 Good morning, everybody. Good morning and welcome. My name is Nancy Lindborg. I'm the president of the US Institute of Peace. I'm delighted to welcome everybody here on such a glorious spring day. USIP, as many of you know, was founded more than 30 years ago by Congress as an independent federal organization dedicated to the proposition that peace is very possible and it's very practical. And we look at what are those ways of managing conflicts so that it doesn't become violent and resolving it if it does. And without question, the kind of conversation that we're going to have this morning together is a demonstration of the ways in which talking together and exploring creative ideas is absolutely essential. So I'm delighted that we're able to come together to examine areas where the United States, where China and Africa can work together to address some of the continent's most pressing security issues. And we certainly have a long list, everything from the not so distant Ebola episode to now the pending four famines, which are highly entangled with various violent extremist groups. There's a lot that we can work on together. And I want to thank the Carter Center for being a partner and helping to make today's event possible. For the last three years, USIP and the Carter Center in coordination with the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel have been leading the Africa-China-US Consultation for Peace, which is a forum to explore shared interests, share issues, ways that all three sides might benefit from joint efforts. We're seeing that China's increasing influence on the security of the continent requires the international community to really recalibrate our assumptions and to look at how we might more creatively address some of these crises. And the Africa-China-US Consultation for Peace is a very promising effort to doing that. It provides a platform that involves all the stakeholders and looks at ways to innovate new ideas with less formal channels, which is what we'll have a chance to do today. We've seen how the US and China have already worked on other issues together in Africa, including the Ebola crisis, UN peacekeeping, and some of the counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. So there's much to explore, more to do, and much to build on. We're very fortunate to have with us today three leaders of the Africa-China-US Consultation for Peace here today. We have Mohamed Imid Chambas, the special representative of the Secretary General and head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel. Ambassador Zhenhua Zhang, former China Special Representative for African Affairs, and Ambassador Princeton Lyman, former US Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, and our wonderful senior advisor here at USIP, who I so appreciate as a partner and wise counsel. So building on their work, we hope that today's discussion will really identify, develop specific concrete ways to advance tripartite multilateral cooperation between Beijing, Washington, and African governments. And the sessions today will review the progress this effort has made so far, while also exploring the challenges and opportunities to work together, specifically to promote maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and to counter violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin. So before we move on to the first panel, it is my great pleasure to introduce and welcome up to the panel a longtime colleague and friend who I've worked with more years than we either of us care to mention, Jordan Ryan, who is the Vice President for Peace Programs at the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia. And prior to the Carter Center, Mr. Ryan had a very long and distinguished career with the United Nations, where he brought a lot of development experience to this whole world of dealing with conflict and working in post-crisis settings. Jordan had the very unique experience of working with the UN in both Africa and China. So you're uniquely suited for this conversation and served as the humanitarian coordinator of the UN mission in Liberia and served in China as the res rep in 1991. So I first met Jordan Ryan when he was the director of the UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Please join me in welcoming Jordan Ryan, who is one of the movers of this event today. Thank you. Well, it's always nice to come to USIP and to be welcomed by Nancy, a true mover and shaker on things of peace and also a very long and distinguished career. Carter Center is delighted to work closely with USIP and the UN on this initiative. As you probably know, President Carter has a long involvement with China. It's probably noteworthy that he was the president to normalize relations with China at a time when it was not a foregone conclusions. Both President Nixon and President Ford had been unable to do so despite heroic efforts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. But it was a decision of President Carter that moved forward to the finalization of normalization as he likes to say that his predecessors had always said that they agreed to a one China policy. He was the president that made sure it was the one China policy with the People's Republic of China. That was the policy. Subsequent to that, President Carter has met with President Xi and had discussions in Beijing where President Xi invited the Carter Center to be a prod for what can be done to make sure that the US and China find ways of collaborating. And so as Nancy said, born out of that was this initiative, the Africa-China-US consultation for peace. From 2013, there have been meetings in Atlanta, here in Washington, in Beijing, and in Africa that have looked at various issues. But we've been very lucky, I think, to have the strong support of USIP. And Jennifer from the China program has been engaged with this. And we're certainly deeply grateful that Ambassador Princeton Lyman has taken time to really play a key role in advancing this effort. We're deeply grateful for his time and also energy and intellect. He's joined by an old friend, Mohamed Chambas. I knew him from the days of the UN mission in Liberia when he would come in with his ECOWAS hat on and be able to speak sense and to really advance the effort of peace, even when the warlords were trying to do some pretty nasty things. And Ambassador Zhang Zhenhua, a remarkable individual, both a diplomat and a statesman. So we have the US, the UN, China, and the UN with a focus on Africa working together. We're also delighted today that a colleague from the United States, Ambassador David Shin, who's one of the experts in the world about China's involvement in Africa, and has been involved with some of our early discussions that have framed the initiative has agreed to moderate several panels. We're going to get our money's worth out of that today. So we're very much looking forward to this preliminary discussion that will set the stage. The three are authors together with John Goodman from the Carter Center of a good discussion paper that's online with foreign affairs. It's available out by the coffee, but they'll have much more to say, I'm sure. So with that, I'll turn it over to David, who will spur, no doubt, a fruitful dialogue on the issues of Washington, Beijing, and Africa. Thank you. Thank you very much, John. You just indicated that the audience is going to get their money's worth out of my being here. All I can say is I'm here for free. So it should be very easy to get your money's worth. The members of the panel have been introduced already, so there's no need to go through their names in very distinguished backgrounds. Again, they will each speak for about 10 minutes, and then it's my understanding the rest of the time that we have can be devoted to interaction with the audience. So I'm going to begin just by asking Ambassador Chambas if he would open with remarks, and then we'll go on down the agenda. Thank you very much, Ambassador Chen. Let me also express my appreciation for the opportunity to be here this morning in such a distinguished gathering. At the outset of my intervention, I would like to thank the Carter Center and the United States Institute for Peace for organizing this meeting. The Carter Center has facilitated a series of meetings in the framework of the Africa, China, US consultations for peace. These have involved African stakeholders and have been fruitful in clearing the path towards identifying common ground for the trapeitide that is Africa, China, US cooperation, with and in Africa. I have no doubt today will make further progress in that direction. The topic to be discussed in this particular panel is the development of China, US cooperation in and with Africa. For the past couple of decades, trade between China and Africa has grown at a breathtaking pace. China has thus joined the US and Europe in the group of Africa's major trading partners. It is not only in the realm of trade that China and the US are among Africa's major partners. In the framework of their engagement at the UN, Chinese and Americans have combined efforts to address threats to peace and security. The security situation on the African continent arguably remains complex and is facing evolving and multifaceted threats mostly related to armed conflicts, terrorism and violent extremism, transnational organized crimes, including human arms and drug trafficking, piracy, political transition processes and challenges, and the management of natural resources, including land, water, minerals and oil. All these areas constitute domains where China, the US and Africa can deepen their trap tied collaboration. In the specific case of West Africa on terrorism and violent extremism, Boko Haram and Sahel based armed groups continue to be active in the late child basing area and the general Sahel region, particularly in the north of Mali. But indeed, lately we've seen more attacks in Burkina Faso and in Niger, which is really of concern. Affected countries of the LCBC joint efforts created a multinational joint task force to take on the threat posed by Boko Haram. Today, the MNJTF have been successful in weakening Boko Haram's capability of nuisance. Indeed, Boko Haram has been chased out of its stronghold of San Bici forest and are really scattered now. Nevertheless, support to the LCBC countries in the region is still required, especially to meet the immediate humanitarian needs of some 2,300,000 internally displaced persons and refugees. Facilitate their return to safe areas and assist them to rebuild their livelihoods. Also in the framework of the persecution, rehabilitation and reintegration of former Boko Haram fighters who were captured or surrendered after they're being deputed, we need to see how we can work to handle this correctly so that it can encourage more fighters to come out and also help to integrate them properly in society. Of course, that does not mean some blankets, just anybody who comes up. There has to be proper screening and I think this is where some expertise is needed to be able to sort out the bad guys and those who were probably just victims of Boko Haram. Together with my colleague from the UN Office for Central Africa, we are currently encouraging member states and leadership of ECOWAS and the economic community of West African states. ECOWAS to convene the long awaited joint summit on Boko Haram with the aim of developing common regional strategy that addresses the root causes of its emergence and it's important that West Africa and Central Africa countries come together. The Boko Haram threat is not a threat just to these four countries, it goes beyond, it's a threat to countries beyond the LCBC countries and that's why this kind of joint ECOWAS collaboration is also very necessary. Given the replications of the threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel, the LCBC and within MAJTF continue to be a field for cooperation and mutual and global interest. Boko Haram onslaught has galvanized attention on the devastating effects of climate change affecting the late child basin. As of 2015, the late child basin was home to up to 50 million people whereas its resources have been sharply decreasing. It is anticipated that the population would double by 2030. In the past 50 years, the surface area of late child has shrunk from 200,000 square kilometers in 1960 to 1,700 square kilometers as of 1985. Since then, it has rebounded to about 8,000 square kilometers showing the unpredictability of external shocks, severely straining people's coping mechanisms. The importance and urgency to restore and enhance the productive capacity of the late child in order to prevent crisis in the future cannot be overemphasized. The US, China and Africa cooperation in sustaining the water bodies such as the late child which would help to preserve the environment and restore the surrounding ecosystem to its original status would contribute to address one of the root causes of insecurity in the region. There is also a marked concern with regards to transnational organized crime committed by groups operating across national borders in West Africa and the Sahel. The large and extensive borders of many African countries but particularly the Sahelian countries make it impossible for individual countries to properly police and secure. So now we have concepts such as ungoverned spaces which are realities in the White Sahel. Criminal activities including those committed by terrorist groups on the borders between Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, including hostage-taking, drug smuggling, human trafficking, small and light weapon trafficking underscore the link between terrorist networks and illicit trafficking. In November 2016, EQUAS adopted at ministerial level a new regional action plan to address the growing problem of illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa which covers the period 2016 to 2020. This is the new regional strategy. China and the US joined contributions to the implementation of this action plan in the form of financial operational resources would be beneficial. Collaboration in the area of peace and security in Africa should continue to include and lay emphasis on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. This is particularly important as existing security threats and transnational organized crime including trafficking in arms and ammunition and illicit arms are readily available in large parts or carrying large parts of the continent. This being said, much needs to be done to enhance joint collaboration of China and the US in cooperation with Africa and other partners in promoting peace and security if significant advances are to be achieved. But how? The main starting point is the development of a well-articulated trilateral collaboration framework. And at what level? The African Union's peace and security architecture which provides a continental framework relies on regional economic communities, REX and regional mechanisms on the basis of the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage. Given the multifaceted nature and complexity of threats to security in different regions of the African continent, it is not needless to say that initiatives taken at REX and using regional mechanisms have been key in addressing regional security challenges. Thus, the Trapartheid collaboration framework should also be articulated on coordinating among Beijing, Washington and these regional mechanisms in Africa. In my particular area of work in West Africa and Sahel, there are a number of mechanisms through EQUAS but even now through the G-Sank Sahel countries who have come together to stand together to see how they face the numerous challenges confronted in the Sahel. And there are a number of tools that are available which we can be able to utilize within this context of the Trapartheid collaboration. The U.S. and China as the two largest and preeminent powers of the world and also contributors to U.N. peacekeeping should take into account the determination of the U.N. to put emphasis on prevention. That is the emphasis now the new Secretary General is placing on U.N. activities to prevention, prevention, prevention. U.N. has been insisting on the necessity to mobilize collective action to promote locally developed long-term multidisciplinary approaches with the aim to prevent conflicts as well as maintain peace. China, the U.S. and African partners can therefore act together on existing regional security strategies aiming to prevent or mitigate crisis on the continent. Ekoa strategies are there. Just mentioned the Sahel strategies the U.N. has developed and U.N. integrated strategy on Sahel. The Mino River Union have some strategies there too. And of course the maritime security strategy in the Gulf of Guinea also known as the Yawande process. It is my view that one of the niche areas identified as most viable as a result of U.S., Africa, U.S.-China consultation could serve to outline a concrete roadmap on the objectives of the Africa, U.S.-China consultations with planned activities and milestones. I therefore look forward to further discussions on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea as well as other above mentioned issues of interest during the remainder of the day. And I thank you for your attention. Thank you very much, Ambassador Chambas for presenting us with a wide variety of issues for potential collaboration involving China, Africa and the United States, issues like climate change, countering Boko Haram, arms control, something we don't talk about terribly often, and a maritime strategy for the Gulf of Guinea. Now let me turn the floor over to Ambassador Shinwa. Thank you, Ambassador Shinwa. Thank you very much for the audience. Friends, come forward to support our activities today. It is a great pleasure to arrive here in USIP to join all of you and sitting here, see all the discussions, topics we are going to have. Just, we've already put everything in the article we want to tell people. So I'll probably just add something which is not in the article, but still reminds me from time to time that how do we come here? What is the topic of three-week cooperation? Come forward. Then just remind me of my starting period as the representative for African affairs for Chinese government. I finished my posting as ambassador to South Africa in January 2012. I received my appointment on the 2nd of February, 2012. My first conference I joined is in London for the Somali settlement peacefully, and with a lot of celebrities here in that conference. And I remember the Secretary Gary Clinton gave a quite stunning warning to those involved in the incident. As soon as I came back to Beijing, suddenly I have a proposal on my desk. It was supposed to come from a State Department or US government, probably also the work of Ambassador Princeton there. It's about South Sudan, it's about South Sudan. Actually it was brought back by Vice President Xi Jinping when he visited the United States for the last time as the Vice President. He just finished this one as the President. And I didn't prepare for that. South Sudan, such a faraway place. What has it to do with me and with the United States? Anyway, that's not our cooperation, African affairs. A lot of things happened on that. So I think what kind of way we start this? Usually you probably have initiative from the leaders. You work together, they find out probably this is the way we do it, but this is certainly not. Then probably you have a proposal from scholars. The people say that this is the way you both are trying, but I think it's not. If I have any say on that, I would say probably it's the Deng Xiaoping's way to start it. That means you want to cross the river? Okay. Then you're exploring the finer stones under the water. When you finally save, you put a step on that. One step up, then the cross the river. This is why we tried here in Sudan and South Sudan matters. And also what we also do in Africa for China and United States. And so when this thing's put to us, I studied, then one step another, I try to talk with Ambassador here and there, and we exchange our understandings, our informations on what is the best we can solve. And this serve the interests of South Sudan, interests of Sudan, interests of United States, interests of China, and interests of Africa. The result suddenly brought us all here that we tried this cooperation. And the one on the 27th of September, 2012 in Addis, when in the witness of Ambassador Prince Lemon, those sides, Sudan and South Sudan, signed an agreement to agree, cease their conflict, and resume the production of oil for South Sudan, which is their lifeline, 97% of revenue of that country relies on oil production. And I thought, we succeeded here. And then we carry on with this process to all other steps. That proved to be practical and successful. So that's where we start. I think I'm happy to see carry on with more participant from, of course, from Africa countries, that's quite essential, and also from EU and from other countries of the world. I hope we can do that. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador Jean-Wabre. I think you've raised two very important issues that I hope there's a lot more discussion on. One fairly well known, the collaboration between the United States and China and African countries on the South Sudan problem, a very serious issue that is far from being resolved. But you also mentioned Somalia, and we don't hear as much about Somalia, but in fact, there has been collaboration, particularly at the UN level, in terms of trying to find solutions for that country. Let me now move on with our concluding panelist, Ambassador Princeton Lemon. Thank you very much, David. Thank you for being here and moderating. And let me also express my appreciation to the Carter Center, which particularly mentioned John Goodman, who keeps us going on this all the time and doesn't let us rest in this collaboration. And thanks also to my colleagues and friends at USIP, Jennifer Statz, who heads the China program here. And of course, you heard from Nancy Limburg, our wonderful president. It's a particular honor and pleasure for me to be working with such two, such distinguished leaders. Ambassador Shambas, I've known for many years, has done extraordinary work, may have known mostly for his work in West Africa, but I also recall your leadership with Unimid in Darfur. And it's been a great, great leader in this effort. And Ambassador Zhang Zhenhua and I have worked together throughout the South Sudan and continue. And he has been an extraordinarily fine colleague. I think one of the things that in pursuing this trilateral approach is to clarify a little bit how the US and China operate and where our interests are in Africa. And I think it's important and it's one of the principles under which we've been operating that the United States and China compete a lot in Africa. We compete economically. We compete for African boats in the UN and other international bodies. We compete in some other ways. But this is not a strategic competition. This isn't our vital interest at stake in a kind of a zero sum game because it's the overwhelming common interest in Africa which is the development, the peace and security and economic development in Africa that serves both of us. It's the framework within which healthy competition can take place and be fruitful. But it's important to have that concept in mind because then it opens the door to the kind of cooperation that we've been talking about and doesn't ignore the fact that you have to work through what may be at some places competing interests or difficulties. I think that when it comes to US policy in this regard, as Ambassador Zyonga said, the both president, Xi and President Obama had emphasized the opportunities for our collaboration and cooperation in Africa and both governments promoted that. And today in South Sudan, as Ambassador Zyonga said, we were in different positions in that situation and we had different strengths and different capabilities to call on. China is a major investor in the oil industry in Sudan, South Sudan. It has relationships with the government of cartoon that we did not have. It had a number of important stakes in South Sudan and we had another advantage and I think it goes to something that Ambassador Shambas has talked about. We had a framework of Africa in the lead on the negotiations calling on each of us. We had Tavo and Becky's leadership of the Africa Union high-level panel which was in charge of the overall negotiations. So both of us working not only together and seeing how we could be helpful, but we were also working within the framework that the Africa Union panel wanted and Tavo and Becky was not hesitant to say to us, you guys in the US, you can do this and I'm sure you approached Ambassador Zyong and said here's something you can do. And that framework's important and I'll get to it as we get to some of these other areas. Because there is a concern and it came up, I gathered recently in a conference that Jordan was telling me about within Africa is what does this kind of collaboration mean? You get two big powers coming together, should Africa be worried? You know, I remember when I was ambassador in Nigeria when the Cold War was ending and some of my Nigerian friends said to me, well, you know, we have a saying in Africa that when two elephants fight, the grass gets crushed, but it's also true when two elephants make love, the grass also gets crushed, they were a little worried. So the question arises, what does that mean for US China? And this makes it very important that as we try and develop and advance this collaboration that we do it in the context in which the African organizations are leading. And it's why I'm so pleased that Ambassador Zyong has led us in this last year, year and a half to focus more on West and Central Africa and particularly the problems that he's described which are so very complex. But where you have vehicles, you have the Lake Chad Basin Commission, you have the G-5, you have Ambassador Shambas' own very important office, and it's in that context, it seems to me, that we can work collaboratively without looking like the two of us are ganging up on Africa for some more narrow reason. We experienced this also when we met in Lome a year ago to examine at your suggestion, Ambassador Shambas, this question of the Gulf of Guinea. Now the source of probably the biggest piracy anywhere in the world, it's very different from the piracy off the coast of Somalia, it's much more varied, it's got different actors, different kinds of actors, it's attacking various ships for different reasons, oil and other reasons, fisheries problems, but also it's a gateway that area being so unsafe also makes it a gateway for the drugs that come in from Latin America and then go through this hell up to the market in Europe. And that drug market has complicated all the more the problems of governance in the Sahel, the various groups that have been in various kinds of merchandising, smuggling or otherwise, and you get this network which you've described so well of both criminal drug and terrorist activity. So again, African countries have been coming together and now the AU has come together on a plan for the Gulf of Guinea and again these are areas in which we can work. Just make one more comment about the nature of that kind of cooperation. We're structured very differently in how we operate and China has a number of institutions that operate in Africa through the Ministry of Commerce, through their X-Inbanks, through a number of vehicles. We're structured with our USAID program and then we have our various counterterrorism programs. It's harder in that way sometimes to do joint programs but it's not so hard to do complimentary programs where we draw on our particular strengths. So as we look at the areas of the Lakeshade Basin where China is so strong and capable in infrastructure where the United States is very good in health and governance and other forms of development and you could see complementarity developing in a way that doesn't require all the complexities of jointness. The last thing I would pick up on Ambassador Shombas is your comment about the Africa Union's restructuring of its peace architecture. I think this is a very important development that's been going on now for well over a year within the Africa Union. Restructuring their ability to both focus on mediation and prevention, on capacity for peacekeeping and for actual counterterrorism and peace enforcement. And here already the United States and China are contributing in various different ways but we haven't