 Well thank you very much for choosing to show up for my talk today. I remember Mises used in the past when they had concurrent sessions and I always felt like I was in competition with somebody else and now I've got a captive audience. So this is really an encouraging week of the year for me. I sometimes get a little discouraged when I see Gen Z and I come here and reminded that not all is lost. So I'm very pleased that you're here. It's a friendly audience unlike some that I speak to. So I have a lot of slides. I probably will not get through all of them but since Tom DiLorenzo used none I figure I will use his unused slide show. Well not really but he was kind enough to let me expand my PowerPoint. That was a joke but I didn't go over very well. Alright further ado. Alright so I have had an interest in environmental economics for a long time partly because it was one of those areas where I thought that we really need to think hard about this if you're dedicated free markets because it's an area where a lot of people think that markets don't work very well and there are really two areas of subsets I guess you could say of environmental economics. One would be the questions about resource use like land use which we're going to focus on today, deforestation, oil reserves and are we running out of oil etc. Fisheries, overfishing, recycling questions, things like that and then there are the other questions about externalities which if you have looked at any of my YouTube's from past, Mrs. U, I spend more of my time on externalities in those. Bash Ronald Coase a little bit and things like that. So that would be things like if you are engaged in a consumption or production activity and your activity causes some kind of cost or benefit for someone else who's kind of a bystander, those are the externality questions and if you take an environmental economics course you're probably going to run into those issues as kind of the bread and butter of a basic presentation of these things from the mainstream. The core issue of both of these is property rights, right? Who owns the air, who owns the oceans, who owns the oil reserves, who owns the land and where we don't see property rights being very clearly protected and defined, then that's when we run into problems and we'll see that Barry Rothbard recognized that, Carl Minger recognized that, we can go back a long way and see that that's been understood. So what we're going to do here is first look at some issues of subjectivity, calculation, the nature of efficiency and how that connects to the environment and then we're going to look at government and land management. And I will go as far as my time permits on talking about some of the problems that arise when government manages land or owns land outright, when it restricts the use of land as we see with, for example, zoning laws. A lot of people will look at land use and for that matter, water use questions and say, well, this is just capitalism run amok and we've got to control capitalism or we're going to have islands of plastic in the ocean and so forth. So if you have a chance to take a look at this article on Mises.org from Mark Branley from about, I think this is about five years ago, he talks about land ownership in the United States and Tom DeLorenzo mentioned this very briefly in his talk last hour. And this is a map of some government land ownership. This is just federal lands. It does not include state owned lands. It does not include municipalities that own land and there's awful lot of that as well. You know, cities own roads, of course, streets and parks and these kinds of things. A lot of the infrastructure is municipality owned. So this is only a fraction, but you can see, I think Tom mentioned that in the state of Nevada, there's something like over 80%. Well, I think actually if you just look at federal land, it's well over 90% that is that is owned by the federal government. A lot of this is BLM land, Bureau of Land Management. This is not the other BLM used to be, I could say BLM and everybody knew what I was talking about and now I have to specify. This is I don't think this map includes a Bureau of Indian Affairs land, which according to the government, this is owned by the Indians and Native Americans, but I don't know whether Native Americans would see it that way because there are a lot of restrictions on how they can use that land and transfer it. Military bases, of course, national parks, national forests and forest service land. There's tons of these agencies with various acronyms that own and manage this land and a lot of the remaining private land is heavily restricted. Mark gave, Dr. Brandley gave this table showing some of the states that have the highest percentage of federal and state land. You can see Alaska is like 91.2% federal and state owned and Nevada is, I guess, Tom was right, 85.1% did not break 90%. So and then down at the bottom, Mark threw in New York because it's got a very high percentage of state owned land, even though federal owned land in New York is not that high, so 37% total. And then if you look at offshore territorial claims by the federal government, you find that massive amounts of land, though submerged, is also claimed by the federal government. So you can have this island out in the middle of the Pacific and you've got a 200 mile radius around that island, which is a huge amount of underwater territory. And this is increasingly important because we already know there are offshore oil reserves and navigation rights that are sometimes in dispute, as we see in the South China Sea. And so these kinds of things are important to think about. This is a massive land grab, really. I mean, ironically, the, maybe not ironically, I don't know, but the 200 mile claim of the exclusive economic zone that gives us this kind of territorial claim was done by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. So this presents a calculation problem for us because if government ownership of land is accompanied by all of the various bureaucratic restrictions that they impose, and you can read Mises' excellent short book