 Dear Catherine ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure for me to be here. I'll try to Give you my best insights into the topic of German leadership and Germany's role and responsibility in Europe and I am Much more looking forward to the discussion afterwards frankly So if we think about German leadership This mostly goes back to the year 2010 for at least Germans leadership in the European Union and the hot debate that started then when The sovereign debt crisis hit several countries in the euro area a banking and sovereign debt crisis obviously and Germany that has always been a constructive long-term oriented Partner and country in the European Union Suddenly moved to center-stage of policymaking and seemed to be the one key Pivotal player among the member states to keep the club together and Since that time Germany got as much praise as it got criticism some praised it for the ability to actually navigate pretty well between crisis management, which sometimes required very quick very very big decisions overnight and The ability to keep a strategic perspective on the long-term issues and that every move in crisis management May actually mean changing Fundamental elements in the setup of the European Union if you get it wrong But also if you get it right that you create path dependencies for future developments you really need to think about That is why in the euro crisis Germany was able to combine Crisis management measures, which it agreed to often late and after very serious domestic debates With always a push for the reform of the eurozone all of that always in a very German way and that's where part of the criticism emerged because German policymakers have strong convictions About how economic policy should be designed how fiscal policy should be designed and how the architecture of the eurozone should work In order to maintain a stable currency and a competitive economy That was possibly not always right and it was never uncontested and that is why Germany Suddenly became the subject matter of a lot of very harsh criticism in very polemic terms and in very let's say in violent ways and unfortunately there was also in the German press sometimes some Reaction which one could judge as prejudiced on other European partners So I would say that in the context of the sovereign debt crisis what we have seen in the public discussion between member states is a breaching of taboos where for decades Dealing with conflict in the European Union was mostly done behind closed doors and never in that public way This became an element where Germany then suddenly had to worry about its image and its leadership capacity and informal ways in the European Union in the eurozone crisis nevertheless Germany was able to take or Have a very strong impact on the actual policy choices made which was due to several elements one was obviously its relatively solid own economic position at the time its Own economic size and hence its contribution to all rescue mechanisms, which is 27% in all the sovereign debt mechanisms Sort of the financial mechanisms to handle the sovereign debt crisis and together with France by the way almost 50% 47% of the eurozone GDP Allies in those two countries. So as soon as there was a Franco-German compromise There was a very high probability that this would be the chosen solution in the eurozone secondly, Germany had very credible and strong domestic veto players which was Key for the government to actually be able to shape policy choices because what happened was that in the question of designing rescue packages Government could say incredibly say if This or that principle is not respected the Bundestag will not ratify and the German parliament had to ratify every single decision Secondly the German Constitutional Court Said very clearly when it had to take the decision whether Germany could enter the euro Not the eurozone. It wasn't called that way then it was called the European Monetary Union back in the 1990s it said only because there is a no bailout clause and Germans can never be obliged to bail out others. That was the reason why Initially the German government never wanted to call any financial aid a bailout because that was legally not Not acceptable, but it was financial aid and supposed to be liquidity help So those veto players Obviously were a problem at home But strengthened the negotiation position of German policymakers considerably in all EU negotiations Germany I think at that time never seriously doubted its own interest to keep the euro together because German economic success depends on the single market. It depends on stable currency relations in the European Union. So the absence of exchange rates is the best thing that could happen and Obviously the sovereign debt crisis as it unfolded in Greece was a tremendous threat to German and French banks as well. So there was a very very direct national interest to do this, but there was also a very strong and Audible European case that was made So all that is to say that when Germany moved to that center position of leading the European Union as some saw it it did this with Many resources for its power I'm jumping forward a bit and looking at the current situation with the migration crisis only five years later Another crisis that seems to be existential for the European Union and the principles that underlie integration namely the absence of borders the free movement of people the creation of of not only a single market and But also of cooperation and justice and home affairs. So freedom of movement and all these things Germany clearly sees or the German government sees that It in no way has the same ability to influence the European response to this crisis The tools it has at its disposal the The the way to convince its partners to do something that looks like a European solution to the crisis The situation is simply completely different to the Eurozone And I think policymakers only learned that in the last few months that the power resources are are not there in the same way As far as I observe the discussion in Berlin There is a very firm and strong belief that the only solution to what we are currently seeing