 Llywodraeth a gweithio, wrth gwrs, mae'n nhw'n Michael Hutt. Rhywedd y dynyn ni'n iawn ar gyfer y Swyth Asiae Institut yn ysgolion, ac mae'n hyn o'n ddod o'n mynd i dda i ddechrau y functon sy'n mynd. Mae'n ysgolion lle o'r gweithio Cymru, Cyngorol, Peithanigwll, yn Trilancur, daeth Mark Sulta. Mae'n ddod i ddod i'n gweithio. Mae'n fwy o anod o'r dynnu. Mae'n ddod o'n mynd amddangos i ysgolion yw ysgolion south-agir institute, and also the SOAS Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy. As we were saying earlier, if you don't have a banner, all publicity is always so on these things. So that's the hosting arrangement. I should also warn you that we are filming this event. So if you wish to look in the shadows, please do feel free to do so. Also to say that copies of the book are on sale this evening a oeddech chi'r byddwch am y cyflawn i жyrnod gyda €15-pwg peflawn i €25-pwg, ond rydych yn have to have cash to pay for that and also, after the formal proceedings are over, the Norwegian Embassy has very kindly provided us with some refreshment which will be served outside in the foyer at 8 o'clock at the latest, perhaps a little earlier if we finish before time. Y dyfodol eisiau hwn yw gemi gwyllt. Rydw i ddweud â'r sgol yw'i stref detrwyr a'r llwyddechydig ddechrau'r phesgawd. Udych chi'n mynd gwneud, rydw i f companion ym mwyaf ar y dda. Yn ymryd yw'r arfer, Mark Sulta, yw mwyaf a'u cyflawni'r dylunio cymhigiaidau o dymogau a rydw i arhannu cy定odau ar gyfer gyfan, yn ymrwy filmol. Cynwys yma, ym 25 yw'n ymgylchol yw, yng Nghymru, Llywodraeth Llywodraeth, Llywodraeth Llywodraeth a Llywodraeth Llywodraeth. Felly, yn ymgyrch i'r cysylltu'r Llywodraeth yng Nghymru yw'r 2010, rydyn ni'n ddweud y cysylltu'r Llywodraeth a Llywodraeth Llywodraeth i'r idea. Rydyn ni'n ddweud y Llywodraeth yng Nghymru yw'r ysgrifennu, a'r ysgrifennu traddiffinol ac ysgrifennu ar gyfer y rai'r lluniau'r Cymru, ychydigon i gyflaenio Afri ac, wrth gwrs, mae'r cysylltu cyfrifiwnol i'r ddaethau ymgyrch, ac mae'r ddweud y cyfrifwyr yn ddweud, mae'r ddweud y cysylltu'r Llywodraeth i'w Mark Salthor. Rydyn ni'n ddweud ymgyrch gyffredigau'r cyfrifwyr ar gyfer y cyfrifwyr eich bod yn cyfanydd two members of the peace effort to the two players in the engagement of the time that is described in the book. The first is Mr Vida Hadgeson who is the minister and chief of staff at the office of the prime minister in Norway who is also responsible for EU affairs at the ministry of foreign affairs. Mr Helgeson was State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2001 to 2005 and in that role he led the Norwegian Diplomatic Team which facilitated the peace process between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. From 2006 until he started his current role as Minister in 2013 he was Secretary General of Idea, previously mentioned, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance in Stockholm. We also have with us Mr Eric Solheim, who is currently OECD Development Assistant Committee. Suta, you've said he's a committee in my notes. He's the chair of the OECD Development Assistant Committee. He's also serving as the United Nations Environment Program Special Envoy for Environment Conflict and Disaster. Mr Solheim was Norway's Special Envoy to Sri Lanka from 2000 to 2006. And from 2005 to 2006 he was also Minister for International Development. And since 2007 to 2012 he held the combined portfolio of Norway's Minister of the Environment and International Development. So a warm welcome to our two guests from Norway, please. Last but very much not least, Dr Suta Haran Naderaja is a lecturer in international relations here at SOAS. And his research examines how the international community secures itself against the emergent threats to international order through global frameworks which combine themes of security, development and liberal governance. Before joining the SOAS faculty in 2010, Dr Naderaja completed his PhD in the Department of Politics and International Studies here and then lectured in international security at the University of Sussex. His doctoral research focused on the Norwegian peace process in Sri Lanka. So I think we can welcome you to the BGLT as well. So the format of this evening is that first I will ask Mark Salter to give us a brief account of his book and how it came to be written. And then we'll turn to the panellists to each give their own comments on the topic and the theme of the book and the way it has approached those themes. Then I'll ask Mark to respond to those comments before we throw it open to Q&A from those who are here. So first over to you Mark. Good evening. Had a chance to say hello to quite a few of you in the foyo. Those I haven't hello to you too. Well this will be brief. What I'm going to just first say something about is how this book came about as Professor Hut mentioned. I mean obviously there's lots could be said about this but the fundamental is this that after the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka I think there was a discussion that went on primarily between Eric Suleheim and Vido Helgeson but not exclusively them. Which was this discussion about well there we go this is what's happened. How do we respond if at all. And I think part of what they felt after reflection needed to be provided as a response was an account of what the Norwegians got up to in Sri Lanka. An account that was telling the story from their point of view but was also giving the views of others key actors on how the Norwegians had performed. And I mean the wish to tell your story is universal but I think in this case it was enhanced by the fact that in the latter stages of the war in Sri Lanka the Norwegians became to a great extent the kind of whipping boys and girls of nationalist forces in Sri Lanka actually on both sides. So basically if anything went wrong blame it on the Norwegians. And I kind of thought of that last week you know there's been a big thing in the UK here about at least in some circles with Jeremy Corbyn as the Labour Party leader. Blame it on Corbyn. You know climate change blame it on him. Sort of temperature not your liking blame it on him. It's a bit the same in Sri Lanka. Something went wrong blame it on the Norwegians. Which of course was somewhat unreasonable to put it mildly. So I was approached by Vidar my former boss at idea. He muttered to me earlier was his nepotism questionably. I hope it wasn't. I don't think it was. I think they wanted a story told and they thought I might be in a good position to do it. It's true that I knew the country recently well. I'd been visiting Sri Lanka since the early 2000s. I first visited just after the CFA ceasefire agreement in 2002 and was back many times thereafter. So the book is basically an attempt to tell the story of Norway's engagement in Sri Lanka. But it's not a hagiographic effort. It's not, at least I don't think it is, presenting the Norwegians uncritically a sort of peace saviours of the nation. Which they certainly weren't actually. But even whether they were or not that's not how they perceived it and that's not how it worked. So it's attempting to tell a story. And I would like you, those of you who actually read the book, to look at it that way. This is a story. Read it as a story. Tell me if you think it's a reasonable story. And I'll just add there that I was quite pleased. I did a couple of interviews today at the BBC. One of them was called Asia Network, which is a radio programme aimed at the Asian community in the UK. I got an hour's worth of grilling. An hour. Incredible. When does that happen these days on any media programme? An hour on anything. Short attention span media doesn't work like that. But the guy who interviewed me was a young Sinhalese, well a British Lankan, I mean Sinhalese. And he said to me in his best South London tone. He said, oh you know, Mark, when I got this book it's like I got this big thing. I thought this is academic. I don't know if I really want to read this. He said, but you know what, it was a really good story. Now to me, that was praise. Praise of the highest order. That's what I wanted to hear. Because that's what I've tried to do. Now, obviously I can't go through all the issues involved. I just want to touch on a few. The first is how and why did the Norwegians get involved in Sri Lanka? Well, the first point to make is that the Norwegian engagement in Sri Lanka goes back a lot further than many people, even those who know the country and know the situation, realise. By my estimate, the beginnings of Norwegian engagement in Sri Lanka go back to the mid-60s when the first development assistance programmes were developed. And they were modest to begin with though, NGO assistance. But over time they built up and after 1977 there was a bilateral development assistance agreement and things picked up. So without going to the details, the point there is that Norway didn't just arrive on the doorstep. It had been camping out in the garden, maybe even living around the corner for some time previously. So relationships trust was built up over time. And I think that's an important message about peace building, about peace facilitation, is that it works best, or at least the parties are most likely to really work with you, if you've actually got a track record of involvement and engagement and support. The second thing about the Norwegian engagement is that clearly what facilitated it was a broader strategic decision that Norway took in the aftermath of the Cold War to get involved in peace facilitation, peace mediation or peace diplomacy in fact, as it's officially described. I've got this very explicitly in the book from a number of people I interviewed that they kind of sort of almost spotted an opportunity that in the aftermath of the Cold War small states or smaller states could start doing things in the mediation facilitation area that were simply not possible as long as conflicts were hostage to the superpower conflict. So in fact, the earliest Norwegian engagement that I'm aware of was in Guatemala when the Norwegians hosted a meeting of the contact group between the government and the rebels in early 1990. But things kind of picked up thereafter, and particularly after the 1993 Oslo process, as it's known between Palestinians and Israel, which at least at the time was perceived as a huge success and all those kind of iconic images of Shimon Peres and Yas Arffat sort of on the White House law and so on and so forth. How that's relevant to Sri Lanka is it really provided a kind of calling card for Sri Lanka, for the Norwegians. And in