 And I would like to compliment the Institute for the initiative in organizing this event on a topic which unfortunately seems to be lower and lower on the radar screen and less and less importance attached to it. I hope I can, in my presentation, prove that the country is important. So there are two main interlocking messages that define this year's European Commission reports as well as its proposed enlargement strategy, which was presented just a month ago in Brussels. And there are two very important messages. The first one is the importance of maintaining the credibility in the enlargement process. The second message is maintaining the momentum in the process itself. I would say that the first message maintained that the credibility is probably the most difficult one for two reasons and it has two angles. First of all, the importance of ensuring that in the candidate countries themselves there is a continued effort to pursue effective and meaningful reforms in order to fulfill the criteria set for accession. And secondly, the importance of ensuring continued support within the EU member states and public opinion on enlargement and the importance of fostering a debate that will demonstrate the benefits that have already accrued from the enlargement policy of the European Union over the past years, particularly as regards economic development, but also as regards political stability, extending the frontiers of peace and security to include more and more countries. And to quote just one quote from the strategy that was adopted by the European Commission. It says, all enlargement countries have a clear European perspective. Progress towards membership depends on the steps taken by each country to meet the established criteria based on the principles of its own merits. This is crucial for the credibility of the enlargement policy and for providing incentives to the countries to pursue far-reaching reforms. At the same time, it goes on to say, it is essential for member states, together with the EU institutions, to lead an informed debate on the political, economic and social impact of the enlargement policy. They have a key role in providing citizens with the facts on enlargement policy and in so doing to inform them of the benefits, including its major contribution to peace, security and prosperity, and to address any concerns they may have. This I feel is becoming more and more difficult. And even if we have many examples of the positive benefits that have accrued from enlargement for the European Union, there is no denying the decrease in support for enlargement within the European Union. On the one hand, you have a number, in a number of member states, governments who hesitate to give vocal expression to its support for enlargement for fear of alienating voters, particularly before elections, and on the other hand, you have also the rise of populist parties who equate enlargement with increased levels of immigration. And this is likely to increase, unfortunately, during the course of next year when we have the European Parliament elections, where the loudest voices will probably be the extremist voices regarding the dangers of enlargement being equated with more immigration into the European Union. This is, in my view, a short-sighted approach, which will only serve to weaken the European Union's transformative power and would also have serious implications for the Western Balkan countries themselves, because a diminishing prospect of EU accession would dilute that power of the European Union for much needed reforms, and it would also fuel nationalist, populist agendas in some of the countries, particularly the Western Balkan countries, where the situation remains fragile, in particular Bosnian Herzegovina and Macedonia. So I think this is also, interestingly, one of the important messages that came out from the conference that was hosted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the IIEA informally at the end of May on the 10 years of the Thessaloniki agenda, which, as you know, set out the European perspective for the Balkan region. And at that conference informally, there were several personalities who emphasized the importance of the enlargement policy, not least the dead minister for European integration, Lucinda Crichton, who made very clear that were the EU to withdraw its prospect of membership, it would lose, and I quote, one of its most effective tools for promoting peace, democracy, and prosperity in Europe. So if we look at this year's enlargement package, we will see that it does reflect the need and the importance of maintaining credibility, but also the importance of maintaining the momentum. It emphasizes the accession process as being more rigorous and more comprehensive than in the past, and of course, it has become more complicated. I think Tony Brown has some interesting statistics about comparing the enlargement negotiations when we joined in 1973 with current enlargement process and how difficult it has become. In the overall report of the commission, it sets out five key challenges which reflect those areas where major reforms are still required in the candidate countries. First of all, economic governance and competitiveness. There of course, there is still a major challenge of trying to ensure legal certainty for business and economic operators in those countries. A legal certainty which in many of the countries does not exist because of political interference, because of public procurement policies that are not being respected, public procurement standards that are not being respected, because of political