bureaucracy, if you have not read that, it is pound for pound, probably one of the best Mises reads that you will find. It's not difficult and I urge you to take a look at that. But basically what can happen with government ownership of land is that they end up using it for political purposes. What else would they do with it? They use it to reward their friends and punish their enemies to respond to political goals that they think the voters will respond to. Bradley says that government restrictions on use of resources on government lands limits economic growth and land socialism, which is what this really is, will create economic calculation problems. So the first calculation issue here, he says, is the government's decisions regarding the use of this land and the resources on and under the land. Since the government owns the land, we see no prices for these resources. You can make up prices. I mean, the government will lease oil reserves. They will lease rights to some of the mineral resources under land, but that's not the same thing as a market price. It's playing games with something that might be called a price, but because it's not resulting from voluntary action, it's not conveying the same information that you would see in a marketplace. So it's almost useless. The government has no way to economize on these resources in the sense that government officials, even if they wanted to, could not efficiently allocate those resources. They make them based on political considerations. So they end up allowing the private sector to access the wrong resources, wrong in the sense that if we were allowed to have private ownership of these resources, we would choose to use them much differently. We don't know exactly what that would look like. Maybe we would chop down fewer trees on federal lands. Maybe we would chop down fewer trees on federal lands. We don't really know what that would look like, but it's highly unlikely that the decisions made by the government bureaucrats in charge of this land would match exactly what we would see in an encumbered market. There are some other calculation problems as well. If the government, and I sort of said this already, that the prices that we see that the government creates aren't market prices and therefore don't give us any solid information on how to manage this. All right. So if you take a typical undergraduate or graduate level economics class that deals with the questions of market failure, as it's called, you will see a short list of three or four items, usually including these, that first of all, there are externalities, the side effects of our consumption or production behavior. We're accidentally or unintentionally imposing benefits or costs on other people. There's the argument that markets don't produce enough public goods. The public good is not just something that's produced by the government, but a public good would be classified as something that if you use it, you're not using it up. There's just as much left over for somebody else. And it's hard to charge a price for it. So you end up with what's called a free rider problem. Now, Austrians are going to look at this. Austrian economists are going to look at this and say, well, these are in a lot of ways spurious complaints against the market. For one thing, if you try to introduce the government to fix these things to the extent that they are problems, then you're going to end up with often worse outcomes. But the third is the inefficiency from some kind of market power. This is the genesis of all this antitrust law and so forth, as you see. Dominic Garmentano's classic old work on this on antitrust law, the case for repeal, is really great on this. I'm not going to talk about that today. But usually these problems with externalities and public goods arise where property rights are not well protected. And secondly, and I've got an article I think toward the end of the presentation here that I'll mention about Art Cardin who talks about the fact that just because you've shown that the market didn't match your idea of what is efficient doesn't mean that the government's going to improve upon that. In fact, it may make things worse. I had a, when I was not as politically astute as I am now, which is not very, I just got into Wofford. And I read some of the things that my colleagues there were writing. And I again, not being very astute, thought it would be a great idea to criticize them. So a fellow in the English department wrote about, I wrote an article about his basically extended field trip with students to the coastal areas of South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia and bemoaned the problems of land use in those areas and said in an article on this, he said, it's a bad idea to turn the whole future of a region over only to people with money to make. And I couldn't resist this, I probably should have, but I couldn't resist and I ended up writing something to kind of argue that this was way off base. He went on to talk about some of the, you know, the depredations of the environment by the people that were selling hamburgers and used cars and all of these things that, you know, obviously to him, this was a bad use of land. I don't know whether he's really forgiven me for that article, but in any case, there are some important questions. I think that I've got some of the same preferences that a lot of my more leftist colleagues have that I like going hiking and untrammeled wilderness and I like seeing trees more than I like seeing used car lots and I like seeing, I like going out into places where there are fewer people and seeing wildlife and so these are these are preferences that I probably share with others. The problem from an economist standpoint here is that when we try to make these arguments about the best land use, we run smack into some major problems of calculation and of subjective comparisons of value or comparisons of subjective value. So how do we know what land use is best? Is it best that a national park be used in the way that it is or would it be better if people were allowed to live there? If we had homes on that property, we