joint statement in which they Said they would abandon all their nuclear weapons programs all their nuclear programs and return at an early date To the non-colliferation treaty at an early date Non-colliferation meaning treaty meaning as a non nuclear state So they know what we're looking for and so the question is is Kim Jong-un? really in a position to deliver that now He's made some gestures. He released three Korean Americans the other day and frankly Normally when they make these releases they do so in the context of our doing something Usually sending a senior official to sit there with a North Korean TV camera on them while they try not to smile and still bring home these prisoners in this case he already has has had a meeting with With then director of the CIA. He's got an agreed meeting with the president. He's seen the Secretary of State. These are huge gestures I mean not just in Northeast Asia in any part of the world So he's gotten a lot already out of this process. The question is what is a joint communique going to show? I suspect North Korea will talk about their sharing of the goal. I Suspect they're going to try to avoid talking about the time frame of the goal It's usually in their context more of a biblical notion that when the lions lie down with the lambs Give our give up our nuclear weapons So I think the Trump administration needs to put some time horizons on this in our case It was to say that they had to Return at an early date to the non-colliferation treaty very clear what that means Ultimately we failed because North Korea did not give us verification They allowed us to verify things. We already knew they would not allow us to look at undeclared sites I really wonder where they're going to go with that It may mean the president says I trust you But I can assure you I don't need to assure John Bolton because I think he already agrees that you know What's trust got to do with this? This is all about verification So I think there are a lot of unanswered questions, and I think it's way too soon to be doing the paperwork for a Nobel Prize for our president Why don't I jump off the you raise the these this acronym we're going to hear so much about in the coming weeks CV ID And you just zeroed in on the verification piece, but I wonder Bob Whether you just take a crack at the whole concept of CV ID in this round of negotiations negotiations, so Comprehensive Verifiable irreversible Dismantlement there's a lot wrong with that as a something that could be accomplished for example Irreversible that word has confused me since I first heard it Because I have never heard anybody who is going to have along with the weapons exported all the scientists and engineers Or have have them shot I so I don't see anything as irreversible, and I think the use of the word which is supposed to convey a permanence is Unfortunately misleading and we shouldn't mislead the American public the Congress or anybody else nothing's irreversible as a matter of fact My most important point on this is that you can never take away From North Korea, it's latent or recessed capability to build nuclear weapons It has done it once it has tested six the last one by the Technical knowledge that's out there would have it probably be a true multi-stage thermal nuclear weapon 10 times the size of the Nagasaki yield weapon and Potentially much larger so forget irreversible Now what what about comprehensive I Like to think there'll be a declaration first Where the North says has to do what either Libyan case or my experience the Iraqi case after the first go for Declare everything they have we have 27 nuclear weapons We have 14 kilograms of plutonium. We have 17 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. We have these facilities Comprehensive declaration so that when you find something they didn't declare then you have a complaint of some kind all right What if they declare? 24 nuclear weapons Could we ever be sure they don't have 28? Let me give you the answer no All right, if they declare 14 kilograms of plutonium, can you be sure they don't have 24? Hint no Same thing with highly restraining. Can you get limits if the rest of the declaration is accurate? In other words if they show you once again the same centrifuge cascade that they showed I our expert Who came from Los Alamos labs? And looked at it that we expect those show us that again But will they show us the other one that they didn't show the first time and will they show us other? Facilities they may have for the production of fissile material and if they have thermonuclear weapons We have to be concerned about isotopes of hydrogen as well. How do they produce deuterium? How are they producing tritium? Where are they doing it? there's a lot to go here and we will only know within some broad range whether their Declarations are accurate because once they show us the cascade we can look at the capacity of the machines We can look at how long they've been operating we can say well the most highly restraining they can have is that But if they declare half that Are they necessarily lying? I would say it may be very hard to know so my Comment about CV ID is that it is a political pile of crap now The second point here is that you what you want to do though is get as comprehensive as you physically can You want to get as verifiable as you physically can you want to do? Dismantlement in destruction so it is as complete so they have to start again as you can But you should not delude the American public the United States Congress or the international community about what you will ultimately Have in North Korea You'll have a country that built nuclear weapons and can build them again and by the way we talk about many analysts do Japan as having a plutonium overhang how long would it take Japan to build nuclear weapons if it decided it wanted to? Look at your wristwatch and then think about those weapons. They'd be like