really made it as complimentary as we could and it also takes us into the Security Council where we need to collaborate in support of those various AU initiatives. So I think we've got opportunities and we have to think about how we do it. And I think that the agenda we have today which looks very specifically at some areas will hopefully give us some clues as to how to move this process forward. But I think it's an exciting one and I think it can be good for all three of us involved if we do it. And again, my thanks to all who have been supporting this effort. Thanks. Thank you very much Ambassador Lyman for focusing on the process of trilateral cooperation and making I think the critical point that this only succeeds if it is African led. If it looks like it's led by either United States or China, it's probably going to fail. It does look like we're ganging up on one or more African countries but if it's coming as an initiative from the African Union from one of the sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States or even a series of key African states, the chances of any initiative, any cooperative initiative succeeding in my view is much greater. In my post-state department career, I've spent a lot of time attending conferences. I've just come from one at Duke and the University of North Carolina, for example. And my biggest complaint about conferences is that they never leave enough time for question and answer. You get to the last 10 minutes of a panel session and then someone realizes oh, it's time to let the audience get involved. We have, as I understand it, about 45 minutes for Q&A which is more than the panelists actually spoke. So the floor is going to be yours. I will take one question at a time. Now I don't know do we have an arrangement for microphones to be, we do. The only thing I would ask is that you, one, introduce yourself and your organization and also indicate if your question is directed to a particular panelist or if it's directed to the entire panel. So let's begin with the first comment or question. Please. Hi, Doug Westbrooks with the International Stability Operations Association, private sector companies that support peacekeeping and stability operations. And my question is on the Chinese support for peacekeeping in Africa. We've seen that the Chinese have been very robust in their support, especially I think in what South Sudan. I'm just curious what are their plans for the future in terms of how much they will be working with you and to increase their support? So I'll just go ahead. Thank you very much for the question. Peacekeeping, yes. This is quite an essential part of the Chinese African policies and it had been actually strengthened and been developed in the latest years. But this peacekeeping efforts we participate is actually under the UN command. And we usually do this first according to the recommendation of the UN. Sometimes also we have the suggestions from the EU. And of course same time we consider and combine with our particular interest in particular area. But mostly this is actually arranged by the UN. Sometimes the suggestions put forward or deployment directed by the UN is also discussed among different departments in Chinese government. Not always agreeable to each other, but anyway, eventually it agreed and been deployed. So it is basically a UN directed and EU supported. Thank you. Gentlemen, directly back, yes. Thanks a lot. My name is Mr. Jean-Pierre Lucamba. I'm the Vice-Chairperson for African Dance Forum. My question is directed to Ambassador Princeton. I've got two questions. The first one you just said that the strategic framework in which both China and the US can find themselves in a win-win situation. And I want to know that kind of cooperation versus Brits vision. And my second question will be, trade is linked with the mobility of people. African don't have any challenge to travel to China compared to the challenge we're having to travel to USA, especially with the new coming migration policy in the US. Can't you see that that can create also imbalances between US and China influence in Africa? Those are my questions. Well, you know, on this question of how the cooperation is a win-win case. And I can again draw on, first of all, on our experience working on the Sudan's House of Dan. And to be perfectly honest, I think both of us found at one point in the process that the negotiations to solve the oil problem between Sudan and South Sudan were not only not going well, they were misdirected, if I can put it that way. And China was in a position. And without settling that oil problem, you couldn't settle the basic issues between Sudan and South Sudan. You couldn't end the fundamental conflict between them. And it had been going on for a long time, the struggle over how you divide the resources, the payments, et cetera. And China was in a position to educate people on the nature of that industry and what was involved, and what ideas made sense and what did not, and did a lot of that behind the scenes. We were able to use our position with South Sudan, in particular, to get that country to move towards certain political decisions that were necessary to get a final agreement. So here is a case where we had complementary capabilities, where we employed them. And the result was you had an agreement. Now, the agreement was good for both of us. It not only brought peace, a peace agreement between Sudan and South Sudan, but it also enabled the oil industry to operate, which was vital actually for both countries. And for China, not only were those interests, but I think the Chinese investors were also benefited from having those problems solved. On a larger case, one of the things that we have been looking at in particular is do we have a shared interest in security? If you look at the article we wrote, we pointed out that China approaches its relations in Africa somewhat differently than we do. China doesn't want to get involved in issues of democracy, human rights, and those things. And we, as a Chinese friend of mine, said we'd like to meddle in those issues. They become part of our thing. But given those differences, security has an impact on our respective interests. So when it came to, for example, not only security in the Sudan area, but Ambassador Zhang participating with others on security in the DRC and China's increasing role in support of Africa Union peacekeeping, that without having to get involved so much in some of these underlying issues of democracy, human rights, still we have a common interest in security, which allows us both to do our thing. So those are examples of where you have complementary interests that are always quite together, but they're areas that serve both of them. Now on the migration, look, I'm a big fan of bringing people to China that does a great job of bringing a lot of people to China for training. We have done it well over the years for many years, not so much in the same volume, but I think in many ways we have the program, the Yalu program, the young Africa leaders initiative, and there's been many others. Yeah, now we're going through the United States is going through this whole question of migration and safety and terrorism, et cetera. And I can't speak for this administration, but my guess is that we're going to work that through and not undermine some of the more beneficial positive programs. It may take us a little while, but I think it's important. I really do, and I hope those connections continue. Please, Larry Freeman. Thank you very much. Lauren Freeman, I've been working on economic development policies for Africa for over 25 years. Obviously, I think everybody here knows and the panel knows. I mean, the overwhelming most pressing problem on security questions is also the lack of economic development, especially in infrastructure. I mean, the deficit in railroads and water and energy is appalling, and the deficit in hundreds of thousands of megawatts in Africa is literally killing Africa, lack of electricity. So we have to address this problem for security, as well as humanitarian reasons. And this China Silk Road policy announced by your president Xi Jinping in September, I think, 2013, has now made its way to Africa, particularly in railroad building, which is taking place at a breathtaking rate. In Kenya, I was on a new train in Ethiopia, Nigeria. So the question is, why isn't, as part of this trilateral cooperation, the Silk Road development is an area where everybody cooperates, and it's win-win. And the United States has, under the Obama administration, refused to participate in this. And the United States has also refused to build the infrastructure, even though we have desires from Africa to do so. So wouldn't this be the right time as part of your trilateral cooperation for the US to join for China and the African countries to work together on infrastructure, especially in energy production? This is also a way to mitigate the unbelievable migrant process crisis that is now overwhelming Europe and maybe overwhelming the United States. President Trump met with Xi, my understanding for my colleagues was a good, solid meeting. The China's having a Silk Road conference on the 14th and 15th. My wish would be that this president, unlike the previous president, joins the Silk Road for common interests. But this was not emphasized in your op-ed that I reread today. And I was wondering if you would put this in this proper context. Thank you. I think this may be something that all three panelists would like to comment on. But let me start with Ambassador Genouan. Yeah, when we prepare for these discussions, I should admit for myself that I didn't put much attention on this side. We emphasize and mostly concentrate on the peace and the security matter. Therefore, the political development, I totally agree with you that a lot of troubles and the conflict we have on the African continent, if you trace the root of the problem, they are more or less connected with the underdevelopment. When people fail, they are not fairly treated. And when this kind of threat of living has become so threatening, a lot of things troubles start. But for this trilateral cooperation in economic field, particularly for the independent, I think we probably have a lot to do. So for this one bedroom initiative of China, I think Chinese President formally invited the United States to participate in this initiative and program, which I read from the media according to the latest visit in Miami. I think that's good. And it is a platform. A lot of people can join in and do a lot of things. All together, that's something quite encouraging. Thank you. Mr. Trump, what do you want? Yes. I think not like a baby trying to learn how to walk, steps that are tentative. We just didn't want to start running and then we have to fall down too often. But I fully see where Ambassador Freeman is coming from. Yes, as we all say, peace and development stability are all linked. There will be no development without peace. And peace will not be sustained unless of course there is economic development to back it. And it's true also that with some of the conflict, I mean, not some, but almost all the conflict areas where you start to analyze, you find elements of marginalization and exclusion and poverty and lack of. So yes, the area of economic development, particularly infrastructure development in energy and railways and telecom, et cetera, it's a wild field where there can be participation, let me just say, participation by all in a win-win framework. I think Ambassador Lyman had mentioned that sometimes it doesn't have to be collaboration, but just there's enough room for all to participate in a constructive and positive sense. For instance, in the Lake Chad Basin, we talk about the shrinking lake, which some have said, if you want to cite an example of a climate change-induced conflict, you look there, Lake Chad. And I gave some statistics about how much the lake has shrunk, resulting in impact in livelihoods and bigger population shrinking resource-based. One of the proposals which have been on the table for a long time has been the canal from the Congo Basin to the lake. And recently, the World Bank has picked this proposal up and I'm told that some progress is being made in making it reality, discussing with China and other partners. So sure, I think projects like that, they'll be huge and they'll have opportunities for private sector from US, even Europe, and certainly China with its experience in building canals can lead the way. And I think more and more this is the kind of framework in which we should be looking. But we wanted to start modestly and just look at some areas where we can enhance this kind of collaboration. And that's why, for instance, the first area that we were looking at and where we tried to mobilize support on the continent was in the area of piracy. And it's something which the regional economic cooperation is concerned about, the ECOWAS and the ECAS, but it's also the Gulf of Guinea cooperation. These are the three that came together to set up the initial framework for collaboration in the Gulf of Guinea. So we thought let's pick one issue which all of us can see clearly this basis for such collaboration, but it can be expanded. Yes, thanks. Going to your question about power in particular, which is so vital. And again, there are opportunities for complementarity. I mean, as you know, President Obama initiated the Power Africa program, which leverages a lot of private sector investment power. For if you look at Northern Nigeria, without development of greater access to power, that area is deindustrializing. It's one of the major sources of unemployment and unrest in that region. China is investing in the railroad, as you pointed out, very vital. And it would be good to see Power Africa be able to develop projects up there as well. And I think that's the kind of complementarity you would want. The US does infrastructure now through the millennium challenge account, and there again, complementarity is possible. So as President Obama said, it doesn't always have to be your part of some integrated program if your activities are complementary under a plan that the Lake Jadon Basin or ECOWAS or another African institution says these are parts of our overall plan. Next question. Lou Moselle. My name is Lou Moselle. I recently retired from the State Department after 32 years. When I was serving, well, let me say first of all, that use of the word complementarity is perfect. I was so happy to hear you use that. And I want to give a couple of examples and then draw out from the panel perhaps other ways we can work in a complementary basis, with China. When I was serving in Liberia, the Chinese government refurbished the JFK hospital in downtown Monrovia. And then we were able to get NGO physicians to work in the hospital serving the population. So there was that complementarity between the infrastructure part and using American NGOs. We also invited China to participate in the security sector working group that we established with the government of Liberia. And as a result, we did security sector reform in terms of retraining and rebuilding the armed forces of Liberia. While China did some work with the Ministry of Defense in terms of providing equipment, vehicles, computers, and refurbishing their facilities downtown. In my most recent posting as chief of mission in Eritrea, the Chinese were very active in the mining sector. But I was working with the government to ensure that they pressed the Chinese mining firms to adopt best practices in the extractive industry. The new railroad that was built by China from the port in Djibouti to Addis Ababa, that will transport millions of tons of US donated grain. So there are, I see these opportunities for, as you mentioned, complementarities throughout Africa. I think a lot of it depends on the individual working relationships between ambassadors. But I found more often than not that the Chinese ambassadors in Africa were open to opportunities. We're looking for opportunities to work in a complementary manner with the United States and the EU and others. So I guess I would want to draw out from the panel, at the micro level, how do we look for opportunities, whether it's in health, whether it's in agriculture, whether it's in energy, infrastructure, security sector reform, training, peacekeeping, and the like, to work together with China on the continent. I think this is, again, a question to all three panelists. Let me start with Ambassador Lyman on this, and then we'll work the other direction. Good to see you back. You know, you're absolutely right that the kind of collaboration at Liberia is a good case, and some other countries were on the ground. Ambassadors got together, aid programs got together. When we were in Lome last year, the two ambassadors who attended the whole meeting were talking about working more closely together in Togo. What I think we need is more encouragement from capitals to our various embassies, and that would ask Ambassador Zhang about that, to encourage that kind of activity. A lot of it comes out of the initiative of the local ambassador or the local aid missions. What I think I'd like to see is reinforcement from capitals to encourage that kind of cooperation at the individual country level, because there you've got a natural framework of the kind you're talking about. Mr. Canvas. Yes, I think, as Ambassador Mazel says, on the ground there are a number of things that can be done. For instance, in the context of the current developments in the Gambia, again, our approach as you and I have been, that when we're on the ground, we routinely consult with the ambassadors represented in country, and specifically in the case of the Gambia. We've been talking with the Chinese government, which has been doing some very good things in the agricultural sector to continue with that. On the governance side, there's a lot to be done in the Gambia after 20 years of the personal rule of Germany. And the Gambia just went through parliamentary elections over the weekend, and already you have organizations such as IFAS and others on the ground looking to see how can we support the electoral commission to build up its capacities, going forward to be able to conduct credible, peaceful elections, which are important for sustaining the peace, creating an environment in which whatever work that China will be doing in agricultural development or other areas, can also equally be sustained and to the benefit of the people of the Gambia. So there are many possibilities of that kind of. And Ambassador Lyman, you recall in Togo, the Chinese ambassador and the US ambassador worked marvelously, very, very close consultations where they were already on their own looking to see this big Africa-Union meeting on piracy and the blue economy. How can they, in their own way, at the embassy level, collaborate to support this kind of initiative? Thank you. I agree with Princeton that on the macro level, all the times that both ambassadors on site, the Chinese ambassador, US ambassador, working in different capitals in Africa, the most of them work and collaborate pretty well. And of course they need the encouragement from both capital. And I think on Chinese side, the encouragement is there because we have so many political economic consultation between two governments. Each year we repeated that and the signal is pretty well. Whenever we can find the opportunity to work together here in African continent to serve the policy of both countries, to serve the interests of the African people, that just go on well. And also one policy we have now in China, I don't know whether I can translate it correctly. It's called result-oriented practice. That means you do something, you eventually will find out whether it works out for the result, for the positive result you want to have. So even for this policy here, being practiced in the Chinese government, practicing, in Africa, that works. So I think we do have a lot of room to maneuver in this area, thank you. Thanks. Good morning, can you hear me? Yes. My name is Kitty Thurmer and I've worked in Africa with NGOs in a variety of countries, happy to be here. And you had mentioned Ambassador Lyman, the elephants fighting or whatever in the grass. And for me there's another elephant in the room. And that would be the big question mark about where the new Trump administration might be going vis-a-vis Africa policy. And especially in light of the fact that at the State Department, for example, there's a current vacuum of African talent, same with ambassadorships, and I know it's still early. But given the fact that you all have discussed so many different collaborating operations, I'd like to know if you think these will continue in the new administration, thank you. Ambassador Lyman, I think you get stuck with that one. Well, if I wish I knew the answer, I'd be happy to give it to you. I think it's early, we haven't seen a lot of indication from the new administration about Africa policy. And I think a lot of us are waiting to see. But after a lot of stormy rhetoric during the campaign about China, one of the things that was striking about the meeting in Mar-a-Lago was that it didn't have that tone. And that opens the door back to the kind of things that we were seeing earlier, where can you find collaboration? Where are the areas where you're not going head to head? And so I'm hoping that that is going to eventually get attention, again, back to Africa for China and the United States. I don't think it came up in that summit. I haven't heard anything about Africa in that summit. But I think it's encouraging that it went from the kind of harsh rhetoric of the campaign to, okay, now what can we do together? Kinds of things. And that may open that door. On Africa policy, it's just hard to know there's a lot of debate over the aid program. It's not clear yet how they're gonna structure for peace operations. That is, are they gonna have special envoys or not have special envoys? Because we've had a special envoy for Sudan, South Sudan had one for the Great Lakes, et cetera. All of that is still very unclear. So all of us are encouraging in various ways. But I don't see anything negative, but I don't see where it's going, quite frankly. I would just add on this point that I think the issue of greatest concern are the proposed budget cuts to the State Department, 28, 29%. I don't think those will hold up in Congress. I think that there probably will be some cuts, but not in the range of 28, 29%, which would be pretty devastating and probably come largely from the foreign aid program and commitments to the United Nations. That's where the money is. It's not in the personnel salaries of individuals. But we need to watch this place. And those of us who are interested in international affairs, I think need to make our voices known on that question. Please. Good morning, Mike Fallin with Senate Foreign Relations Committee with Chairman Corker. To your last point, Ambassador, I think that the Congress is going to consider not just the skinny budget, but the follow-on budget after a great deal of discussion in areas and with organizations and individuals who've had long experience. That said, there are countries that have not provided in the multilateral space a significant relative to U.S. commitments, especially in the humanitarian peacekeeping space, comparable amounts for the size of their economies. My question for the panel had to do with the fora under which China and the U.S. and their partners on the African continent can discuss the purpose, as Ambassador Zhang mentioned, to achieve outcomes, the impact. And the win-win strategy begs the question as to who the winners are. And at present, the crises across the continent are driven by actors who are much more narrowly focused on their interests and not necessarily the people of the continent. So I wonder where the efforts to both inform each other's experience on the continent and willingness to find common ground in diminishing the drivers of conflict. The four famines or the three famines across the country or across the continent right now are a significant near-term threat, but they derive directly from misgovernance on the continent. Thanks. I think that's probably a question for all three panelists. Does anyone want to volunteer to begin with that one? Yeah, regarding the fora, I mean, maybe we should also inform that our last meeting was actually in Lome, in Togo. We chose that venue because there were preparations already ongoing there for hosting the African summit on the piracy and maritime and the blue economy. And to that meeting, we invited the ECOWAS, at a high level, the Secretary General of the G.S.A.S.I.L. and also the Secretary General of the LCBC Secretariat. And they participated and indeed saw that their respective organizations could be platforms which we find areas for the kind of collaboration that we're talking about. So be in the lecture-based area through the LCBC Secretariat and some of the various activities that they want to, that they themselves have defined to work on the G.S.A.S.I.L. Five Permanent Secretariat. So there was good reception of this idea within these organizations. And going forward, I think we should be able to use a number of mechanisms that they themselves have already defined. I mean, the new Permanent Secretariat of G.5 works along three pillars, security, governance, development resilience. And in any of these areas, I think we could find exploring further with them areas in which we can advance this kind of collaboration. Yeah, thank you very much. I agree with you to the definition and how to define who is the winner and where's your interest, where is this success. And in my case, I experienced the whole period of conflict in South Sudan. The definition is sometimes quite important. When they start this, actually later become the Civil War in South Sudan on the 16th of December, 2013. The first question we have is from the Department of Council of Service in China, in foreign ministry. They put forward this directive to the embassy and said that zero casualty, we had this in Libya, cannot be successful, but we suffer quite heavy economic losses, but in South Sudan, the first four, we have this zero casualty directive from the Council of Service. That means we have to evacuate all the Chinese personnel, not only from the capital, but also from the oil field in South Sudan. They defined it quite narrowly on this, but we analyzed all the things in the embassy together with the ambassador and with, even with the South Sudan government and with the IGAT ministers. We realized if we withdraw, evacuate all the Chinese personnel from the oil field, that's the end of the industry there. Without Chinese personnel, Chinese technicians, no one can operate all the oil field. In before, probably we're pretty good, we have some North Sudanese operating in the oil field. They all been driven out after independence. So Chinese actually is holding on the responsibility of doing that. If we evacuate, the whole oil field could be ruined and be looted by anybody who lived nearby. That could be the end of the industry. Even if you have to peace restore later, when you have to go back, try to restore the oil industry probably need three, four years, the country has already become a failed country because 97% of the revenue, generally, for the government, for the whole country is out of the oil field. We did have a fierce debate, how do we do? And the South Sudan government did have a lot of lobbying on the Chinese government to say that. We cannot afford that. Not only the salaries paid to the soldier, to the government officials, even the medicine supply, the food supply, the education, almost everything run, the country is by this. So eventually we took a certain degree of a risk on the zero casualty policy. And also with other partners in this whole South Sudan problem, peace restoring, peacemaking process, we've been actually pressured from time to time to say that, would you please give all the income of the oil field to an independent party, a third party, to monitor the expenditure of this money. But that was strongly resisted by the South Sudan government. Without the participants, what do you think the Chinese oil company can do? It is only a company operating there. All these things happened during our cooperation. I think we need to all study and look at that quite carefully and do all the useful lessons for the future. Thank you. Mr. Lange, do you want to add? Thanks. Because I think Mr. Zhang is illustrated very well that when you don't have a