fact in my interviews with a number of government officials at the time, it's pretty clear that they treated the Oslo, they regarded the Oslo process and its apparent success as a reason to consider Norway as a potential facilitator in a way that they might not have done otherwise. Okay, third point, again without going into too many details. The official start of Norway's facilitation involvement in Sri Lanka officially really comes in December 1999, when the then president, Chandrachakumar Atunga, survives an assassination attempt on her by the LTT. She loses sight in her right eye but she survives. And on the backs of that wins an election, what would otherwise perhaps have been a very closely contested election. And in the immediate aftermath is interviewed by the BBC and just announces to the world, you know what folks? The Norwegians, we've chosen them to facilitate the peace process. Now Eric will tell you, if you ask him at least, that the people most gobsmacked by that announcement were precisely the Norwegians. They had no idea that she was planning to make this announcement publicly. But there it was, it was out in public domain thereafter. My point here is simply that even preceding that, there were probably three or four occasions starting in 1990 and going through the 90s, where the Norwegians were asked by the government and then eventually even by the LTT to get involved in some form of mediation, backdoor channel of communication between the two sides. In other words, Norway by the time it got involved in the genuine business of peace facilitation already had a serious history in Sri Lanka of economic development, engagement of political support and of requests to facilitate discussions. So there's a context and I think that's important to understanding the Norwegian role and it may be an important lesson for those who try to engage themselves in facilitation efforts elsewhere. It doesn't come for free, it requires homework, patient support and work. Okay, I will just finish off with a couple, this is really relating to the final chapter of the book which after this long story that I tell gets into the question of lessons learned. What do the different actors in Sri Lanka see in the effort to facilitate a peace agreement? What do they see as key lessons from that Norwegian effort? This is just picking up a couple of key ones. Number one, Eric and Vida tell me if you think I'm putting this too strongly or disagree or whatever, I'm still going to say it because it's what I think. The Norwegians misread the political context when the initial ceasefire and subsequent peace process took off. What do I mean by that? What I mean is very specifically that they thought that it was sufficient to have one side of the similar political equation on their side and that side was the government of Ranawik Ramasinga then Prime Minister, Prime Minister again today. They thought that was sufficient but it just simply wasn't. They didn't have President Kumratunga on their side. The government didn't have her on their side and that was an accident waiting to happen. It was a bomb waiting to be dropped which is indeed what happened at the end of 2003. Chandrika Kumratunga on the backs of the LTT's interim self-government proposal suddenly declared a state of emergency, took three ministries under her own control including the defence ministry basically just scuppered the entire process. That was fundamentally a product of the failure of a bipartisan political consensus in support of the peace process on the Sinhalese side. I think we know from peace processes around the world instinctively that you have to have all parties minimally on board with the process. If you don't, the chances of the thing falling through are heightened and I think that is a key lesson from Sri Lanka. I mean in the Norwegian's defence they were not alone in making this mistake. They were not alone in making that assessment. It was probably how most people especially in the international community viewed the situation. There was a Prime Minister who was pro-peace, who was pushing things, who was making them happen. Let's go with him, let's make it happen. Let's not think about the lame duck president who's sniping from the sidelines. Peace processes don't work like that. You have to bring everybody on board. Final point. The international context and this is something that Vidal Helgeson has written and very eloquently about and spoke also and I hope reflected in the book. The post 9-11 environment, the war on terror, these were things that have fundamental impacts in Sri Lanka and impacts that were not fully appreciated at the time. In particular, the war on terror provided an opportunity for the Sri Lankan government in the form of Mahinda Rajapaksa once he was elected as president in late 2005. As indeed in many other countries we know, to dress up a long-standing ethnic or civil conflict in the colours of a global war on terror. That's what Rajapaksa did and you have to say it was immensely successful, at least successful in terms of immediate objectives. Even after the end of the conflict, for a brief period at least, Sri Lanka was selling the Sri Lanka model of combating terrorism as a way to go forward and talking to the Nigerians about how to combat Boko Haram and so on and so forth. I think maybe I'll finish with this that the real message there is that when you're doing your facilitation or your peace efforts, attention to the broader parameters of the international order and how they may or may not impact on your efforts locally or domestically is absolutely essential. I'm going to stop there just to finish by saying I want to thank Mike Hutt. I want to thank in particular Suthar for his patient support in setting up this event. I want to thank my publishers Hurst for having faith in the book fundamentally. I think they did anyway. I hope they did. And to all the organisers here for setting this event up. Last but not least, I wish to extend a personal note of thanks. I haven't had an opportunity to do this before in public to Eric and Vidar because not only have they been my constant interlocutors with the book, they've been tremendous supports. I want to thank them for being here in a way the project in the first place. My only hope is that they feel it was worth it in the end. Thank you very much. Mr Eric Solheim will give us the first set of comments when reactions to the book. Over to you, sir. Well, good afternoon. Good to see you all. Let me try to set out what I consider is the added value of this book. I mean this is not the first book so what does this book add to what is already known? I mean, Cosmark has set out its comprehensive story. I think very well told. Easy to read, not boring about what Norway did in Sri Lanka. But for those of you who are not that interested in Norway but more interested in Sri Lanka that I think is most of you, what is new? I will argue there are three main issues where it sheds more new light. Number one, this is the book shedding a lot of new light about the workings of the Tamil Tigers. Because remember, we were basically the only foreigner speaking to the Tamil Tigers. I mean, I met Mr Prabhakaran more often than any non-Tamil in the world. Prabhakaran spoke, I mean, I'm not aware that he spoke officially at any point to any single ease. He once met with a Muslim delegation and his relationship to the international community was very limited. So except for Tamils, basically we were the people speaking to Prabhakaran. So we know even better, I would claim, that nearly anyone else. And of course, meeting Mr Balasingham here in London on basically a weekly basis, we got an insight into the workings of the LTT which no one else can claim. That applies for instance to the fact that if a person had been killed by the LTT, the LTT would claim that well, they hadn't done it, that was the government who had done it to put a blame on them. Balasingham never ever did that, never ever. He would explain why the LTT had killed off that person. So we got an insight into it which no one else could gather and that set out in this book what happened, what is known about the killing of Rajagandhe, what's killed, known or later killings, why the LTT was the first step as an organisation which was so violent and why there were no meaningful political initiative from the LTT side from 2006 to 2009 when the organisation was pushed and pushed and pushed. You would think you would come up with something. I would claim that the death of Balasingham was the main reason for that. There was no one who could produce a political initiative from the LTT side. It also sets out our long conversations in the end phase of the war. To me there is no doubt whatsoever that the Government of Sri Lanka committed huge war crimes at the end of the war in the discriminant shelling of Tamil civilians killing of tens of thousands of people. There were a huge number of rapes which was documented by Francis Harrison sitting down there. A vast number of Tamos were handing themselves over to the Government of Sri Lanka. There were no witnesses to that in all likelihood all these are now dead. So there was huge war crimes on the Government of Sri Lanka side. But there was also a clear offer to the LTT leadership to find an organised end to the war at a point where everyone knew the outcome of the war. There was no way whatsoever the LTT could win. They were moved into a weaker and weaker position. Provocran could have saved their lives of all these civilians and their lives of all the LTT characters if they had accepted an organised end to the war and this is set out in the book. Again, this cannot be used as an excuse for war crimes. You are not allowed to shell civilians even if your opponents are stupid. But it's also part of the story that Provocran is responsible for this brutal end to the war by not accepting common sense which would have been to end it and fight with other means in another day. All the LTT characters would have been alive if we were able to pick up the fight in other ways like many other groups in the world. So I think the number one value of the book is setting out the relationship to the LTT and the knowledge of the LTT and very, very, very powerfully making the argument that you always need to engage. To me, a main problem in the peace process was that the Government of Sri Lanka tried to limit our relationship to Provocran and the LTT leadership which was a complete mistake. Over time, the international community prescribed the LTT again a major mistake. We should have done exactly the