 CHAPTER 14 OF THE FIRST AND SECOND NATURAL LAWS AND OF CONTRACTS The right of nature, which writers commonly call Ius Naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature, that is to say, of his own life. And consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. While liberty is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of external impediments, which impediments may oft take away part of a man's power to do what he would, but cannot hinder him from using the power left him according as his judgment and reason shall dictate to him. A law of nature, Lex Naturales, is a precept, or general rule, found out by reason by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life, or takeeth away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. For though they that speak of this subject use to confound use and Lex write and law, yet they ought to be distinguished, because right consistseth in liberty to do or to forbear, whereas law determineth and bindeth to one of them, so that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty, which in one and the same matter are inconsistent. And because the condition of man, as hath been declared in the precedent chapter, is a condition of war of everyone against everyone, in which case everyone is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies. It followeth that in such a condition every man has a right to everything, even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural right of every man to everything endureth, there can be no security to any man, how strong or wise soever he be, of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live. And consequently, it is a precept or general rule of reason that every man ought to endeavor peace as far as he has hope of obtaining it, and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war, the first branch of which rule containeth the first and fundamental law of nature which is to seek peace and follow it, the second, the sum of the right of nature which is by all means we can to defend ourselves. From this fundamental law of nature by which men are commanded to endeavor peace is derived this second law, that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defense of himself, he shall think it necessary to lay down this right to all things, and to be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right of doing anything he likeeth, so long are all men in the condition of war, but if other men will not lay down their right as well as he, then there is no reason for anyone to divest himself of his, for that were to expose himself to pray, which no man is bound to, rather than to dispose himself to peace. This is that law of the Gospel, whatsoever you require that others should do to you that do ye to them. To lay down a man's right to anything is to divest himself of the liberty of hindering another of the benefit of his own right to the same. For he that renounceeth or passeth away his right, giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of right is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original, right of his own right, that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him, not without hindrance from another, so that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of right is but so much of his own right original, right is laid aside either by simply renouncing it or by transferring it to another, by simply renouncing when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth, by transferring when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person or persons. And when a man hath in either manner abandoned or granted away his right, then is he said to be obliged or bound not to hinder those to whom such right is granted or abandoned from the benefit of it. And that he ought, and it is duty, not to make void that voluntary act of his own, and that such hindrance is injustice and injury as being sine yori, the right being before renounced or transferred. So that injury or injustice in the controversies of the world is somewhat like to that which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity, for as it is there called an absurdity to contradict what one maintained in the beginning, so in the world it is called injustice, and injury voluntarily to undo that which from the beginning he had voluntarily done. The way by which a man either simply renounceeth or transfereth his right is a declaration or a signification by some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs that he doth so renounce or transfer, or hath so renounced or transferred the same, to him that accepteth it. And these signs are either words only or actions only, or, as it happeneth most often, both words and actions. And the same are the bonds by which men are bound and obliged, bonds that have their strength not from their own nature, for nothing is more easily broken than a man's word. But from fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture. Whensoever a man transfereth his right or renounceeth it, it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he hopeeth for thereby, for it is a voluntary act, and of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some good to himself. And therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any words or other signs to have abandoned or transferred. As first, a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life, because he cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself. The same may be said of wounds and chains and imprisonment, both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded or imprisoned, as also because a man cannot tell when he seeeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly, the motive and end for which this renouncing and transferring of right is introduced is nothing else but the security of a man's person in his life and in the means of so preserving life as not to be weary of it. And therefore if a man by words or other signs seem to despoil himself of the end for which those signs were intended, he is not to be understood as if he meant it or that it was his will, but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted. The mutual transferring of right is that which men call contract. There is difference between transferring of right to the thing and transferring or tradition that is delivery of the thing itself. For the thing may be delivered together with the translation of the right, as in buying and selling with ready money or exchange of goods or lands, and it may be delivered some time after. Again, one of the contractors may deliver the thing contracted for on his part