strong African structure under which to cooperate, it's more difficult. And I think that's true in South Sudan. EGAD has not been a strong director of what should be done by everybody and as a result, individual countries. But in this case, individual countries can then do some things. And I know Ambassador Zhang and his government made the decision quite a while back even though there was no agreement on an arms embargo in South Sudan. China decided to stop selling arms to South Sudan. Those are the kinds of decisions you sometimes can make when there isn't that kind of leadership. It's not sufficient, but it's possible. In the DRC, which is an area of serious concern, there is a overall friends group and China has participated in that, again to bring some kind of coordination as we do. But it's more difficult when you don't have that African structure within which to operate because then you can do a lot bilaterally and informally in a lot of this, but it's not the same, it's not as efficient. Nigeria is another difficult case. Here you're looking for much more coordination from the Nigerian government and it's very hard to get the Nigerian government to really help coordinate not only on the humanitarian side, but on the development and investment side. And that makes it more difficult, we're gonna touch on that later in the conference, but then if you don't have a government that is keen on doing that, it makes it harder. We have time for one more question. Let me go over to this side over here, please. Hi, my name is Yvonis Gamilla. I am a student at American University. Thank you for talking with us today. Going back to the topic of complementarity, I know we've mentioned there are a lot of ways that the US and China can sort of push for complementary initiatives and programs in Africa, but what about in the case of overlapping or duplicated programs and initiatives? I mostly see that sort of path as a way to justify political agendas within Africa. I know you mentioned they're both fighting for African votes in the UN. And so, well, my question is, what are the most prominent ways, points of overlapping between the two countries and is there really a way to expand communication between these two countries, given that there are possible political implications to this? Again, I think that's something that all members of the panel can respond to. Let me start with Ambassador Lyman on this one. What are the areas that we talk about in the article that we're both overlapping and not very well coordinated in the area of peacekeeping support? I'm not talking about UN peacekeeping support, but I'm talking about support to the Africa Union. China, there was a big peacekeeping summit year and a half ago in New York, and everybody pledged money toward increased peacekeeping. One of the things that China did was pledge $100 million to help support African peacekeeping efforts. We also have several different U.S., several different programs of supporting African peacekeeping capacity. I don't get the sense that they're well-made complementary. I think they maybe overlap, maybe they just don't mesh as well as they should, and I think it's because of the nature in which we each do our business, and it hasn't been an area where either from the AU's initiative or our own that we get at making them really more complementary and less either duplicative or not really doing as much as they could. Just in that same area, maybe I can mention the current initiative going on to create a force among the Sahel countries similar to the one that has been established by the LCBC countries, the multinational joint task force by which I spoke, and especially as it has been fairly successful in rooting out Boko Haram from its stronghold in the San B.C. forest. So based on that success, the Sahel countries are also looking at a possibility of a similar force. Now, such a force will require support from partners, including the U.S. and China. The UN, the Africa Union are looking at the details of it, the concept of operation, and perhaps in that discussion, this could be another area, because as I also earlier indicated, we're seeing in the Sahel the extremist movements coming together and announcing a fusion. So they are uniting in their efforts to step up on their activities. Similarly, the response to them should be a coordinated one. The countries themselves want to step up, they will need international partners to support their efforts. Thank you. And just like what I said at the beginning, these three parties' cooperation did not come as a very well-planned program. It just starts from some necessities we need. We start to face this crime, and this is a crisis we need to handle, and just both sides can render some kind of efforts the other side didn't have. And so it's come forward with us of this three-way cooperation, and it's a complementary. And as we carry on with this, we found that it's more workable and more fruitful for all sides involved, and also for the African side. So we just carry on. It probably is still on the primitive stage, beginning now, and I think it's worth working on that. So that's why we are here, and we want to explore it further and have it push forward for every size good. Thank you. I'm a great believer in coffee breaks and tea breaks that begin on time. It is 10.45. We've got 20 seconds left, not enough for another question. So we shall have coffee and tea, and please give the panel a big round of applause. We still only have four microphones, despite having six seats, so we'll just need to share. Oh, sure, sure. I can hear it as you're speaking. Thank you. Okay, for my three minutes, one minute, time to go. Thank you, thank you, thank you. I will let you start. All right, welcome back everyone. I hope you got all the coffee and tea you could handle in our short break. Thanks for coming back for our panel now. My name is Jennifer Statz. I am the director of the China program here at the US Institute of Peace. And here at USIP, our China work is focused primarily on China's impact on peace and conflict dynamics around the world. So the discussions today are obviously of great interest to us and very important for us. So we're really looking forward to the day and I would personally like to thank all of you for coming and for your contributions through the discussions this morning and this afternoon. Today's conference is really meant to highlight some of the progress that the Africa, China, US consultations for peace have already made, but also to spark some discussion and generate some new insights about possible opportunities for collaboration in the future. The meetings obviously are held around the world, but today because we are in DC, we're going to highlight the DC perspective a little bit more. So our panel this morning, I think we'll be able to hit on both the work that has been done as well as offer a little more insight into the Washington perspective. We've got three members here who have really been key members of the consultation for peace effort. You've already met Ambassador Chambas and we're thrilled to have him back again. He is definitely working hard today on all of our panels. And we're also joined by Dr. John Goodman and Dr. Yahweh Liu from the Carter Center. John is the Associate Director of the Conflict Resolution Program at the Carter Center and Yahweh is the Director of the Carter Center China Program. I think our first panel showed there are lots of questions about the US position and policies on some of these issues. So we're very fortunate to have two experts from the US government with us as well. We have Dr. Asish Malakiash from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in the Department of Defense and Mr. Michael Bittrick, the Deputy Director of the Office of Security Affairs at the Department of State. This is a very full panel and we have a lot of area to cover. So we'll ask each panelist to speak for about five to 10 minutes and then we'll make sure we've got some time at the end for discussion as well. To briefly set the stage, maritime security and piracy off the eastern coast of Africa and Somalia have been the focus of multilateral efforts since at least 2008. And indeed, 10 UN Security Council resolutions address the challenge posed by piracy off the eastern coast with the latest resolution in 2011. By contrast, the phenomenon of maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea has received far less international attention. Just two UN Security Council resolutions and a presidential statement issued by China in April 2016. Yet the Department of Defense has at times characterized the west coast as one of the most dangerous waterways in the world. So looking forward to discussion on these issues today and we'll start with Ambassador Chambas. Thank you very much, ma'am. If there is one area where progress has been made in finding common ground for China-US collaboration with and in Africa, it is on the maritime security and blue economy. As the experience in the Gulf of Aden has exemplified, the maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea is a selected and well-defined area where the US, China and Africa's concerted efforts will be able to address specific challenges in the regional context and thus help create momentum. Since the start of this strapati, Africa, US, China consultations for peace in Africa. Reflections on cooperation in the maritime domain have spanned from assessing the challenges and issues, identifying potential areas of joint collaboration, understanding current continental and regional initiatives to specify at the technical level areas of practical joint collaboration. The commonly agreed basic postulate is that the maritime domain is an untapped engine for growth and development in Africa. Focus should be beyond combatant piracy, though important it is, as there are larger maritime governance challenges that include other crimes such as human and arms trafficking, illegal fishing, et cetera. The Wachin vision of the African Union 2015 integrated maritime strategy aims to foster increased wealth creation from Africans, oceans and seas by developing a sustainable, thriving blue economy in a secure and environmentally sustainable manner. Last July, as part of the strapati consultations for peace, we met in Lome under the auspices of the government of Togo and acknowledged that maritime insecurity, transnational organized crime and arms trafficking are serious threats that require transnational support network from regional, continental and international partners and most importantly, effective, coordinated and collaborative responses. Thus, a number of potential areas for tripartite cooperation or maritime security were identified. And these included an inclusive, institutional and governance support to the existing EQUAS, ECAS, Gulf of Guinea cooperation, maritime security architecture, otherwise known as the Yaounde process. More dedicated knowledge management and research on maritime security issues and strengthened collaboration and cooperation at the operational level. Last November in Beijing, the Carter Center facilitated technical tripartite meeting to which UNOAS participated together with other partners from EQUAS, ECAS and GGC, maritime security architecture was held. The meeting identified key and specific themes as instrumental to a sustainable maritime security cooperation while addressing the root causes of regional maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea. In several recommendations, aiming at enhancing Africa-U.S.-China cooperation in the maritime domain were made. Four were prioritized, including the formation of a tripartite research consortium with the objective to commission research and analysis on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea to inform regional leadership, policymakers and international partners and enhance coherent support for maritime-related programs. The request to the Yaounde-based Inter-Regional Coordination Center, the ICC, to conduct and share analysis of capacity-building efforts and activities in order to harmonize and de-conflict contributions of the tripartite partners and other international supporters. The request to the ICC to begin not the International Criminal Code, to begin working with maritime stakeholders to develop information sharing protocols between the Yaounde framework institutions, states, the shipping industries and international reporting centers. And the request to the G7-plus-plus-plus group of friends of the Gulf of Guinea mechanism to encourage participation by all relevant actors so as to improve coordination and harmonization of multilateral efforts among the various donors. So maybe I should leave it at this just to show that in this particular area, there's some effort already underway. We've had these two important meetings. It's very promising. And on the other side, that's on the African side, the regional economic communities involved and the regional organizations involved are very keen to see how this trilateral called collaboration can materialize in support to them institutionally and also in operationalizing their own defined methods to deal with issues of privacy. In the Gulf of Guinea, but also to harness the tremendous resources of the blue economy in that particular part of Central West Africa. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador Chambas. Assisi, I think we'll go to you next, thanks. Thank you very much, Jennifer. Thank you for the invitation to be here, the Carter Center, I mean the USAIP. And to the Carter Center, also thank you for being one of the organizers. Very happy to be here, to offer some of my personal insights underlying personal, so as not to necessarily tie my organization or indeed the US Department of Defense to my remarks. The context was already laid out by the four ambassadors earlier and Ambassador Chambas just now. But just to reiterate a couple of points as to why we are here and why Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea is so important. First of all, is a very vast area, stretching from Angola in the south all the way up to Senegal in the north. Secondly, it encompasses some very key countries. When we're talking about demographics in Africa, issues of politics, security and economics, this region is very, very important. But why is it important to the United States? Why is it important to China? The Gulf of Guinea, of course, is part of the global commons. It's part of the global commons. Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea therefore must be placed in this broader context of international security. Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea affects global insecurity. The manifestations of this insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea have already been identified here in the morning. It includes IU fishing, piracy and armed robbery at sea, which by the way is under-reported in the Gulf of Guinea. It includes illegal trafficking of narcotics, arms and other goods, human smuggling, environmental crimes and so on. Because the manifestations are so many and varied, the framework for responses must be also varied. And in my view, the framework for responses should include at least five key elements. Of course, being from the Department of Defense, I would start with security. I think security is a key element to this framework for responses. It's important that African states are able to impose the sovereignty of the state at sea. It's important that the rule of law is actually a reality at sea. And in many cases, unfortunately, this is not the reality. The second point for me, the second key element, would be safety. African states must be able to ensure the safety of individuals, the safety of the assets of companies operating at sea. For me, this is critical. The third point pertains to economics. Somebody has already said here this morning that he boils down to development. He boils down to prosperity. And prosperity through maritime trade in Africa is not a reality just yet. The fourth point I would identify is stewardship. Stewardship in the sense of ensuring the health of the seas for future generations. And all of these elements must rest on a legal foundation. And this is critical. The legal frameworks on maritime security in Africa are weak because the laws in place oftentimes are antiquated. So this is something that we need to focus on. Now to the actual responses. African states have been cooperating quite intensively over the last 10 years or so to achieve maritime safety and security on the continent. When we first started working on this issue, one of the key words used to be sea blindness. Now the narrative, the discourse of maritime security in Africa rarely includes that term sea blindness. So there is awareness of the strategic importance of the maritime domain. African countries have cooperated on three key levels to achieve maritime security on the continent. The continental level, Ambassador Chambers already mentioned, aims 2050. That's the Africa integrated maritime strategy. Very ambitious framework. That really positions Africa very well to take advantage of the full potential of the maritime economy to the prosperity and to the development of Africa. The United States has been a key supporter of the AU process to achieve aims 2050. And my sense is that the United States will continue to support this very important effort. Then we have at the regional level and focusing on the Gulf of Guinea, the African countries of West and Central Africa have put in place a very comprehensive maritime architecture. And this maritime architecture is founded on the only code of conduct. And the only code of conduct outlines a very comprehensive structure, a very comprehensive multi-layer structure that has at the top a coordination center. I prefer the French acronym CIC as opposed to the British or the English acronym. For obvious reasons. But you have the CIC in your own day that brings together the two wrecks, ECAS and ECOWAS. And each one of them with their own coordination center, Cresmac for the ECAS region and Cresmao for the West African region. And below that you have multiple maritime zones, stretching from zone A in Angola, all the way to zone G in Senegal. And the importance of the zones is that he pulls resources because individually these African countries do not have the wherewithal to address their problems. The pulling of resources is really the way to go. And then at the national level, many African countries are now beginning to take steps to develop integrated maritime security strategies. And maritime strategies that go beyond navies, that go beyond the naval dimension of maritime security to capture some of the other important factors, economic, environmental, and so on, that must be part of these strategies. And some of these countries have already produced the strategies and are already starting to implement the strategies. Well, let me just say that these responses require international support. I know that the United States government has been very, very supportive of these efforts over the last 10 years, very, very supportive. Some other countries, not so much. So I think that it's important that all countries, especially the big powers, contribute to ensure the sustainability of the maritime security architecture in place in the Gulf of Guinea. Now, moving forward, I think that there are some specific, some specific issues that these tripartite relationship could pursue. And I will just mention three, because I only have one minute. I think that, first of all, there is the need to focus on how to best align force structure to the maritime threats. And this is something that we are just beginning to discuss in the African context. When I go to Africa and sit down with my brothers and a couple of sisters who are admirals, and we have these conversations about force structure and the threats, because the African admirals are, have been trained in a classical way of looking at force structures, they think Navy, they always think Navy. And navies are not necessarily the most adequate tools to address the maritime threats and challenges that Africans face, coast guards perhaps. But admirals do not, especially the admirals who have gone to the big naval academies here in the United States and around the world, they think that the coast guard doesn't really qualify. So one of the things that Africans must do is to perhaps design uniquely African force structures to address their maritime threats. Secondly, we have been talking a lot about trade and about prosperity, but one of the things that African countries lack is merchant marines. If Africa is going to engage with the outside world in trade, they need a good solid merchant marine, and this is something that they like. And thirdly, to conclude, back to where I started, IUU fishing. IUU fishing is not just about fish, it's also about security. And some of the fisheries in Africa are collapsing. And this from somebody who is on a DOD is a huge challenge, because if the fisheries collapse, many Africans, about 70% of the protein intake, that the animal protein intake that Africans consume comes from fish, fish products. So if you have a collapsing of the fisheries, you will have serious food security issues and other types of security issues. There is some evidence that the fisheries are collapsing, but we don't really know the magnitude of the problem. We don't really know whether this can be reversed. And this is an area where I think that China, the United States, and indeed the African countries must cooperate to find a solution. My one minute, a card is back, so I'll just finish here. Thank you very much, Henry. Thank you very much, Isid. We'll try to keep things moving, because I know we've got a lot of people, but again, we will leave time for questions at the end. So Michael, we'll go to you. Yes, you just saw an incredible demonstration of U.S. government, Department of Defense, Department of State, collegiality, and teamwork. And we wanna make sure that that's part of our work together, not just as a U.S. government interagency, but to the broader international community as we seek to address the challenges of maritime security and safety in the Gulf of Guinea. I want to say thank you to Jennifer and the Card Center. Vice, right now the issues in regard to safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea are very important for the United States, and we do want to work very collaboratively with all stakeholders that can be brought to bear, because as noted by Ambassador Shambas, this is a space where the Africans are seeking to own the problem set. This is key for the U.S. strategy and our approach is we want to support African ownership across the seas of the Gulf of Guinea. I think I would also wanna give you a personal aside here that's very important, because while I've been to Africa and I've been to Europe and other places, working on the security issues of peacekeeping and conflict and maritime security, I have never had the opportunity to go to China, but my wife and I are going to China for the first time in our lives this year. And two days ago, we were on the website looking for flights, and I have a confession, just keep it in the room here among us, but I was on the United Airlines website. Yeah, I'm, I'll tell everybody here, I don't think I'll be flying United Airlines to Beijing in a couple of months, but anyway, that's, I just wanna make sure that's clear to everybody. I do think we wanna make sure that when we're talking about future flights, let's make sure that we keep a good approach and a good cooperation and we find, yeah, that's enough. Let's talk about opportunity. We've talked, I think you've hit well a lot of the opportunities that we have in the domain of maritime safety and security and the maritime economy. It's really critical for the US to further that as part of its strategy. Over the years, we have witnessed a lot of progress on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. And, but piracy and related crime continues at really concerning levels as noted by Aziz and Ambassador Shambas. Several countries in the region have ineffective governance structures, weak rule of law, the practices, their precarious legal frameworks and inadequate forces. And again, we wanna pick the right forces. The absence of this effective maritime governance system is hampering freedom of movement in the region and disrupting trade and facilitates environmental crime and oil bunkering and hinders quality of life for the communities of the coast. And of course impacts the inland countries who wear insecurity at sea will impose taxes and inadequate food provision for inland states. So it's not just a problem of coastal states but also inland states in Africa. Now, by quantifying the economic impact of maritime criminal activity, we believe one can demonstrate the importance of investment in the maritime sector as a whole. It is a crucial source of livelihood for many communities, platform for trade. Investors are less inclined to invest in maritime domain and in just the greater, larger African economy when they're at sea risks and their transport costs are elevated. We saw this phenomenon during the epic of Samalia piracy back five years ago. And we're hoping to keep that in abeyance as we've seen three incidents in the last two weeks. Anyway, the absence of this governance does discourage the growth and opportunities that we want to see for the African continent and it discourages investment. Let's talk, okay, so we've got a little bit of the problem. We've got a little bit of the challenges, some of the challenges, some of the problem and now some of the opportunity here. Let's talk about one key fact that we as partners need to keep us in the forefront of our approach. And that is to continue to push regional ownership. A year ago, this month, as noted earlier, China, as part of its presidency on the council, brought to the council a comprehensive approach led by the states of the region to counter the threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea as well as criminal activities. And this was, of course, the resolution, the Security Council resolutions also earlier, in 2011 and 2012, noted that states in the Gulf of Guinea region have a leadership role to play and the international community needs to assist in strengthening their efforts. And, again, this has been something very clearly laid out in UN resolution. Now, all of the UN resolutions and the work to date has been stressing and emphasizing that African leadership and ownership. And I'm not going to repeat all of the Yondi Code of Contact details in the AIM 2050 details, as well as the work of the, that's ongoing in ECAS and ECOWAS to support their development of regional maritime strategies. I will say that a number of our countries in the Gulf of Guinea have begun not just to speak about but now to implement. What does that mean? That means that the national level countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, South Tomeprincip, Senegal and others are now developing those strategies to ensure that they have comprehensive approaches to addressing these threats. And, again, this is a place where partners need to take notice. The U.S. approach here has been identified number one by we seek to safeguard U.S. citizens and U.S. interests, including protecting the lawful flow of commerce in the Gulf of Guinea. It's a primary government objective there and involves three dimensions. I'll go through them quickly. Prevention, response and governance. In the area of prevention for the U.S., we're seeking to prevent attacks from occurring. And our goals are to inform U.S. citizens in a timely way about threats and then, of course, increase the risk to criminals operating in the maritime domain, seek industry partnership on these strategic goals, track privately contracted armed security personnel and pursue implementation of the armed personnel security standards, the PCASP. And also, finally, to assist in the development of and enhanced regional maritime patrols. On the response side, there must be a response in the maritime security that focus on the need for African leadership and institutions. Right now, this involves not only the capacity development but expanding combined operations, reinforcing the policy on ransom and concessions for those taken hostage and then facilitating that integrated strategy. On governance, third area, this is of particular importance because this lays the foundation for the country's security and development. In that area, the U.S. government works with African states to strengthen their judicial sectors, to build political will and strategic frameworks, to develop and improve national legislation empowering maritime forces, to strengthen information sharing and support capacity of states in the region to address impunity for those actors conducting or facilitating piracy. It doesn't do any good to have great domain awareness, to have the ability to respond to threats at sea and then when you bring them back into the justice sector, you lose on the forensics, you lose on the investigations, you lose on the criminal justice part. And then finally, we will seek to use strategic communications to maintain political momentum and action by regional organizations and their member states. Now, before closing, we're here to talk about the role of the U.S. and China working together in the Gulf of Guinea. As mentioned, we have number one, the Friends of the Gulf of Guinea. It is an extant structure led by partners that are providing specific long-term assistance in the Gulf of Guinea, the EU, Germany, the UK, France, UNODC, the Italian government. All of these stakeholders have been pretty active in the Friends of the Gulf of Guinea. So this, as we work on habits of cooperation, would be one where we would encourage the Chinese government to consider engagement. We also should note that last week, President Xi and President Trump met to discuss the next steps in that U.S.