Hondas. They'd hum to be wonderful Right, so Japan is not a long way from being a nuclear weapons take neither is South Korea Would have to separate the plutonium so my point here is that? North Korea will always be a recess nuclear weapons day It can legitimately join the NPT if it makes the declaration and we get the verification that we would want but it will never ever meet the standard of Absolute certainty that they've given up everything I Welcome either of the three of you to jump into this too But but also I wanted to just remind people that Bolton John Bolton said a few weeks ago that the precedent He sees for this negotiation is Libya So if any of you wanted to maybe take a shot at why Libya is not North Korea I think that also be useful Yeah, Libya is often brought up in a number of contexts One is by people like John Bolton who feels feel it would be easy for the North Koreans to say in an afternoon If you can just bring up a u-haul trailer and take it all away We'd be done here In fact, the North Korean nuclear program has gone on since the 1960s The Libyan program could fit in a two-car garage And so I don't think Libya has much to do with it on the other hand people have also used Libya as a model It's somehow North Korea will never give up their nuclear weapons and I've never been happy with the word never in this context that they would never give up the nuclear weapons because after all Gaddafi did so and then he ended up with that hideous, you know triple-a state funeral that he had so I Don't buy that either So I don't think Libya really has anything to do with North Korea and one time the North Koreans Kim Gagwan my interlocutor said we want the same arrangement you had with India because in a supreme example of mistiming as I was Beating up on the North Koreans and frankly the Chinese in September 2005 to to have a statement Compatible with CV ID we had at the very same day a negotiator in Delhi preparing the way by which we could Allow them to keep nuclear Deliverable nuclear weapons while we would then sell them nuclear material for civilian nuclear use So kind of extraordinary and so Kim Gagwan said to me Well, why can't we have what India has and I told him there is not enough time in the day to explain to you The difference between your country and India, you know, which is a little rhetorical point designed to not answer the question So I think we have a we have a problem in kind of laying this out and While it may make sense in television commentary in the US to talk about models such as Libya It has no bearing on how we have to deal with this issue He's annual take a shot. Yes, I think you know Mr. Bolton we have to keep in mind keeps bringing up Libya In the context of North Korea, and I don't think it's a very subtle undercutting Of this effort. He's made it very clear. He would like to see us Do strikes against North Korea and when he brings up Libya I think it's a subtle message or maybe not so subtle message to the North Koreans be careful Look what happened to Mr. Gaddafi But I do want to say in terms of this set of issues. We're talking about how much verification is at the heart of it and although the concept of Decisive it is questionable. I agree Verification will I think this whatever negotiation this leads to an agreement it leads to I think it'll live and die by how Well verification goes and this is why I think it was so monumentally stupid to come out of the Iran agreement because with the Iran agreement we had finally had a agreement with the Iranians that was it's it's most innovative aspect was verification most intrusive regime of inspections and monitoring ever negotiated and Instead of tearing it up the Trump administration should have been holding it up as this is the model that the United States is now Following when it comes to verification. This is our new gold standard This is the precedent that we're going to apply to you and then my second point is in terms of just following up on what Bob was saying all the problems with the terms and we are getting very much tripped up over Civit and de-neuclearization. They're very important and I my hope is that before Trump and Kim gets to the table They'll have a lot of these concepts worked out in agreements on Definitions, but it really goes to show you in order for this to succeed What we really need to do is change the nature of our relationship with North Korea That is really the only guarantee we're going to have as to whether or not this is really something different and that is of course very complicated and with a president like mr. Trump who doesn't have any real negotiating experience is A hothead and can go off script that is a little worrying I think Kim Jong-un sees an opportunity in Trump and the fact that he knows when he sits down at that table He's not going to hear a word about human rights. He's not going to hear anything about political reform So I think he sees an opportunity in negotiating with this president But unless and until we actually change the nature of our relationship with the North Koreans I really don't see how It will be Changed that is irreversible or sustained over time I'm glad you raised Iran and I want to ask Danny this question because I've Pulsed a lot of the people I talked to about what effect withdrawing from Iran may have on this upcoming negotiation and a number of Korea experts have actually told me they're not sure it will Because Kim views his encounter with Trump more along the lines of a Nixon Mao You know two great nuclear actors facing off and and won't get that bothered or preoccupied by the details of a Multilateral disarmament deal negotiated with a country thousands of miles away Your point about verification was interesting, but beyond the verification point just the notion of American credibility in the wake of what happened with Iran Do you think Danny it will make a difference in this negotiation? Well, I think