 So what my talk speaks to is a fundamental challenge for any business organization from frankly any evolutionary kind of system and that is this tension between exploiting, sort of essentially surviving in the moment, earning revenues in the moment and exploring, finding new competitive opportunities, responding to a changing environment. So how does the enterprise to reconcile those two competing tensions? Can you give an example? Blackberry is very successful at one juncture in a highly competitive market. So one can't take success for granted. It's tremendous pressure to come up with the next generation of the Blackberry phone and that equipment. So the immediate reinforcers are towards refining the existing business model. But in the backdrop, why that energy is happening, there's a fundamental change to the phone as a base, as essentially a small computer, where apps are really critical. So the key application for Blackberry, yes, it's a phone and you add secure email. The world evolves and all of a sudden the phone is also this basis to an entry point to the broader web. And the firm struggles with that in some sense kind of, again, is vectorized around its current approach. And really, I think there was sort of a business model cognitive failure to recognize what is a fundamental value added of Blackberry. Is it this artifact of this device? Or why corporate buyers in particular were favoring Blackberry was a secure communication system it offered. So you might, you could imagine a counterfactual where Blackberry indeed kind of belatedly post bankruptcy is reconceiving itself as really we're actually a software firm. And to be agnostic about the hardware. But that was a really fundamental reconception. And when they make that transition in the near term, it's actually probably going to reduce their revenues. The margins you're going to get for licensing this software to be put on other vendors' equipment is going to be less than selling your own proprietary equipment. So the immediate reinforcements kind of kept them in their current business model and it wasn't until sort of the shadow of bankruptcy that really provided this reconception. They could have, they didn't have to make a discrete shift. You could have imagined them allocating some resources to a new line of business that was going to offer to the Android system, potentially Apple, this kind of value added service. So it wasn't as if the managers weren't competitively engaged, but they were very much focused on the current context and their current ways of competing. I think for me, one of the interesting puzzles about the large established firms, such as whether it's Nokia or the RIM, is at one level, the large established firm can do experimentation. It has the resources. It can run parallel experiments vis-a-vis a startup, right? So if you think about the startup enterprise, there's lots of discussion about the lean startup and the idea is okay. You're going to engage in the market with these early prototypes. You'll get this feedback. And the feedback suggests maybe this isn't the right, quite, conception of market and technology when pivots both in technical space and market space. The startup can really only run one experiment. So it's very responsive with that single initiative. And it needs to make that work very quickly. Otherwise, its funds run out and it's not going to make it. The established firm actually has the luxury of engaging in some level of parallelism. So I think my sense is the problem, the pathology for the established firm, isn't you can't run parallel ways of competing. But fundamentally, if you're a hierarchical organization, the resource allocation is done by some central body. So while you can do many things, it's hard to be of multiple minds, right? So it's very hard for the chief planning off of the CEO and his or her team to say, gee, we kind of think option A is the right way to approach the market. But you know what, we're going to bet 30% of our resources on B. A population of startups, you have independent minds, each pursuing their own vision, their own passion, their own view of the way the future of this technology market is going to work. So collectively, they are covering A, B, or C. So I think fundamentally, if the established firm is to really engage in parallelism, it needs to create kind of discrete resource allocation centers and bases within it. And essentially, metaphorically, that's necessary to become of quote, multiple minds. In the absence of that, what I find, what you see, I think is late in experiments are happening, but they're ultimately squashed through a kind of singular selection criteria, a singular mindset that the dominant executive team has in that enterprises.