opposite. We should have opened up as many doors as possible. As many people as possible should have spoken to the LTT leadership. There should have been more people coming to the engagement because what people do not really understand is the character of the top leadership of the LTT. They were very isolated. Except for Mr Balasingham they had no real knowledge of the world. They had never been abroad. Balasingham and Provocran had been to India but had hardly been to the south of Sri Lanka. Never everywhere else and had no real understanding of thinking of Washington or in Delhi or for that matter in Colombo. So it was an enormously isolated warlord sitting there taking basically all the decisions and they were not based on proper information not based on good knowledge and insight. If there had been a much more active relationship to him some of these mistakes could be avoided and I still believe that there would be the potential that international community and others could have convinced Provocran to accept federalism and for that matter and that would imply a resolution to the conflict. Second area where it provides I think new insight is the inner working of the government of Sri Lanka however because that's more open so more people are aware of that. Was set up by Mark I mean the except for the LTT leadership's belief in violence and violent response to every problem and the non-acceptance of federalism the other major problem of the peace process was the lack of unity on the singali side. The government and the president coming from two parties but all through the process the SLFP and the UMP fighting each other sometimes quite often fighting each other at least in words and attitude more than they were fighting the LTT and that made it very very difficult to get any real offer to the timers because if either side made an offer to the timers the other side would oppose it even if the offer you gave us the blue copy of what the other side said the other months. So that and there were any leader on the singali side really making a substantial serious offer to the timers would be stabbed in his or her back by the other party and the other side by the singalis. That was an enormous problem. And the number of opportunities were missed as I said by Prabhakran but others were missed by the government of Sri Lanka was an enormous opportunity after 2002. Yes, maybe we should have waited until the SLFP and the Chandigabin on board maybe but of course there was a momentum there which was not grabbed to really push the peace process forward on a kind of bipartisan way. In 2004 the first part of 2005 with the tsunami again there was a new opportunity there was a kind of national unity which had hardly been in Sri Lanka there was a willingness to find solution but again it was missed and that opportunity was not missed by the LTD that was missed by the government of Sri Lanka at the time they had opportunity but they waited waited waited waited and there was too late momentum had gone out of the process. It also sets out the cynisism of my invertsia pachse and the president of Sri Lanka he was trying to portray himself as the great saver of the syngolies but he was ready for any sort of dirty deal of any type if he could help his political fortunes. Tried to portray himself as a principle politician but the opposite was the case I mean he for instance told me that he was ready to give the north to Prabhakran no problems there would be no elections he would just give it to Prabhakran but there were two conditions number one it should be within the Sri Lankan state not a separate state and the other condition was that there should be no protracted peace process because he thought a protracted peace process and the mind he supported among the syngolies so it was a protracted peace process but it was not as opposed to a back room deal a big bang where Prabhakran was not the chief minister of the north in such an exercise because absolutely contrary to what was his public statement if you don't believe this well it's up to you whether you trust me or you trust my Indiraughtra Paxa because there were only two people in the room when this offer was made so that I can just leave it with you who you want to trust on this matter finally the third era of international community that was a definite weakness of the process I mean now we were selected as the facility exactly because we could not really bend anyone's arms we were a small far away nation dominated by Christians who could do limited harm to Sri Lanka that's why we were acceptable to India most importantly to me because India was both the main foreign player in Sri Lanka they could not accept any major power they would not accept the United Kingdom nor France for sure not the United States or China any major player at the end they accepted nowhere because we were small we kept them informed all the way and we could not really harm Indian interests adding to that we were also acceptable to the government of Sri Lanka and to the LTT for exactly those reasons they contemplated others for instance the government of Sri Lanka proposed France as a negotiator then the LTT said no no no no you speak French meaning that president and she spent her younger days in Paris during that student revolution there so they could not accept France but France would never have been acceptable to India and the circumstances so that was absolute non-starter so we were accepted because we were a small player we could not really make difficulties for anyone but that of course was also the weakness we could not put any pressure on anyone we could tell people that we would expose their lack of peace effort but we could not really put pressure what we could do was to mobilize others to put pressure that's of course why we spoke so basically on a monthly basis to India and we run ourselves all the time to fund the Indian leaders and try to make it put pressure that's also why we organized a group of co-chairs being the United States European Union Japan and Norway because these others plays could put some pressure the difficulty with that was of course that Sri Lanka never came to the top political level because there was always in Sri Lanka people tend to believe that the world was rotating around Sri Lanka at the center of the universe and fortunately it was not if you were in Washington or any other capital there were always so many other crises but always Iraq or Afghanistan or the domestic issues or the reelection or whatever or the economic problems was always another crisis so Sri Lanka didn't really get to the attention of those who could really put pressure on the government because they were helpful throughout India was helpful throughout but still they were helpful but not really using their leverage to put pressure on the government where they could have less leverage on the targets but they could have spent they could have done more to put pressure on the government unfortunately they would not be able to pull that off and still I believe that these people are through negotiated means the lack of vision of the LTP leadership meaning propaganda is at the end believed that every issue has a violent response and that federalism why he accepted federalism he still couldn't embrace it and postponed it to a point where it could not be achieved secondly the lack of unity is parties and their infighting and thirdly our lack of ability to really mobilise the international community to put pressure on the parties thank you Mr Herbysen Good evening Mark started or ended by asking whether we thought it was worth it and obviously that question could pertain to the exercise of the book or the exercise of the peace process I think both were worth it the book because it just had to be done giving Mark who among the several virtues mentioned one was left unmentioned the fact that he as a resident in Sweden was able to read Norwegian files which was useful in the process of writing the book the fact that he could go through it all make interviews and present not from a Norwegian perspective reflected through his fairly unbiased eyes a process from the very beginning to the very end I think it had to be done and it's very good that it has been done the peace process also had to be done it had to be tried because you have to try and when we engaged as a third party that comes with several limitations and one limitation is already mentioned by the phrase third party there are two other parties there are two main parties and the ultimate responsibility rests with those parties whether you call them first or second parties or whether you call them the two first parties because as a mediator you need to treat them in a similar way we were obviously very mindful of the fact that lack of bipartisanship had always been the big impediment on the government side in Sri Lanka but it wasn't up to Norway to resolve that issue the LTTE came across as obviously much more of a monolithic structure but we also saw how the corona breakaway made the peace process management more complicated on that side too there are at times also divisions within the third party different opinions but always resolved by peaceful means the book also shed some light on the issue and I can talk about it because I wasn't involved issues between Eric and Foreign Minister Torbjörn Jagdland when it comes to dealing with the process and how one of the parties tried to play with the third party role but ultimately the third party can't carry the major responsibility and that was something we were very mindful of in the process I clearly agree with what Eric said about the international context and what Mark said about the international context the way the post 9.11 world impacted on this process was a challenge the way particularly when the tsunami devastating as it was provided an opportunity for restarting the peace process because it had such a profound effect on both sides and not least on the LTTE side the international community wasn't able to engage with the north and the east I think that's where the final curtain was drawn in many ways on the LTTE side and the way the international community was effectively shut out at the end of the war reflects not the post 9.11 world but maybe what Farid Zechariah called the post-american world how what was seen by many as the international community as meaning the west was shut out in a very dramatic way making any efforts diplomatically at the end of the war very difficult but again the national situation is what matters the most and this is also a story of people that put down a