and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after and in the meantime be trusted. And then the contract on his part is called packed or covenant. Or both parts may contract now to perform hereafter. In which cases, he that is to perform in time to come being trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise or faith. And the failing of performance, if it be voluntary, violation of faith. When the transferring of right is not mutual but one of the parties transfereth in hope to gain thereby friendship or service from another or from his friends, or in hope to gain the reputation of charity or magnanimity, or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion, or in hope of reward in heaven, this is not contract, but gift, free gift, grace, which words signify one and the same thing. Signs of contract are either express or by inference. Express are words spoken with understanding of what they signify, and such words are either of the time present or past. As I give, I grant, I have given, I have granted, I will this be yours, or of the future, as I will give, I will grant, which words of the future are called promise. Signs by inference are sometimes the consequence of words, sometimes the consequence of silence. Sometimes the consequence of actions. Sometimes the consequence of forbearing an action. And generally, a sign by inference of any contract is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor. Words alone, if they be of the time to come and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a free gift, and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to come, as tomorrow I will give, they are a sign I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some other act. But if the words be of the time present or past, as I have given, or do give to be delivered tomorrow, then is my tomorrow's right given away today, and that by the virtue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words. Wollohok tuum esekras and krasdabo, that is, between I will that this be thine tomorrow, and I will give it thee tomorrow. For the word I will, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will present, but in the latter it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come, and therefore the former words, being of the present, transfer a future right. The latter, that be of the future, transfer nothing. But if there be other signs of the will to transfer a right besides words, then, though the gift be free, yet may the right be understood to pass by words of the future. As if a man propound a prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, the gift is free, and though the words be of the future, yet the right passeth. For if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them run. In contracts, the right passeth not only where the words are of the time present or past, but also where they are of the future. Because all contract is mutual translation, or change of right. And therefore he that promiseeth only, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseeth, is to be understood as if he intended the right should pass. For unless he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying and selling, and other acts of contract, a promise is equivalent to a covenant, and therefore obligatory. He that performeth first in the case of a contract is said to merit that which he is to receive by the performance of the other, and he hath it as due. Also, when a prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him only that winneth, or money is thrown amongst many to be enjoyed by them that catch it, though this be a free gift yet, so to win, or so to catch, is to merit, and to have it as due. For the right is transferred in the propounding of the prize and in throwing down the money, though it be not determined to whom but by the event of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of merit this difference, that in contract, I merit by virtue of my own power, and the contractors need. But in this case of free gift, I am enabled to merit only by the benignity of the giver. In contract, I merit at the contractor's hand that he should depart with his right. In this case of gift, I merit not that the giver should part with his right, but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine rather than another's. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the schools between meritum congrui and meritum condigni. For God Almighty, having promised paradise to those men hoodwinked with carnal desires, that can walk through this world according to the precepts and limits prescribed by him, they say he that shall so walk shall merit paradise ex congruo. But because no man can demand a right to it by his own righteousness, or any other power in himself, but by the free grace of God only, they say no man can merit paradise ex condigno. This, I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction. But because disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own terms of art longer than it serves their turn, I will not affirm anything of their meaning. Only this, I say, when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth meriteth, and may claim the prize as due. If a covenant be made wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another, in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war of every man against every man, upon any reasonable suspicion it is void. But if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void. For he that performeth first has no assurance the other will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power. Which in the condition of mere nature, where all men are equal and judges of the justness of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed. And therefore, he which performeth first does but betray himself to his enemy, contrary to the right he can never abandon of defending his life and means of living. But in a civil estate where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable, and for that cause he which by the covenant is to perform first is obliged so to do. The cause of fear which maketh such a covenant invalid must be always something arising after the covenant made, as some new fact, or other sign of the will not to perform. Else it cannot make the covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing. He that transfereth any right, transfereth the means of enjoying it as far as lieth in his power. As he that selleth land is understood to transfer the message, and whatsoever grows upon it, nor can he that sells a mill turn away the stream that drives it. And they that give to a man the right of government