can't know that. We can have individual preferences about that. My wife and I took a trip early this summer where we visited four national parks. It was really really great to be able to see some of the things we saw and the experience for me would have been diminished if I had had to look at some apartment building on the edge of the Grand Canyon but these are these are merely personal preferences that I have. Will government really bring us closer to what we want? We can see in some cases that restrictions lead to very problems they're intended to to prevent. So pulling from a Driscoll and Rizzo's book, The Economics of Time and Ignorance, they say to know whether a market process is optimal, we would need to know the very information whose discovery is the object of that process. If we could independently ascertain the information, the process would be superfluous. For me to be able to say or for me to say that the that that an apartment building on the edge of the Grand Canyon is not optimal would be for me to assert information that I don't have because I don't have a market that would communicate that in any effective or believable way. Hayek in his book, Law, Legislation and Liberty, who's quoted in a book that I should go ahead and mention here. This is an oldie but a goodie. This is Roy Cardato's book, Efficiency and Externalities in an Open-ended Universe and not insurmountable as a text on environmental economics and and published by the Mises Institute a number of years ago, but I think the concepts there are really really great. Anyway Hayek says that the whole of the so-called welfare economics which pretends to base its arguments on the interpersonal comparisons of ascertainable utilities lacks all scientific foundation. The fact that most of us believe that they can judge which of the several needs of two or more known persons or more important does not prove either that there is any objective basis for this nor that we conform such a conception about people whom we do not know individually. The idea of basing coercive actions by government on such fantasies is clearly clearly an absurdity. So this brings us to one of those words favored by Austrian economists, catalaxie. I can't even pronounce it, catalactics. Because catalactics is the study of monetary exchanges. There is in a catalaxie there is no overall hierarchy of goals. There are only the separate objectives of the individuals. Now this is separate and distinct from economic efficiency. You'll hear a lot of welfare economists talking about efficiency. Well it's not efficient for there to be apartments on the edge of the Grand Canyon. They'll assert without a shred of information, valid information. So economic efficiency is compatible with Austrian economic theory only in so far as it applies to the assessments of whether the means chosen by the individuals are consistent with the accomplishment of ends chosen by the individuals. So we can't engage in interpersonal comparisons of the values of the ends. I can't say with any authority that the value that people have from living in an apartment building on the edge of the Grand Canyon is greater or lesser than the value to the people like me who visit once in a while and hike around and want to see something that doesn't have an apartment building on it. There's no way for us to make that assertion with any... I can't say it's efficient to have an apartment building there or it's efficient not to have an apartment building there. So catalactic efficiency occurs when economic efficiency is promoted by an institutional setting that ensures that property rights are secure which in turn promotes the discovery and use of information for the accomplishment of individual plans. So it takes into account the fact that we can't judge other people's valuations of environmental goods. So if we want to promote this kind of catalactic efficiency we need to think about what is it that promotes the security of property rights? What is it that promotes the ability of an individual to pursue and obtain their ends with good information? Good information that may be provided by a market. We have prices that tell us how relatively scarce this good is compared to that good. In a voluntary marketplace setting in a catalaxi we can have that kind of information provided to us. So part of what we do in an Austrian environmental economics is we look at institutional settings. We don't try to say well let's figure out whether it's better that this land be used for a national park or be used for an oil field or be used for a parking lot or a solar farm or... We don't try to make those decisions because we know that we can't make those decisions for other people. Cordado again in this in this book says that no meaningful means ends framework is even possible without the ability to access and control physical resources. Beyond this the role of this institutional setting is to allow the exchange process through the price system to disseminate as much information concerning appropriate exchange opportunities as possible. The more restrictions you place on that ability to exchange freely with other people the lower quality that information is going to be that you get out of the market price and if you dispense with market prices altogether or you decide to sort of make up make believe prices where the government's leasing mineral rights or something on federal land then you have no idea you are operating without information that would would help us to make these decisions correctly. So Cordado says efficiency is an individual goal seeking problem we're not trying to figure out what produces the maximum value to society and you'll see this all the time in welfare economics well let's see how can we maximize the social value of something we can't do that. Well you can pretend to do that but you can't do that with any kind of any kind of certainty at all. Rothbard mentioned this and again I'm quoting from Rizzo here time uncertainty and disequilibrium where Rothbard said we cannot decide on public policy tort law rights or liabilities on the basis of efficiencies he's