lot of effort and people that were willing to make great sacrifices for peace this is not the story of the war there are always war heroes in wars and there are contests who are war heroes is a contested issue but this is a story about peace heroes and in my view peace heroes are often in a more challenging and difficult situation than war heroes it's easier to become a war hero in some ways than a peace hero if you're a peace hero you need to challenge your own constituency you need to make sacrifices a war hero rallies his or her own constituency and I think that's important to keep in mind Ronil Vikramasinga's Prime Minister was willing to make great sacrifices for peace Chandrika as well was willing to make sacrifices when she started this process quite often things came in the way of going all the way on the LTD side Anton Balasingam was clearly with his foresight and wisdom a man who was willing to make sacrifices for peace and challenging his constituency like Ronil was willing on his side and I think this is interesting also in the current context Ronil is back as Prime Minister and there is an end to the violent conflict but that is not an end to all conflict and tension and deeper rooted issues in Sri Lanka and society and therefore winning the peace winning the effort of addressing issues that are still there to build a lasting and inclusive peace is still very much a challenge for the people of Sri Lanka and the politicians of Sri Lanka I think it's an interesting thing to note that Ronil Vikramasinghe who was willing on the other end of the book at the early end of the book to make sacrifices is back as Prime Minister and let's hope that he will be a successful peace hero as he set out to be 10, 15 years ago thank you Our final speaker is Dr Sutharan Nadar, our very own Thank you Good evening Thank you to Mark and Eric and Rida and Michael for inviting me to make some comments on this book It's a big book and it's locked in it covers a long period and I've read it with a view to a story and that's exactly what I felt as how I went through it I'm glad Mark used that term told me I'd be disparaging if I said that Essentially he gives an account It's an account of Sri Lanka that starts around 81 accelerates to the start of the peace process and then follows it through in careful steps all the way through to the end of the peace process around 2006 through the redemption of war, the end of the war and then ends and as a story it's told very clearly through a Norwegian perspective and that's in great part because he's two key contributors the people whose perspectives are most represented are Eric and Rida and in that way it's a valuable book because for many of the events that we know about many of the moments we know about you get an insight into precisely how the Norwegians as a whole and occasionally Eric and Rida separately understood that along with a whole bunch of other diplomats are the international voices non Norwegian voices so in that sense it should be read and I think the book is particularly valuable because of the number of common boxes that in their own words the diplomats are able to say what they think however there's always a however as with any story it has to start somewhere it has to choose what it includes it has to choose what it leaves out this is not a criticism it's just an observation if you read this book you will get a perspective on Sri Lanka that's implicit, it's not explicit because the purpose of the book is to work through Norwegian diplomacy and the focus is entirely at a very high level it's about interactions with Mr Valisengar, Mr Peraran Mr Vikramasengar with Chandrika and so on and it's effectively track one what you don't get is a sense of what is Sri Lanka any account of a peace process must start with an account of the conflict and in this case you have to work out what is the explanation of the conflict from the peace process in my view that's the only weakness but it's an important one because if you read it you'll get a sense of a very powerful armed organisation and a strong but divided leadership battling it out with a Norwegian squad in the middle to some extent that's true but as Eric very clearly observed when one government makes a peace move whatever that move is saying hello then the other party the opposition party will stab them in the back it's an observation but it's a very profound statement why is this possible in my view, the thing that's often left out is the force in Sri Lanka of singular Buddhist nationalism mainstream legitimising context that's not possible to understand why even as they battle each other blaming the Norwegians or blaming the LTT has become the way to gain popular legitimacy and in particular I'm just going to say the key is where the conflict starts in the book it starts in 81 and it starts primarily with the run up to the start of the war and the pogrom in 1983 and in that sense key issues like the demand for Tamilulam etc become tied up with the LTT now it's fine because it's an account of the peace process but you don't really understand why before 81 this had become a mainstream Tamil popular demand and you also don't understand why is it that a community that started with federalism went to Tamilulam was then offered federalism and then eventually was ratcheted back now the book is exhaustive it's working through a series of failures Ptoms the post-anami aid sharing mechanisms the failures around specific micro details of the peace process and the detail isn't valuable but I would suggest as you read it you should think about the broader context thank you I mean I think I'll just make two observations firstly thanks to everyone for their comments I think Suhtha is absolutely right on one thing the way he defined the focus of the book and my intentions is absolutely correct if you tell a story you have to decide what is the story what's the plotline, who are the characters and that's a decision you make and by definition it maybe means that some of the characters are left out or the plotline overemphasises some things and de-emphasises others from some people's perspective and that kind of leads me to my second thing and I think what's Suhtha if I hear Suhtha correctly his sort of criticism or his implicit the weakness he identifies is that I he feels I haven't given sufficient contextual analysis to how we got to conflict in Sri Lanka and that would possibly take us back to the post independence period and the 50s and the non-violence movement of the early 60s and the federal demands of some of the mainstream Tamil parties and so on and so forth I suppose my response at one level was yes of course I could have done that it's just that this is already quite a big book and it's about a third shorter than the one that I wrote originally and I just didn't feel that it was really added value to get too much into the analysis of the roots and causes of the conflict those are issues that are well addressed elsewhere and I felt that the Norwegian story was the one to tell but all that said I think the points he's making are absolutely I mean they're valid we do need to understand that bigger picture maybe just one other comment I just thinking about what Eric was saying I mean again I mean I'm very familiar with you know one of the things about spending a long time working on a book and interviewing people as you get to know your interlocutor's thinking perhaps even better than they themselves realise so what I heard Eric saying there was absolutely consistent with the things that we've discussed in the past I just wonder though whether this emphasis that he placed his sort of third point about the weaknesses of the Norwegian position the lack of a big stick or the lack of a kind of power base I mean he's not the only one to say that but I mean given that as he himself said you know it was a definitional kind of criteria of Norwegian engagement that they didn't have that I mean for example Kadrigama the foreign minister who was assassinated in 2005 I mean people like him were so crystal clear that given the desire to defend national sovereignty maintain sovereignty there was absolutely no way in which the Sri Lankan government was going to accept in a third party who had anything more than a facilitation I mean even the language you know they weren't allowed to be called mediators they had to be called facilitators which by definition I mean crucial difference there you know I think maybe the question I turn around Eric is well maybe the Norwegian's weren't didn't have the big stick but the question is could anybody have had it and would have made a difference even if they'd had it because if they had I'm not sure the Sri Lankan authorities would have allowed them in I don't know it's a difficult one but it's just a question, thanks Well thank you very much to all members of the panel for very concise and very pertinent comments and observations I think this is the stage of the evening where we now open it up to the floor for questions May I ask you when you're asking a question to identify yourself and keep your questions and comments brief if you can and perhaps if you wish to address them to a specific member of the panel you could just let us know who that would be so who would like to go first please Yes There's a roving mic somewhere There's a microphone around somewhere Just the microphone if you can Maybe if you can make yourself heard whilst we look for the mic Okay thank you Hello my name is Chris Langdon from Reconciliation Through Film Two questions, one for our Norwegian guests What have been the lessons you've learned from the process in Sri Lanka for the other peacemaking initiatives you have I mean for example from the unit supporting the Sri Lankan process under people like the late Thomas Stangerland you set up a peace and reconciliation unit How have you developed the thinking from what you've because you were clearly very keen to learn from the failures in Sri Lanka How has that informed your peacemaking in other situations and I know you've mentioned the question of Ranil now being back in power now also there is a reconciliation commission by no less a person in CBK maybe a question for Suta How do you see now we have two of the faces who we've been discussing both now back both of them committed to reconciliation on paper and of course obviously there's now a new face of the president How do you see that process of reconciliation playing out given the actors have a long track record in history Okay so that's two questions one for either of our Norwegian guests who would like to