American credibility with North Korea started at zero and the Likelihood is that the withdrawal by Trump from the Iran deal Didn't fundamentally alter Kim Jong-un's thinking. He's witnessed dramatic changes in the US posture and the abrogation of agreements explicit or implicit as say the The house flipped from one party to another or the White House changed Occupant it certainly doesn't help, but I don't I don't think that Kim Jong-un is particularly looking up broad for From models or for examples or that he was likely to take America's word for it in the first place I mean I very much agree with Suzanne that if we're going to put North Korea to the test Verification is the testing ground. That's where it's going to matter But we should bear in mind when we talk about CV ID or other parts of the doctrine that It isn't John Bolton and isn't Mike Pompeo who's really Doing the Negotiating or who's leading the effort. It's Donald Trump and Donald Trump is not focused on CV ID per se he's focused on a grand but perhaps a short-term deal now I don't think that North Korea believes that it needs a deal It is getting so many of the things that it has Signaled that it wants in terms of the loosening of sanctions in terms of the status as a nuclear pier Setting itself up to be India to be Pakistan. I don't think the Libya model is Is in play at all for anyone other than John Bolton? They don't need a deal. I think what is on offer is basically cap and freeze that the North Koreans aren't going to Trade or sell their nuclear in their missile program, but they are prepared perhaps to lease peace and quiet to lease a Ceiling on the size of the arsenal and through a freeze on testing these temporarily a Ceiling on the qualitative improvements But that lease is going to have to be renewed on a regular basis and trust me The price is going to go up one more question for me and then And Chris I'll let you go in a second and then I'll go to the floor But the last question I wanted to ask has to do with sanctions and the role that sanctions relief plays in the negotiation The administration has sort of presented this as you do everything. We ask you and then we give you sanctions relief Is that a viable strategy? Is that a strategy that others like the Chinese are going to be willing to sign on to and if not How do you see that process playing out the negotiations? Maybe I don't think it's viable at all on the other hand I don't see how they get relief from new year from UN sanctions unless the US goes along with it And I don't see us going along with any of it the issue would be of course whether China chooses to enforce The sanctions that they've that they've agreed to but I think as a general proposition We've talked about we talked about this a lot the idea that all sanctions relief Should be back loaded until North Korea has done everything they've been asked and that's certainly the way Pompeo is talking Right now we ended up with some tight sequencing of issues. So you do this we'll do that you do this We'll do that with the concept that at the end when they quote cheated what they did was they didn't give us verification We didn't we stopped giving the next tranche of heavy fuel oil I think that was kind of the right way to go But of course that's some part of the Trump narrative that somehow we gave them all these things and never got anything in return So I think he's going to face a tough situation And if I were Kim I'd say you know we would love to give up our nuclear weapons as soon as possible But I need to build up the economy here I need to show my people that we're not being threatened by your The presence of your troops in the region so I need a few things if I'm going to do this But I'm absolutely in favor of doing this and I think that's going to put President Trump in a tough position But I would Be very surprised if the day after he announces a cap and freeze That a if I opened up the New York Times I wouldn't even have to open it up could be on the front page Mark Landler And the only question would be your headline writer Because I would think that would be considered a tremendous failure by the Trump administration to accept cap and freeze I don't want to write your column for you, but You're already nodding your head. So I think yeah So I think he has a real trouble accepting Trump I think is putting himself in a situation where he's going to have to get something real out of this and Real means in the de-nuclearization side, and I'm not sure he knows how to do that Why don't we go to the floor? We have about 15 minutes left and let me just ask I'll call in a moment But just please identify yourself When you're called on and then and then perhaps if you'd like to address the question to a specific person Just go ahead and do that we start with a gentleman here on the island second round There's microphones coming around so just wait for a moment Thank you, this is Song Zhang with Shanghai Wenhui Daily I think one of the key question on this issue is how North Korea will be assured Their security and they won't be invaded in the future by US because I don't think Kim will trust President Trump or even like this Iran nuclear deal. It's been international agreement. It can be We're drawn by US government. So what kind of mechanism is a good idea to make sure North Korea's Security Council, you have a specific person in mind. No problem Any of them. Thank you. I think that is indeed a key question and We have our narrative about how the North Koreans cheated with Pakistan on the agreed framework back in The 1990s that North Koreans have their narrative to about us cheating by not fulfilling the obligation Contained in the language of the agreed framework that we would normalize relations with the DPRK It did not happen for a variety of reasons some of them having to do with North Korea something having to do with a Change of both houses of Congress, but the North