 section 42 of personal memoirs of U.S. Grant. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevenger. Personal memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant, chapter 42. Condition of the Army. Rebuilding the railroad. General Burnside's situation. Orders for battle. Plans for the attack. Hooker's position. Sherman's movements. Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I now begin to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been. Only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from Cumberland Gap and far back towards Lexington, Kentucky, East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread, and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt, and rice. Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October. His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. The distance was about 330 miles through a hostile country. His entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. A hostile community lived along the road, guerrilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the west. Often Sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River at Eastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have to supply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent from St. Louis on small steamers to be convoyed by the Navy to meet him at Eastport. These he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson, Alabama without delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over mussel shoals. It was delivered at IOC on the 27th. In this Sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, East Tennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. Sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport with Blair bringing up to rear. Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville. All indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command in East Tennessee, 25,000 more, by the same route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, an order to Sherman to halt General GM Dodge's command of about 8,000 men at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur North towards Nashville and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the roadbed. All the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads united. The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson, over which to supply the army. From Bridgeport, a short distance further east, the river supplements the road. General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers, axes, picks, and spades. With these, he was able to entrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. When these were not near enough to the troops for protection, they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work, making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. Car builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars, thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer, except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had to work to its full capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these deficiencies, I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville and all the cars he had except ten. I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and on the Memphis and Charleston Road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston to Nashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms. The length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles. The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against Burnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland. Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington and on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for Burnside's relief, calling attention to the importance of holding East Tennessee, saying the President was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not at Chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them, hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the many had. There was no relief possible for him, except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga. On the 4th of November, Long Street left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go against Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up. The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of Burnside's army, and plied me with Dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th, before Long Street could possibly have reached Knoxville, I ordered Thomas, peremptorily, to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals, wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery, but he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done but to answer Washington Dispatches as best I could. Urged Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encouraged Burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved. All of Burnside's Dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out. He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon, but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14th I telegraphed him. Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can hold Longstreet in check until he gets up or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain passes by every available road to get to his supplies. Sherman would have been here before this, but for high water in Elk River, driving him some 30 miles up that river to cross. And again, later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief as follows. Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there you can tell better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made to throw Sherman's force across the river just at and below the mouth of Chickamauga Creek as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his left at the same time and together it is expected to carry Missionary Ridge and from there push a force onto the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack and if he can carry look out mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry thus being concealed from the enemy and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up look out valley. Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will ascertain if they have started and inform you. It will be entirely out of the question to send you 10,000 men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here? Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th, that being the terminus of his railroad communications. It is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position threatening Knoxville and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day. My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival, except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's Corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga. With the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades and so get into Chattanooga Valley. The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chittamoga River so as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear and thus force him, either, to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at Chittamoga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way possible, cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north with his right flank extended to Chittamoga Valley east of the ridge. Thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with the army of the Cumberland, occupied the center and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. To carry out this plan Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Browns Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to appoint opposite the north end of Mission Ridge and to place his command back of the foothills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. There are two streams called Chittamoga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga. North Chittamoga taking its rise in Tennessee flowing south and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east while the south Chittamoga which takes its rise in Georgia flows northward and empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town. There were now 116 pontoons in the North Chittamoga River their presence there being unknown to the enemy. At night a division was to be marched up to that point and at two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current 30 men in each boat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the south Chittamoga, capture the pickets there and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of the Tennessee where Mission Ridge would strike it if prolonged. And a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on the south side entrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge leaving enough of Palmer's Corps to guard against an attack down the valley. Look out the valley being of no present value to us and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Mission Ridge Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him to Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He was then to move out to the right to Rossville. Hooker's position in Look Out Valley was absolutely essential to us so long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line for supplying the army. But it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front or even after the battle for this purpose was begun. Hooker's orders therefore were designed to get his force past Look Out Mountain and Chattanooga Valley and up to Mission Ridge. By crossing the north face of Look Out the troops would come into Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley and would necessarily force its evacuation. Orders were accordingly given to march by this route. But days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Look Out Mountain until we got through with the troops on Mission Ridge. By marching Hooker to the north side of the river, dense up the stream and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time. When in this new position he would have Chattanooga Creek behind him and the attack on Mission Ridge would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Look Out Mountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As explained elsewhere the original order had to be reverted to because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against Mission Ridge. The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him with General Thomas and Smith and other officers to the north side of the river and showed them the ground over which Sherman had to march and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities in Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety. Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I believe, from Kelly's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command fully appreciating the importance of time. His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind and one division, Ewing's, was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at the ferry and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. News had been received that the battle had been commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications. The President, the Secretary of War, and General Hallick were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but more indurable because I was where I could soon do something to relieve the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22nd and ordered Thomas to move on that date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and 21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. General Orlando B. Wilcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville, about Maynardville, and was still in telegraphic communication with the north. A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened from the east. The following was sent in reply. If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If successful, such a move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee if he can hold out. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause alarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky and would meet such a force before he got through that he could not return. Meantime Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be affected in full view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side and would not come to view again either to Watchman on Lookout Mountain or Missionary Ridge until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point opposite the town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of marks to join the troops on the south side. His crossing was in full view both from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy, of course, supposed these troops to be Sherman's. This enabled Sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery. End of Section 42. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim, at jocclev.com Section 43 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, by Ulysses S. Grant, Chapter 43 Preparations for battle. Thomas carries the first line of the enemy. Sherman carries Missionary Ridge. Battle of Lookout Mountain. General Hooker's fight. On the 20th, when so much was occurring, to discourage, rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Browns Ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge, news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville, of Wilcox being threatened by a force from the east, a letter was received from Bragg which contained these words, as there may still be some noncombatants in Chattanooga. I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal. Of course I understood that this was a device intended to deceive, but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the 22nd, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leaving our front and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville and another division started to follow but was recalled. The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until Knoxville could be captured and his troops there be returned to Chattanooga. During the night of the 21st, the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, 116 in all, were carried up to and placed in North Chickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee where the north end of the bridge was to rest. Hearing nothing from Burnside and hearing much of the distress in Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23rd with the Army of the Cumberland what had been intended to be done on the 24th. The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made very strong for defense during the months it had been beseeched. The line was about a mile from the town and extended from Sitaco Creek, a small stream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into the Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga on the left to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. Among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town named Fort Wood. It owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and Missionary Ridge where most of the strength of the enemy was. Fort Wood had in it 22 pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23rd Thomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's Corps of two divisions, Sheridan and T.J. Wood commanding to the foot of Fort Wood and formed them into line as if going on parade. Sheridan on the right, Wood to the left extending to or near Sitaco Creek. Palmer, commanding the 14th Corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. He supported Sheridan with one division, Bairds, while his other division, under Johnson, remained in the trenches under arms ready to be moved to any point. Howard's Corps was moved in rear of the center. The picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These two were carried before halting and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost, in this preliminary action, about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured, with the exception of the firing of artillery kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in. This ended the fighting for the first day. The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer, I should have rested more easily, but we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. By the night of the twenty-third, Sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division, Austerhouses, had not yet crossed the river at Brown's Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross, but I was determined to move that night, even without this division. Orders were sent to Austerhouse, accordingly, to report to Hooker if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fourth. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him. General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as chief engineer of the military division. To him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. During the night, General Morgan L. Smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. During this night also, General J. M. Brannon, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery belonging to the Army of the Cumberland and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to use Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none. At two o'clock in the morning, November 24, Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chickamauga with his 116 boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well armed men. The boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of anyone who could convey information to the enemy until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops affected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start with equally good results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced using the pontoons for the purpose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. The rest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E. Smith. The troops, as they landed, were put to work in trenching their position. By daylight the two entire divisions were over and well covered by the works they had built. The work of laying the bridge on which to cross the artillery and cavalry was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons however as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little past noon the bridge was completed as well as one over the South Chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below. And all the infantry and artillery were on the South Bank of the Tennessee. Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. By one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of Chickamauga River. J. E. Smith next to the right and a little to the rear, and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith's command in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish line preceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached, the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. By half past three Sherman was in possession of the heith without having sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was now brought up and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without a veil. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this too failed and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga Station. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee. During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded and carried from the field. Thomas, having done on the 23rd what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. Howard, however, affected a crossing of Citico Creek and a junction with Sherman and was directed to report to him. With two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the Tennessee and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga Hooker was engaged on the west. He had three divisions. Osterhouses of the 15th Corps Army of the Tennessee, Gearies 12th Corps Army of the Potomac and Crufts 14th Corps Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on the right at Wahatchee, Cruft at the center and Osterhouse near Brown's Ferry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and entrenched and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. These brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L. Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops except artillery with a small infantry guard were kept on the mountain top I do not see. A hundred men could have held the summit which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down against the assault of any number of men from the position Hooker occupied. The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered and full of chasms making it difficult to advance with troops even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up the ground becomes more even and level and was in cultivation. On the east side the slope is much more gradual and a good wagon road zigzagging up it connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit. Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Gary's division supported by a brigade of crufts up Lookout Creek to affect a crossing. The remainder of cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhouse was to move up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Grosse's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attracted the enemy so that Gary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved and captured the picket of over forty men on guard nearby. He then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope and filing into their rifle pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhouse was up and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss and killed and captured. While the operations at the bridge were progressing Gary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles resisted by the enemy directly in his front and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy seeing their left flank and rear menace gave way and were followed by Croft and Osterhouse. Soon these were up abreast of Gary and the whole command pushed up the hill driving the enemy in advance. By noon Gary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain with his right closed up to the base of the upper palisade but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Nob. Hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. It was in full view extending from the Tennessee River where Sherman had crossed up Chickamauga River to the base of Mission Ridge over the top of the north end of the ridge to Chattanooga Valley then along parallel to the ridge of Mylarmore across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek then up the slope of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day was hazy so the Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise but the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially fortified but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon the clouds which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below settled down and made it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little after five direct communication was established and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to cross Chattanooga Creek and met with some opposition but soon overcame it and by night the commander General Carlin reported to Hooker and was assigned to his left. I now telegraph to Washington. The fight today progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary Ridge and his right is now at the tunnel and is left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge. The next day the President replied, Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside and Halleck also telegraphed, I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burnside is hard pushed and that any further delay may prove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him. The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had been sent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. On the night of the twenty-fourth, his division, having crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour in the night but it was not connected with an assault at any point. End of Section 43, Recording by Jim Clevinger, Lillorock, Arkansas, Jim at jocclev.com Section 44 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Jim Clevinger, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant by Ulysses S. Grant Chapter 44, Battle of Chattanooga A Gallant Charge Complete Route of the Enemy Pursuit of the Confederates General Bragg Remarks on Chattanooga At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give orders for the next day and sent a dispatch to Wilcox to encourage Burnside. Sherman was directed to attack at daylight, Hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained. If he had gone, then, to move directly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders from me. The morning of the twenty-fifth opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers, presumably staff officers, could be seen coming and going constantly. The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the twenty-fourth was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near of which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point and back farther, where the ground was still higher was a second fortification commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was lighting up to sea, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held a hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge, Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of John E. Smith's division, and Coors with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga Station where the main depot was located. The enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success. The contest lasted for two hours. Coors, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. From the position I occupied, I could see column after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two Bragg's, charged up the west side of the ridge to the Support of Courses Command over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay there for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith's troops into a wood where they were speedily reformed when they charged and drove the attacking party back to its entrenchments. Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce him. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of Orchard Knob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also. The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over Chattanooga Creek and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga Creek and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once. I watched eagerly to see the effect and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. The center of the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood but concealed from view by an intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. The Confederates were strongly entrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us and had a second line halfway down and another at the base. Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle pits so rapidly and followed them so closely that rebel and Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated and were pursued. The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform on our troops went to the second line of works over that and on for the crest. Thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th for this charge. I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along the rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. The pursuit continued until the crest was reached and soon our men were seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was now getting dark but Sheridan without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement before this disposition was complete and beat a hasty retreat leaving artillery, wagon trains and many prisoners in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement the army of the Cumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery and small arms that day except for his prompt pursuit so much in this way would not have been accomplished. While the advance up Missionary Ridge was going forward, General Thomas with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the Corps making the assault and myself and staff occupied Orchard Nob from which the entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defenses I ordered Granger to join his command and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood who commanded the division to the left of Sheridan accompanied his men on horseback in the charge but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left in Bears Front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Woods Division but he was so much excited and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way the enemy confronting Sherman now seeing everything to their left giving way fled also. Sherman however was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning. As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland to push over the pontoon bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga and to move forward to Chickamauga Station. He ordered Howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L. Smith was ordered to reconnoiter the tunnel to see if that was still held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville. Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. He got his troops over with the exception of the artillery by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in and as many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's position during the night of the twenty-fifth was near Rossville extending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville. During the night I telegraphed to Wilcox that Bragg had been defeated and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold out. To Hallick I sent an announcement of our victory and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside. Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's Corps was to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In addition to the supplies transported by boat the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge boxes and four days rations in haversacks. In the battle of Chattanooga troops from the Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the Tennessee and from the Army of the Cumberland participated. In fact the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together under their respective commanders during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's Division of the 12th Corps, Army of the Potomac, Osterhaus' Division of the 15th Corps, Army of the Tennessee and Cruft's Division of the Army of the Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own Army, Howard's Corps from the Army of the Potomac and Jefferson C. Davis' Division of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy, hardly rivalry. Indeed I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished. The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes. First, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops. Second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle. Third, in placing so much of a force on the plane in front of his impregnable position. It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between Bragg and Longstreet and finding this difficult to do planned the campaign against Knoxville to be conducted by the latter general. I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very well. We had been three years at West Point together and after my graduation for a time in the same regiment, then we served together in the Mexican war. I had known Bragg in Mexico and met him occasionally subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them. Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man professionally and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of an irascible temper and was naturally disputatious, a man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives. As a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect even of the most trivial order. I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg. On one occasion when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post-quartermaster and commissary. He was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster himself for something he wanted. As quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition and endorsed on the back of it his reason for so doing. As company commander he responded to this urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred exclaimed, My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarreled with every officer in the army and now you are quarreling with yourself. Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights which he had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius and thought he saw a chance of killing two birds with one stone, on several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the Union Army by means of his superior military genius. I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military capacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy. My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did, Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position, the army of the Cumberland was to assault in the center. Before Sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. For this reason, Hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally. Note, from this point on this volume was written, with the exception of the campaign in the wilderness, which had been previously written, by General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present arrangement of the subject matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of July, 1885. End of Section 44. Recording by Jim Clevenger, a Little Rock, Arkansas, Jim at J-O-C-C-L-E-V dot com. Section 45 of Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. The relief of Knoxville, headquarters moved to Nashville, visiting Knoxville, cipher-cypher dispatches, withholding orders. Chattanooga, now being secure to the national troops beyond any doubt, I immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville about the situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious. Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing Chattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of older boats and put in condition to run. General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. General Granger, with the fourth corps, reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. With the provisions carried and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, after which event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for Burnside's army and his own also. While following the enemy on the 26th and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas verbally not to start Granger until he received further orders from me advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the situation. I was not sure, but that Bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reach Dalton. In that case, Bragg might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence towards Knoxville and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon Burnside. When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreat was most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons, and small arms, abandoning provisions, and altogether seemed to me moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Claiborne's division, which was acting as rearguard to cover the retreat. When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold, Palmer's division took the road to Graceville and Sherman moved by the way of Chickamauga Station toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation at Ringgold, I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the condition of affairs and direct him by my orders to start Granger at once. Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of Burnside, I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops. Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains situated between East Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge and about twenty miles southeast from Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left behind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His men were attacking Claiborne's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. Just beyond the gorge, the valley is narrow and the creek so torturous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. This attack was unfortunate and cost us some men unnecessarily. Hooker captured, however, three pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field. I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction. At this point Sherman came up having reached Graysville with his troops where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. I went back in the evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there overnight and did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. I then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a full day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23rd of the month Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for 10 or 12 days and during that time he could hold out against Long Street, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. He was already very low in ammunition and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. Finding that Granger had not only not started, but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had to solve. At Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left and that he must be relieved within that time. Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to Cleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road and these troops had not yet returned to camp. I was very low to send Sherman because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at Chattanooga, but I had become satisfied that Burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements. Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River near Chattanooga on the night of the 23rd, the men having two days cooked rations in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold and at night they must have suffered more or less. The two days rations had already lasted them five days and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food. They did, however, succeed in capturing some flower. They also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills which the men made up into bread and in this and other ways they act out in existence until they could reach Knoxville. I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary that I determined to send a message to him. I therefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if he could, report to Burnside the situation fully and give him all the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga during the battle and had been there even before I assumed command. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson and did accompany him. I put the information of what was being done for the relief of Knoxville into writing and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of General Longstreet. They made the trip safely. General Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary. Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scowls and flats as they floated down. On these by previous arrangements with the loyal people of East Tennessee were placed flour and corn with forage and provisions generally and were thus secured for the use of the Union troops. They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy, so that when relief arrived Burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported. Our total loss, not including Burnside's, in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4529 wounded and 330 missing. We captured 6142 prisoners, about 50% more than the enemy reported for their total loss. 