respond Obviously every conflict is separate I mean you can learn some general lessons and that can inform what you do in other theatres but at the end every conflict has its separate roots I think the three main lessons we learned in Sri Lanka I mean this book is rich so there are also a huge number of kind of second layer lessons learned about how maybe should Norville have done more on information should we have had a bigger team and all these kind of issues but there are second layers I mean the three main issues number one was there should have been a lot more engagement with the LTT we should have avoided the situation where the government of Sri Lanka made an engagement with the LTT a reward for good behaviour when the LTT behaved well according to their view then well fine if it goes there if it does not behave well then we shut the channels we should learn from this you need to speak to people remember that this was at the time of the completely ridiculous idiotic Bush doctrine that you should not speak to terrorists they didn't want to speak to the Taliban when the Taliban was weak now everyone want to speak to the Taliban now the Taliban is much stronger everyone say we need to speak to them and that complete failure that we should not speak to so called terrorists that was though they all wanted us to do it many more should have done that should we have opened channels in a complete other way and we should have really tried to impress upon Prabhakar and what other international views he made one step after the other which were to me absolutely counterproductive he said that key to the LTT is that they are not proscribed well if they don't want to be proscribed why do you make actions which at the end will do me to be proscribed so to set out in the book at the end it was just Sweden who opposed proscription of the LTT I still recall the Honour Iosom who is now the Vice Secretary General of the United Nations he called me from the EU meeting saying that well I am now the last remaining only foreign minister opposing proscription of the LTT I can't do it alone when no one else support me and Prabhakar had made all the steps which at the end was doomed to happen but if many more people have related to him maybe and I think that could be avoided secondly we should have done a lot more to put pressure on the two main forces in Sri Lanka to come together true Norway could hardly do that but we should have insisted that more that Indians should do it they were the only who really could put that pressure on the on the President and the Prime Minister on the SLFP and the UMP and they didn't want to do it they didn't want to be involved in Indian politics but at the end that was a failure and thirdly as we have already touched upon a stronger international component maybe Norway should have also elevated it on our side and myself maybe nice guys and have found titles but of course maybe if we had involved the Prime Minister and the top players of the Norwegian Government more they may have been able to speak at a higher level in the United States and in the other places so that we could have done more to bring the international community together but it was not easy because Sri Lanka was never at the top of anyone's agenda remember that the peak of this was exactly at the same time as the war in Iraq at the early phases of the Afghanistan conflict with western involvement and a huge number of the conflicts which were much higher on the agenda in key capitals so we did a lot to try to attract the attention but maybe we could have done more Thank you Sota, there's a question for you and I'm not in a disagreement with Sota on the role of Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka because of the core of the problem but this is not a book about all aspects of Sri Lankan politics and history, it's a book about this phase of the peace process and that's why that's not really covered except being of course very important background music for sure Yeah, well I had a slightly different perspective and if you look at the period from the moment the Norwegian initiative was made public around 2000 from that time on and certainly after it became a formal process it was a period of incessant protest right, it was a period of mobilisation by the Buddhist monks mobilisation by relatively small but rapidly growing singular nationalist forces like the National Movement Against Terrorism singular rumair who eventually within by 2004 on the one hand the JVP secured power with an alliance with the government and then on the other hand the JHU took a chunk out of the UNP's vote base and also came to power it's worth noting the JHU is still in power so in the sense of it's a crucial moment although the book quite rightly focuses on the interactions amongst high level players the actual fabric of Sri Lanka transformed significantly in those 5 to 10 years on the one hand you had a kind of affirmation of mainstream affirmation of singular nationalism and on the other hand on the other side there was again after a long time popular protest based on Tamil nationalist principles now the book that's occasionally referred to the Pongodhamun movement and so on and as then it's kind of dismissed as a sort of LTT orchestrated on the other hand once the LTT is gone we still have popular mobilisation where it's permitted where space permits it explicitly on the basis of homeland nation self-determination the TNA's election victories its election campaigning is based entirely on this so what I'm actually saying is that it's not I'm not saying that it needs to be part of the book but I'm saying that if you don't see that and you read this at a high level you can't understand why actors are doing the things they do and with regards to Vikram Asingar being Prime Minister then and Chandrika Kumarathunga being President at that time to explain his inability to make steps Rhino was always concerned that Chandrika would blow the peace process up and to some extent you could say he was right on the other hand now that Suricena is President allied to Vikram Asingar his explanation for not making moves is the opposition will blow things up so in some senses the idea of the well-meaning but hapless Rhino Vikram Asingar is a persistent story now he may be well-meaning he may not but there is a question if a Prime Minister without a helpful President he could not move forward now with a helpful President can he move forward my suggestion is that in the next 6 to 18 months will be very clear on why the peace process starts there is a chapter titled 2000 and the key points of that chapter are one the destruction of the Sri Lankan military's offensive capability comprehensive destruction on the one hand and the weakening of the Sri Lankan economy the collapse of the Sri Lankan economy on the other and the context for that is that the peace process starts because Sri Lanka does not is not able to prosecute the war and the economy is in crisis within the first year of the Norwegian peace process both those things got fixed first of all the inflow of international aid changed the context where the Sri Lankan economy started to revive and secondly as Brian Blogat has detailed in his book on the Sri Lankan military in 2002 between the ceasefire and the start of the negotiations the Sri Lankan navy doubled in size the Sri Lankan air force doubled in size the Sri Lankan air forces attack gunships doubled in number and the armies artillery doubled in number all within the first 6 months the army added 30,000 soldiers so although the context as then was very much about what military advantage one side or other was trying to secure through the negotiations in fact the table had already shifted decisively now those are the kinds of context I'm saying it does not take away from the analysis presented here the analysis very much representative of how things were talked about and understood but if you're looking at the structural problems underlying this peace process there's much more than the interactions between key and significant figures those are two very full answers thank you very much I think there was a hand up here yes please thank you I'm Rajesh Venugopal from the London School of Economics this is a book on Norway's role in in this ceasefire period in Norwegian mediation and I wanted to ask you how Mark you address this issue particularly given the fact that two of the leading people involved in Norway's side were close collaborators in the book and to some extent it leads to the inevitable questions to how you maintained a certain critical distance from this and were able to work objectively because you know the objects about whom you're writing about are here defending the book and expanding on it and talking about it so I wonder how we should approach the book should we see it as Norway's official version of what happened or should we see it as sort of your critical review of the literature and of the subjects that you have written about I suppose my initial temptation is to say will you just view it the way you want to view it really but if you ask me what I think I hope is that yes it absolutely is a critical account I mean let's be clear here Fedar and Eric and indeed a number of other Norwegians were important interviewees I mean sources for me but I'm a journalist by background I like to think at least that I know about the difference between reporting and hagiography so I've always I've reported a lot of what I had to say where I questioned it I think I've indicated that and where I thought they were wrong which I did think sometimes or disagreed I've certainly done that as well and I think I hope at least Eric particularly would be the first to agree that our discussions have not all been plain sailing in terms of our analysis of problems and situations but I mean you know fundamentally of course there's an issue I mean with you if you have sources who are part of who are one of the parties I mean they're primary they're privileged sources but that said I just would go back to the thing of which I said in the introduction about telling a story I have tried to tell a story and that means talking to the actors in the story and I think it's really up to you to judge whether you think at the end what comes through is a kind of credibly independent or objective account of the storyline which sets out the facts but also interprets them and certainly doesn't just give them privileged uncritical treatment the feedback I've had from people who have looked is they feel I've done that but I'm very open to people telling me they