Koreans in exchanges I've had track one and a half not as recently as then but They have said that that taught us that we cannot trust you And I said what would it take and they said nothing you we just will never trust you I got that but The idea here that has been in my mind for some time and it was put there by a colleague of mine is that We did not normalize relations at least in part Because the United States America to have normal relations with a country that is such a gross violator of human rights with respect to the way It treats its own people is it's pretty understandable And so if you present to the North Koreans as I did That they will have to do something to change the way they operate Internally those prison camps what they do to their own people that this makes it just Absolutely impossible to think of a normal relationship in North Korean initial reaction to me was well There you go wanting to change our regime again. Well, yes in a sense, but but not the way by the use of force We would need them to move down a continuum to what is more broadly accepted as Acceptable practice in the international community by the United Nations and others So I think that really is the answer to the question of what would have to change Yes, you'd have to have verification and denuclearization etc etc But I the idea that we would have a normal relationship with a country that still maintained Sort of Stalinist policies is impossible to make politically Could I just yeah, I just like to add on this point I think it's a myth that North Korea is worried every day about our invading them If you look at the history since the Korean War, which they don't they don't even acknowledge They invaded South Korea, which I think anyone You know should know is what happened. They have used this argument. Oh, we're great of your invasion That's why we need these nuclear weapons In fact, if you go through all the history if you read, you know memoirs by people who are the NSC staff It's always kind of holding the South Koreans back There's never been a kind of desire on the US part to invade North Korea and there are a lot of obvious reasons for it So I think it's one of those things where North Korea says these things holds to them and then expects us to act To react to them and try to give them assurances For example, the Chinese came to me and said why can't you show? Your acceptance of their state by beginning a process of having interest groups in each Interest sections in each capital the way we did so successfully with Beijing So I went back to Washington. I said I've got an idea. I didn't want to taint the idea by saying it came from the Chinese. Why don't we do what we did with China and this would begin a process by which North Korea would see we have We have diplomats in their capital. They have diplomats in our capital It's kind of a down payment on the eventual recognition of states Everyone thought it was a terrible idea and then they they thought about it They worked it Condoleezza Rice worked it because she understood it She got a president Bush to accept it and we went back and then I was in Berlin of all places And I sat down with Kim K-1. I got great news. We are prepared to in the absence of any Denuclearization at this point. We're prepared to put an intro section in Pyongyang have American diplomats there It's how we normalize with China. We have a great relationship with China So up and Kim K-1 just looked at me. I don't know. We have no interest in that So I think you have to be prepared for the fact that North Korea says things and they seem to be interested in things until they're not so You know, we got to be realistic about who we're dealing with here Why don't I go to the other side this gentleman back here? Bob Holly retired Foreign Service Could someone on the panel address the issue of what the security architecture in northeastern Asia would look like? Given a successful outcome of the negotiations or given an unsuccessful outcome in the negotiations Does anyone want to take a crack at that? Well, I think it's a little related to the previous question in terms of How the North Koreans will be convinced that they'll remain secure. So I would assume that mr. Pompeo in his Discussions with Kim Jong-un has probably spent a lot of time Providing reassurances that regime change is not the US policy and explaining why mr. Trump does not believe in regime change And I think that's true I don't think he's a regime change president and maybe some people around him are but I don't think he is and then I think it's notable that Kim Jong-un has now met with Xi Jinping twice and I think that If I'm going to assume a large part of that discussion probably focused on security guarantees And this is where of course the Chinese will play a pivotal role in Extending those guarantees to the North Koreans so that they do feel safe enough to enter into this deal Whether or not the threat of the US invasion is real or perceived or just hyping to get more out of this so I think in terms of the Security architecture That will be a significant change if we go down this road is the Chinese's relationship with North Korea and providing those guarantees What does failure mean because I think you also asked like in the event that this all collapses Well, what does it look like? I do think then our allies and Chinese will be worried that we will then shift back to the Rhetoric here of necessity for military strikes And don't forget one of the reasons I think President Moon became so active in Seeking dialogue with the North Koreans of course he ran on that platform But let's face it. He was also very concerned that the Trump administration was going to move forward With a preemptive strike or a bloody nose without even consulting Seoul So I do think it will throw it would throw the region in disarray This gentleman down here in the front Thank you for coming. My name is Mitsuo Nakai