talking about that mainstream version of efficiency or minimizing of costs only he says only ethical principles can serve as criteria for our decisions about efficiency it can never serve he says as the basis for ethics on the contrary ethics must be the guide and touchstone for any consideration of efficiency and this is in logic of action two and Rothbard says look we economists are going to have to get used to the fact that we don't not all of life can be considered by our own discipline we're going to have to realize our limits here on this all right so if you take an environmental economics class of any kind you'll probably run into this term the tragedy of the commons this term originated so I'm told from an article from 1968 written by a biologist named Garrett Harden H-A-R-D-I-N but the idea is much older than that we can find as we'll see people like Carl Minger from the Austrian school the founder of the Austrian school talking about this kind of thing and even before that we understand this problem that if you've got a resource of some kind that's not owned and anyone can use it then it's going to be overused and we're going to have a problem whenever a person can use the resource but doesn't face the full cost of using that resource so you know think about an office refrigerator right so the little refrigerator in the break room and there's stuff in there like coffee creamer and who knows what else but there's you go in there and you use this stuff but you use it without thinking as much about the fact that other people might want to use this as well and even though there may be some cultural constraints to this you think well I want to be a considerate person that consideration pretty quickly runs into limits we don't when you've got a small group of maybe five or six people sharing that refrigerator that's one thing when you've got a commons that is much larger than that is shared by many more people it becomes much more difficult to handle these things so I created this kind of this is an adaptation from a game theory text with two ranchers Al and Bob and they've got a common pasture nobody owns the pasture Al doesn't own it Bob doesn't own it and they've got a decision to make do I put one cow out to graze or two cows cows out to graze on this pasture pasture has a rate of growth of grass that is given by nature it's going to the grass is going to grow at a certain rate whatever that is and the more cows you put on it the more that grass is going to be depleted if Al and Bob put both put one cow out to graze each they both get five let's say five pounds a day of beef weight gained 10 pounds total if they put a total of four cows where they both put two cows out to graze on this pasture then they only get eight pounds of weight gain for their cattle each day because the grass is not keeping up in growth rate with the depletion from the consumption from the cattle so from a the point of view of maximum weight gain for these cattle you'd want to have one cow from from each rancher but how is it that this is going to be enforced if neither one of them owned the property neither one of them owned the pasture so if you look at for example the upper right quadrant here so here's Al who decided to put two cows out to graze Bob puts only one cow out to graze Al's cows is gaining six pounds or the two cows together gaining six pounds a day and Bob's single cows gaining three pounds it Al is incentivized to put both cows out to graze on the pasture because if he only put one cow out to graze he'd get only five pounds of weight gaining a day so Al's got the incentive to put two cows out out to graze same thing for Bob this is symmetric so if Bob puts two cows out to graze he gets and Al puts only one then he gets the six pounds of weight gain so they both got an incentive to put two cows out to graze so we end up here in the lower right quadrant where they get a the least weight gain possible in this situation a minger pointed this out many many years ago long before garret harden he said minger said when all members of society compete for a given quantity of goods that is insufficient a practical solution to this conflict of interest is only conceivable if the goods pass into the possession of some of the economizing individuals and that these individuals are protected by society in their possession to the exclusion of all other individuals this is why barbed wire was such a great invention because it allowed pasture land to be cheaply separated into private parcels which could be controlled in their access and you would not have the same overgrazing problem of this is a picture I usually show this every year you may have seen this if you've been to a previous mises you but this is an aerial photograph of the boundary the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic looking north so the Dominican Republic is on the right and Haiti is on the left what's the difference between the right and the left well obviously the Dominican Republic's got a lot more green there's trees growing the Haitian side does not why would this be the climate's the same two sides of the border the difference is property rights so if you look at an economic freedom index such as that that's produced by the let's see it's the Frazier Institute and I think they've got a partner or two involved in this you can find this at free the world dot com listing of economic freedom that's you could quibble about the methodology there I suppose but it's it's um I use it frequently Haiti has a much lower ranking of overall economic freedom they're ranked number 103 whereas the Dominican Republic is ranked number 62 but if you drill down to the protection of property rights component of that of that index Haiti's index for property rights protection is much lower than the Dominican Republic so the Dominican Republic with whatever its flaws does a better job of protecting property rights so in on the Haitian side what happens if you go onto public land and you cut down a tree probably nothing there's not as much protection for property rights so you end up with a commons where the minute