-China relationship. There are four foundational framework activities that are supported as part of this comprehensive dialogue that will be overseen by the two presidents. One of them is diplomatic and security dialogue and another one is cyber security and law enforcement. If there can be found a way within the framework of those just-established frameworks, that we would suggest might be an area for the U.S. and China to work together and try to make progress in the Gulf of Guinea response together. As we can say, the U.S. and Chinese interests in Africa are extensive and they can be complementary in so many ways. We've seen this in the areas of peacekeeping where we're starting to think about ways that China and the U.S. in an Africa peacekeeping context could work together and cooperate at a minimum. And so as we've described these many inputs, these many requests for support of the African partners, there certainly can be a place in space under these newly-established frameworks that we're discussing for the U.S. and China to work together. One area of consideration might be to conduct joint research as a means to help further inform the conversations by the African and international partners both on policy and programs. So in closing, the ability of African states to guarantee safe and secure maritime conditions will be critical to the health of their national and regional economies as well as to the broader international economy. And improving the levels of security will require conventional, regional, and national level commitment. I really strongly appreciate the efforts of the Carter Center to put this dialogue forward. Thank you very much. So we will now turn again to two of the folks who've been working the hardest behind the scenes, but also kind of on the front lines of this effort to hear from first John Goodman and then Yahweh Lio. Good morning, everyone. I know the assignment is to go into the Gulf of Guinea Advanced Seminar. And I think that's very important. But let me try to just step back for a second and place the Gulf of Guinea conversation in a general context and give some sense of the real challenges that this type of work and this type of cooperation involve, because it's very important not to underestimate those challenges. It's almost a mantra that the United States and China have cooperated in the Ebola crisis in Liberia and in South Sudan, and to some extent on piracy issues, particularly on the east coast of Africa around the Gulf of Aden. And any conversation about tripartite cooperation you're going to hear, those three, again and again and again. But I wanna pick up on something that Ambassador Jung mentioned in his comments, which is the extent to which we have studied very carefully how those types of cooperation came about, why they came about at certain times, how did it work, and what lessons were learned. Because one of the challenges that this type of cooperation faces and I think Ambassador Jung mentioned it about the Ding Chaoping approach of step by step across the river and Ambassador Shambas mentioned it with baby steps, is that at the current juncture we don't have a very strong conceptual framework for when and how and under what circumstances three-way cooperation or cooperation with others can work. And in terms of developing habits of cooperation, essentially what we have now is an ad hoc approach. And what we're trying to move forward through this initiative and through many other conversations is to move from an ad hoc approach to something which is slightly more systematic and slightly more conscientious or conscious. And so I think that's one of the major challenge that this type of tripartite collaboration and cooperation is facing right now. The second major challenge is that if we're trying to form habits of cooperation, breaking habits is also very hard. And whether it's in China or in the United States, I think Mike Bittrick's comments about going to China for the first time are very indicative of the situation. In China, if you talk to Africanists, they mostly know Africa. And if you talk to those in China who know the United States, they know the United States and you could say the same thing in the United States. So tripartite conversations are exceedingly rare. And on the African side as well, it's not a very comfortable and normal conversation to discuss tripartite conversations, tripartite issues. And so one thing that's needed is regular, in my view, in any way, regular meetings, regular conversations, a kind of constellation of interactions and forums that would help foster this type of thinking. And it's only through those types of interactions that trust can be built. And it's only through those types of interactions that the normal prisms of approaching these issues can be changed. Because drawing on what Ambassador Lamina said and others have said, the common interests greatly outweigh the different interests on issues from climate change to peace and security as a whole. The third challenge is, I think, sometimes a tendency to think that the Africa file and the search for issues of common ground in Africa with Africans is some kind of addendum to the bilateral U.S.-China relationship, that it's a search for positive points in the midst of a very complicated relationship. And I think, actually, you have to draw the conversation back to Africa in this sense. So there's a famous joke that says, who won the Cold War? And they answered Germany or Japan. And I think you could also ask, who lost the Cold War? And to some extent, you might say Africa and Central America. And so when there are great power differences of importance, Africa is at great risk of suffering from those. Not to say that the conflicts are generated by the great powers, but their repercussions on Africa can be very, very important. And I give an example of this because Sudan was mentioned in the morning. If you contrast the different approaches on Darfur between Sudan, China and the United States and the consequences that had in addressing the situation in Darfur, those are very significant. And compare that to the much more constructive approach in the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan and later the South Sudan internal civil war. And so this type of collaboration has consequences for Africa. And I think that that is an issue which is important for, in my view, our African friends and partners to consider that contributing as Ambassador Shambas is doing to the bilateral relationship is helpful in a kind of 360 degree manner. So finally, because our task was to talk about Gulf of Guinea and because I'm sharing the panel with my great colleague, Yawe Lu. Let me say just two things. One, I wanted to give a sense of the timeline and the realities of this work on the Gulf of Guinea. I think it was March of last year that Ambassador Shambas initially raised the idea of working on Gulf of Guinea. In July, there was very high level meeting which Ambassador Shambas mentioned in Lome Togo in which the regional economic organizations, UNOAS of course, the government of Togo and many others participated. And out of that meeting there was, I felt, I think there was, Ambassador Shambas has mentioned some of the specific conclusions, but generally, a sense of willingness to work together and an invitation from the region to find areas of cooperation. In December, there was a technical meeting of those people directly managing maritime security affairs in the maritime security centers in West Africa and Western Central Africa. And to show you the way that progress on this type of file can work, in the spring, I think, I can't remember the date now, but March, I believe, in Beijing, the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, one of China's leading think tanks, held its own meeting on China-Africa cooperation. And the topic of Gulf of Guinea came up and there were indications of a willingness to work on Gulf of Guinea issues. So what we've gone from is identifying an area of possible cooperation to exploring that on the three sides, including with the Europeans and others, to coming up with a list of possible recommendations. Now translating those recommendations into concrete action on the ground is a challenge and it will be a challenge, I think, in any field that is addressed. But I think that's an idea of the overall process for the way that this type of work can proceed. So let me close by making two remarks. The benefit of the Carter Center's position here is that we're new to the maritime security field, it's not a particular expertise of ours, and so we have kind of an outsider's vision of it. And so from this six or maybe actually maybe 10 months or so that we've been working on this particular issue, the two observations I would make are one that there is not at the moment a multilateral forum, including all actors on Gulf of Guinea issues. That would include the private sector, regional states, international actors, and so on and so forth. That is a gap in the current setup. And the second is that Ambassador Shambas mentioned when there is a forum that people can rally around that forum. There is that forum in West Africa, it's called Dayounday Code or Dayounday Structures. And it is ripe for a multilateral support to strengthen it. The states of the region and the institutions have all expressed interest in receiving joint support and it's now up to all of us and to find the proper mechanisms to provide that support. In some ways it's not as, we use this colloquialism in the United States, it's not as sexy as piracy off the coast of Somalia, it's not a one-off, it's not a short-term operation. But I think actually that's healthy to have a medium to long-term process in which multiple partners collaborate to strengthen maritime security structure in West Africa. That's an enduring and significant common venture that would benefit all actors involved. So with that I'll turn it over to my colleague, Dr. Yahweh. Thanks, John. Thanks, Jennifer. I was told last night about 10 o'clock that I'm gonna speak on the Chinese perspective. In the context of Gopal Guinea piracy, I'm not going to focus on the Chinese perspective only in the context of Gopal Guinea. What I'm going to try to say is sort of what I've observed since starting working on this project. So I'm going to basically touch on five aspects but in about five minutes, so don't worry. The first one is suspicion and cynicism held by China and the US against each other. The second is this, Ambassador Zhong talked a lot, is breaking habit that John talked about earlier, is how does China get out of this principle of non-interference in other countries affairs? The third is leadership, the role of the leadership that Ambassador Zhong earlier referred to in his remarks. The fourth is the role of African countries, African ownership as was discussed here. The last one is individual diplomats, ambassadors at the grounds of matter. So on the first one, I think both President Obama and Secretary Hillary Clinton and others openly and publicly shamed China and criticized China on what China is doing in Africa. I think that is very blunt and I personally heard former US ambassador to African Union who is now the dean of the school, the early school of international affairs. In Atlanta at the Council of Foreign Relations talk, it's basically saying China is only interested in extracting materials and the resources from China. That runs very deep and you probably have felt it today in one of the questions from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think on the China side there's less public criticism but China side basically I think strongly believe what the US is doing there, democracy, human rights but it has not led to sustained development. What is the goal of US quote unquote intervention there? So this debate I think this perception or misperception bias is still very strong and needs to be overcome down the road. The second is non-interference. I think Ambassador Zhou one time said South Sudan is the country where China violated its own golden rule of non-interference because there are interests in South Sudan, there are interests everywhere now in China, one belt, one road being example. So I think China is inching out of that principle but China is a latecomer, is a new kid on the block and China needs to learn and this is one area I think China can learn a lot from US, from EU and from other partners. The third is leadership matter. I think Ambassador Zhou said in 2012, he had a proposal landed on his desk right after Vice President Xi's visit. So I don't know, I think we need to look into that. Who put that into his office and maybe it's Ambassador Lyman or somewhere else through the State Department, then the proposal was able to. And then 2015, when President Xi came over here for his state visit, there was the MOU between USAID and MOFCOM, Developmental Assistance between China and the US. And then there's the Ebola outbreak that was talked about which led to US China working together to establish the first CDC in African Union. So that matters, before the meeting in Mar-a-Lago, I wrote an article for Diplomat. My first item on the recommendation is for the two leaders to talk about coordinating their effort in Africa. I think before President Trump goes to China, later the year, I mean this is the most important achievement of the meeting is President Trump has agreed to go to China. I think that's when we should all work together to try to make something happen when the two leaders engage each other, when they look at what's going on in Africa, then when they pay attention, because 2015 when President Xi was here and then he went to New York, he pledged 100 million for peacekeeping. You know, I've been asking the question, who put that into President Xi's pledge? I don't think Ambassador Trump was able to tell me, nobody was able to tell me from the China side. How did that get into the pledge? And then he went to South Africa and he said security and peace matters is what China is going to offer, more resources. It's going to become a priority for China. So I think we should take that advantage. Now the fourth one is African ownership. I think for China this is very important. When we were in Beijing at the conference, the Chinese foreign minister person who was in charge of African affairs, anything we do, he said and he emphasized, it has to be proposed by Africa, has to be approved by Africa, has to be led by Africa. Otherwise we're not going to do it. So on the particular issue of piracy, where is that proposal? You know, should Ambassador Shambos go to United Nations to talk to, because China, when China was the chair of the P5, issued that resolution. You know, there is the, after our Togo meeting, there was the Africa Supreme meeting. We didn't see that proposal coming from Africa. So if China doesn't see that, because the ambassador of Togo, Chinese ambassador and the American ambassador, they were all in the room. The Chinese ambassador said, we already offered ships to these countries. You know, what US is going to offer? I mean, can they offer training? Because the conventional wisdom is, China is really good at hardware. US is really good at software. You know, kind of two ambassadors, which leads to my last point, is ambassadors make a difference. I think early on, Charles Freeman, Lawrence Freeman talked about, oh, you talk about in-life area. I know that's a legend, sort of in terms of US, China working together, ambassadors make the difference. You know, in Togo, we saw, because the Togo foreign minister said, he never saw Chinese ambassador, American ambassador in one room. They were in one room there. But then there was no follow-up. You know, both ambassadors seem to have specific recommendations, but how they're going to be acted on, that will have to come from the Togo foreign ministry, or from any of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea. So I'll end my remarks, talking about the Chinese perspective. So I'm very hopeful that maybe when the two leaders meet later this year, this would be higher on their agenda, because as Ambassador Lyman said very early, there is no strategic competition between US and China in Africa. This is where competition is okay, but this is also where collaboration and the cooperation are very, very important, very, very necessary, but it should be encouraged and we should all work together on that. Thank you. Wonderful. Thank you very much to all of our panelists. I think we covered a lot of ground. It's still have about 30 minutes left for questions. Just a couple of things that struck me through that. First of all, that was an excellent overview of the strategic context and the security situation and threats on the ground, and the reasons why, obviously, our friends in Africa are concerned, but also why the United States and China also should be concerned and thinking about creative ways to address some of these challenges. Again though, echoing the theme from the first panel about the importance that these efforts be African led, and I think that is something that obviously has remained true through this discussion of the Gulf of Guinea. I think there was a good discussion of the different activities underway, the different fora and mechanisms and frameworks available, and the need to think strategically about how to use those to promote some of the good suggestions and opportunities that were mentioned for possible cooperation and collaboration going forward. Again, I think hitting on the importance of ambassadors and leadership and the role that those individuals on the ground play in driving some of these efforts forward as well as having support from their home governments and their home capitals and the need to make sure all those pieces are integrated. And finally, I just wanna thank this panel for raising the question of strategic mistrust and suspicion that does make this cooperation hard. And I think we are slowly taking steps to overcome that, but obviously it's gonna take some time and it is a real obstacle that has prevented us from moving faster on some of these issues. And so I thank them for raising that and perhaps we can talk about all this little bit more in the Q&A section. So we'll see, we may go one at a time or take them in groups depending on how overwhelming the response is. But if you have a question, please raise your hand. And again, please identify yourself and if you're directing your question toward a specific person, please let us know. Cheryl, go ahead, sir. I am Ajuma Biuridia from the Nigerian Embassy. We'll start with the last speaker. Talking about strategic mistrusts and common interests or national interests. How do we find a common ground for the leaders of these two great countries, like the US and China? In Africa, talking about America, they have their own interests. China, they have their own interests and you want to bring the leaders together. Where do they overlap? That's this, our common ground in what we desire to achieve in Africa. Because like the last speaker said, the accused China of having an interest, that's why they're going to Africa. That's China having an interest, that's why they're going to Africa. But I believe that every country, every war power coming to Africa, there's an interest. So where do we find a common ground? So as we were able to say, okay, this is what we desire for the Gulf of Guinea area. That is the maritime domain. That is the question. Then I have a contribution on the issue of having a coast guard. That is the recommendation on moving forward by the professor from African State of Statistics, Assis Malakwais. When you talk about the Navy worldwide, we have the rules for the Navy, which includes diplomatic, policing, and the last one, which is the Namao Offen. In the U.S., you have coast guard because you have a large coastline and the U.S. Navy is a global Navy, it's a blue water Navy. When you talk about the countries in the Gulf of Guinea, they have a small area to cover, and most of their Navy function is policing role. They don't have this blue water Navy that will be divided into those that will be policing their coastline and those that will go for warfare outside. So if we are talking about a coast guard, it should be duplication of effort because the Navy will be put out of function if you have a coast guard and a Navy. Moreover, we are talking about the resources in this area. They don't have enough resources to divide between the Navy and the coast guard because if they have enough resources, they would have equipped their Navy's right now and they will be able to police the whole of their coastline. It's because they don't have enough resources, that's why the coastline is not being policed very well. So dividing the resources between a Navy and a coast guard, we just do the limited resources. So I'm subscribing that if the war power like China and U.S. are going to support the Navy's of this Gulf of Guinea countries, it will be by providing maybe ships, regional maritime awareness, radar, and all those other coastal radars to support the Navy to increase their capacity. Thank you very much. All right, thank you. So there's a lot there. So I think we'll pause for just a moment and maybe start with our Carter Center friends to talk a little bit about the process they've used for trying to identify those areas of shared interest between China and the United States and Africa and anybody else who wants to chime in and then Ashish will let you respond to the coast guard question if you want. So for me, I think last July, when we had a meeting in Lome Togo, the former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria said, I actually found one country where U.S. and China could work very closely, and that is the Northeastern Nigeria humanitarian crisis that was mentioned early before. For both countries, Nigeria obviously is very important. They have political interests, they have economic interests, but the most important thing as was discussed many times today is the security. If there's no security, then no country can really benefit its presence in that particular country is gonna be threatened. But again, our frustration is, yes, that proposal was floated at the meeting. American ambassador, Chinese ambassador, African representative, they all heard that. So the thing is, hogging to move forward. That is, because fighting Boko Haram, the lake chat basin, that area seemed to be pinpointed to the Northeast Nigeria. I mean, that's the common ground where the two countries can build up. And that was the specific recommendation from me in my article is what if President Trump and the President Xi can talk about that issue? There's no competition here, there's no rivalry here. The common interest here that unites both China and the U.S. is to eliminate the root cause of radicalization over there in Northeast Nigeria. So it's very easy to identify, but it is very difficult to start the process of two countries working with Nigerian government and other regional organizations in Africa for that particular goal, if you wanna add to that. Thank you very much for the question from my brother from Nigeria on navies and coast guards. Well, let me first say that the United States says, the United States Department of Defense has a very good relationship with the Nigerian Navy. And we have helped the Nigerian Navy build capacity and we are looking forward to continue this relationship. In fact, some of my very best friends in the Nigerian Navy was not too long ago in Lagos at the invitation of the Nigerian Navy to give the keynote address to the Jubilee anniversary of the Nigerian Navy. So I'm fairly familiar with the Nigerian Navy. But I also have these difficult conversations with my Nigerian Admiral friends because you already have duplication. On one hand, you have the Navy. On the other hand, you have the NASA. Many of them, both of them, trying to do sometimes the same thing. You write in the sense that the Navy has some very specific functions. You mentioned the diplomatic function, but naval officers are not diplomats in the sense of the State Department sense. They're diplomats in a special sense. For example, right now, we have our Navy doing certain things, sending certain diplomatic messages to one particular country. And in a very important way. So you are absolutely right on that. But navies are also about fighting wars in the maritime theater. You're correct. But I think that where we disagree a little bit is on whether or not African countries should have a blue-water Navy or a brown-water Navy. Or in fact, they should find another completely different concept for maritime security forces. This is where we disagree. You need to understand that navies are very expensive. Navies are very expensive. Navies can quickly bunk-wrapped a country. Because you're talking about the purchasing of ships. What about the maintenance? That is a big problem. When you buy a ship, you have to realize that that's only about 20% or so of your costs. And that is one thing that we need to be very, very careful. But again, I think that the key issue beyond the issue of the responsibility is the function. What is the function? What do you want that particular force structure to do? Is it policing? Is it imposing the sovereignty of the state at sea? What is it that you want to do? I think this is where you need to start. If you start by saying, look, I need a Navy, so therefore I'll put together a Navy, well, to what end? To what end? If you look at diplomacy in terms of the projection of force in the maritime domain, where are African countries projecting force to? And again, to what end? What is it that Africans need to do? Perhaps protecting the fisheries. Perhaps preventing environmental crimes and so on and so forth. So that's the conversation that I think we should have. And as I said at the beginning, we have a very good relationship with the Nigerian Navy and we'll continue to have this conversation. We'll take a few questions I think at once. Thank you. My name is Doris McBride. I'm with the State Department. And my question has to do with the fact that we're talking about two countries and a continent or specifically a region of a continent and whether or not it is effective for two countries to try to work with the region where the countries in that region have various levels of capability, particularly when it comes to the land side, which is where the maritime instability start in terms of the institutions that would support a Navy or a Coast Guard or whatever it is you're doing on the water side. So I'd like the thoughts of the panelists on that issue. How do you improve the institutional capabilities in those countries that have varying capabilities when as two countries you're trying to work with an entire region? Thank you. I am John Huggins with a foundation called Oceans Beyond Piracy. We talked about different levels of coordination that were mentioned earlier, the national level, the regional level at ICAS and ECOWAS, and then the continental level with the Ames 2050. I'm wondering if the panel had a thought on which area offers the most potential for U.S.