happening in Europe, but also in its neighborhood is a European answer and That is mostly about working with countries of origin and transit countries it is about European border control externally and it is about a Somewhat fair distribution of those who have a right to asylum across the European Union Merkel has been very liberal in her approach to The migration flows and you know that at a certain point she said what she said about Syrians being welcome in Germany Which was at the time interpreted as an act of humanitarian responsibility and moral leadership But it was also criticized for being not coordinated with the European partners and Germany going alone basically and There was a lot of criticism that this what she said actually caused more migration flows than would have been there anyway. I think One needs to see one additional element which is key from the German perspective and that is that When Hungary Threatened to stop the migration flows on its own external border and close up There was a very strong feeling that if that happens this would actually endanger the whole idea of Having abolished borders within the Schengen area and having free movement in the European Union as a whole so The Assessment that I've heard many times in Berlin was that it was better to show more openness to take pressure of some countries To prevent that borders close up this of course didn't Succeed in all ways as hoped but this reasoning is also why I think that Germany is very likely to Maintain as long as it's care it can its current stance saying we are not closing our borders within the European Union The current government of course is under strong domestic pressure on that issue in particular from Bavaria, but As far as I can see there is a very consistent Position in the government that this is the right policy to pursue and What is now happening is very clearly a race against time because the political Support for Merkel's policy and the government as a whole really depends on the ability to reduce migration flows this year Last year Germany took in a million refugees Those are the official numbers some of them will and can be sent home because they have no right to asylum about 200,000 are already identified as not legally present in Germany And the question of course is how Germany can change its own approach to this because so far We have been very slow in sending people home But there's a sentiment that this needs to change in order to make it visible that it's not worthwhile coming if you don't have a right to asylum and It is also a sign of credibility for the government to actually prove that the situation is under control I'd like to briefly comment on Germany's situation in the EU 28 and the way from the Berlin perspective Germans tend to think about partnerships with other countries So I think there is no doubt that in particular in the situation where we have multiple crises and a very complex situation of handling them That Germany cannot solve anything alone Nothing really and it needs partners and of course the go-to-play still is Paris now France hasn't been particularly forward-leaning and present on EU issues for a while But the situation changed Last year with the horrific attacks first Charlie Hebdo and then the attacks terrorist attacks in Paris Where France somewhat went back to its proactive role on foreign and security policy and actually put a very clear ask on the table with The decision to evoke the solidarity clause in the EU treaty basically telling its partners it needs Support in handling the terrorist attacks And the terrorist threat more broadly For Berlin this was a challenge because it was absolutely clear immediately that there was no way not to react in a way that would Seem like really showing solidarity But at the same time as you may know Germany is traditionally post-war Germany very hesitant to quickly employ Military means and the question then was how can Germany answer that French quest for solidarity It took a while almost two weeks until the decision was taken But the decision that then was taken from a German perspective at least was pretty substantive to send more troops to Mali Some more troops were planned anyway, but the number was increased and also to be of assistance to the French military operations in the Middle East The interesting thing about this decision was that despite the correlation with a decision to prolong the mission in Afghanistan Where Germany continues to have a very strong presence in the north? That despite the fact that those two decisions had to be taken literally at the same moment in the German Parliament There was no very very strong Controversy in the media or even obviously in Parliament there were critics But in no way was there at some point any doubt that this decision would be taken and I think it shows a very important result of an ongoing Discussion about Germany's own role and responsibility in Europe and beyond This was very explicitly launched by the current foreign foreign foreign minister Frank Walter Steinmeier when he came into office for the second time. He said I will do a review of German foreign policy in all its dimensions because The world is changing Germany's role is changing was very much under the impression that Also because of the situation in the European Union and the intense debate on Germany's role That should not only be a debate about Germany, but also Germany debate about about Germany and what this Country should do in terms of foreign policy and also defense policy The review was interesting because in a very German way. It was first of all a very broad discussion that was organized with Many experts asked to analyze German foreign policy along two questions one was what if anything went wrong and then what if anything can we do better? So a number of experts including myself from Germany were asked to answer those questions in whichever Topical or regional area they wanted to pick and then the same number of international experts was asked and all of this was published and made the subject matter of a large international conference in Berlin then followed an internal phase in the foreign ministry where