a tree gets big enough to be worth cutting down somebody cuts it down and nobody's going to stop you and so you end up with no no forest to speak of on any land that's not protected in that way by property Murray Rothbard extended this to water and and if you look at Walter Block and Peter Nelson's book water capitalism the case for privatizing oceans rivers lakes and aquifers they point out that Rothbard and Block and Nelson all point out that if you privatize a body of water then you can alleviate some of the difficulties that are associated with that commons typically in the United States if you have a lake or an ocean or river this is a kind of a commons and nobody in particular is going to have enough control over this to limit access and to guard against against overexploitation of that resource so Rothbard says in his book for a new liberty only private property rights will ensure an end to pollution the invasion of resources only because the rivers are unowned is there no owner to rise up and defend his precious resource from attack if in contrast anyone should dump garbage or pollutants into a lake which is privately owned he would not be permitted to do so for very long the owner would come roaring to its defense now several years ago you saw pictures like this and some others that you you might have seen about this this great pacific garbage patch and the the coral of plastic that's out there in the middle of the ocean because we're we're using drinking straws apparently and that is it's a commons I mean the ocean is a commons now does it have to be that way I don't I don't think so in fact there have been some interesting steps I won't get into about how that that we've started to see some movement toward privatization of oceans but for the for all practical purposes this is still a massive commons and a lot of plastic that winds up floating down rivers ends up in the middle of the ocean nobody owns the rivers nobody owns the oceans we would be very surprised if we saw someone's swimming pool in their backyard with massive amounts of plastic floating around it I mean I'm gonna pick I don't have a pool but if I did I would be picking up the least little bit of litter out of that pool it's my pool I'm the same way about my front yard I mean compare that to the side of a highway I mean people just throw stuff on the side of a highway all the time nobody's I mean they got signs that have empty threats about fines if you pollute but or litter but my front yard I guard with some intensity if you throw a can in my front yard I'm not going to be happy about that a lot of this litter appears to be the result of people just dumping stuff that they know nobody's going to say anything about so one observer pointed out that fishing nets account for 46 percent of this trash the majority of the rest is is ropes oyster spacers eel traps crates baskets and a good 20 percent of it at least in 2018 with this article was written was from the 2011 Japanese tsunami just washing up onto shore going back out to see carrying with it a lot of debris so I always ask for a drinking straw when I get my coffee my iced coffee the idea that we are creating pollution in the middle of the pacific because we're using drinking straws in Kansas is just not the case but people feel good because they I don't have time to tell my story about paper drinking straws in China in 1948 but maybe if you ask me afterward I'll get to that so there are some political considerations I'm running out of time here of course so I'll go quickly through this art carden says that the information needed to know whether a particular regulation works quite literally does not exist and the key difference between firms and governments is that firms have market tests for their decisions governments do not the second problem that governments face here is incentives so if you're elected to public office you don't become an angelic creature who's suddenly not interested in your own well-being and is now completely devoted to the well-being of your fellow creatures and the bureaucrats that work for these elected officials are also not publicly interested anymore than a private sector merchant would be so we tend to assume that people have their own personal interests that have an outsized role to play in their decision making this is not different for people in government so political incentives are fundamentally different in other ways from market incentives if you're if you're operating a firm you have to think ahead what's going to be the value of this firm next year five years ten years down the road even if I'm not going to live that long I still have an interest in preserving the value of that because I want to be able to sell that firm when I'm ready to retire and in order for me to sell it for the highest price possible I have to ensure that the buyer can anticipate a an ongoing high value for that firm political incentives are different in that way because they they discourage that long-term view so I have to think about if I'm a political elected official I have to think about the next election if I feel like I'm pretty secure in my position I'm probably going to get re-elected and I might think about the election past that but there's no way for me to bequeath my my political capital to another person at least not very easily and the level of uncertainty there about whether or not my my my seat in congress will remain is going to discourage me from thinking much past the next election or or two so this may lead to some very short run decision making Rothbard says while rulers of government own public property their ownership is not secure in the long run because they may always be defeated in an election or deposed hence government officials will tend to regard themselves as only transitory owners of public resources while a private owner securing his property and its capital value may plan the use of his resource over a long period of time in the future the government official must exploit his property as quickly as he can since he has no security of tenure so what does that mean I mean you're going to