in sovereignty are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers, and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice. To make covenants with brute beasts is impossible, because not understanding their speech they understand not, nor accept of any translation of right, nor can translate any right to another. And without mutual acceptation there is no covenant. To make covenant with God is impossible, but by mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by revelation supernatural or by his lieutenants that govern under him and in his name. For otherwise we know not whether our covenants be accepted or not, and therefore they that vow anything contrary to any law of nature vow in vain as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the law of nature it is not the vow but the law that binds them. The matter or subject of a covenant is always something that falleth under deliberation, for to covenant is an act of the will, that is to say, an act and the last act of deliberation, and is therefore always understood to be something to come and which judged possible for him that covenanteth to perform. And therefore to promise that which is known to be impossible is no covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the covenant is valid and bindeth, though not to the thing itself, yet to the value, or if that also be impossible to the unfamed endeavor of performing as much as is possible, for to more no man can be obliged. Men are freed of their covenants two ways, by performing or by being forgiven. For performance is the natural end of obligation, and forgiveness, the restitution of liberty as being a retransferring of that right in which the obligation consisted. Covenants entered into by fear in the condition of mere nature are obligatory. For example, if a covenant to pay a ransom or service for my life to an enemy, I am bound to buy it. For it is a contract wherein one receiveth the benefit of life, the other is to receive money or service for it, and consequently, where no other law, as in the condition of mere nature, forbideth the performance. The covenant is valid. Therefore, prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it. And if a weaker prince make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger for fear, he is bound to keep it, unless, as hath been said before, there arises some new and just cause of fear to renew the war, and even in commonwealths, if I be forced to redeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it till the civil law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear. And what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break. A former covenant makes void a later. For a man that hath passed away his right to one man today hath it not to pass tomorrow to another. And therefore, the later promise passeth no right, but is null. A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For, as I have shown before, no man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment. The avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force in no covenant transfereth any right, nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so or so kill me, he cannot covenant thus, unless I do so or so, I will not resist you when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting, rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to execution and prison with armed men, notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law by which they are condemned. A covenant to accuse oneself, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature where every man is judged, there is no place for accusation, and in the civil state the accusation is followed with punishment, which, being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true of the accusation of those by whose condemnation a man falls into misery, as of a father, wife, or benefactor. For the testimony of such an accuser, if it be not willingly given, is presumed to be corrupted by nature, and therefore not to be received. And where a man's testimony is not to be credited, he is not bound to give it. Also accusations upon torture are not to be reputed as testimonies. For torture is to be used but as a means of conjecture, and light, in the further examination in search of truth. And what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured, not to the informing of the torturers. And therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient testimony. For whether he deliver himself by true or false accusation, he does it by the right of preserving his own life. The force of words being, as I have formerly noted, too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants. There are, in man's nature, but too imaginable helps to strengthen it. And those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word, or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it. This latter is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on, especially in the pursuers of wealth, command, or sensual pleasure, which are the greatest part of mankind. The passion to be reckoned upon is fear, whereof there be too very general objects. One, the power of spirits invisible. The other, the power of those men they shall therein offend. Of these too, though the former be the greater power, yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear. The fear of the former is in every man his own religion, which hath place in the nature of man before civil society. The latter hath not so, at least not place enough to keep men to their promises, because in the condition of mere nature the inequality of power is not discerned, but by the event of battle. So that before the time of civil society, or in the interruption thereof by war, there is nothing can strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the fear of that invisible power, which they every one worship as God, and fear as a revenger of their perfidy, all therefore that can be done between two men not subject to civil power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth, which swearing, or oath, is a form of speech added to a promise by which he that promiseeth signifyeth that unless he perform he renounceeth the mercy of his God, or calleth to him for vengeance on himself, such was the heathen form, let Jupiter kill me else as I kill this beast. So is our form, I shall do this, and thus so help me God. And this with the rites and ceremonies which every one useth in his own religion, that the fear of breaking faith might be the greater, by this it appears that an oath taken according to any other form or rite, than his that sweareth is in vain, and