Reagan Foundation's Japan native US citizen I Like to think that I I know a little bit about Asian mentality so to speak but I still don't understand What triggered the change of heart? That's a mystery to me Maybe just maybe Dennis Rutman visits had a little bit about About that too because he mentioned he likes Disneyland and then I found out later on that South Korean government It's been sending the clip a video clip to North Korean government and Kim is Certainly watching that and found out this is how South Korean people live So what about my country? So that it may have a lot to I don't know that for sure I just I just want to know what triggered it. It's also what Bob said is right It's a long complicated issue to denuclearize and I was listening to Bill Richardson and He said that Pompeo should go back and talk to him before June 12, maybe two more times maybe three more times So what's the question all that so that's another question that I have great. Thank you, Danny So I think it's a highly debatable proposition as to whether Kim Jong-un had a change of heart If you believe that that he woke up one morning and had a conversion Thanks to drinks with Dennis Rodman or any other reason then We'll we'll know when as Suzanne pointed out this gets put to the test in terms of Verification terms of access to sites and so on but so far nothing that we've seen falls outside a very familiar North Korean Strategy or a set of tactics, which is dial up the pain scare everybody silly Dial it down Extend an olive branch Wait for the proffers the compromises the offers to come rolling in Bank as much as you can or as the North Koreans used to call it milk the cow and then when you Have run out you've gotten all you're gonna get and some of your own Promises come do then it's time to as they say rinse and repeat Roll it back up again, and there's no shortage of excuses the North Koreans would have for why they are now Abandoning their temporary offer of calm Why don't I go to the Back to this gentleman, and then I'll come back up to the front This is a sangmin. I'm from the radio free Asia North Korea announced that they're going to demolish the nuclear Test site are coming the May 23rd and 25th. I want to know how do you see that this one? This is kind of a some gesture to show their gene in it about the denuclearization Who wants to take that? It is it's nice It doesn't mean a great deal. I mean it doesn't mean a great deal in the sense that tunnels are dug in order to Have Nuclear test explosions that do not vent For a variety of reasons states do not want to vent this partly Environmental partly because other countries try to collect what's vented to understand what just happened So they will dig more tunnels if they want to keep testing. This is kind of like the cooling tower I mean it there's an imagery to the test site being Collapsed never mind whether or not it was already collapsed from the last test skip that even if it wasn't it still is is more of a Demonstration a show then it is substantive. It has very little to do with Tiny bit to do with what we will be or ought to be asking for in the process of denuclearization I need to defend the cooling From this, you know vicious right-wing attack The cooling tower was of course part of the young beyond complex the part of the You know the reactor and the purpose of a cooling tower is to take hot scalding water and as the name implies to cool the water We we had an agreement with the North Koreans on some 11 Procedures in which we essentially disabled the reactor now. Why were we disabling the reactor? We weren't dismantling it at that point. We were simply taking some actions the collective Putting them together would require North Korea some five years to put it back together and start using the reactor again Well five years is not an eternity But five years at least should get you through a few crises So they can't just say we're mad at you. We're turning the reactor back on But so we had all these 11 things which usually involve sawing off pipes, etc And it wasn't really understood by the general public So I talked to Wu Dawei the Chinese representative I said, you know, we need something that's people can understand a little better and I rolled my notes And I and I was holding my notes in my hand and he said what do you mean? I said, can't we just take that cooling tower and blow it up? And so Wu Dawei said good idea. We're gonna work on that. So another example of us Chinese Cooperation which by the way, I call me old-fashioned call me naive I think us Chinese cooperation on a third country issue is important and we ought to get back to it So we did it It did take them actually took them seven years to get the reactor back in shape They've never been able to build up the cooling tower. So they've been dumping hot scalding water into the river That was always a possibility. I don't consider it even ideal from a North Korean perspective But I think the point was well taken if they want to do that It kind of shows you how all message they are I don't think the closing of the nuclear test site is as insignificant as Bob says but not for the reason you may think I actually think it's part of the North Koreans negotiating strategy I think they are if you take it together with the giving up of the returning of the prisoners of the American detainees This the suspension and testing both nuclear and ICBMs I see it as them Giving these things away before they get to negotiating tables so that they're not seen as Concessions once they get to the table in other words, they're doing this to set the tone for good productive Negotiations and not because they're weak. They're going to be weak at the table itself I think that's very important to them. Danny. Did you want to add? Yes, two things one I very much agree with Suzanne that these are deliberate gestures to set the stage for the Upcoming summit. I have a less benign