be you're going to pillage this in some way for as much as you can I mean go ahead and extract those resources sell off those mineral rights because you can use that political capital to get reelected but you may not have much of an incentive to think about long-term conservation considerations Rothbard goes on to say that even the most securely entrenched civil servant must concentrate on present use because government officials cannot usually sell the capitalized value of their property as private owners can in short except in the case of the private property of a hereditary monarch you can talk to some others of us about monarchy maybe later government officials own the current use of resources but not their capital value so he says to kind of wrap up Rothbard here it's the government official who must take and run who must exploit the property quickly while he is still in command now back to our you know my my article a long time ago about the use of valuable coastal property and I live in South Carolina we've got some beautiful coastal landscapes and and I grew up going into the salt marshes of coastal South Carolina and going crabbing and shrimping and tooling around a little motor boat and this fantastic landscapes are really to this day enjoy that that kind of terrain people value that as I do and because people value those natural landscapes private developers will take that into account when they're making their their plans for development but it is expensive if you preserve the natural landscape that means you can't do as much of this well this you know that's that's a lot less natural landscape and a lot more concrete and steel a lot more people on that beach than you might see at a more expensive beach resort so there's this trade-off between access and affordability if you prohibit development on government-owned land you're reducing the supply and therefore increasing the price for users of other land to imagine two mile wide stretches of beach next to each other if the government says we're setting aside this one mile of beach as a national seashore and nobody can build on this and we will only we'll be very restrictive about what we allow people to do on this property the substitute for that mile of beach is the mile next to it and that's the closest substitute probably so what's going to happen to the value of that land what's going to go up right and so a lot of the development will simply shift so you may think well the government preserved this land but when in in actual fact what they may have done is simply move the development next door so you may have less natural habitat next door than you would have had otherwise did this really improve things from the point of view of someone who values natural habitat i mean you get the government sort of stamp of no access but it didn't really necessarily produce a an increase in the availability of that natural amenity housing availability may drop the cost of visiting environmental amenities like beaches may go up which in turn may mean that this becomes more of the province of the the wealthy and the ironically the very people who are in favor of some of these national reserves national seashores national farms national parks or they think that they're doing this out of a concern for the common the common person's access to these amenities but in fact they may be reducing that access more than they recognize i won't get into the mechanics of this let me just take a couple of well one minute and and mention briefly zoning i'm going to get to the picture since that's more interesting this is uh near where i live um i don't know why the cost coast shows up there but anyway there's the cost code one of them and you see this kind of urban sprawl that people complain about and this is one of the land use concerns that i hear from people well if you know if you don't govern if you don't plan municipal planning and you don't do this sort of restrictive zoning then you're going to end up with people living wherever they want to live well wow that that would be bad right uh when people build stores and and strip malls and and and all of this all of this stuff well randall holcomb who's um years ago he he's he's been i haven't seen recently but he's been to some mesas conferences and and um has has written extensively on this and he said urban sprawl can produce more efficient land use patterns and enhance people's quality of life nobody forces people to live in single family detached homes developers build them because that's where people want to live um if you look at at states like california where i know i've talked to a couple of you from california here and and uh california is famously restrictive on their land use maybe this is one of the reasons why it's so expensive to live in places like the bay area because you can't build outside of very narrowly defined uh areas so um some economists have suggested that zoning um can actually increase the spread of urban areas into undeveloped areas um and and a good example of this is uh this is toronto and not in california canada um but you see the green that was over the years set aside as a reserve you can't build in that area so what has happened in in some of these places and i think seattle is another example of this kind of thing with a green belt well you can't build on the green belt it gets increasingly expensive inside the green belt close to the to the city so what do you do if you want affordable housing well you move outside it's really ironic to me that people talk about affordable housing and at the same time we're practicing these kind of policies that make housing far less affordable but you're you're encouraging longer commutes because now you have you can't just be where the green belt is you have to be outside of that and commute a longer distance creating more pollution uh more time burned on the highway uh more highways and um more car accidents and all of these things that are adverse consequences of these kinds of land use decisions i am out of time i'll have to stop here i'll welcome questions at the q and a this afternoon thank you