no oath, and that there is no swearing by anything which the swearer thinks not God, for though men have sometimes used to swear by their kings, for fear or flattery, yet they would have it thereby understood they attributed to them divine honor, and that swearing unnecessarily by God is but profaning of his name, and swearing by other things as men do in common discourse is not swearing, but an impious custom, gotten by too much vehemence of talking. It appears also that the oath adds nothing to the obligation, for a covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God without the oath, as much as with it. If unlawful, bindeth not at all, though it be confirmed with an oath. End of Chapter 14. This recording is in the public domain. Chapter 15. Of other laws of nature. From that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as being retained, hinder the peace of Under the peace of mankind there followeth a third, which is this, that men perform their covenants made, without which covenants are in vain, and but empty words, and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war, and in this law of nature consisteth the fountain and original of justice. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to everything, and consequently no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust, and the definition of injustice is no other than the not-performance of covenant, and whatsoever is not unjust is just. But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not-performance on either part, as hath been said in the former chapter, are invalid, though the original of justice be the making of covenants, yet injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away, which, while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore, before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant, and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon, and such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the schools, for they say that justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own. And therefore, where there is no own, that is, no propriety, there is no injustice. And where there is no coercive power erected, that is, where there is no commonwealth, there is no propriety, all men having right to all things. Therefore, where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is unjust. So that the nature of justice consists of in keeping a valid covenants. But the validity of covenants begins not, but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them, and then it is also that propriety begins. The fool hath said in his heart there is no such thing as justice, and sometimes also with his tongue, seriously alleging that every man's conservation and contentment being committed to his own care, there could be no reason why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto, and therefore also to make or not make, keep or not keep, covenants, does not against reason when it conduced to one's benefit. He does not therein deny that there be covenants, and that they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept, and that such breach of them may be called injustice, and the observation of them justice. But he questioneth whether injustice, taking away the fear of God, for the same fool hath said in his heart there is no God, not sometimes stand with that reason which dictateth to every man his own good, and particularly then, when it conduced to such a benefit as shall put a man in a condition to neglect not only the dispraise and revilings, but also the power of other men. The kingdom of God is gotten by violence. But what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? Were it against reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it? And if it be not against reason, it is not against justice, or else justice is not to be approved for good. From such reasoning as this, successful wickedness hath obtained the name of virtue, and some that, in all other things, have disallowed the violation of faith, yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a kingdom. And the heathen that believed that Saturn was deposed by his son Jupiter, believed nevertheless the same Jupiter to be the avenger of injustice, somewhat like to a piece of law in Koch's commentaries on Littleton, where he says, if the right heir of the crown be attained of treason, yet the crown shall descend to him, and eo instante the attainer be void. From which instances a man will be very prone to infer that when the heir apparent of a kingdom shall kill him that is in possession, though his father. You may call it injustice, or by what other name you will, yet it can never be against reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves, and those actions are most reasonable that conduce most to their ends. This specious reasoning is, nevertheless, false. For the question is not of promises mutual, where there is no security of performance on either side, as when there is no civil power erected over the party's promising, for such promises are no covenants. But either where one of the parties has performed already, or where there is a power to make him perform, there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other, to perform or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof we are to consider, first, that when a man doth a thing which notwithstanding anything can be foreseen and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident, which he could not expect arriving, may turn it to his benefit, yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of war wherein every man to every man, for want of a common power to keep them all in awe, is an enemy, there is no man can hope by his own strength or wit to defend himself from destruction without the help of confederates, where everyone expects the same defense by the confederation that anyone else does. And therefore, he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him can in reason expect no other means of safety than what can be had from his own single power. He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defense but by the error of them that receive him, nor when he is received be retained in it without seeing the danger of their error, which errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security, and therefore if he be left or cast out of society he perisheth, and if he live in society it is by the errors of other men, which he could not foresee nor reckon upon, and consequently against the reason of his preservation, and so as all men that contribute not to his destruction for bear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves. As