think I've I mean at least discussing you know whether they feel I've done that thanks Thank you. Did you want to add up? Yes please Needless to say I share Mark's view on this but I'd like to add that pertaining to Sutha's perspective since this is not a book about the conflict it's not about the underlying causes of the conflict it's not about the dynamics of the conflict throughout the peace process but it's about the peace process obviously it will give Norway and the Norwegian perspective way more significance as an account than would an account of the conflict always not a part it wasn't a party to the conflict but we were very much an actor in the peace process so if you want to look at this as an account of the conflict and with a view on the conflict you'll not find this a credible objective account it's an objective account of peace process very much seen from the facilitator's perspective as a facilitator of the peace process Thank you. Just here please Gentleman yes Yes please Thank you my name is Jonathan Steele I'm a journalist. I wanted to ask Eric Solheim a very intriguing point you raised in your introduction I mean you were very clear that war crimes were committed in the final phase of the war the whole thing was total defeat of the LTE but you also seem to indicate that there was a point when if the LTE had made a sensible proposal there could have been a sort of political outcome that would have avoided the killing of the last few months I mean at what stage could that have been possible because surely once the Sri Lankan army started in autumn 2008 to advance northwards they would never have accepted anything less than non-conditional surrender surely. I mean what was the proposal that you think could have been put forward at that stage that would have been acceptable to Roger Paxa thank you To me it's absolutely clear that I mean up to about the summer of 2008 no one thought that the M the war could be won by either side I mean changing norway of course did not have particularly specific intelligence in Sri Lanka so we really relied a lot upon intelligence provided by others and it took the view that India is by far the nation which is most informed about what's happening in Sri Lanka understand it best so because we took Indian views very seriously up to about August 2008 the Indians always said these war cannot be won they can only be a negotiated peace but from around August 2008 Narayanan then the national security advisor told me no maybe I was wrong maybe the government can win a military victory and of course from that point the LTT was moved into smaller and smaller perimeter they lost Kilinocchi which was the kind of the LTT capital and the area was shrinking and shrinking in January 2009 we made a co-chair statement from which we initiated where we said we know the outcome of the war there is no way the LTT can win it's clear that the government has won we didn't put it in exact these words but that was the intent so let's find an organized M to the war the offer was very clear there would be some sort of ships LTT caders would hand themselves over to India to the United States to the United Nations to the ICRC basically whatever system they would want to accept and every cater handing himself for herself over name would be registered photos would be taken and there would be an amnesty for all except the absolute top leadership basically the chief of intelligence of the LTT this could easily have been organized of course it's possible to kill someone after you have handed yourself over obviously it's possible that it's much more difficult to kill anyone who has handed himself over to the ICRC with photos taken, registered etc so to me it was very clear and true I'm right on this rank I wouldn't have wanted this they wanted a full a full victory but they would have had no choice but to accept this because if the LTT had accepted this the Indians and Americans and other would have told them very very clearly here you have a chance to end the war with tens of thousands of lives spared and please do it so they would have had no option but to accept at that point but this stop because Prabhakaran did not want this we were calling we were speaking to the LTT by telephone to the one but more importantly to KP which was them the kind of foreign minister of the LTT previously the chief weapons percher of the LTT and conveying this message and we were told I offered to go there but more importantly people like Ban Ki-moon offered to go there top level foreign ministers and no problem to send anyone there to discuss this matter with Prabhakaran that we got the reply please come but you will meet with Mr Nadesan who was the head of the political wing of the LTT and of course with Nadesan you could not make this kind of deal only with Prabhakaran so I personally no doubt there was a way it would have been humiliating for sure for the LTT that it would have saved the lives of all these people but I would not be able to fight with other means another day Can I just just a quick word I mean it's only to back up something Eric said I mean I was particularly struck by this when researching the book and writing it is that this process that Eric just described of the proposal from the co-chairs for a so-called organised surrender I mean which was conveyed then to the LTT leadership by amongst other things Tori Hatrym Ambassador in Colombo I mean it's kind of almost when you read it it's agonising the offer the proposal is on the table it's got the backing of the co-chairs no question as Eric said that the government especially got to by Roger Paxer absolutely not what they wanted absolutely not what they had in mind but at the same time no way they could have refused it if the LTT had agreed but of course what happens is basically silence I mean apart from the suggestion of meeting with Nadesen you know it's just crystal clear that the message from Brabacaran to the extent there was much was we're not going down that path and the consequence as Eric said is that thousands and thousands of lives that could have been saved were lost As late as April 2009 one month before the final end of the war K.P. it was then in Malaysia we had agreed that he would come to Oslo we would discuss this this organized end we had even sent Norwegian security people to Kuala Lumpur to picking up that at the very last moment Brabacaran said now we shouldn't go Towards the back in the middle please My name is Thana International Live Channel Thanks for Mark bringing this book out obviously all of you just mentioned that read this as a story looking forward to it but former British Prime Minister Tony Blair apologised for taking part in the Iraq war would honourable former Minister Eric Solem would apologise for facilitating Sri Lankan Government for massacring 80,000 Tamils in the North and East within two weeks and Tony Blair's excuse were wrong intelligent and if you do think that you should apologise and what would be your excuse please Do you wish to respond to that I think I have very clearly set out all we did to put an end to this war at the last moments we have no leverage with the Government of Sri Lanka we did our utmost with the international community to put pressure on them to stop the way the war was handled what we did have was we were the people really relating to the Tamil Tigers because at that time no one else was doing that and we did our utmost to convince Prabhakram to organise an end to the war he refused we did not refuse he refused Indians did not refuse Americans did not refuse he refused so we should put the blame where the blame should be put and that's squarely in two places is with Mr Ratchapaksa the President of Sri Lanka and his brother Guta by Ratchapaksa and it is with Mr Prabhakram Thank you for that very clear reply Lady in the yellow top Militia Pesic Media University Institute London whether Tony Blair apologise or not it seems depends which source of information we followed because evening standard said one thing BBC the other but my question is actually related to journalism into media usually journalists follow more conflict to link to war heroes and peace heroes because it seems like visually war is more appealing and attractive how did you see the role of media did they cover the peace process how did they cover it did you see the differences between different sides in reporting on the peace process this is a question to the author I think well mark was a journalist he said and then the two gentlemen who run the process probably all three paid attention to what they were doing Mark you're a journalist apparently apparently yes Pani I'm going to say something brief because I'd like to hand over the response to Eric and Vidal because they were there and they really saw how the Lankan and Tamil media were reporting for example it's a fascinating thing how the peace talks were reported in the media I just want to only put in one thing which is that an observation comment that one Sri Lankan journalist made which is reported or recorded in the book who covered the peace talks quite a lot including the New York Times and she said that one of the issues she saw and this is speaking as a Sri Lankan herself but a writing for English language media was that there were numbers of domestic journalists who would turn up for press conferences with the Norwegians and would feel embarrassed about the fact that they didn't really speak English and thus wouldn't put a question because they didn't translate and so on and then they would rely on other sources of third hand accounts of the talks and end up with reporting on the talks which was actually very skewed my point being this that I think there was a lot that got literally lost in translation in Sri Lanka there was a lot where what the Norwegians for example said and what they meant simply didn't reach a domestic audience not for any reason of ill will or misintention but simply because of the language and cultural gap and I think the lesson for that and this is relevant for other conflict context is that and it's something that the Norwegians themselves and you'll see it in the book you know I think reflect on quite a lot is that they're probably there should have been and probably could have been a much bigger effort on the Norwegian side to really ensure that their message or messages got out to ordinary Sri Lankans but on both sides of the ethnic divide just to make sure that information about in fact for example with the peace talks in Oslo in November 2002 when the so-called Oslo declaration was tabled you know which