-China cooperation and what might be the U.N.'s role in that. Thank you. Again, my name is Louis Maisel. We had some success in East Africa in terms of reducing piracy. We had some coordination with China in terms of areas of patrol and the like. The question I ask is, are there any lessons learned from what we're able to achieve in reducing piracy off the coast of Somalia that we can apply to the Gulf of Guinea? Okay, great. So we'll start with those three questions. First question, again, was talking about two countries working with a region where the countries in that region have very different levels of capability. We'll let Ambassador Chambas take the first step at that. And then the question about, what areas do we see the greatest potential for cooperation? What is the role of the U.N. there? And then the question about lessons learned from successes trying to combat piracy off the coast of East Africa. Yes, in the area of the cooperation with the support of the United Nations, you'll recall that in the context of the discussions of the AU, there was a lot of collaboration already, preparatory to the summit in Lomi. And some specific support was provided by experts in this whole area of the blue economy, namely fisheries, indeed mining, and the protection of the seas. And so these are areas where collaboration can continue. UNEP, U.N. Agency for Environment in particular, in particular is very supportive here. The U.N. Economic Commission for Africa provided a lot of expertise. So that's clearly one area. The other area has been in providing capacity for the Inter-Regional Coordination Center in Yawande. Here, I think the U.N. will be very open and indeed very pleased to have some collaboration working with China and the U.S. to support this particular secretariat of the three countries regional organizations here, their course, the ACAS, and the Gulf of Guinea Corporation, which have come together to see how they can collaborate. And so these three, working with the U.N. and with support of China and U.S., I think there's a lot of scope there for building up the capacity. I can take a third, but you're okay. So on the shade, excuse me, on the East Coast piracy question, the third question that we had. As I said at the beginning, Carter Center not specialized on maritime security. So we've had a kind of outsider's perspective through this initiative. But I would say there are four major lessons learned that were critical to the success of that. And those who are specialized in the Gulf of Guinea may have different lessons learned, but these would be mine. The first is that they had a mechanism called shade, which stands for shared awareness and deconfliction. So first, there was a mechanism. That's a very important lesson. There was a mechanism. In the Gulf of Guinea, the International Coordination Center could be that mechanism, but it's not in place yet. Second lesson or second point would be that the shade mechanism seems to have been successful because it was a working level mechanism. It was not at the top levels or strategic or political levels, it was a working level mechanism that allowed those directly involved in the different countries to work on the piracy, maritime security issues. Thirdly, the shade was voluntary and it met regularly. So countries could come and they could share what they were willing to share, but there were no requirements about necessarily coming to every meeting or necessarily sharing information with which they did not want to part. Fourthly, the shade was, I call it all inclusive. So it included any country from the region, any international actor or stakeholder involved, and it included, very importantly, included private industry, because private industry are once suffering primarily from the attacks. They need to be involved in the conversation. And fifthly, if I understand correctly, the shade mechanism was under UN stewardship, but not under what I would call UN micromanagement. In other words, there was a framework provided by the United Nations, but the mechanism itself could run and meet with not necessarily kind of day-to-day management by the United Nations or another actor. And so some of those lessons, I think, have already been learned in the West Coast, on the West Coast, but it's a slightly more iterative or slow process than the kind of quick establishment of those mechanisms on the East Coast. Just to add, from our perspective, working on Somalia, we had a major challenge, of course, of bringing governance to that part of Putland and other surrounding regions. That's a little different dynamic in the West and Central Africa, where you have states that have authority and the ability to govern in principle the communities along their coastlines, and the problem set is different in that way. In order to tackle a Somalia challenge, you really did have to work with those local authorities and communities at the foundation and try to seek to address their grievances. While at the same time, you had best practices in terms of onboard security in the Gulf of Eden, the response in the Somalia coast, that could be translatable to the Gulf of Guinea approach, especially as private companies. So that's probably a lesson that's not completely appropriate, but at the same time, on the on-vessel onboard protection side, certainly something to consider for some of the threats you see in the Gulf of Guinea. We may have time for one or two more questions, yes. Yeah, can I record a question for Mr. Liu? You mentioned that you hope China would learn from United States example. The United States has a military presence in almost every African country and has engaged in military actions in several African countries. What lesson would you hope that China would learn from that American tutelage? Are there any other questions? We'll collect the final round. Okay, yeah, we will let you answer and then if we'll go down the line, if folks want to answer. I don't think I have an answer for that question other than to say that China is building a logistic base in Djibouti. And I think down the road, maybe China military presence will grow. If this OBOR is for real, as many Chinese, including Ambassador Jones said, this is not a five-year thing. This is not a 10-year thing. OBOR is probably going to be a 50- to 100-year thing initiative for China. And then the interests are going to be there and how China is going to protect its interest and also to preserve security and peace in Africa and other parts of the world. So I think that that's just natural to imagine that China's military presence is going to grow. In terms, when I said China has a lot to learn, I think that's really in other parts of things that the United States probably has done better. For example, developmental assistance. United States has a USAID. China doesn't have an equivalent of a USAID. China's aid programs are run in Mofcom, whose primary interest and mission is economic and trade. And on China's foreign aid, there's less transparency. There is no evaluation. We don't know how those decisions are made. For example, the Carter Center is working a lot on health, public health, capacity building, and disease eradication in Africa. China has that too. But if you go to China, you ask them how the public health assistance programs are decided. So you go to Mofcom. Mofcom say, yes, the money is going to come from us, but we don't make any decision in terms of what activities they're going to have. So then you ask, where are those decision makers? And you go to the National Commission on Family Planning and Health. So we go there and say, well, actually, we only made a macro decision here. Specific decisions are made at the provincial level, because the provincial department of health actually decide how many medical teams they're going to send and they packed with problems. So in this area, I think China has a lot to learn from the US and from EU. And China signed MOU also with France in terms of developmental assistance to Africa. So, and China, I think, is setting up a South-South fund that international NGOs can apply in developmental assistance. So the last time when Jordan was in China, actually, last week, they talk about the specifics and probably down the road, they're going to call for proposals. And this is, I think, another area that China is trying to play ball with other partners. Thanks. All right, thanks. I would like to follow Ambassador Shin's excellent example of trying to wrap up on time, not just for coffee, because I know lunch is waiting. But I would also like to give our panelists if they want just 30 seconds for a final word before we break. Well, you all have gone. Do either of you want to speak, and we'll then, Ambassador Shin, we'll go ahead. Very quickly. On the US side, we're really looking forward to expanding and deepening this conversation on how we can support our African-led efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. And so some of the ideas thrown out by the panel today are going to be very useful for us to reflect on. And we are encouraged by them. And we will definitely be following up, including and hopefully through some of the existing for that are hopefully going to be useful for both the US and China going forward, such as the Friends of the Gulf of Guinea, for example. Just I was also going to reiterate the Friends of the Gulf of Guinea. But I would really focus on the Ounday process. I think that the Ounday process is key to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. And I know that the United States government has, over the last decade, more or less has been providing tremendous assistance. So I think that now a better coordination, better collaboration with other partners could very well be decisive. And I think that the next first step is to ensure that the code is actually turning to a binding agreement and then operationalizing it. Thank you. Just to say, I mean, repeat what I said in the beginning. It's been a good collaboration between China and the US in the Ounday. This can be replicated with equally good results also in the Gulf of Guinea. And they are different frameworks that we have shared, which can be used for this effective collaboration. All right, well, thank you very much to our panelists. And thank you to everyone in the audience for participating in the conversation this morning. I want to take just one second before we break for lunch to thank the events team here at USIP, who's been working incredibly hard behind the scenes to make sure that everything goes well today. And no one has been working harder than Rachel Vandenbrink, who's standing at the back with the microphone. So I just want to thank everybody who has been, again, really pulling all this together to make today possible. So thank you for that. And we'll move from this panel of almost directly into lunch. Lunch has been prepared. It is available in the back room there. It's available on the table. It should be marked as to what's inside each box. We'd ask you to go back, grab your lunch, grab a drink, and then come back out to the tables. We will have an excellent keynote lecture ready for us as we're eating. So please feel free to grab your lunch, bring it back, and we'll try to get started here in the next few minutes. Thanks so much. Thank you, ma'am. Thank you. It was wonderful. Appreciate it. Thanks for that. Can we survive? We better sit her and talk her, but I'll stand up. I'll introduce you from there. Austin, dude, if you're going to sit, I'll sit right there. I thought we'd then have a little bit of a conversation. That would be good. That would be excellent. I don't know if you're going to sit. I did. It's fantastic. This is an incredible job. I think we're going to sit here together, OK? Go ahead. Coordination as opposed to cooperation. OK, I think I'll get started if you're OK. Thank you. Wow. OK. Please just short more about our friendship. Right. Ladies and gentlemen, you may continue with your lunch, but I want to get started with the program because we're fortunate to have a really excellent speaker. And I promised him I would not give him a long introduction. We are friends and colleagues. And it's been extraordinary for me to know him and watch his work. He is currently the Chief Executive Office of the Asia Group and Chairman of the Center for American Security. He was Assistant Secretary, Kurt Campbell was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia from 2009-2013, and played a major role in what was called the Pivot to Asia. I won't go through all his extraordinary career, but I'll say this is one of the things that I admire most about him. He is in the best tradition of what's called the Scholar Diplomat. He has served in many parts of the government, the Defense Department, National Security, State Department. But he has also been associated with CSIS, with Harvard University, has written or edited 10 books. He's one of those people who has a major impact on policy but actually understands what it is. But quite seriously, he is a major, major thinker and actor on the scene of policy in Asia. Kurt, you gave a talk not too long ago, which you talked about habits of cooperation. And it's one of the things that we have been talking about here, where in recent years, but not that long, China and the United States have been looking at how we cooperate in Africa, an area where we don't have strategic competition. We may have some kinds of competition, but we have a lot in common. The question is, how do you develop that kind of cooperation, what are the prospects for it? And how China might see it, we'd see it. And most important, how the Africans would see it. So Kurt, I just want to tell you, we are so pleased to have you here. And I give you a warm welcome and turn it over to you. Thank you. Thank you, Princeton. It's great to see so many friends in the audience. I want to commend the partnership between the Carter Center and USIP. My good friend Jennifer now works here. And I want to commend her work in particular, that she is implementing and overseeing on China. I will say, we all have many lives. And Princeton was nice enough to talk about my recent experience. But as a graduate student at Oxford, I did my thesis actually on radical movements across Southern Africa. And so this is at a period where we were all interested in how China would play a role in certain organizations in Southern Africa. I got to ride the train, or part of the train. I got on the train in Tanzania in Dar es Salaam. We set off in about six hours into the journey. The train just stopped. So I sat on the train. This was in about 1985. I sat on the train for about a day. And then found my way wherever I was going. So I come to the study and appreciation of Africa over a long period of time. And had the chance, when I was at the State Department, to work with Princeton on a lot of innovative stuff in Africa that really sought greater partnership between the United States and China. And I will tell you the interesting thing about the relationship between the United States and China. And you may not realize it when you look at the enormity of the bureaucratic connections between our two governments. We have at least in the past the strategic and economic dialogue. We talk about strategic issues. We talk about various aspects of our economic relationship. We work on cultural exchanges. But in truth, I know of no two powers that do as little together on the global stage as the United States and China. And what's clear over decades is that we have not developed the habits of cooperation that Princeton graciously referred to that will be necessary for not just coexistence, but progress going forward. And so if you, for instance, look at a different set of two relationships at a very different period in the 1970s and 1980s, when the United States and the former Soviet Union were really at daggers drawn, right? We had enormous areas of strategic competition. We actually did more between the United States and the Soviet Union together in various places. And we cooperated on more issues than we've generally seen in terms of cooperation between the United States and China. For instance, the United States and the former Soviet Union had active cooperation in space. The United States and China do nothing together in space. We had programs that we worked together in Africa and other places. To date, most of the coordination or partnership or coordination is limited and careful. And there are a variety of reasons for that. But I would be of the view that if the United States and China are to establish the kind of stable, productive, cooperative relationship, we will need to find areas where the two countries can work more productively together going forward. Now I will say we all have our perspectives. So we just concluded a remarkable summit in Mar-a-Lago, really unlike any meeting that we've ever seen between the United States and China. I had a chance to talk to friends inside the Trump administration. I have never seen such a gap in perspectives among participants on the US side. You have some very senior advisors to the president that believe that the United States and China must be friends and that we can work together. And there's lots of property to develop and hotels to run in the world. We can make a new hotel in the South China Sea, lots of exciting things. There is a very strong group of people that really see absolutely no threat from China and believe that partnership is essential. On the other hand, there are advisors around the president who believe that hegemon's fight and that conflict is both inevitable and it is in the best interest of the United States that that conflict comes sooner rather than later. So you see these two perspectives play out even in front of outside visitors who are in just to give a perspective on bureaucratic organization in terms of how the United States and China should organize going forward. So I will say I was one of those people that was quite anxious about the summit, very worried that we would have sparks. I did not think that the personality similarities between President Trump and President Xi would be in the best interests of the cooperative relationship. And I thought there was a real chance that we would head into a very destabilizing set of interactions. I had just been in Beijing and I think Princeton, there were two fundamental schools of thought in China about how to see President Trump in the United States. The first school essentially argued that the president was and his team are essentially transactional and that really it's about the price. It's the price of doing business. If the Chinese team can come in with a series of initiatives to buy American planes, to invest in American factories, to buy agricultural products and beef and pork and dental hygiene products and bring them to China, that that will help in the short term storyline that the president is seeking to make America great again. And that the key for the summit, for the president, President Xi, is to find the nature of that price, right? But there is another group and this actually mirrors interestingly the relationship in the United States. There is another group that argued, no, this is in harbinger of a very different leading edge in the United States that's gonna be more hostile to China, more competitive and more prone to conflict over time. And I think, as is the want of the Chinese leadership, they spent an enormous amount of time preparing and staging for the event in Mar-a-Lago just to make sure that they had a lot of different approaches to what they would witness there. And I'm using this as a background to understand the issues that Princeton wants us to explore. The Chinese arrived, normally on a trip like this, the president, President Xi, would travel around the United States, would do other visits, but because this was so fraught and so important, he would come in with his senior team about 10 different people and then leave almost immediately thereafter, making no intermediate stops in Latin America or Canada. That's how high the stakes were. On landing, President Xi was informed that the United States had just bombed Syria. And part of his advisors said this isn't a front and this is meant to be a threat directly to China. And this is something that is not in the best interest of China. We have to think carefully about what our response should be. A very different group of his advisors argued differently, no, this is not a front, this is a terrific diversion of the United States. And the more time and effort that the United States spends in the Middle East, sort of you go girl, better for China because frankly, there are no win-win solutions for the United States, generally speaking, in the Middle East and certainly not in Syria. So there was some anxiety, but they went into the meetings. They were shocked at how, I'll say, rather than disorganized, informal the Trump team was and it was clear that they had not had time to prepare for the summit. There was really no economic preparation really whatsoever. The Chinese proposition for 100 days to study the economic thing was readily accepted by the Trump team. And some of the discussions around North Korea and other issues really did not germinate. What was interesting though in the back and forth between the two sides is that for the first time, it was not the United States that put a global agenda on the table for discussion. It was China. It was President Xi that underscored that there were areas that the United States and China had begun to work together on development assistance very carefully and slowly in places in Asia and also cooperation across Africa. President Xi talked about the possibility of China assisting PEPFAR programs. I found that quite interesting and quite surprising. And it was China that put these ideas on the table and the US response was interesting. We'll have to think about it. We'll have to study it. But our primary focus is how to stop the fundamental nature of the relationship. This was the approach of the administration that China and other countries had gotten the best of the United States and that China was winning in the relationship with the United States and that the primary focus of the US-China relationship over the next few years is the trade balance and investment opportunities and a degree of reciprocity between US and Chinese business between the United States and China. And I agree that those issues are important but it's interesting that the initial go round is an effort on the part of the US side to narrow the agenda when it has always been the case that the United States has tried to enlarge the agenda. And it was often the case that Chinese friends were more focused on narrow issues ensuring that the United States did not take steps for instance on Taiwan or in other areas that were antithetical to Chinese interests. So the reason that I lay this out is that it seems to me that beneath the surface, in fact, there are gonna be enormous possibilities to get work done because I think the Chinese attitude towards the US in the coming period is that the relationship is gonna be too important to be left to the chief executive. That there's going to be a need for a greater diversity of engagement across civil society in the United States. So I think you're going to see actually more fanning out and spanning out of Chinese engagement with nonprofit organizations, other institutions that are engaged in collaborative work outside the narrow central issues of North Korea and the trade balance. I think part of that is a desire on the part of Chinese friends to build ballast in the relationship. One of the things that we have seen, remember the US-China relationship, its early genesis was a shared concern about the former Soviet Union, right? So that the relationship came of age that was the glue that held the two countries together. More recently, the ballast in the boat of the US-China relationship was the business community, and American investment in China and the like, but increasingly our business community is divided about China with technology firms, even some manufacturing firms, arguing that we're not getting the best part of the deal and that it has to be renegotiated. And so what Chinese friends are looking for in the US-China relationship are areas in which there will be people that will understand and acknowledge that there are areas where US-Chinese collaboration and cooperation makes sense and are necessary going forward. And I believe this is going to be one of those areas. And I will tell you that what was striking when Princeton and I worked together at the State Department is it turns out that actually implementing and developing cooperation between the United States and China in these projects and efforts in Africa or elsewhere are among the most difficult things imaginable. And I was always interested, like if you are trained as a political scientist or you have interest in anthropology, why is that? Like what are the reasons why? And the initial theories of the case I had were these. I think first and foremost, our primary interlocutor, we just heard that from an excellent presenter on the stage earlier. The primary implementer and discusser of development issues in the United States government still is the State Department in conjunction with USAID. They end up talking to their counterparts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who actually have no responsibility for budget or decision-making associated with Chinese activities in places like Africa or elsewhere. So the attempt to bureaucratically link up is uneven. And we find that in a number of areas, but it's most acute on issues associated with development. Secondly, I do believe that on some issues that Chinese would seek to align and potentially coordinate, but not necessarily cooperate. And there's a lot of reasons for that. And we have to recognize that from a Chinese perspective cooperating with the United States brings baggage with it, right? And there is perhaps a view on the part of Chinese interlocutors that they would prefer to have their own unencumbered set of relationships with Chinese friends. That is often balanced by a desire to learn some of the lessons that the United States has experienced, to recognize that some of the criteria for aid and assistance that have been developed through the international financial institutions and the multilateral development banks are in fact good for development, something that grudgingly is coming to play a role in the AIIB, right? But still others that would argue that fundamentally China wanted to be unencumbered, and there is a sense that in certain circumstances there is a quid pro quo associated with certain involvement in various countries. Now in recent times, the focus in the West has largely been around whether Chinese practices of development are in fact welcomed across Africa. And there is occasionally anecdotal reporting in the West about concerns associated with mining and extractive industries and the tendency to import Chinese labor associated with some of these areas. I think my own sense is that a lot of that in fact is anecdotal, and that across the board the Chinese practices of engagement in many countries, particularly in Southern Africa, have begun to evolve substantially, and there are more effective partnerships that are being developed accordingly. I would say simply that going forward, the primary reason that Chinese interlocutors have been weary is that they grow weary and tired of dealing with an American government that is often not sustained in its efforts, changing course often. If you look at the last five or six years, what has been important at the top of the list of the US-China relationship from the American perspective changes every several months. Is it, you know, tell us if you're in China, what actually matters to you? Is it North Korea? Is it the islands in the South China Sea? Is it balance of payments issues? Is it Iran? Is it climate change, right? And so this constant changing nature of the hierarchy of issues causes Chinese interlocutors to inherently hedge and to be careful. And what they're looking for is a sustained level of engagement, and I will also say that I think Chinese friends also are wary of very high profile engagements. And so on the one hand, they recognize to launch a big cooperation between the United States and China might give it the boost that it needs bureaucratically and financially. It also cares with at risk. And so some of the things that they prefer to do are done more carefully behind the scenes. I found, and I'll just give you a for instance, you