for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of heaven by any way, it is frivolous, there being but one way imaginable, and that is not breaking but keeping of covenant. And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion, it is manifest that though the event follow yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary, and because by gaining it so others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore that is to say keeping of covenant is a rule of reason by which we are forbidden to do anything destructive to our life, and consequently a law of nature. There be some that proceed further and will not have the law of nature to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of man's life on earth, but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death, to which they think the breach of covenant may conduce, and consequently be just and reasonable. Such are they that think it a work of merit to kill or depose or rebel against the sovereign power constituted over them by their own consent, but because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death, much less of the reward that is then to be given to breach of faith, but only a belief grounded upon other men's saying that they know it supernaturally, so that they know those that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally. Breach of faith cannot be called a preceptive reason or nature. Others that allow for a law of nature, the keeping of faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons as heretics, and such as use not to perform their covenant to others, and this also is against reason. Or if any fault of a man be sufficient to discharge our covenant made, the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindered the making of it. The names of just and unjust, when they are attributed to men, signify one thing, and when they are attributed to actions, another. When they are attributed to men, they signify conformity or inconformity of manners to reason. But when they are attributed to action, they signify the conformity or inconformity to reason, not of manners or manner of life, but of particular actions. A just man, therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can that his actions may be all just, and an unjust man is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our language styled by the names of righteous and unrighteous, than just and unjust, though the meaning be the same. Therefore a righteous man does not lose that title by one or a few unjust actions that proceed from sudden passion, or a mistake of things or persons. Or does an unrighteous man lose his character for such an action as he does, or for bears to do, for fear? Because his will is not framed by the justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to human actions the relish of justice is a certain nobleness or gallantness of courage, rarely found, by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life to fraud or breach of promise. This justice of the manners is that which is meant where justice is called a virtue, and injustice a vice. But the justice of actions denominates men, not just, but guiltless. And the injustice of the same, which is also called injury, gives them but the name of guilty. Again the injustice of manners is the disposition or aptitude to do injury, and is injustice before it proceed to act, and without supposing any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action, that is to say injury, supposes an individual person injured, namely him to whom the covenant was made. And therefore many times the injury is received by one man when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger, if it be not done, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to obey, but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation, and therefore could not injure him. And so also in commonwealths, private men may remit to one another their debts, but not robberies or other violences whereby they are endammaged, because the detaining of debt is an injury to themselves, but robbery and violence are injuries to the person of the commonwealth, whatsoever is done to a man conformable to his own will signified to the doer, is not injury to him, for if he that doeth it hath not passed away his original right to do what he pleas by some antecedent covenant, there is no breach of covenant, and therefore no injury done him. And if he have, then his will to have it done being signified is a release of that covenant, and so again there is no injury done him. Justice of actions is by writers divided into commutative and distributive, and the former they say consisteth in proportion arithmetical, the latter in proportion geometrical. Distributive therefore they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for, and distributive in the distribution of equal benefit to men of equal merit, as if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy, or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors, and therefore the just value is that which they be contented to give, and merit, besides that which is by covenant, where the performance on one part meriteth the performance of the other part and falls under justice commutative, not distributive, is not due by justice, but is rewarded of grace only, and therefore this distinction in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded is not right. To speak properly commutative justice is the justice of a contractor, that is a performance of covenant in buying and selling, hiring, and letting to hire, lending, and borrowing, exchanging, bartering, and other acts of contract. And distributive justice the justice of an arbitrator, that is to say the act of defining what is just, wherein being trusted by them that make him arbitrator, if he perform his trust he is said to distribute to every man his own, and this is indeed just distribution, and may be called though improperly distributive justice, but more properly equity, which also is a law of nature as shall be shown in due place. As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant, so does gratitude depend on antecedent grace, that is to say antecedent free gift, and is the fourth law of nature, which may be conceived in this form, that a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace endeavor that he which giveth it have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is voluntary, and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good, of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence or trust, nor consequently of mutual help, nor of reconciliation of