Not only Strategies and objectives were reviewed But also the way the ministry is actually built to answer to those challenges and the third element was a very very ambitious series of town hall meetings throughout Germany to get an understanding of where the society is on those issues because the sentiment was that Germans generally don't wish a stronger engagement of The country Internationally, but it has proven that slowly there was a first big opinion poll done as part of this process And then a follow-up one that this is clearly slowly shifting And I think this is the function of two elements one is the situation in the world is changing so Rapidly and so radically that there's a broad sentiment that we cannot not do anything and there's also a sentiment that Important allies such as the US Have additional interests and are not only as they used to be or not primarily focused on Europe So that sentiment of Europe has to become stronger and who if not Germany contributes I think is very present in Germany as a whole these days and the other element that in my perspective changes public opinion slowly, but surely is that Policymakers take a stronger stance in that discussion German policymakers who actually Reflect on the question of German leadership and responsibility If you take the Munich security conference two years ago where we had a lineup of speakers who actually put this issue At the center of their presentation German policymakers Also last year then our federal president the Chancellor, you know a number of people who actually made the case for Germany being more present and more engaged and setting in a way the very broad objectives which are That Germany will always lead through Europe. So there's a very very clear commitment in The result of the review process But also the political speeches that Germany sees its international role through the prison of the European Union There is of course an issue with the partners. I've briefly spoken about France Germany never wants to lead alone and the the idea that the Defense Minister was la von der Leyen Formulated a while ago saying we are leading from the center Very much reflects that concept that it's not about going alone But it's difficult to see where the partners are a Particular issue of concern from the Berlin perspective is the question of the British membership in the European Union There is a pretty strong engagement among Those responsible for negotiating that matter in Berlin to be constructive and helpful and try to find out how The British ask can be accommodated But there's also a sufficient degree of realism that it's probably not the negotiation results that will decide Which way the referendum goes, but many other factors including The migration crisis and possibly a return of the euro crisis if it happens in the next few months so Final word on another Partner which is looked at with Questions at the moment. That's of course Poland Until the last general elections in Poland the German-Polish relationship Was very strong very Friendly and very constructive. Of course, there were issues like energy or climate policy where there was no immediate agreement but there was a very strong sense of the strategic interest to have a Solid relationship in particular since Russia attacked Ukraine where the Polish government First of all ask the EU partners and the NATO partners to show a much stronger military response and wanted to be part of the core group that handles the issue in the European Union, but then Accepted that this was essentially done by Germany and France vis-a-vis Putin and Ukraine This situation has dramatically changed since the Polish elections at the end of last year I would say There's a big concern in Berlin about the topic of backsliding democracy in Poland the reforms the constitutional reforms that have been done the decisions on media and Courts are seen with a lot of concern But there is a clear sentiment that this should not end up in a public Confrontation and hostility because Poland is simply too important a country and a further alienation From the German perspective is obviously not productive But this is an issue to to be observed in the next few months how it plays out As you know the European process in observing what's happening in Poland is launched and we will see how how this all plays out Let me conclude by saying that like any country in the European Union Germany is under constant Pressure to deal with the multiple crisis and the need to think long-term That means also to think about the future architecture of the European Union how to deal with a possible Brexit of it comes how to deal with the Eurozone how to think about a further deepening of the Eurozone how to as I said improve efforts to make or build a stronger EU border control and also To think about stronger European approaches to defense policy, which is obviously so far only done in an intergovernmental way But while those are all big concerns, I would say I have Rarely witnessed a situation where there was so much Caution to actually believe that a big thing can be done Simply because treaty reform seems to be almost impossible to handle and The assumption is broadly that we have to move ahead incrementally With certain elements that for instance the Eurozone still needs wherever possible They should be done to second or through secondary law or if necessary through intergovernmental arrangements But that indeed the reflection needs to be prepared For a moment of deep deep crisis whether there then needs to be a leap forward that is really substantive and and as I said Brexit is a very very negative and worst-case scenario from the Berlin perspective, but I would expect if I close on that sort of forward-looking note that if ever this would Become a likely scenario in the next month to come I would expect Berlin to be prepared in order to not let the EU unravel Keep those parts together that wish to be and be a very constructive player in the attempt to in particular Provide a vision together with others as needed on a potential deepening at the same time I'm very much looking forward to your comments and questions. Thank you very much