never hear any commentary about areas where you have subtle victories in the US-China relationship, but I'll give you one. So several years ago when I was at the State Department working with Princeton, we attempted an effort to start a negotiation with the leadership in Burma, in Myanmar, to get the military junta to release Sonsang Suu Kyi and to begin a process down this path. During this period, the dominant neighbor and friend of Myanmar by an order of magnitude was China. And so as we were beginning these consultations, we had to have a complimentary set of discussions with Chinese friends. I will tell you initially, Chinese friends were very suspicious. This is part of the pivot encirclement strategy that you're trying to pincer move us. And I try to explain that not everything, and particularly Burma, is through a Chinese lens. And in fact, we have our own experience, our own history here. We began a very intense effort at dialogue around assistance and support in Myanmar that began in 2011. Sets of cooperation that continue today, largely beneath the surface with remarkably little public commentary. But at the same time, a trust-building exercise that has been at least moderately successful, as Sonsang Suu Kyi has come to play a larger role as the people that were more aligned with China are no longer in power in Myanmar. At the same time, there is not as much a sense of Myanmar or Burma as a piece on a chessboard that is basically being grappled with by Washington and Beijing. So it's that kind of experience of careful, quiet, behind-the-scenes collaboration, and sometimes just coordination or alignment of efforts that underscore that our interests are not necessarily competitive and that we have shared interest in a degree of stability and development over time. My own sense is the reason that I wanted to come today is not only to pay my respects to Princeton and his team, is that it seems to me that for those of us who care about the US-China relationship, as I do, it's going to be finding these areas where there are potential for creating, as we discussed, habits of cooperation that are perhaps a little bit away from the main arena of strategic contention and debate, but where the potential impact on lives are the greatest. So I'm excited to be here. It's great to see a terrific crowd. We can all breathe a sigh of relief that President Xi got on an airplane, flew back to China, and no one was blown up, and no one was insulted, and we go forward. I think Chinese friends came away thinking transactional, and I think Chinese American friends thought we can do business. So we go from here. Thanks, Princeton. Eric, thank you so much. And you've put it in a very fine perspective. And let me just draw on something we heard in the last panel. For example, we were talking about cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, and Mike Bittrick was talking about a group basically of donors, the friends of the Gulf of Guinea. China is not a member of that. And my feeling is, and that's a joker and correct me if I'm wrong, but China is not comfortable just hanging out with the donors in the West if the Africans aren't there. So how one goes about this cooperation and how one structures it. But coming back to this question of China having sort of put the global issues on the table, do you have a sense of how they view Africa in terms of their overall view of priorities of areas? Is this an area that they feel more comfortable in engaging in that kind of cooperation as opposed to, let's say, someone with more strategic implications? President, it's a great question. I'll answer it two ways. You know, we have all lived through periods in which either the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union or earlier the European rush in the 19th century defined the essential experience of outsiders in Africa. My own sense is that the strategic dimension of relations with Africa has lessened, but I think it's lessened in a way that is actually healthier for Africa and certainly healthier for the mindsets of strategic thinkers in either Washington or Beijing. I'll also say there is an interesting dynamic here. You are right, in many interactions I've had with Chinese interlocutors about Africa, they will sometimes stop and say, look, you can't impose this on Africa. This has to be more a conversation in which we're listening to the views, the values, and the preferences of African friends. And that's an interesting thing that comes from China, but I will tell you there is a fascinating psychological development or anthropological between the United States and China. So the United States does not believe in any way that we are a colonial power. We're the United States. We came after colonial powers, our relations with Africa are post-colonial. For China, China psychologically almost identifies as a third world nation in some respects, not a great power. But from the perspective of Africa, if you ask most Africans, what do you think of China and the United States? They're both great powers, right? So neither of us would think of ourselves as powers with this kind of role and baggage, but most Africans would quietly say, no, these are great powers and great powers behave in a certain way. I'll tell you, my own sense is, I think Chinese friends understand this more than the United States does. I still think there is a struggle about how we see ourselves and how other countries see us in most circumstances, and that is the case clearly in Africa. I have been struck in many conferences that I have participated in Beijing about Africa and that they took on board concerns that certain ways of doing business had alienated African interlocutors and were prepared to make changes. Ultimately, the three-way dimension, Princeton may not be the way that true cooperation evolves in these circumstances. I tend to think of it as three bilateral conversations. There is the conversation between the United States and the particular African host, the conversation between China and the same host, and then the interaction between Beijing and Washington. And the key is to make that dialogue and that conversation reinforcing, honest, sharing of more information and spiraling upward rather than spiraling downward in terms of best practices. Let me just ask you one more question that I'm going to open up the crowd, but if you were, put you on the spot here a little bit, Kurt, if you were advising the Trump administration on the value of this kind of cooperation in Africa, what would be the things that you think would make the Trump administration say, you know, this is a useful thing in the context of how we see China and how we see our position in the world? So look, it's a great question. You know, there is a lot of analysis right now about why did President Trump and his team decide to go after Syria. My own sense is that despite all of the post-anti, you know, red line use of chemical weapons, my own sense is I think as a human being, he was appalled by actions against the children. And so, and I find myself both concerned and comforted, frankly, it's the first time I've seen President Trump actually care for human beings other than in the hotel empire, right? So no, I mean that, I mean, he clearly it affected him and that is a positive thing. On the other hand, you know, it needs more than that for it to be strategic. But in the first instance, Princeton, that support for children and that reality of the costs feels to me like something that can be built on. So let me give you an example. If you look at one of the things that Princeton worked on others, the PEPFAR work is remarkable. I think by any measure one of the most successful programs that the United States has been engaged in over the course of the last decade. If the budget that the administration has put forward, goes forward, that program will be devastated. And the only other country that could potentially step in working either together or in a complimentary way would be China, to be honest. And I believe that is something that we should look at carefully. I would also say that I think it would be a stinging rebuke of the United States. I think it would show a real lack of leadership. But if I had two choices, one choice is the program not happening at all, or recognizing that we needed China to bail us out of the lack of support, I'll take the second option every time. Interesting indeed. I could ask you a lot of questions, but I feel obligated to open it up because you've raised a lot of very important issues. Mike, do you want to start? You know my feeling from the Senate. Thank you so much. Great to have you here and hear your perspective. Let me ask, I touched on something in an earlier session and I wondered what your perspective was if you were advising the Chinese administration. As it relates to the expectations that other national actors contribute a greater proportion to the multilateral sphere, recognizing that China does invest in Africa separately, are there opportunities for the U.S. to encourage and get some response that more adequately represents the size of their economy? Can you, so would you mind just ask the question? So you're saying you believe that China should do more on the aid side or the business side, I'm trying to understand. No, on the multilateral through the UN contributions and phone. Look, I'm not the first to recognize or to think that China has, for a variety of reasons, has been hesitant to work financially through encumbered circumstances and that has been the case not just, and in fact it's really not just through the UN even through large financial institutions. Part of it is that they feel that they're not as well represented as they should be. They feel that they've been held hostage in certain institutions, even like the IMF and the World Bank. They would like to give more, they would like to have a larger voting share and they feel that the United States has held on to the voting share but not been prepared to pay its bills. And so they find an incongruity with respect to people wanting China to give more but not giving more responsibility more generally. And I think we tend to think of the AIB and the One Belt, One Road as strictly competitive as we're gonna set up a parallel set of institutions that are gonna compete with the Bretton Woods institutions where in fact I think there is some of that undoubtedly but there is also the set of circumstances is that the existing shareholders in the original G7 and the IMF, the Multilateral Development Banks have been remarkably reluctant to give up their controlling shares. They want very much Chinese resources but not enough in terms of voting and decision making. And that's the classic thing that established powers do incorrectly when you're dealing with a rising state. So when you engage Chinese friends on this conversation they will take you back time and time again to the United States inability to pay its dues to hold up the institution because of questions around use of birth control monies, the external impediments on activities that are imposed by Congress. They will focus on those things as inhibitions to fuller Chinese engagement. Now I think basically those are things that can be gotten through over time. My issue really is not any of those issues. I think our biggest problem is that our engagement on these is episodic and not purposeful. So there are periods where these are high up on the list. I give Susan Rice credit and Samantha Power. They focused on these hard, Darfur and other issues where there was substantial cooperation between the United States and China but then there are other periods and I will tell you we're about to live through one in which the senior team in the US government is not focused on these at all. And so ultimately I think we will have more impact if we have a sustained set of principles and approaches. I think the key issue for the United States right now is not so much getting, because I think China's made a decision. For right now they're gonna put many of their resources into the institutions that they've helped design. So we played a terrible hand in the AIIB. If you wanna look at a hand of how not to do diplomacy, it's that, right? And that happened in the administration I participated in, disaster. And we're gonna have to try to recover now. And over time make clear to Chinese interlocutors that there are elements of, again, the global compact about how to do development that will be appropriate with respect to both One Belt One Road and AIIB. Yeah. Doug Brooks. Hi Doug. Hi Doug Brooks, International Stability Operations Association. So for the better part of a half a century the Chinese have benefited from American principles of free trade of collective security and so on. And now a century we're abrogating the leadership role and I'm wondering, would the Chinese see themselves as a natural leaders to take over as the US sort of steps out of the international scene? Is that not a role that they're really interested in? Look, there are a lot of elements in that. In that, and I'll just begin with the first one. If you look at in Asia, what is the common denominator of almost 40 years of history in Asia over the last 40 years? This will surprise most folks, but the fundamental belief at the end of the Vietnam War, at the end of the Korean War, at the end of the Cold War, at the end of the global financial crisis was that American power was substantially ebbing and that we were in the midst of a hurtling decline. I could show you commentary from 1976 that would be much worse than anything that we are experiencing today. And so even though I can stay up late at night just like you can, you know, watching reruns of something and wondering what's gonna happen to our country, at the same time, I think probably rumors of our demise are exaggerated. And I think we're gonna find that there's more staying power in the United States, more strength to our institutions than we realized. No, I just, and more forward momentum. So I would just posit that as an outset, but I understand that's not what your question is. Your question is what does China want, right? Where does China want to go? Yeah, so I'll tell you my answer to that and I don't want to offend Chinese friends, but they do not know. So they are primarily focused on means, building power. That's what they're gonna do. And they think about it as like, we're gonna work so goddamn hard. We're gonna swallow our bitterness and we're gonna work hard and we're gonna build capacity. We're gonna build power. And then you ask, well, what are you gonna do with that ultimately? And there's fundamental debate and a lack of strategic thinking. There are some that would say the time will come inevitably and invariably for China to be the lead country on the international scene. Even the most confident Chinese interlocutors right now, the idea of that I think is chilling to them. And I don't think that's where they want to go. I think fundamentally right now, they want a complex relationship with the United States. They want to work together where we can, but we are always gonna compete. We are always gonna compete. And the hard thing for us, we have no preparation for a relationship like this. Our relationship with the Soviet Union was black and white, you know, monochromatic. This is a incredibly multicolored fabric that involves my closest counterpart when I was at the State Department was a colleague from the Chinese interlocutor. The interlocutor that I was at daggers drawn for the longest period of time was a Chinese interlocutor. So it's both and it's gonna be both forever, right? And the question really is that the answer to the question is more about the United States. We've got to make clear that we're going nowhere and that we're going to be a dominant country on the global stage. And I think the real issue is it is hard for both countries to cooperate. It is hard for both of us. And I think part of it is the strategic culture in China, despite the language is fundamentally zero sum. And in the United States, we do not realize how wedded we are psychologically and how much we take for granted that we're dominant and that we are the dominant country in the international system. And so for us, cooperation is harder for China. We want to cooperate on our terms, right? And China similarly challenges. And so I think the next period, the next 40 to 15 years are about an uneasy set of circumstances where both of us need to work together. And there are no two countries in the world that I'm aware of that have this much interdependence, right? And are as uncomfortable with interdependence. We are both chauvinist, nationalist countries. And we believe that we can take steps unencumbered when in fact, neither of us can. Kurt, it strikes me as I hear you, and I'll come back to you in a minute, but that the kind of cooperation we should be looking for in Africa is the kind of cooperation which each of us can say we came out very well, rather than, oh, look what we did together for Africa, because of that kind of competition that'll exist almost everywhere. Yes, it'll be very important for Africa, but we each will want to say we came out very well out of it. I think that's right. I mean, to put it in Trumpian terms, we gotta be able to say we're winning here. And I think that that's entirely possible. That's why some of the programs that are on the chopping block right now are very good programs, better than anyone else. And I believe these are areas that we should begin consultations. And so guys, I hate to say it, but it's a huge win for China to be able to come in and say, look, America had this leadership role, they're giving it up in some of these areas, and we're helping take it over. So that's a big win for a Chinese interlocutor to go to Beijing and say, look, these guys are so stupid, they're giving up there, so we're gonna pick this up, right? So yeah, good. Yes, gentlemen, right there. Thank you very much. Interesting. You're, you want to introduce yourself. Manny Iqpo, I'm a consultant here. Hi, Manny. Hi. When you talk about cooperation, there's also competition, isn't it? While we're sitting at a table with the Chinese, but also there's competition in areas of academics, technology, and business. We look at Africa right now, a lot of involvement by the Chinese government and the companies. US companies are having problems doing business in Africa, because the rules of the rules are different, right? Here we have this anti-corruption issue that's been going on for many years. As a result, it hindered a lot of American companies in going to Africa and doing business because the leadership there, there's a lot of corruption going on. It is not so when you look at it from the prism of the Chinese government and Chinese corporations, companies there. How can you, what would you recommend, going forward, not knowing how much the new administration is gonna engage in Africa? What do you see going forward to encourage American companies to increase their footprint in doing business in Africa? Being mindful of that, knowing that the rules of engagement is different for them, but I'm saying so much, but knowing that some have paid a lot of penalties in the last 15, 20 years because of corruption issues. We don't see that coming from the Chinese side. And to go by the Chinese company and say, hey, we're aware of what you're doing, but because of what you're doing, you're undermining our ability also to go in and play. So that's what I mean by cooperation or so competition. So, sorry, it's a great question. I'm gonna give you a slightly different answer if I could. So most of what our firm does, my firm does, is help American companies or try to help them as they struggle with challenges, trying to recognize that the history of the 21st century is gonna be written in Asia. And you gotta be effective and you gotta work in that environment. I hear from a lot of American executives about an uneven playing field. And there's a view that a lot of what they're experiencing is our structural problems that are beyond their control. Now, I don't wanna say that those do not exist, but I will tell you that I think in many circumstances, this is what American firms tell themselves as they go up against absolutely tireless, hungrier competitors on the global stage. And so, what's fascinating, for instance, let me give you, let's talk about a country like Cuba. So Cuba has now opened up for telecommunications with what's happened, right? So finally, American firms are thinking maybe we're gonna get going there, but they go there and they find already Huawei, L3, Samsung already involved in a brutal competition, staying up all night, doing whatever possible to make market inroads. And so, I would simply say in many circumstances, both in Asia, Latin America and Africa, it's just gonna take a much more relentless effort on the part of the United States and it is not simply issues associated with state corruption and the like. I think that's too easy, frankly. I've heard, I've been in meetings with guys, and I say, why haven't you done this? Why haven't you gone here? Why haven't you tried this? And they say, well, it would never work because it's corrupt and the deck is stacked against us, right? I will tell you, you'll lose a lot of markets if that's gonna be your approach. And that does not simply apply to Africa. It really applies to almost every emerging market globally. Yes, ladies and gentlemen, State Department. Sorry, I got one of those voices too. Thank you. Been really interested in your remarks. My name is Doris McBride. I am at the State Department in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. And my question is, do you think that the US and China are interested in the same places in Africa? And if they are or aren't, are they interested in them for the same reasons or for different reasons? Thank you. So, it's such a broad question, but I'm gonna tell you a fascinating anecdote. So, remember the Libya upheaval in 2010. So, again, there are areas of collaboration that never make it into the news that take place beneath the surface. So, when it looked like there was gonna be a need to evacuate large numbers of people from Libya, I remember the current Chinese ambassador called me in and shocked because the number of Chinese nationals in Libya turned out to be 10 times more than they believed. 10 times more. 10 times, not one, two, three, 10 times more, and they needed help if things, and we put in place a huge effort if necessary to help and assist more generally. So, the first thing I would say is, I'm not sure we have a full and complete accounting of the many areas of Chinese interaction across Africa. It's deeper, more fundamental, and more focused on more areas than people acknowledge. And so, it's not just extractive, it's increasingly technology. There's a huge focus on ensuring that Chinese technology companies play a big role in the backbone infrastructure issues as well as the cutting-edge technology. And they see some interesting comparables to rural development in China, as well as how development can take place in some newly urban areas across Africa more generally. I think there are some areas where there is similarity on extractive issues, oil, natural gas and the like. I think China, to be honest right now, has a more diversified view of areas that it wants to cooperate in China. I believe China has a very sophisticated technology agenda for Africa that we're at the very early stages of and, in fact, not particularly focused on. I think we are more focused on health and well-being and development more generally. At least we have been for the last 25 years. I don't know, this is the question that we were talking about earlier, in two years time, I don't know where that will stand. Yes, lady right there. Hello, hi. My name is Tiffany and I'm a foreign service officer and I've spent most of my career in sub-Saharan Africa. What are your thoughts on China and the public diplomacy arena? We're seeing that they're doing a lot more in the exchange front. A lot of academics from sub-Saharan Africa are going to China. They're tapping into the African intelligentsia on the ground, building infrastructure and curriculums for universities and other academic institutions and the media arena. For surpassing what we could do with the licenses and Voice of America, is the United States losing out to China and public diplomacy arena and what could this mean? Thank you. So as you plan your career, don't make sure you try the East Asia Bureau because it'll be helpful for your career development as you go forward. No seriously, so when you're at the State Department, people don't realize the most important thing is that you have to recruit good people for your bureau and so that means you go and spread horrible lies about other bureaus. I did it all the time, I would say, I'm sure there are overall that corruption when you come to our bureau, so anyway, look carefully. Look, you know, you try to be hopeful and bipartisan. I mean, do you know how many times a week someone comes to me and asks for help on a visa issue? I'm a former official, I have no role at all. Do you know how many people I work with across Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Africa, elsewhere that don't know what to do about their visa, don't know what to do about their educational issues, worried about their scholarship, so are we losing out? I mean, obviously, could we make it more difficult for other countries to visit right now? I mean, where do we think this is going to end? Is it just gonna be these five or six nations that are on this potential list? I mean, I will tell you, I work a lot with Malaysia, and this is not the question you're asking, but what haunts an Asian friend is the idea that they will be subjected to something, some indignity that will cause them to lose an enormous amount of face, and so when in doubt, let's not do it, right? Let's not risk, let's meet in Canada, let's meet in Tokyo, right? And that's gonna have corresponding and follow-on effects. We're seeing it across every country in the world, and it is not just China. Australia has many more students that are coming to study Canada, parts of Europe until quite recently, and so, yes, I do worry about this a lot, and given the role that we played in the 70s and 80s and 90s as South Africa struggled through its many dimensions, it's hard to see that the scholarship programs that would bring South African and Southern African students to the United States would be cut by about 50% in the current budget. That's a lot, not like 5%, which we would get anxious about, but 50%, it's just enormous, yes, and so this is, I guess, what in sports we would call an own goal, right? I'm gonna take liberty of asking the last question, Kurt. One of the areas Ambassador Chambas talked about extensively this morning was the problems of terrorism in the Sahel region of Africa, not only Boko Haram, but AQIM, et cetera, and it's becoming a major issue. How do you think China looks upon, not terrorism in general, but terrorism as far away as in Africa? Do they make that link between concerns about terrorism nearer to home, or is that a distant issue? Look, my sense is that we're talking about earlier issues. What does China want? Where does China want to go? You'd have to ask the Ambassador directly on this. My sense is that China has very mixed and complex views. It wants to play a larger role and wants to assist more in development. The area where this really hits though, Princeton, is the Belt One Road. If you look at the ambitions for this, it involves huge resource allocations in areas that have traditionally been unstable. And I think what China sometimes worries about is that right now, the United States is the global target. And I don't think any country would ever aspire to play a role that would assume more international status that would then accordingly come with it some element of targeting and negativity. But I think Chinese friends worry about that. They do have issues in the West that concern them. I do not believe they view that those issues in the West are as tied to other issues. They may in their propaganda, but deep down, I think they see them as more domestic in their inspiration. Ultimately, I don't believe that China wants to put itself in a position where it is more susceptible or vulnerable to the kinds of attacks Princeton, that those in the West and the United States have experienced. So how you balance that, how do you rise, how do you play a larger role, how do you be more dominant in certain areas, but not make