one man to another, and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war, which is contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature, which commandeth men to seek peace. The breach of this law is called ingratitude, and hath the same relation to grace that injustice hath to obligation bicovenant. A fifth law of nature is complacence, that is to say that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof we may consider that there is in men's aptness to society a diversity of nature rising from their diversity of affections, not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an edifice. For as that stone which by the asperity and irregularity of figure takes more room from others than itself fills, and for hardness cannot be easily made plain, and thereby hindereth the building, is by the builders cast away as unprofitable and troublesome. So also a man that by asperity of character will strive to retain those things which to himself are superfluous, and to others necessary, and for the stubbornness of his passions cannot be corrected, is to be left or cast out of society as cumbersome thereunto. Forseeing every man not only by right, but also by necessity of nature is supposed to endeavor all he can to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation. He that shall oppose himself against it for things superfluous is guilty of the war that thereupon is to follow, and therefore doth that which is contrary to the fundamental law of nature which commandeth to seek peace. The observers of this law may be called sociable. The Latins call them comodi. The contrary, stubborn, insatiable, forward, intractable. A sixth law of nature is this, that upon caution of the future time a man ought to pardon the offenses past of them that repenting desire it. For pardon is nothing but granting of peace, which though granted to them that preserve in their hostility be not peace but fear, yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time is sign of an aversion to peace, and therefore contrary to the law of nature. A seventh is that in past revenges, that is retribution of evil for evil, men look not at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow, whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design than for correction of the offender or direction of others. For this law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth pardon upon security of the future time. Besides, revenge without respect to the example and profit to come is a triumph or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end, for the end is always somewhat to come, and glorying to no end is vain glory, and contrary to reason. And to hurt without reason tendeth to the introduction of war, which is against the law of nature, and is commonly styled by the name of cruelty, and because all signs of hatred or contempt provoke to fight, in so much as most men choose rather to hazard their life than not to be revenged. We may, in the eighth place, for law of nature set down this precept, that no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture declare hatred or contempt of another. The breach of which law is commonly called contumally. The question who is the better man has no place in the condition of mere nature, where, as has been shown before, all men are equal. The inequality that now is has been introduced by the law's civil. I know that Aristotle, in the first book of his politics, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by nature some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort, such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy, others to serve, meaning those that had strong bodies, but were not philosophers as he. As master and servant, were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of wit, which is not only against reason, but also against experience. For there are very few so foolish that had not rather grinned themselves than be governed by others, nor when the wise, in their own conceit, contend by force with them who distrust their own wisdom. Do they always, or often, or almost at any time, get the victory? If nature, therefore, have made men equal, that equality is to be acknowledged. Or if nature have made men unequal, yet, because men that think themselves equal will not enter into conditions of peace but upon equal terms, such equality must be admitted. And therefore, for the ninth law of nature, I put this, that every man acknowledge another for his equal by nature. The breach of this precept is pride. On this law dependedeth another, that, at the entrance into conditions of peace, no man require to reserve to himself any right which he is not content should be reserved to everyone of the rest, as it is necessary for all men that seek peace to lay down certain rights of nature, that is to say, not to have liberty to do all they list. So it is necessary for man's life to retain some, as right to govern their own bodies, enjoy air, water, motion, ways to go from place to place, and all things else without which a man cannot live or not live well. If in this case, at the making of peace, men require for themselves that which they would not have to be granted to others. They do contrary to the precedent law that commandeth the acknowledgment of natural equality, and therefore also against the law of nature. The observers of this law are those we call modest, and the breakers arrogant men. The Greeks call the violation of this law pleonexia, that is, a desire of more than their share. So if a man be trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the law of nature that he deal equally between them. For without that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war. He therefore that his partial in judgment doth what in him lies to determine from the use of judges and arbitrators, and consequently against the fundamental law of nature is the cause of war. The observance of this law from the equal distribution to each man of that which in reason belonged to him is called equity, and as I have said before, distributive justice. The violation, exception of persons, prosopolepsia. And from this, followeth another law, that such things as cannot be divided be enjoyed in common, if it can be, and if the quantity of a thing permit, without stint, otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right. For otherwise the distribution is unequal and contrary to equity. But some things there be that can neither be divided nor enjoyed in common. Then the law of nature which prescribeth equity requireth that the entire right, or else making the use alternate, the first possession, be