interference, and also because public financial management remains very weak. And similarly, in the same context, there is the enormous challenge of the unemployment rates. If you look at Macedonia itself, over 30% unemployment, the majority of which are young people, and it does emphasize the importance of priorities in terms of spending by the individual countries themselves, and what the European Union could do to offer in terms of advice and encouragement. In that context also, I would highlight the role of the Regional Cooperation Council based in Sarajevo, which was established precisely to promote economic and regional cooperation in the Balkan region to help them with the accession process. The second important challenge is the rule of law, which is now at the heart of the accession process, the so-called chapters 23 and 24, which focus on judicial aspects, and here the main problem remains the lack of independence of the judiciary, the involvement of politics in the judicial process, and also the problem of the very weak fight against organized crime and corruption, and the need for a much more determined effort to eliminate corruption, which still remains at high level, as well as organized crime. There is also the issue of abuse or preventive detention in a number of countries. If you look at those who are detained very often purely for political reasons, Macedonia is an unfortunate example in this respect, and again, the selective approach in launching of judicial proceedings against individuals very often under the charge of fraud or abuse of public office, but it usually is purely because those individuals have been critical of the government of the day. The third important challenge is strengthening the functioning of the institutions guaranteeing democracy. Of course, the parliament is the main issue, and the fact that in several countries there is still a lack of effective political dialogue. It's so difficult, I remembered my own time in Macedonia to get the politicians to learn to pick up the phone and to talk to each other and to try to resolve differences. Unfortunately, party interests get in the way, and so as we've seen also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the lack of a political consensus driving the national policies of the country. In the same context, of course, there is the problem of very politicized public administration and the need for a much greater involvement, more inclusiveness, I would say, in the reform process, and by that I've been bringing in all the political parties, civil society, so a much more open debate about policy which doesn't exist at the moment, and similarly, a more inclusive approach in the enlargement process. Slovenia is an excellent model in terms of inclusive approach in the enlargement because it set up a core negotiating group which represented all the main factors in society, and really it ensured that whatever Slovenia was proposing in the negotiating process had the full backing of the entire country and so made the voice of Slovenia much stronger. And I understand that Montenegro has followed now the same approach in its own process. The fourth challenge, of course, is fundamental rights and the fact that there are still a lot of examples of discrimination against the Roma community, discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin, discrimination against the gay and lesbian community, and the need for the institutions that are often established to deal with this that they should have effective funding, proper resources that they can really ensure that non-discrimination is fully respective of the EU standards. And in the same chapter, of course, there is the issue of media. And there, sadly, all the international media watchdogs plus the international institutions, like the OSCE, which has a special representative for the freedom of the media, are unanimous in saying that there has been very serious backtracking in the Balkans regarding freedom of the media and respect for the independence of the media and that this needs to be addressed in a very more effective way. And it's not just a question of legislation because there is discussion in some countries about legislation, it's a question of changing the mindset, changing the mentality. And the fifth major challenge set out in the enlargement package for the countries is bilateral issues and overcoming the legacy of the past. Bilateral issues, which, of course, the Balkans have produced more bilateral problems, I think, than the region can absorb because of its history, but we have some very positive examples also of how these can be resolved. And perhaps the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is the best example that if they put their minds to it, and of course it was brokered by the European Union, by Lady Ashton, but success can be achieved. And we mustn't forget that these are two countries who were sworn enemies, but nevertheless getting them together to reach an agreement and enable the both to move forward shows that if there is a will, it can be done. But of course there are other intractable, inter-ethnic issues linking with constitutional issues such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and you also have the problem of Macedonia and Greece over the name issue. And the legacy of the past, of course, is a challenge which doesn't, is not particular to the Balkans, but is facing many post-conflict societies. South Africa is probably the best example of how to address the legacy of the past and how to promote a policy of reconciliation, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa is probably the best example of successful reconciliation process. Northern Ireland still has to face that challenge and the Balkans even more, but there are some local initiatives to try to overcome that. So if we look at the record over the past year and also some of the proposals that the European Commission has included in this year's package, the momentum is nevertheless there. With Turkey, admittedly, it's a modest step, but there has been the opening of a new chapter in the negotiations focusing on regional policy. So momentum moving, the bicycle is turning very, very slowly, but at least it's moving. In Montenegro, we have the negotiations that are ongoing and the process is in place and this demonstrates, I think, the importance of once negotiations are in place, the mechanism of trying to make sure that all the reforms stay on track. Serbia, we expect negotiations, formal negotiations to start in the next few weeks. Already the so-called screening process, which is a technical process whereby all the legislation of a given country is assessed to see whether it is compatible with the EU that is already underway. Kosovo, the negotiations for the Stabilization Association Agreement, which is sort of the first step, it's the parlor before you get into the kitchen, so to speak, is already underway, was started just a few weeks ago. And for Albania, which went through an electoral process this year, which was, okay, there were a few problems, but nevertheless, generally the impression was of a smooth transition after the elections and the Commission on that basis has decided to recommend that Albania be granted candidate status at the December Council of the European Union, and this will give an added incentive to Albania, such a decision, to pursue reforms in those areas where there are still a lot of weaknesses, such as corruption, organized crime, et cetera. There are two black holes, I would say, in this scenario. And one of them is Bosnian Herzegovina that I mentioned, and there the language of the European Commission's report is quite stark, the process is at a standstill. And it does reflect the situation and the seemingly impossibility of the leaders to set aside their own interests and to come forward with consensus approach, and it is this lack of political consensus that has resulted in the country really not moving forward as it should. And next year there will be elections in Bosnian Herzegovina, so there's a major challenge and the question arises, what to do? How should the EU react? Should it be more effective on the ground? Should it be more proactive like occurred in Serbian Kosovo, et cetera? The second black hole, sadly, is Macedonia. And even though the commission for the fifth time recommended that negotiations to start, you will recall that in 2009, on the basis of good progress during that year, that was a good, I always call it a good vintage year because really progress was made and Neve, who's there, was working with me and knows how difficult it was. But we felt that the country was making progress and a recommendation for opening negotiations made 2009. That has been repeated five times and the negotiations have not yet opened. The situation in the country is extremely serious and I would say personally that the danger of instability is more real than in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And we saw the events of the 24th of December in the parliament, in Skopje, when all the opposition members of parliament and the media were physically forced out of the parliament chamber. It was quite a dramatic situation and dramatic scenes, which reflected the total lack of political consensus of political dialogue and the totally polarized situation in the country. In addition to that, public administration continues to be extremely politicized and the government control of the electoral process is unfortunately very real and the official report of the OSCE spoke of allegations of voter intimidation and misuse of state funds for electoral campaign. And if you look at this year's progress report, you will see also references to the political interference in the judiciary, selective approach in the judicial process, as well of course as the lack of a media freedom. And all of this has created a climate of fear in society and I traveled there regularly and it's very sad to see that independent minded organizations, civil society, simply adopt a self-censorship approach because they are afraid of being the subject of harassment or intimidation. In addition to that, of course, there is the name issue which is on the one hand, it's a very convenient excuse for the prime minister of the day and the government to say that all the problems of Macedonia are because of the name issue. And it is true that the longer this name issue continues, the more serious the situation gets and also the more it strengthens the current government's populist agenda in the country. So the message really is that this name issue needs to be resolved sooner rather than later. It has gone on for far too long. But of course, the only way it can be resolved is if there's a dialogue between the two sides, if they sit down to talk, we all know the difficulties of reaching agreement from Northern Ireland, if both sides don't sit down and talk. And the general impression is at the moment that Greece is reluctant to engage in a dialogue. And this is very difficult to understand because it means that the overall situation there is going to deteriorate. And so there is no other alternative to engagement between the both sides on