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and over 7000 stands of small arms. The enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned. I had at Chattanooga in round numbers about 60,000 men. Bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. He had sent Longstreet away with his corps, swelled by reinforcements up to over 20,000 men, thus reducing his own force, more than one-third, and depriving himself of the presence of the ableist general of his command. He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of Browns and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind, and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while Chattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga, Knoxville, with its garrison, would have fallen into his hands without a struggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division to reinforce Longstreet. He also started another division a day later, but our attack, having commenced before it reached Knoxville, Bragg ordered it back. It had got so far, however, that it could not return to Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latter blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River at Browns Ferry in full view of Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain a few days before the attack. They then disappeared behind Foothills and did not come to the view of the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knew it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the Tennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet was therefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he had captured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. It would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army, a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it. The probabilities are that our loss and killed was the heavier as we were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss and killed at 361, but as he reported his missing at 4146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. There was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. Then too, Chattanooga, following in the same half year with Gettysburg in the east and Vicksburg in the west, there was much the same feeling in the south at this time that there had been in the north the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed the people and press in the south that was allowed in the north, Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union. General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had previously been named by the President for promotion to the grade of Major General, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a Major Generalcy. My recommendation was heeded and the appointment made. Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed the authorities at Washington, the President and Secretary of War, of the fact which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved without further bloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation, sending a new commander with a few thousand troops by the way of Cumberland Gap and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to remember Burnside, do something for Burnside, and other appeals of, like, tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our victory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition or overpowered, and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that Long Street had been driven from the field. Burnside followed Long Street only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Long Street would leave the state. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off East Tennessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman made disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with instructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga and, about the twentieth of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee. Nashville was the most central point, from which to communicate with my entire military division and also with the authorities at Washington. While remaining at Chattanooga, I was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut, so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and Washington. Nothing occurred at Nashville, worthy of mention, during the winter, so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies, so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected to retain the command I then had and prepared myself for the campaign against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against Mobile from the Gulf. I expected, after Atlanta fell, to occupy that place permanently and to cut off Lee's army from the west by way of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and then Southwest. I was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile, if that city was in our possession, if not to Savannah, and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made. The army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over a Cumberland Gap until their animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. Accordingly, I left Nashville in the latter part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there and putting my horses aboard went up to the junction of the clinch with the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired up to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains. I went by rail therefore to Knoxville where I remained for several days. General John G. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio. It was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky the first point where I could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville. The road over Cumberland Gap and back of it was strung with debris of broken wagons and dead animals much as I had found it on my first trip to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons and in that condition frozen so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one and very disagreeable. I found a great many people at home along that route both in Tennessee and Kentucky and almost universally intensely loyal. They would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings to see me generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. I was then 41 years of age while my medical director was gray haired and probably 12 or more years my senior. The crowds would generally swarm around him and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more complementary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general owing to his being muffled up and also owing to the travel worn condition we were all in after a hard days ride. I was back in Nashville by the 13th of January 1864. When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dispatches into cipher and who could also read the cipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. Under the rules of the War Department at that time Mr. Stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used and of saying who and who alone should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers as well as the ciphers used were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under and had to report to the War Department through General Stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded. I was obliged to leave the telegraph operator back at Nashville because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come to be forwarded from there. As I have said it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of the cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War Department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly I ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B. Comstock of the Corps of Engineers whom I had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could. The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to Captain Comstock as directed by me stating that his orders from the War Department were not to give it to anybody, the commanding general or anyone else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said that if he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished. Finally seeing that punishment was certain. If he refused longer to obey my order and being somewhat remote even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders from the War Department he yielded. When I returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. I informed the Secretary of War or his Assistant Secretary in charge of the telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved for he had only obeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it. That they would have to punish me if they punished anybody or words to that effect. This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was over when we had another little spat. Owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with he boldly took command of the armies and while issuing no orders on the subject prohibited any order from me going out of the Adjutant General's Office until he had approved it. This was done by directing the Adjutant General to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the Adjutant General's Office until he had examined them and given his approval. He never disturbed himself either in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him so that orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this in writing and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of General-in-Chief of the Army but he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that he should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee but Burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger and which were to be left he would be amply prepared to dispose of Longstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before stated Sherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee near Chattanooga with two days' rations in their haversacks without coats or blankets and without many wagons expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they were suffering but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice had it been required for the good of the cause which had brought them into service. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River. End of Section 45, Recording by Jim Clevenger, Little Rock, Arkansas. Jim at joclev.com.