yourself a target, is one of the great challenges of Chinese diplomacy. Well, I encourage it's been terrific to have you here. And you've given us an awful lot of rich, richness to think about as we go through the afternoon. So I'd like to ask you please to give a strong hand to of applause to Kurt King. Thank you, Kurt. Oh, thank you. Thank you. Thank you. How are you? The Carter Center stuff, yeah, exactly. The Carter Center stuff. It's on. It's on. It's on. I have to use myself too much for you. I have to take care of the disease a lot. I'm very co-active as I'm very active. Thank you. Yeah, I'll see you. Yeah, I can do it. You can. He's a good man. He's a great man. He's a forward man. He's a walker. He's great. OK, very good. OK. So I don't know what to talk about. We're going to office the defensive guys. I'm going to go to the defensive guys. OK. And I'll talk to the defensive guys. I'm going to talk to the defensive guys. Thank you. But we have to put our smiling faces on the table. Yeah, okay. All right, I think the third panel is about ready to begin. So if you wanna take your seats, well, great. Well, welcome back. And after, I think a fabulous luncheon presentation, this panel will be challenged now to keep you awake. And if you've had the turkey sandwich, we know what that does to you. So we hope we'll be able to keep it up. Mohamed Chambas needs no introduction. He's been here before. We're delighted that the defense attache from the Embassy of Nigeria, Mohamed Aminu Yacobu is joining us from State Department, Connor Godfrey, who's leading the work on Lake Chad Basin. And we're delighted that the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Senior Program Officer for Africa Programs, Oge Anubugu, is here. I'm the moderator instead of Jennifer. Of course, we wanted to make sure you guys were reading the program and seeing we changed at the entire time. We're gonna violate the protocols that both Mohamed and I know well. The UN is never supposed to be called on first. It's always member states. But since we're in the U.S. Institute of Peace, why not break some rules? It will be fun to hear. We're gonna focus on what would it look like to cooperate on the issues of countering violent extremism. We wanna focus on Lake Chad Basin. But I think we wanna get a kind of state of where things are. Some of the possibilities of where collaboration could work are the challenges for that. So I think there's nothing better than to turn to the panel. Our previous moderators have set a high standard. So again, I think each discussant will probably have 10 or 12 minutes to speak. And then we'd like to open it up to questions. We're supposed to stop at three, but we started 15 minutes late. So we'll just see if we can get dispensation from the organizers to make sure that we have as many questions taken. So with that, please. Thank you very much. One of the major security challenges in West Africa and the Sahel is of course the rise of violent extremism. We had earlier talked about Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin area. And also, of course, the threat of jihadists in north of Mali. More and more opposing challenges to Burkina Faso. We're in the northwest of Burkina Faso today. We are seeing more frequent attacks. And indeed, schools have been forced to shut down and many government officials, functionaries are being withdrawn, deepening the threat to the young, new democratic dispensation in Burkina Faso. I think all of this is what led to the Secretary General coming out with a plan of action to prevent violent extremism. And this is a plan under which the UN underscores the need to take a more comprehensive approach which encompasses not only security approach which is necessary, but also a need to address what we call the root causes of violent extremism. What it is that it is that creates this environment in which young people are in their large numbers driven to the messages and to join violent extremist groups. In this approach, yes, we need to support the efforts of, for instance, the MAJTF, and I talked about that, encourage Nigeria to step up. And since General is here, he will tell us the effort that they have made in that direction. We need to see how we enable the MAJTF to be effective in its operations. But as I mentioned, the G5 Sahel countries also now want to be in the forefront of the measures that are necessary to allow them to coordinate militarily their efforts in dealing with the Jihadist and violent extremist groups in the Sahel. The plan of action on preventing violent extremism also however wants to look at the immediate humanitarian needs of the population. There are several thousands of people, millions indeed, in IDP camps, displaced in communities. How do we make sure that we reach out to them and provide for their urgent needs? Failure to do that only creates more disgruntled young women and men who can easily be recruited. And this is why we very much appreciate the recent effort by a government of Norway which hosted the Humanitarian Summit and where there was very good response by the international community, including by the US, to meet the urgent humanitarian requirements of the displaced communities. Clearly, we believe that in that area, China can be of help. But we should look at this as a continuum. From the humanitarian support, we need to quickly look at the early recovery, efforts that need to be made to bring back life to communities where Boko Haram, for instance, had been chased out, or in the Sahel, areas where populations are beginning to go back. We need to move in to ensure that schools are rebuilt, clinics are re-established, and people are helped to resume their livelihood activities of farming, or fishing, animal husbandry, et cetera, et cetera. And then, from a UN perspective, we believe that the medium to long-term development perspective needs to be brought on board. And here, we have two major instruments, initiatives, the Sustainable Development Goals, which the international community embraced, and we need to work with the countries to begin to draw their national plans on implementing sustainable development goals across a broad spectrum of areas, 17 targeted goals, including, of course, building socioeconomic infrastructure and dealing with the energy requirements, and also mobilizing women and youth to empower women and youth to become part of the socioeconomic lives of countries. The fact is that in many countries or areas where we have seen the spread of violent extremism, there have been genuine cases of exclusion and marginalization. It is not by accident that some of these areas, the countries where there are some of the poorest also be it north-east of Nigeria or extreme north of Cameroon or deeper county of Niger or the extreme north of Mali, these are the most underdeveloped parts of the country. So we need to deal with the socioeconomic development of these parts of West Africa and Sahel by creating the social and economic infrastructure in these places and creating job opportunities for youth, for women, et cetera. In that regard, there's also the issue of using the new international understanding on how we turn the disaster of climate change into opportunities. I mentioned Lake Chad Basin, but it's true generally of Sahel, the impact of the desert and dwindling lands for grazing by animal herders, dwindling lands for agriculture by sedentary farmers. Even if you take the great river basins there, the Niger River, it's a shrinking river also. We need to see how in many parts of it, projects for desilting to bring back more water for fishing, for agriculture can be undertaken. There are projects already identified and designed. UN system through UNDP and many of its agencies will work on this. We need to rally the partners around these projects. And here again, I think there's a lot of scope for collaboration between China and the US in supporting these various initiatives. I know that there's a whole debate in this country and we need to see where the pendulum will swing regarding commitments under the COP 21 engagement, COP 22 engagements. But as far as some of these areas of Africa are concerned, I think the evidence is there, what the impact of environment has been of climate change and has been on populations and in fueling or being at least one of the drivers of conflict. So with that, I think there is real possibilities for cooperation in many technical fields to support the LCBC secretary to work in the lectured area to support the G5 secretary in some of these projects across the Sahel. And then even bilaterally, bilaterally many of the projects being undertaken, be it energy, renewable energy and other thermal and hydro energy projects that China is undertaking there. There can be collaboration with the US in all of these fields. So maybe let me just leave it there for now. Good. Well, thank you very much both for pointing out some of the existing challenges and including these new ones that are spreading out and cause a great concern, but a focus on an approach to solutions which include linking humanitarian early recovery and longer term development works. And I should point out that China actually does have a national plan on implementing SDGs. It's one of the first countries in the world to develop its own action plan. So it's something that needs to be done in many countries. Let me turn to General, please. Thank you very much. Let me start by thanking the USIP Qatar Center and UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel for organizing this forum. It is very important and there is a saying in Africa that when the two elephants fight, it's the grass that is beneath the surface. So for us in Africa would prepare the two biggest economies in the world, cooperating rather than fighting over influence or whatever. If they cooperate, we are sure we will benefit better and they too should be able to meet their own basic interests there. So since we are here to discuss areas of collaboration, cooperation and coordination between the two big powers, I would like to start by contextualizing the discussion in a way by situating ourselves in the region. On the screen you can see the map of Africa and we are talking about lectured region. There I start from Nigeria, we have Niger, we have Chad and Cameroon that border the lectured. Now, we need to understand the situation around this sub-region. If you look to the west of this region, we have Mali. There's a lot of conflict taking place there. If you look to the north, you have Libya. Also you know what is going on there. Now to the northeast, we have the border of Chad and Sudan that is Darfur. You know what has been happening there for many years. If you look to the far east, there is Somalia, there, El Shabab. And then to the near east, we have South Sudan, conflict. And then southeast, you have Central Africa Republic, also conflict. Now, some people call this the arc of instability but there are more to that. What is causing the conflict there? Why is it taking place in those areas? What can be done? What has been done already and what must be done by international partners like the United States and China? First of all, in Nigeria, we have the north-eastern part of the country which borders the conflict zone. But most affected are three states of Yube, Borno and Ademar. These three states have a combined area of about 59,196 square miles. This is equivalent to the area of the state of Georgia. Now, also important here is the so-called Sambisa Forest. This forest is known as the den of Boko Haram. It is a forest that spans about six states, from southern Borno, northern part of Ademar, some part of Yube, Gombe, Bauchi, Jigawa and Kano, and extends beyond Nigeria to the east, going into Cameroon, up to Central Africa Republic. You are all aware of the porosity of borders in Africa. Now, this is significant because a lot of free movements in that area are unnoticed. Now, the Sambisa Forest, if for the sake of analogy, the size of it is about the size of West Virginia. That is the part that is in Nigeria alone. So, it's a vast area with very difficult terrain. During the rain season, vehicles cannot pass there. They will be bogged down. It's heavily forested. So, even when you try the normal ISR platforms from the air, you might not see what is going on under. Now, let us look at what else is a problem in this region. Major environmental problems affecting the region, starting with desertification. If you look to the northeast of this region, we have Sudan. That is the source region of the Sahara Desert. Now, every year, especially between the periods of November to April, there's a large movement of the desert southwards, which affects farming lands and a lot of other things. It is estimated that the desert itself advances 0.6 kilometers per year southwards. And Nigeria alone estimates to lose 2,168 square kilometers per year to this problem of desertification. Also, Borno State, which is at the center of the conflict, is affected about 55% of its land, is affected by desert. Now, what is significant here? This region is made up of peasant farmers, people who live year after year from what they harvest from their farms. When this desert advances, it takes over the family land. They lose that source of livelihood. And you know what is the next. And it's estimated that about 35 million people live in these states in the northern part of the country that is affected by desertification. Next issue is the shrinking of the lake Chad, which is in the middle of this conflict region. Now, back in the 60s, this lake was considered as one of the largest lakes in the world. Today, this lake has lost 90 to 95% of its water. It has shrunk dramatically. For analogy, this lake used to be about the size of the state of Vermont. Today, it is less than the size of the state of Rhode Island. So, talking about the population that depend on this lake, it is a population in the northern part of Nigeria, especially northern part of Cameroon, Chad, which is barren and desert, same with Niger. So, the only body of water that is important to these communities is a lake Chad. It's estimated that about 60 million people used to depend on this lake. And it is drying up fishing activities, farming activities, water resources for their livelihood has disappeared. They are left with nothing. Next, let's look at some statistics in Nigeria. Looking at the bar chart in front of you is poverty prevalence by geopolitical zone. I deliberately chose 2011 for this because I don't want the effect of the conflict to disturb the dataset. As of 2011, the conflict had not picked. A lot of these areas were still living in relative peace, farming activities were going on and normal commercial activities essentially were still taking place. But look at it, the worst in terms of poverty prevalence is the northwest, followed by the northeast. Now, somebody could say, why is Boko Haram not in the northwest? There is no linear relationship between poverty and violence. So, but there is a strong relationship. Next is illiteracy level. Again, look at it. This is the graph showing the level of literacy, percentage literacy of the population in the various regions. There you can see the northeast as 29.7%. It is the worst record. Now, these are just the two indices I wanted to bring out. The other socioeconomic indices you can extrapolate from here. These are the key ones. Now, let's talk briefly about extremism and how it all started. Starting from the 1980s, major extremist violence started with the Mitestinal Group in Kano. They were dislodged and some of them scattered. A few of them came out in few areas like Bouchie and Gombe some years later. But the next major incidents of extremist violence was in 2002. In the states of Gombe and Borno, where a group called themselves the Nigerian Taliban emerged. And then, of course, these were the same people that we all believe metamorphosed into Boko Haram that settled in Meduguri. Now, we are all familiar with what happened in 2009 when their enclave was dislodged from the town in Meduguri. Because the challenged authorities, they were not ready to abide by the common law. They believed that the only legal authority is their leader. So laws were passed, they were disobeyed, and some they started attacking police who wanted to enforce. And government could not sit by and watch. So they were dislodged and then they scattered. Of course, the rest is history. You know, the insurgency full blown started 2013. But by 2014, the most notorious action, the kidnapping of Chibok girls, happened. And then they started taking over territory. And by the end of 2014, they had essentially taken over so many states. About 26 local governments were affected. You can see the red, the areas where they were most active, while the yellow, some presence. They spread up to, you can see the capital city of Abuja, where we recorded a number of serious attacks. Now, what needs to be done? Extremities, insurgencies, and violence cannot be tackled by military means alone. It requires coordinated action in both military, political, diplomatic, and socioeconomic realms. Nigeria has done its best by employing these approaches. In the diplomatic realm, the president has gone around the neighboring countries and secured their cooperation to fight together and the formation of the MNJTF. Also, political level, the government has set up what they call presidential initiative for the North East. This is supposed to tackle the root causes, poverty, unemployment, development, and then fight extremism through counter-violent extremism and deradicalization of the extremists. Now, what next? The military on its own, engaged in a coordinated ground and air operations, recovered all lost territories. And by December, 24th December to be precise, 2016, the last stronghold of Boko Harami Sanbisa fell. As we are talking today, there is no territory under the terrorists. All they are left with is sending innocent girls and children to carry out suicide bombing. Because they believe the security forces will least suspect a little girl in carrying out such things. So they use them and they have been achieving some level of success. For one of time, let me round up here and hope we can expand during the discussion session. Thank you very much. Good. Thank you very much for, I think, a very good history of, and sort of a more detailed presentation of both the socioeconomic issues that have caused a lot of the problems there. So now let me turn to the other side of the table and we'll have Conagratifere, please. Sure. Good afternoon and thank you. Jordan, thank you to you and USIP and to the UN Office for the West Africa and Sahel and also to my fellow panelists, Ambassador Chambas. I very much enjoyed your remarks and General Yakubu for the description of the events in Nigeria. My name is Conagratifere and I'm the Lake Chad Basin Team Lead for the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Where my day job is to work with state aid and DOD colleagues to implement the USG counter Boko Haram strategy. I'm here today replacing my elder and certainly better Ambassador Dan Mosina, who is the senior coordinator for Boko Haram inside the US government. For those of you who know Dan, I have neither his rank nor his Midwestern charm, but I hope I can set the table for a fruitful discussion afterwards. Also in a former life, a private sector life, I had the pleasure of participating in several trade delegations, both in China and in the US. I'm certainly a member of the choir when it comes to the merits of potential collaboration. So unlike peacekeeping and hotspots like South Sudan, where we are already exploring habits of cooperation, I think US-Sino cooperation in Lake Chad Basin is largely unexplored. To borrow President Deng Xiaoping's famous phrase that I heard was used this morning, we would truly be crossing the river by feeling for the stones. I hope to tentatively suggest where a few of the first stones may lie, but given where I sit, I'll do so in the context of US policy for the region, specifically the US strategy for defeating Boko Haram, ISIS West Africa and their successors. And at the outset, I want to acknowledge that the Lake Chad Basin government's campaign against Boko Haram coordinated through the multinational joint task force is an admirable example of a coordinated African-led effort to degrade a brutal terrorist organization, a genuinely African solution to an African problem. The MNJTF architecture, a variety of challenges notwithstanding, has allowed the US and other partners to channel information and other support to willing actors on the ground. In other words, the Lake Chad Basin problem set has already benefited from investments in cooperation architecture. The current USG five-year strategy aims to achieve an end state in which Boko Haram, ISIS West Africa and their successor movements struggle to maintain safe havens, have a diminished ability to carry out attacks against civilians, are unable to significantly affect the stability of Lake Chad Basin governments and are generally degraded and on the path to defeat. To achieve these end states, the US government is pursuing five broad lines of effort in close partnership with Lake Chad Basin governments. The first is strengthening Lake Chad Basin government's security sector capabilities to pursue the fight against Boko Haram both individually and in coordination. This includes robust US support to the MNJTF alongside French and British allies. This includes intelligent sharing, training and equipment specific to this combat theater and longer term defense institution building. Second, supporting governments in the region to develop rule of law frameworks and capabilities to invest, arrest, prosecute, detain and where appropriate, rehabilitate Boko Haram members in accordance with international law. Third, weakening Boko Haram's capacity, financing and cohesion and disrupting links with other terrorist organizations. Fourth, supporting LCB governments efforts to provide long-term population security, building the resilience of communities affected by Boko Haram and addressing the underlying social, economic and political drivers that can lead to violent extremism. And finally, supporting the development and implementation of a coordinated plan to partner with and to assist Lake Chad Basin governments in addressing the humanitarian needs of the population throughout the Boko Haram effective region. Note these five priority lines of effort reflect a complex crisis with absolutely no purely military solution. Failure to restore, for example, civilian security in liberated areas or to address pervasive food insecurity could easily subsume tactical victory on the battlefield and a larger strategic failure to provide viable alternatives to Boko Haram affected communities. In fact, we have already or will soon reach a point where regional militaries see diminishing returns to kinetic action. Continued pressure on terrorist networks must of course be accompanied, as has already been said by my fellow panelists, by investments in civilian security, governance and economic rehabilitation. To set the stage for some specific ideas regarding potential U.S.-Sino-African trilateral collaboration, let me offer a few thoughts on what the United States perceives as key challenges in the short, mid and long term. In the short term, the humanitarian needs are overwhelming. An estimated 5.2 million people will experience food insecurity during the lean season this year, with 50,000 experiencing famine-like conditions. Excellent monitoring and planning by the humanitarian community has already saved lives, but the needs are immense. In the short to mid term, the military campaign will continue to put pressure on the Boko Haram network, leading to an increase in defections and continued civilian displacement. The 2.6 million displaced persons in the region, the vast majority of whom are in Nigeria, will likely begin trickling back to their communities if and when they feel safe. Many will flock to perceive safety of urban areas, while others will return to villages with damaged markets and other infrastructure, limited food and economic opportunity. Managing the reintegration of what we call Boko Haram-associated persons, which would be a tall order in the best of times, will be exponentially more difficult in an environment of general scarcity. How will the military transition responsibility to civilian actors, who will provide security in the newly liberated areas, civilian militias, police, long absence from many of these towns and villages? How will governments and communities handle transitional justice issues and avoid sewing the seed of future conflict? These are open questions, and I know that General Yakubu and his colleagues are thinking about the same things. In the long term, and this is no surprise to anyone in this room, Boko Haram-affected communities will require the civilian governance, judicial and security architecture, capable of preventing Boko Haram or ISIS-WA 2.0 from exploiting feelings of neglect, marginalization and despair. So with these needs on the table, let's turn to U.S.