 I'm going to move right away to Dr. Pal. And I had like a series of interesting questions. But I'm going to just ask you a very simple question under the circumstances. South Korea's and America's interests seem to be not fully aligned at least in the last few weeks. There were a lot of bickering between Seoul and Washington. How do you see the trajectory of American and South Korean interests as we move forward in this process? Well, thank you, Chairman. And thank you for World Policy Conference in Seattle and for the invitation to be here today with my wonderful colleagues. To go directly to your question, I think as I try to write the story of the last few years in the Korean Peninsula with the emergence of new leaders in North and South Korea and in China, five years ago. It's in our course, President Trump, the main players are all pursuing different objectives and the storylines intersect in very strange ways. Just a year ago, when we talked on this subject here in Marrakesh, it was all about fire and fury. The Trump administration had been enormously successful, despite its anti-diplomatic tendencies, in mounting a huge diplomatic campaign of UN Security Council sanctions. And often unnoticed beyond that, tremendous cooperation to constrain North Korea's diplomatic and economic activities beyond the sanctions around the world. And maximum pressure was being put on North Korea at the end of last year. Who would have guessed we'd be here today after that? And I have to give a lot of credit to the South Korean president for his initiatives in this. He there were interchanges between North and South Korea. We don't know what happened before January 1st. But on January 1st, Kim Jong-un made a speech in which he said his nuclear and missile ambitions were essentially satisfied. And he wanted to then take care of the needs of the people of the economy of North Korea together with these assurances of national security through defense measures, nuclear capabilities. And the South Korean leader Moon Jae-in was able to return to his his faction, his party's long term interest in improving relations with North Korea, bringing down the barriers between the North and the South and enhancing economic and other interaction with the North. And he took the initiative to with whatever had taken place in North Korea that led to the January 1 speech of having both guns and butter. He took the initiative with the Winter Olympics to get the process going. And the U.S., if you remember at that time, Vice President Pence arrived at the Olympics and looked kind of stunned. He didn't know what to do. We were supposed to be maximum opposed to anything with North Korea. And everybody was applauding the North Korean teams. They were happy to mix together and it looked very awkward for the U.S. Now fast forward to where we are today. And we have gone from a position of absolute opposition to the continuation of the so-called comprehensive, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization of North Korea to something which in reality, that's now got a new name, but in reality is an acknowledgement that we have a new member in the club. We're not going to give them a past, but like Israel, like India, there's a new nuclear power in the world and North Korea is it. Now the question is on what terms? What do we want them to do to reduce their capacity to make more weapons, whether closing Yongbyon facility down or some other facilities? I think we've gone from having very unrealistic expectations to having much more modest expectations of what can be achieved through bilateral negotiations. And I think President Trump is prepared to declare victory fairly soon, maybe at this next summit, where he'll say we're satisfied that progress has been made, that threats have been reduced. Our people will continue to talk about eventual denuclearization, but that's a distant horizon, not even a prospect, just a distant horizon. And Trump will have satisfied the American desire to keep the Koreas separate from China, because your Cold War strategy requires that we maintain the alliance structure, however dissatisfactory the term of the alliance may be. And at the same time, he will have a greater ability to pressurize South Korea to take the terms that he dictates for the relationship. And this will have a knock on effect on Japan as well, because their calculation is that South Korea and Japan do not have an alternative in the shadow of giant China to being allies of the U.S., but the U.S. will be in a position to set the terms. So in all of this, the South Korean president has been soldiering on in his own purposes to go back to your question to establish more and more linkages, trying not to transgress the lines drawn by the UN Security Council resolutions, but increasingly doing so. And so what we have is a situation at the end of this process where China is a big winner, as you asked Professor Wong earlier, in my view, that's true. South Korea's leader is a big winner politically. That may not be sustainable under democracy. North Korea is a big winner in this. And Trump, at least for the moment, is seen by Americans as having gone from threatening fire and fury to being in a love affair with the North Korean leader. And it's actually selling with the American people that he's brought peace. So it's a four-way win out of a very messy situation. Thank you very much.