was talking about envisaging discussions on a future federal solution to the ethnic divide or the political settlement could be based on that I'm really not sure that that message got through to most ordinary Sri Lankans I mean literally just what in fact was being proposed and yet that's obviously critical without that information how can you build a peace constituency in the country so that's a refresh but Eric do you want to add I can say a few words about Sri Lankan and you can maybe bring the international perspective because the lack of real global coverage of the war at the end was because a main factor for the lack of international engagement I mean there was no TV channel really covering the suffering of the people you didn't see Tamil mother screaming on CNN or BBC in the last phase of the war you didn't see the people who have been bombed to hell you didn't see them you didn't see the bodys you didn't see the war that was one of the reasons why there was limited international action at the end but if we move on to Sri Lankan journalism unfortunately that has been weak it has been very often since a negative I mean referring to what Susoda said I mean portraying the other group as negative inventing stories no check of facts you can invent any sort of story and of course close to the end of the war journalists were absolutely subdued think of the fact that the Santa Vikramatunge one of the well-known journalists and editors in Sri Lanka was killed in broad daylight in the main street of Colombo at 10 o'clock in the morning and no one was no investigation into that murder we parallel to if the editor of Times or The Guardian had been killed at Oxford Street in London in the middle of the day with a lot of businesses around and no effort whatsoever had been put up to investigate the case that was of course enormously extreme event absolutely bloody very horrible but it also sends a very very very very potent message if you can kill a Santa Vikramatunge for sure you can kill any not well known Tamil or Singaporean journalist who do not behave I think it's Francis Maybe you should say a few words on international media You referred to it slightly that the way journalism is evolving seems to mean that there are fewer correspondence in fewer places and in our experience when it comes to the international media those with an in-country presence or at least the capacity to spend considerable amounts of time in the country where obviously the ones doing the best and well informed reporting and I think that's essential in order to as Eric said to mobilise international attention both through the peace process and through at least through the war the absence of reporting towards the end was mind boggling in many ways otherwise journalists with less knowledge of the process tended to have two perspectives either is there a breakdown in the process or is there a breakthrough in the process and if things couldn't be categorised in either of those ways there wouldn't be so much interest in reporting anything Francis Harrison I'd like to bring the discussion forward to what's going on at the moment and we've just had the UN report on Sri Lanka and that report and Prince Aid himself were very articulate about the nature of the systematic crimes that occurred and are still occurring in Sri Lanka he talks about the High Commissioner talks about system crimes and yet we've had remarks from the government from the Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka talking basically about a few individual officers who may have been involved in specific incidents and that's clearly echoed in the recent Disappearances Commission, the Paranagama report so it's the rotten apple theory and yet on the other hand we have an international investigation that's basically pointed to very widespread systematic, very serious problems with the Sri Lankan security forces that addressed that effect not just Tamils but everybody else in Sri Lanka I want to ask Vida Helgeson since he's part of the Norwegian government still what kind of approach Norway will take now to making sure that those systematic crimes of the past and ongoing ones will be addressed by the international community and specifically by your government because I think there's a kind of concern amongst many of the victims that I meet that the international community specifically Norway, Switzerland, South Africa and the United States are very supportive of this new government and therefore not critical enough about the issues regarding pertaining to human rights and you mentioned that I document rape and sexual violence allegations I mean we've now as a group documented 15 cases that have occurred in 2015 after the elections in January and including also cases that occurred after the August parliamentary elections so the ongoing violations are still pretty extensive these are people who've managed to flee abroad and got as far as Europe and obviously represent the tip of some sort of iceberg about actually what's going on in Sri Lanka the ongoing violations are still really very disturbing indeed and we're concerned that the international community doesn't speak loudly enough about those issues I think exactly because I'm currently a minister in the Norwegian government but also a key source of this book and this is an event about this book I will refrain from commenting on the actual situation because the current portfolio I have doesn't cover these issues and we have a government position and I have my personal views that here I'm as representative of my past rather than my present Eric you're indicating you'd like to say I cannot speak on behalf of a government which I didn't vote for I thought we had an agreement which I have very good relations to but I can speak my view on this matter I mean to me there is absolutely no doubt about the big picture the big picture we know there was indiscriminate shelling of a very very small perimeter densely populated by Tamil civilians with enormous casualties in all likelihood it was not just that it was even deliberate targeting of civilian targets like hospitals I mean there are very very strong indications that when the information was given about particularly civilian targets like hospitals they were deliberate to target that's war crimes there is a huge number of Tamils where there is strong witness proves that they handle themselves alive to the Government of Sri Lanka to the Armed Forces of Sri Lanka and who no one has seen since 2009 six years it will be the most immensely positive news I've ever heard if they are still alive you have to me fairly well documented cases like the son of Prabhakaran 12 years old there are pictures of him in the custody of the Sri Lankan army he was given sweets he's not still alive and you have documented a vast number of rapes come down to war crimes what lacks is of course to prove this in a court so that the individual responsibility as to who made the actual orders is done but there is no doubt whatsoever that the decisions were taken at the absolute highest level of government that distinguish also the Sri Lankan conflict from some other conflicts in Sri Lanka there were hardly any freelancers near all violence in Sri Lanka was either done by the LTT or by the government forces in some cases Tamil paramilitary forces but the government of Sri Lanka could always turn these paramilitary groups on and off so the responsibility comes back to the highest level of government but the exact chain of command may be an issue for a court what is then the difficult issue at the moment the difficult issue is of course that still the majority of Singaporeese are not really enthused to put it mildly to bring this up let's be direct in the last election Mahindra Ratchapaksa got 55% of the Singhala vote in Sri Lanka Ranil and Maitre Pada Sirysena won because they got overwhelming support from Tamils and from Muslims even more from Muslims than from Tamils according to what we can read from the electoral results but when you are in a situation that the majority of the Singhalis still have supported Ratchapaksa of course the government would need to bring the majority opinion of the of the Singhalis with them to get this this proceedings take off and I think that will happen it will take time took time in Serbia took time in Chile and a number of other places it will take some time the way it could be done would be to establish such a climate in Sri Lanka that people can speak freely after now very few people I mean few Singhala a few Tamils but I have not seen one Singhalis really giving witness to what happened a lot of the proof by Channel 4 for instance is obviously made by Singhalis there was no Tamils who could have taken these phone videos done by Singhalis but not one Singhalis soldier after now has stood up and told what happened you must establish a climate so that people can speak you must start investigating the most obvious crimes like the killing as I said of Lasanta Vikramatonga of Joseph Parraja Singham where they have made a couple of arrests to see if they lead someone of the nearly 20 workers of this against French organization against hunger and through that gradually build the case for why also Singhalis should accept that war crimes are treated in the way war crimes should be treated unfortunately it cannot be done tomorrow it will take some time but I am absolutely confident it will happen just a quick word I mean in response to Francis question which causes a critical issue I mean to me it seems like part of this is about the perennial issue of strategy in engagement with post transitional governments or transitional governments you know what's the right strategy or the most effective strategy with governments that have come into power in the aftermath of bad things I mean dictators or authoritarian rulers or so on and so forth and I think that so it's really like given the government we have today in Sri Lanka since to attend won the presidential election and Vikramatonga is leading the government as prime minister is the glass half empty or half full it's the old question obviously the judgment call being made by key elements or countries in the international community is that it's half full meaning that this government offers the best possible available chance for moving things forward in Sri Lanka on all fronts economically politically accountability and so on and so forth now and I personally tend to subscribe to that view but I think the thing that needs to be added to it and this is where Francis question you know has its real bite is that but if you