-Sino-African collaboration. And if we truly are finding our way across the river by feeling for the stones, let us not fling ourselves into the middle of the current. I think it's best to think big, but start small. First, establishing habits of cooperation in the field. I've served in three African embassies, two of them in the Lake Chad Basin region or the broader Sahel, and I have never once known my Chinese political officer counterpart by name. That may be a personal failing as a political officer, but I can guarantee you that the U.S. has already established habits of cooperation with European and other partners, often through working groups in the field, and this does not often exist between the U.S., China and our African partners, except, I would say, during UN-shared events. Increasing the working-level interaction in the field is a first relatively easy step toward mainstreaming cooperation and developing a shared understanding of the environment. Personnel protection issues. I know Ambassador Shin raised this earlier as well as others. Working-level cooperation between U.S. and Chinese consular services or our diplomatic security and the analogous bureaucracy on the Chinese side could be a first step in sharing best practices and contingency planning, and the U.S. government would welcome additional engagement on this topic. Moving on to things that might be a bit of a bigger lift. A joint understanding of stability. The United States, China and our African partners all point to promoting stability as a key goal in the Lake Chad Basin. However, I think this 30,000-foot consensus often obscures genuine disagreements about what does and does not promote stability, trade-offs between short-term and long-term stability, and factors that may or may not lead to violent extremism. Further conversations on these topics could prove beneficial. Humanitarian needs. As already discussed, the scale of the humanitarian disaster is immense, and it requires that all international and regional partners remain deeply engaged. The United States would welcome additional engagement from the Chinese counterparts on this topic. Supporting regional bodies. Everyone agrees. Everyone is supporting African-led solutions to African problems and joint investments, technical assistance and other support in regional economic communities and other regional bodies could be a productive discussion. I'll end with one final idea for collaboration, and that is aligning Chinese investment with conflict needs in the Lake Chad Basin. The United States remains deeply engaged in Boko Haram affected areas, promoting social cohesion, working with the criminal justice sector, encountering violent extremist messaging, as well as regular diplomatic and military-to-military engagement. However, the initiation of major infrastructure projects, industrialization of key agricultural sectors, and other job-creating opportunities would amplify the effectiveness of existing conflict programming. Closer coordination between the US government, the host government and Chinese counterparts could identify priority infrastructure or other projects that would have the biggest payoff in terms of reducing conflict and having synergies with existing development programs. However, given the variety of Chinese actors on the scene, from massive peristals to individual entrepreneurs, US diplomats and USAID workers often have trouble identifying where to plug in or how prioritization decisions are made. At the firm level, at the Chinese embassy, in Beijing or through multilateral bodies, and we would welcome additional guidance on that side. So in closing, please let me thank our fellow panelists, and once again thank the hosts, and I look forward to your questions. Great, thank you very much, and thanks for that very interesting suggestion of adopting a conflict prevention lens to investments, but needing to know where to plug in on that. So our final panelist, Oge, from the USIP, please. Thank you very much, and thank you to all my panelists. I am going to try to make sure I don't repeat everything that has already been said here today. So from the conversations that we've had and from the presentations, there is a clear consensus that the global international community is concerned about the rising threat of violent extremism. On this issue, we know from all the conversations here today that both the US and China agree that violent extremism poses a direct threat to security, social development, economic investment and stability. In Nigeria, we've seen the impacts of violent extremist groups, such as Boko Haram, which has already been mentioned here today, on livelihoods and security of people in the northeast and in neighboring countries in the Lake Chad region. The insurgency has resulted in over 14.8 million people being affected, with 7 million in need of immediate humanitarian assistance, over 1.8 million internally displaced, over 4.5 million facing acute food insecurity and close to or even over 160,000 refugees who have crossed from Nigeria into the neighboring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Over the last two years here at USIP, we've been implementing a program in Nigeria, particularly focused in northern Nigeria, where we've focused on building inclusive processes to create trust between government institutions and citizens. This program addresses the drivers and the root causes of conflict that enables violent extremist groups like Boko Haram to emerge in the first place and to continue to thrive. In USIP's work in northern Nigeria, we view addressing the root causes of the conflict as a key piece to addressing violent extremism in northeast Nigeria and its spiel over effects in neighboring countries in the Lake Chad basin. Now, Kamadaya Kubu has done a wonderful job in setting the context of the country, and I just want to add some more on there too as well. In Nigeria, we're dealing with national and state governments that were elected a missignificant population growth, high unemployment rates and the legacy of mistrust in institutional gaps that follow years of exclusion, particularly in northeast Nigeria. Within this context, the shocks of the Boko Haram insurgency and the other internal intra and intercommunal tensions are extremely hard to overcome, even with resilient and determined populations. A new social contract needs to be established between the political leaders and citizens, one that includes and respects ethnic and religious diversities and where citizens feel that they belong to a nation. Addressing these fundamental weaknesses of the government should be viewed by international actors and African partners as vital to addressing violent extremism. It is within this context and based on USIP's work in Nigeria and particularly northern Nigeria that I would like to offer three suggestions on possible areas where cooperation between the US and China on addressing violent extremism could likely occur. First, cooperation should be strategic. There is no doubt that Nigeria as a country represents a country of strategic economic and political importance to both America and China. But more importantly, Nigeria represents a place where both American and Chinese counterparts can work closely with Nigerian partners and international organizations to prioritize the prevention of violent extremism. Key word here is prevention of violent extremism. Given the general context of the situation in the northeast and the Lake Chad basin, addressing the violent extremism challenge, as my colleagues have all said, must go beyond a military response. There is a limit to what guns and weapons can do in the situation in northeast Nigeria and in the countries in the Lake Chad basin. As the Nigerian military successfully recovers territory from Boko Haram, the insurgency also begins to adapt new forms of attacks. And high weapons or strong weapons can do very little in tackling these new forms of asymmetrical attacks. When we think about a strategic approach for discussion, much analysis on discussion on US-China relations on countering violent extremism or addressing violent extremism often concentrates narrowly on US relations between the governments. I would like to suggest the possibility of expanding the conversation to also include strengthening the relationship between non-governmental organizations, quasi-governmental organizations, policy-focused organizations in both countries and transnational networks across both countries, thinking about universities, research institutions in both countries and seeing how they can come together to play a role in incorporating with African partners, Nigerian partners, partners from countries in the Lake Chad basin in addressing the drivers of violent extremism in their communities. Recently, the Institute convened a meeting in Addis a couple of weeks ago at the AU where we brought together a lot of our local partners who are working in different countries on the continent. And this was an opportunity for them to discuss African solutions to African problems. Seeing that the AU is taking the lead in this area presents an opportunity for cooperation for US and Chinese partners to come together to support these African governments to take the charge in the fight against extremism. Second, cooperation must be holistic. Cooperation on addressing violent extremism must be holistic, targeting individuals, communities and structural dynamics and drivers of violent extremism. It therefore requires ownership and leadership at grassroots and communal level in communities that are directly or indirectly affected by the conflict. As Kana has said, there is interest from the US and growing willingness from the Chinese government as well to provide support to stabilization efforts in Nigeria, especially where economic interests are at risk. There is this growing willingness to provide stabilization support in stabilization efforts. In this area of stabilization, there is room for cooperation between the US and Chinese government. There is not only room for cooperation between the US and Chinese government, but also cooperation with other regional bodies too as well, such as the AU, ECOWAS and the G5 countries. Addressing the stabilization needs in the region will create an opportunity for cooperation to tackle security, political and capacity challenges in relationship to one another rather than in isolation of each other. One possible opportunity is restoring long-term domestic security and order in the affected communities. Recent efforts by the Nigerian military have significantly downgraded the strength of the insurgency, however significant work remains to be done to strengthen community security, rebuild trust between the affected communities and their governments, particularly the police, and to foster a new social contract. The gaps in protection of civilians have been well documented as have the challenges of the Nigerian military taking on routine police duties that are also outside of their constitutional mandate. A formal police presence as well has been largely absent from a lot of the communities that have been hit by the Boko Haram insurgency. In the interim, citizens in these regions have had to set up their own sometimes effective but very poorly regulated civilian protection forces. Building effective community police relations is an area of possible cooperation between the US and the Chinese government. Third, cooperation should be long-term. This will require investments from both US, China, Nigerian and all the other governments affected in the Lake Chad Basin. There are no quick fixes to addressing violent extremism, and I think we should be clear-eyed as we go into this, that this is a long-term process. The shocks of the Boko Haram insurgency and other internal conflicts and tensions in the region are extremely hard to overcome, even with resilient and determined populations. US-China cooperation should start from a place of learning from each other, then sharing experiences to improve the process of ensuring peaceful societies and an enabling environment for sustainable development. Thus, it is important that short-term economic gains or short-term wins, though these are very important, should not be sought at the detriment of long-term parity that could contribute to the stability of the region. Although US and China views may differ on how to address violent extremism, there still remains many opportunities for US-China cooperation in less politically sensitive areas such as health and agriculture that could go a long way in addressing the drivers of violent extremism. Apart from the growing food insecurity, which all my panelists have touched on today and I'm sure was also discussed in the conversation in the morning, apart from this growing need for food insecurity in the region and the urgent need for direct humanitarian support, agriculture continues to be an area where political leaders and communities in the northeast and in parts of the Lake Chad Basin increasingly call for support. Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy in all the states of the make of northern Nigeria. The transformation of the agricultural sector, true mechanization and commercial agriculture, as key drivers of growth and development, as well as livelihood, job and world creation. However, it is important that the trans- Trans-Aqua, developed by Italian engineers in Bonifika Engineering Company, that's something I've been campaigning for for many years. And now, in discussions with members of the Nigerian Government Cabinet, with President Bahari himself, with several meetings with the Executive Director of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, engineer Sanusi Adelaide, we have the ability now to move this project, which has a canal component, an economic corridor, production of electricity. If this had been done 35 years ago, the Congo would be different, Lake Chad Basin would be different, CAR would be different. But as we say in Africa, the best time to plant a tree would have been 20 years ago. The second best time is today. And so this program is now being moved on. Unfortunately, the United States has checked all the websites, USID, Defense, etc. There is no support for this water transfer program called Trans-Aqua, any part of it. In December, China Power picked up this proposal after 35 years and is spending $1.8 million of its own money to conduct a feasibility study. The first feasibility study in almost 35 years. This is wrong and we should now have a full support. We have the Defense Department here, the African Center for Strategic Studies, we have the Nigerian Government here, we have the UN here, we have the State Department here, presumably we have others. We should now have this to be the centerpiece of US-China cooperation on Trans-Aqua and water transfer for the long-term for stability and for eliminating poverty. And it seems to me I would make this, if I have any influence at all here, to be the key point to be adopted coming out of this conference. And this would change the lives of 50 million people and not only five countries, the Lake Chad, but all the countries of the Great Lakes who would be connected by canal bringing the water forth. So this is my... I think we want to see if there are other, we really appreciate that but because of time we want to see if there are other questions. Okay, well this is my request of this meeting. We heard it loud and clear with a great deal of appreciation. Thank you. Other comments or questions from the floor? Please. Good afternoon. My name is Major William Warren from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. My question, General Sir, can you talk about if the United States provides you military assistance in any form, what would be most beneficial to the Nigerian military that the US military or the Chinese military could provide you in either building your army or defeating Boko Haram? Thank you. Great. Other comment or question please in the back? Vincel Faso, freelance writer. General, I really learned a lot from your presentation. It was brilliant. I did want to touch on border security because I mean, if you take Nigeria for example, it's got a very long border of Niger. And I've heard Niger has been increasing their border security to the north, especially in a predominantly Muslim area. And then you have that long border of Cameroon too. So my question is, how can US-China cooperation, how can we negotiate with other regional countries to weaken Boko Haram's capabilities? Thank you. Great. So we've heard comments on key project possibilities on the issue of military to military cooperation, the issue of border security. I guess I'd add into the middle, certainly from the Carter Center's perspective, the idea of using mechanisms for collaboration around health. President Carter had launched the Guinea worm ceasefire. We hope to do a major initiative in Nigeria on eliminating river blindness. So it would be interesting to hear from the panel where you'd see countering violent extremism through other methods, including getting people's health better and people engaged in promoting health as a way of promoting peace. So with that, probably what we'll do in the interest of time, start in the reverse order. Okay, if you could make any kind of final comments responding to what's been discussed, and then we'll wind up down here. Well, I believe two of them in questions were targeted to us. He'll get a chance to directly reply, but if you've got anything that you've heard or you feel that you didn't get a chance to say, or you'd like to specially underscore, because we really do want to, unfortunately, pick up time, wrap things up. I think just the three points that I made in my presentation, there are opportunities for cooperation, but then we should think strategically, these should be holistic, and they should be long term. So those are the three points that I would like to leave us with today. So I think that there's a trap we can fall into, which is confusing general need with area for cooperation. I think there are many areas of need. Border security is a fantastic example, but let's be careful to identify why there is a comparative advantage on both the U.S. and Chinese side and why that specific project takes advantage of those differences. I know the U.S. is deeply engaged in border security in this region. A representative from the security and governance initiative is here in the room today would certainly welcome additional conversations, but I'm not sure that there's a comparative advantage for U.S. Sino cooperation on that particular issue. In terms of the military sales and things like that, I'd actually prefer to pass that on to you, sir. Thank you very much. Let me first state that what we expect is not China and U.S. working for Africa or Nigeria for that matter. We want the two countries working with, because many times we get it wrong. That is why even from the end state you mentioned, I don't quite agree because our end state differs from yours. So if we work together, we come up with one end state. We work towards it in collaboration. I think that's much better. Then talking about military equipment or capabilities is actually part of the missing part of my presentation because of time. The military right now is in urgent need of capacity building. And this is an area of equipment as well as training. The target has reduced because we don't have large scale attacks like we used to have in 2014. Now there are smaller groups of people attacking. So we require more precision equipment, weapons and platforms. We require more protective gears for the soldiers like the MRAPs. We require light tanks and artillery for quick movements because they run away sometimes on motorcycles or pickup jeeps. And more ISR platforms so we can see more of what they are doing, especially in the night. And then more modern light attack, close air support. And we are happy the news going around is that the government of the United States is willing to now sell to us what we have been pursuing for the last two years. And then specialised training because the face of the combat has transformed now. It's more going into special operations type of combat. So we are looking for collaboration of whoever, either acting individually or together. The two countries we believe can support us. We are not looking for everything to be done by the two countries together, but they can synergise acting individually. And that's what we believe needs to be done. Border security. The border, as you mentioned, is very wide. There's so many thousands of miles from the east, west and the north. Because of that, there's no way you can man it completely. So we require technology and that's where we are going to. We need assistance, especially with technology that will help us monitor the borders. Especially at vulnerable areas like the crossing points of the Sambisa Forest. Very, very important. Let me stop there. Great. Thank you very much. Yes, just a quick one on border security to say that one of my responsibilities is to share the Nigeria-Kameru joint commission, which is working on the demarcation of the common border between the two countries. This, as you recall, arises from the issues of Abakasi, the International Court of Justice decision. Since then, a lot of progress has been made. In fact, as we meet here, the technical committees are meeting Geneva, trying to make further progress and improve relations between the two countries. Reflecting not only in progress in the demarcation or the finalization of demarcation of this common border, but also in the fight against Boko Haram. But coming back to areas of collaboration, I think we have to understand that in some areas maybe it may not be immediately forthcoming. There hasn't been really a history of Chinese collaboration, even with the countries of LCBC or Sahel in the military area, because these are generally countries that have been closer, either to France or to UK or to the U.S. But, as we have said, this fight against violent extremism is a comprehensive one. So as the military, with support of traditional partners of these countries, take on this battle, we need to look at those root causes. And this is where the investment side, the economic development side, energy, first structure, all of that comes in. And there, China is already involved in these countries. So we need to see how China can help to bring back economic activities to North East, to Chad, to Cameroon, and indeed the Sahel region in order that we can create opportunities for young people, for employment, and otherwise engage them productively so that they don't become targets of recruitment of violent extremist groups. Great. Thank you very much. Well, I want to thank the panelists and the audience and this issue of really looking at how to prevent. Yes, it takes a military response where appropriate, but a much more comprehensive approach, and the opportunity for China and the United States both to get this on the agenda of discussions and for opportunities to really explore what would work. Because certainly coming out of a meeting in Shanghai last week with Ambassador Zhang, EGOT representatives were there. They are very nervous with the success that Nigeria has had of rooting out Boko Haram from Nigeria, and they say it's coming our way big time. So I think the idea of being on the front foot is another one that we'll need to begin. So I think we now get the panel of the wise men to conclude. But again, thanks to the panelists here today. Yeah, 15 minutes. Okay. Rachel, does this belong to someone? Oh, yes. They're general. I think we'll go there. Okay. Because I saw you. Oh, okay. Ladies and gentlemen, we'll convene. We're just going to take another 15 minutes and we'll bring this to a close. I think it's been an extraordinary, rich day. And it's given us a lot to think about as we go on to the next stage of our activities and we will be tomorrow planning our next meeting, which is going to be in May in Dakar. And so we've been able to draw a lot on this. So in this final session, I just think we're each going to try and just say a few words about where we think we had to draw from all this rich discussion and maybe take a couple of questions and then we'll wrap up. But I do want to thank all of you who've stayed right to the end and for your participation. Ambassador Zhang, could I ask you to begin? Thank you, Princeton. And I would like first to thank USIP and the Carter Center to give us our privilege here to exchange quite extensively about what we have done and what we probably do in the future. This trilateral cooperation, it is something new and challenging but it is very constructive for the bilateral relationship between China and the United States and also good for Africa and all of us. Posting in front of us is that we've done pretty well in the past and achieved quite remarkable achievement. But the next one is that from here to where and how to carry on with this momentum, how to find the next feasible place we can all work on and what lesson we can draw from the past and what best we can do in the future. So I would like to do your suggestions and probably I can contribute a little bit at the end of this. Thank you. I would also like to express appreciation to the Carter Center and the US Institute of Peace for this opportunity to be here and to participate in today's exchange. Now I want to maybe put an optimistic spin on things. What do I mean by that? We've been talking about mostly challenges of peace and security and there are some pretty big ones out there. The threat of Boko Haram, continuing threat of Boko Haram and the situation in north of Mali and Sahel. But about 10 days ago a group of countries met in Abidjan and they were discussing the team Emerging Africa and there were some statistics coming out of there that were quite encouraging because if you pay attention to the security situation and the fact that major economies such as Nigeria, Chad because they are primarily oil producing countries that they are in recession it can paint a pretty gloomy picture. But then out of this meeting we find out that Burkina Faso grew at 5% last year projected to grow at 6% this year. Just after the transition that Mali actually grew at 6% last year. In spite of all the challenges in Mali. That Niger grew at 5% last year. So what that tells us is that the potential is still there to scale up economic growth and create opportunities for many young people who are being recruited by violent extremist groups. And that's what we should take advantage of and I believe that the two preeminent powers of the world today in Africa have a tremendous role to play and if they can work in synergy in those areas where they can collaborate rather than compete. I think prospects for even scaling up this growth are bigger and it's when Africa is growing when we can really begin to harness the potential of this great continent to me that will be the most effective way of preventing the spread of violent extremism building peace and stable societies promoting democratic governance and sustainable growth on the continent. I think that we start modestly to identify one or two areas for instance if we talk about collaborating the Gulf of Guinea that also has tremendous potential to unlock huge economic potential in the oceans of the Gulf of Guinea. Not only the oil and gas explorations which are going on there now almost all the countries along the Gulf of Guinea are finding oil but also the fisheries resources and other potential economic benefits that can come from there. So we are on into some very concrete things. Let's work on those and as we build around that I think other areas can also be identified. Thank you. Thank you very much. Let me add my thanks to the Carter Center, to Jordan, to Yahweh, to John Goodman, to everybody at the Carter Center who has worked on this from the very beginning and did so much for this conference, for Jennifer and the team at the USIP, our events team, our China program. Grateful and to the UN support. It's been a useful day. A few things come to mind. We talk a lot about, because we started there a few years ago the cooperation on Sudan, South Sudan, but that was focused on a particular conflict or a set of conflicts and that sort of focuses the mind and the diplomacy around that had its particular dimensions and as I mentioned we had an established diplomatic framework led by Tapu and Becky. So a lot of things, difficult and complicated as it was, it was fairly specific and focused. When you look at the collaboration in the Gulf of Aden as was discussed earlier, the piracy problem there was different. It was focused on capturing ships for ransom. It was one particular part of Somalia that was heavily involved. There was a big commercial interest that could be brought to bear. A lot to learn from there as John Goodman said earlier, but again a very different case. Once we move to looking at West Africa, if we're looking at a set of problems as complex as violent extremism or the long-term problems that have developed in the Lake Chad Basin, we're dealing with a much more complex set of variables and there is no one standout organization that's there that says, come here, here's the overlay, here's the African leadership framework. So we have to think carefully about how we proceed in this environment, where it makes sense. And then to keep in mind and Kurt Campbell was so good about this to see where the overall relationship is going between China and the U.S. with China having put out a global framework at the summit, the U.S. not geared to respond to that, but that conversation is going to go on and that too will have a bearing I think on the type of cooperation, how we see how the two administrations see Africa and how they see it in that context. That will affect us as well. It does seem to me that another thing we've learned from this is that it's the complementarity of efforts rather than trying to do complex joint efforts that are probably the easiest way to go forward. And with Ambassador Schombes' leadership, we've focused, tried to focus at least one piece of this around what African countries are coalescing with organizational strength, and that's the Gulf of Guinea, complicated as that is. There are some very concrete things that are coming out of those studies and et cetera around which, again, we collaborate on areas of mutual interest. As we get into the Lake Chad Basin area, my first time working on Africa was 1971 during the drought in the Sahel. And I remember going to Lake Chad and it was an enormous, fabulous, incredible lake and around which people had all kinds of ideas about great development schemes. And obviously, and a lot of things were done actually collaboratively during that period building up capacity in the Sahel. But the climate change, the other factors that have reduced the natural resource capability, the lake in particular, but the desertification really poses whole new problems for that area. And if we start, not small but carefully, and pick a few areas, I'm rather intrigued, Jordan, by your suggestion on river blindness. It's an area in which the U.S. has worked before. China has worked, it's a health area. It has not only health significance, it has agricultural significance, opens up land that are off limits. So picking things like that may be possible and that demonstrate benefits and get to what Kurt talked about, habits of cooperation. So we will have a lot on our plate in the car. But we've learned a lot, I certainly have learned a lot, I've benefited a lot from everybody here. I think we could take a couple questions, but really I think we'll try and wrap up unless someone has something vital to say. Well then, let me just thank you all again. Thank my colleagues. As I said at the beginning, I feel very honored to be working with these two extraordinary gentlemen. And thank you, David, Shin, for being here, your moderation, your expertise. It's been helpful to us throughout. So thank you all very much. And give my colleagues a big hand.