interpretation I think it's so that Kim Jong-un can begin by saying in effect All right over you now It's your turn and here are the things that you the US side need to do but let's take Kim Jong-un at his own word when it comes to the significance of the Goong-ae the northern test site. He said just last month that the workers party plenum that We don't need to conduct nuclear tests anymore now that our Historic Nuclear force is complete the mission of the test site has ended This is what he's saying So I don't think we should get too misty-eyed about the Gesture that he's making the gentleman in the second row and then afterwards the lady in the program Thank you, Pete Schutley retired Foreign Service officer. My question is to the whole panel I've seldom seen a summit where both leaders are so hugely foaming at the mouth for political success I fear that they're willing to sign most anything just so they can come home and label it a success I'm worried that this is going to be a repeat of 1938 Munich where at first it looks successful and then we know what kind of trouble it caused down the road I Think the ideal outcome is for this let's get this summit over with the two leaders together for Trump I think he wants two things to in order to call it a success The first is that he can come out and say look I did something no American president has done and by the way I had great chemistry with this guy and I have no doubt they will I mean I have no doubt that that will be achieved the second is he's got to be able to come out and say We agreed on it on a end goal of denuclearization Then my hope is that these two guys get out of the way and let the negotiators get to work Let the diplomats get to work the nuclear experts the technical expert to hammer out this deal That's the ideal situation for me. Otherwise, I think we may be in trouble I fear we're down to our last one or two questions, but take the lady in the front row. We'll do one more question Diana Lady Dugan CSIS As Chris knows I think I'm the only person in the room who was actually in soul When the Korean War started and even though I was a child I can assure you that The war started in the north but I Are from the north but I also wanted to get to the latest kind of elephant with rhinestone sunglasses in the corner and that is President Trump's announcement that he's going to work with G on ZTE and I think that he also told President Trump that Korea used to belong to China which is not something that most of us in the room think relates to serious reality but to what degree and I'm not a fan of having China in the middle of anything at this point, but To what degree do you think that this sudden? ZTE switch is going to be somehow part of the Mix in terms of the economic side of things and I say this because you know The newest phrase I guess in North Korea is what? Which is two ways which is meaning nuclear and economic so we haven't talked anything about What other than sanctions would be in the economic side of things? So it's a two-part question what other than nuclear and secondly the degree to which Trump's Very Mercurial but cozy relationship with Z might have a factor Danny you want to take a shot? Well with respect to the relationship with China My observation my experience is that the Chinese leaders are not Not romantic They're highly pragmatic They are looking at a set of policies by this administration Whether it's on trade or high-tech or it's on Taiwan or it's North Korea that they find threatening and very troubling They don't have to look any further than the nuclear Posture review or the national security strategy to see themselves characterized as as the enemy as the threat and they're Responding accordingly past the early efforts by President Trump to link issues across the Spectrum of U.S. China relationship have fed this anxiety in this concern So what we see particularly in the aftermath of the abrupt announcement? Ironically by the South Korean National Security Advisor right on the steps of the West Wing that President Trump was going to hold a summit with Kim Jong-un utterly without any heads up little on prior consultation with Xi Jinping Was a rapid backpedaling by the Chinese in an effort to recapture the lost lips and teeth socialist fraternal Friendship with the DPRK before it was too late and to ensure that China would stay relevant and not be Marginalized by a U.S. Grab Pyongyang this is not a good place for the United States because it sets North Korea up effectively to be able to play the major countries around Against each other and thus puts us in a weaker strategic position. I Just want to say that when the history books are written about the era that we have the privilege of living in I think there will be an understanding that we've had a president who has often made decisions That have nothing to do with the sort of broader Context of the decisions and historians might try to link China policy with North Korea policy with Japan policy But I think a more honest appraisal of where we are suggests that we have a president whose impulses Have often led him in two places where he has had made no effort to link them with other Policies and I think the consequence of this will be dangerous and yet to come last question The rest my point Yes In addition to what ambassador Hill said, I think another define another Unfortunate defining feature of the Trump presidency is not giving a hoot about not only our own national interests But the national interests of our allies and getting back to your question about the regional architecture, you know I think both Certainly president moon has is very hip to this now and it has his eyes open I would assume mr. Albe does too I think we are now at 1107 so this is sort of a little bit past our time So I want to thank the four panelists I think we covered quite a bit of ground and I want to thank you for good questions Okay I don't know