the basis of the UN mediation. At the moment, the mediation is limited to the odd meeting every three or four months between the two chief negotiators, but it's very perfunctory and nothing happens. There needs to be a much more determined effort. And I do believe that member states also must exert more pressure on Greece and use the opportunity of its presidency of the EU for the first six months of next year to really resolve this issue once and for all. In conclusion, just a few words on possible reforms in the enlargement. Next year is an interesting opportunity because there'll be a new parliament, a new commission, a new high representative. And so it's always a good moment to review, to be self-critical and to see what lessons we can learn from the past and how to improve it. And while definitely the overall record of enlargement, as I said at the very beginning, is very positive, nevertheless, there is no doubt that there are ways that we can improve that. Certainly, I think there needs the European Union and the European Commission in particular needs to find ways of using its leverage more effectively. It was effective in Serbia and Kosovo, but in other places, not as much. So there needs to be more consistency, more leverage, a more effective way of using that leverage. It's easier said than done, of course. But nevertheless, there are definitely ways that can strengthen the European Union's role. Also in this whole debate about how to strengthen the EU's role as a peacemaker, as a mediator. At the moment, the OSCE, one of its principal mandates is mediation, but it needs or very often support from the European Union, from the UN, and all of this can together could make really an important, have an important impact in the future. And to give a more effective role for the European Union foreign policy. I would also say that the European Commission needs to preserve rigorously the objectivity for which it was always known in its annual assessments. There is an impression sometimes that the Commission has a tendency to tailor its assessments to suit the policy objective. And this is, I think, not very conducive to the end result. For example, at the moment, the trigger for the member states to determine whether negotiations will start is the phrase, the country sufficiently meets the political criteria. But as we have seen, there are some countries who are there where there is a recommendation for opening negotiations, but who do not meet the political criteria. Macedonia is a case in point. So therefore there needs to be perhaps other triggers. And I would say that one should be the issue of stability. If, as in the case of Macedonia, there has been efforts at reforms in several areas, there has been a recommendation for opening negotiations, but for many reasons it's not possible. I do believe that the only way that the Macedonian situation can be resolved is for negotiations to start, because then you lock that country into a process whereby it's impossible for the country to go off track. If it does, then of course the negotiations are suspended. So that's a strong leverage that the European Union has. So locking a country into the negotiating process ensures that the reform process remains on track. And I do believe that there needs to be some internal discussions in the European Commission on that and how to improve. There also needs to be, I think, a much greater focus on how to enhance the cooperation between the European Union and other actors, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, who have proven expertise in areas where the European Union doesn't have. Media, for example. Education and all the issues dealing with ethnic minorities. The European Union does not have a key, as it's called, established legislation on minorities. Council of Europe and the OSCE have a lot of expertise. So there needs to be more effort to cooperate, not only at headquarters, but particularly out in the field between the OSCE Council of Europe and the EU to make more effective the role of these organizations on the ground. And also to avoid what we call forum shopping of the host country who might see nuances between the EU and the OSCE, for example, in the areas of media or education and plays on that for its own advantage. And the final important area where I believe there should be more focus is to involve civil society much more in the process. And encouraging that, not just through funding, but also to get those countries like the ones I mentioned, to involve civil society much more in the policy development as well as in the accession process. And this also has an important role in terms of resolving internal disputes, resolving conflicts, internal, inter-ethnic, intra, within a given state, or between states. And again, there the OSCE has a lot of expertise in how to, and the EU I think needs to develop that how to bring in civil society much more into that process because this helps then to ensure greater acceptance of whatever is agreed. And we've seen it in Northern Ireland. If you bring in civil society at the earliest possible stage, you can ensure much greater acceptance of whatever is agreed at the national or regional level. And I firmly believe that the contribution from civil society can play a very, very constructive role. And very often civil society is way ahead of the politicians and can act as a control over them. But of course in some countries it's difficult because they are themselves controlled. So I have gone longer than my 20 minutes. I apologize, but I look forward to questions. Thank you very much. Thank you.