if your judgment call is that the glass is half full that doesn't mean that you simply sit back and just look at it you need to engage critically you need to hold accountable you need to set up benchmarks so for example we were discussing this yesterday at a seminar we both took part in I mean the UN report that Francis referred to you know this is actually has led to then a resolution adopted by the human rights council that the government of Sri Lanka is a co-sponsor of now they need to do that but they did but the opportunity that creates is that now holding the government to account for actually benchmarking so you've said that you're going to do these things on account 18 months down the line the next time the council meets okay so let's look at it what have you done what haven't you done what's the explanation what's the justification so I suppose what I'm really advocating is for a sort of glass half full perspective but informed by a strong tenacious search to push the government and hold them to account on the promises that they've made thank you there's somebody toward the second row from the back please you have your hand up several times yes yes sir my question is about the future I think today's and sorry you are my name is Gopirad Nama I'm an analyst today the when there's so many people mention about the embediments of the peace process and if you compare that with the current situation there is no presence of liberation targets of Tamil Yulam instead a Tamil leadership which will only listen to the west Norway and everyone they won't even ask questions that's the Tamil side in the singular side we are together the Chandrika and the running victim of singers together if you look at the Sri Lankan parliament virtually there is no opposition in a funny situation the opposition leaders are the support of the government so in this situation what will be the prospects of having a federal solution for Tamil I'm asking this from Mr Solayam because he tweets a lot about the current situation he's very happy and if the election results comes he says he's happy and all those things okay I mean obviously there are different issues in Sri Lanka we have discussed the issue of accountability that's a key one there need to be economic progress and prosperity that's another one but at the end the Tamil conflict or the Tamil national issues in Sri Lanka was about what sort of self-rule will it be for Tamils in the northeast I mean as Suda said the Tamils started a fight for federalism at some point many people wanted a separate state and I think what is now given is an overwhelming mandate to the Tamil national alliance they want an absolute overwhelming mandate from the Tamils in Sri Lanka to pursue a negotiated settlement with the government there were a few people who were on the paramilitary side like Douglas with Devananda they hardly got any votes they took a more kind of extremist national disposition they hardly got any votes the Tamils in northern Sri Lanka and it is vaulted with defeat and they gave a strong, strong mandate to the Tamil national alliance that mandate might be used it must be met by the Sri Lankan government in real negotiations to set out what will be the character and the type of the evolution federalism self-rule whatever name you want to put on it because at the end of the day there can be no solution to Sri Lanka without Tamil powers in the northeast Thank you I think I've seen refreshments arriving and people leaving and I think time is going on so I think I would like to just wrap up very quickly and ask each member of the panel if they have just one small comment just to finish off with starting with Suta OK Well it's a book launch and ultimately the comment has to be about the book I've made some comments today which are not intended in any way as a criticism of the book and as I said at the start is that the book sets out a particular story I think that and it does that extremely well but to understand Sri Lanka we'll have to look at other things but at the point about the present the glass may be half full and the TNA has won a mandate but I suspect most politicians in Sri Lanka will be thinking about the next election not really about the solution Well politicians always think about the next election they did that during the peace process as well in Sri Lanka and that's a part of reality quite impressive aspects of Sri Lanka is that through decades of terrorism decades or periods of states of emergency other kinds of violence outright and brutal war and governments that were more or less inclusive if I put it mildly democracy has prevailed it has survived and prevailed and that is impressive including the resounding mandate for the TNA to work for Tamil interests in the coming period and I think the book provides an interesting reflection on the story of the peace process but it also shed some light on issues that need to be taken forward in the peace process that is democracy and where the actors in the Sri Lankan politics are now the ones to carry the issues forward and hopefully bring them to a better solution than we've seen in the past Thank you very much First of all I mean we have discussed in a book which hardly anyone in the audience have read that's always a difficulty so please read the book and please contact us if you have issues, if you have further questions if you have disagreements we are ready at least I am ready to come and discuss on the different occasions you can contact me at veryeasy eric.solheim that's the name at ovcd.org send me emails and I will try to be polite and try to respond Secondly on the I am fundamentally optimist I think this is the historical chance of Sri Lanka not that I do underestimate the difficulties not that I believe that is the same however if there were two heroes of the peace process it was and it was from my perspective but you can read the book and make your own judgement so there will be no plain sailing the Tamil I think also need to consider new and more innovative ways of doing politics because the Tamil politics at this 1980 has been either kind of very limited parliamentarian politics at a high level or the brutal military ways of the LTT and there have been much less civilian strikes hunger strikes political manifestations all the other ways of attracting political support I mean there is no the Tamil national issue in Sri Lanka or Tamil demands will not be resolved as a gift from the single ease it will have to come through struggle however that struggle cannot be military it must be a political struggle so my encouragement to the Tamil I mean the Tamil around here is to consider new ways of doing the politics I am not saying it easy but there is a complete new opening for that Tamil Rathapaksa it was very dangerous to do it it is much more opening now so I am fundamentally optimistic I think we will see democracy prevailing I think we will see many of the war crimes coming up for some resolution and openness I think we will see rapid economic development and that will not resolve problems but it is always easy to resolve conflicts if there is rapid development Sri Lanka is now at a 7% economic growth which is with India it is very impressive and the north is of course now very underdeveloped after the war and the Tamil Rathapaksa has an enormous opportunity to go back in west user abilities you are among the best educated most successful people on the planet and you have a lot to offer Tamil Rathapaksa they are all stock brokers dentists, doctors, lawyers whatever I mean I still recall some Tamil is in Norway coming to my relatively modest apartment Norwegian style and they said how can a minister live like that they had a huge huge house in some of the more affluent suburbs of Oslo so please go back and use your abilities to promote economic development but at the end of course there must be negotiations on the political settlement because without that everything else in the long term will bend the mind thank you the last word will be mine the penultimate word can be yours well really just quickly two things the first is Eric encouraged you to read the book and of course I agree please encourage others to read it I say this from a purely impartial third party standpoint no of course it will be as people get the chance to read it and I know Suther has read at least a lot of it and so I really appreciate those kind of informed I mean I appreciate all comments but those kind of really on the substance that's really what I want to hear I would hope to hear the same thing I just wanted to say was that I mean in terms of the future we haven't discussed it so much but you know when I wrote this book I mean the journalists it was important to me in reporting this story or writing up this story the other thing is someone who's been very engaged in issues of conflict resolution conflict management and so on I think understanding how peace processes work whether they succeed or fail but just in particular how facilitators and negotiators do their job this is essential information in today's world we need this information and you know I would just maybe highlight one lesson or reflection which comes I put right at the end of the book it's something that Eric said to me on this precise subject about how the Norwegians had approached Sri Lanka and what they'd learnt from it and Eric said I think I'm quoting him he said you know listen to everyone talk to everyone and I think if we think about the Isis of today you know the groups that people some say we shouldn't talk to under any circumstances well at least the Norwegian approach in Sri Lanka suggested that may not be the most sensible strategy if we at least want to move things forward thank you okay thank you all very much can I just finish very quickly by thanking you all very much for coming there are some drinks waiting for us outside if you are not a regular atender at SOAS events and you wish to receive a weekly bulletin of South Asia related seminars and talks and so on then please just drop a line an email to ssai for SOAS South Asia Institute at soas.ac.uk and you will receive a weekly email telling you what's going on here in relation to South Asia I would like to finish this by thanking very much indeed particularly Suta for pulling this all together our Norwegian guests very much indeed for your generous contribution to this evening's discussion which was very much appreciated and Mark we'd like to all I think congratulate you on this book which I think we can now pronounce well and truly launched so that is one final round of applause please