determined by lot. For equal distribution is of the law of nature, and other means of equal distribution cannot be imagined. Of lots there be two sorts, arbitrary and natural. Arbitrary is that which is agreed on by the competitors. Natural is either primogeniture, which the Greek calls clarinomia, which signifies given by lot, or first seizure. And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the first possessor, and in some cases to the first born, as acquired by lot. It is also a law of nature that all men that mediate peace be allowed safe conduct. For the law that commandeth peace as the end, commandeth intercession as the means. And to intercession the means is safe conduct. And because though men be never so willing to observe these laws there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a man's action. First whether it were done or not done, secondly if done, whether against the law or not against the law, the former aware of is called a question of fact, the latter a question of right, therefore unless the parties to the question covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from peace as ever. This other to whose sentence they submit is called an arbitrator. And therefore it is of the law of nature that they that are at controversy submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator. And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause. And if he were never so fit yet equity allowing to each party equal benefit, if one be admitted to be judge, the other is to be admitted also. And so the controversy that is the cause of war remains against the law of nature. For the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received for arbitrator to whom greater profit or honor or pleasure apparently arises out of the victory of one party than of the other. For he hath taken though an unavoidable bribe, yet a bribe, and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversy and the condition of war remaineth contrary to the law of nature. And in a controversy of fact, the judge being to give no more credit to one than to the other, if there be no other arguments, must give credit to a third, or to a third and fourth or more. For else the question is undecided and left to force, contrary to the law of nature. These are the laws of nature dictating peace for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes, and which only concern the doctrine of civil society. There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men as drunkenness, and all other parts of intemperance, which may therefore also be reckoned among those things which the law of nature hath forbidden. But are not necessary to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place. And though this may seem too subtle a deduction of the laws of nature to be taken notice of by all men, whereof the most part are too busy in getting food, and the rest too negligent to understand, yet to leave all men inexcusable, they have been contracted to one easy sum, intelligible even to the meanest capacity. And that is, do not that to another, which thou wouldst not have done to thyself, which showeth him that he has no more to do in learning the laws of nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions and self-love may add nothing to the weight. And then there is none of these laws of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable. The laws of nature oblige in foro internal, that is to say they bind to a desire they should take place, but in foro external, that is to the putting them in act, not always. For he that should be modest and tractable, and perform all he promises in such time and place where no man else should do so, should but make himself a prey to others, and procure his own certain ruin contrary to the ground of all laws of nature which tend to nature's preservation. And again, he that having sufficient security that others shall observe the same laws towards him observes them not himself, seeketh not peace, but war, and consequently the destruction of his nature by violence. And whatsoever laws bind in foro internal may be broken, not only by a fact contrary to the law, but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his action in this case be according to the law, yet his purpose was against the law, which where the obligation is in foro internal is a breach. The laws of nature are immutable and eternal. For injustice in gratitude, arrogance, pride, inequity, exception of persons, and the rest can never be made lawful. For it can never be that war shall preserve life and peace destroy it. The same laws, because they oblige only to a desire and endeavor, mean an unfaigned and constant endeavor, are easy to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavor, he that endeavoreth their performance fulfilleth them, and he that fulfilleth the law is just, and the science of them is the true and only moral philosophy. For moral philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good and evil in the conversation and society of mankind. Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions, which in different tempers, customs, and doctrines of men are different, and diverse men differ not only in their judgment on the senses of what is pleasant and unpleasant to the taste, smell, hearing, touch, and sight, but also of what is conformable or disagreeable to reason in the actions of common life. Nay, the same man in diverse times differs from himself, and one time praeseth, that is, calleth good, what another time he dispraeseth and calleth evil, from once arise disputes, controversies, and at last war. And therefore, so long as a man is in the condition of mere nature, which is a condition of war, private appetite is the measure of good and evil, and consequently, all men agree on this, that peace is good, and therefore also the way or means of peace, which, as I have shown before, our justice, gratitude, modesty, equity, mercy, and the rest of the laws of nature, are good, that is to say, moral virtues, and their contrary vices, evil. Now the science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy, and therefore the true doctrine of the laws of nature is the true moral philosophy, but the writers of moral philosophy, though they acknowledge the same virtues and vices, yet, not seeing wherein consisted their goodness, nor that they come to be praised as the means of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living, place them in a mediocrity of passions, as if not the cause but the degree of daring made fortitude, or not the cause but the quantity of a gift made liberality. These dictates of reason men used to call by the name of laws, but improperly, for they are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defense of themselves, whereas law, properly, is the word of him that by right hath command over others. But yet, if we consider the same theorems as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things, then are they properly called laws. End of Chapter 15. This recording is in the public domain. Chapter 16 of Leviathan. This is the Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org. Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. Chapter 16 of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated. A person is he whose words or actions are considered either as his own or as representing the words or actions of another man or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether truly or by fiction. When they are considered as his own, then is he called a natural person. And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another, then he is a feigned or artificial person. The word person is Latin, instead whereof the Greeks have prosopon, which signifies the face. As persona in Latin signifies the disguise or outward appearance of a man counterfeited on the stage, and sometimes more particularly that part of it which disguises the face as a mask or a vizard. And from the stage have been translated to any representer of speech and action as well in tribunals as theatres, so that a person is the same that an actor is, both on the stage and in common conversation, and to personate is to act or represent himself or another, and he that acteth another is said to bear his person or act in his name, in which sense Cicero uses it, where he says and is called in diverse occasions, diversely. As a representer or representative, a lieutenant, a vicar, an attorney, a deputy, a procurator, an actor, and the like. Of persons artificial some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent, and then the person is the actor, and he that oneth his words and actions is the author, in which case the actor acteth by authority. For that which in speaking of goods and possessions is called an owner, and in Latin dominus, in Greek kurios, speaking of actions is called author, and as the right of possession is called dominion, so the right of doing any action is called authority. So that by authority is always understood a right of doing any act, and done by authority, done by commission or license from him whose right it is. From hence it followeth that when the actor makeeth the covenant by authority, he bindeth there by the author no less than if he had made it himself, and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly, Chapter 14, of the nature of covenants between man and man in their natural capacity is true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their commission, but no further, and therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant whereof he is not author, nor consequently by a covenant made against or beside the authority he gave, when the actor doth anything against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the law of nature. For though the action be against the law of nature, yet it is not his, but contrarily, to refuse to do it is against the law of nature that forbideth breach of covenant. And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word, in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged. For the covenant made with the author is not valid without his counter assurance. But if he that so covenant hath knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance than the actor's word, then is the covenant valid, because the actor in this case maketh himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor. So, when the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only, there being no author, but himself. There are few things that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things as a church, a hospital, a bridge may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate cannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to their actors. Yet the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance, given them by those that are owners or governors of those things. And therefore, such things cannot be personated before there be some state of civil government. Likewise, children, fools, and madmen that have no use of reason may be personated by guardians or curators, but can be no authors during that time of any action done by them longer than when they shall recover the use of reason, they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the folly, he that hath right of governing them may give authority to the guardian. But this again has no place but in a state civil, because before such a state there is no dominion of persons. An idol or mere figment of the brain may be personated, as were the gods of the heathen, which by such officers as the state appointed, were personated and held possessions and other goods and rights, which men from time to time dedicated and consecrated unto them. But idols cannot be authors, for an idol is nothing. The authority proceeded from the state, and therefore before introduction of civil government the gods of the heathen could not be personated. The true god may be personated, as he was. First, Moses, who governed the Israelites, that were not his, but God's people, not in his own name with Hock Dikit Moses, but in God's name with Hock Dikit Dominus. Secondly, by the Son of Man, his own Son, our blessed Saviour Jesus Christ, that came to reduce the Jews and induce all nations into the kingdom of his Father, not as of himself, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking and working in the apostles, which Holy Ghost was a Comforter that came not of himself, but was sent and proceeded from them both. A multitude of men are made one person when they are by one man, or one person, represented, so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one. And it is the representer that beareth the person, and but one person, and unity cannot otherwise be understood in multitude. And because the multitude naturally is not one, but many, they cannot be understood for one, but many authors of everything their representatives sayeth or doeth in their name, every man giving their common representer authority from himself in particular, and owning all the actions the representer doth, in case they give him authority without stint. Otherwise, when they limit him in what and how far he shall represent them, none of them owneth more than they gave him commission to act. And if the representative consists of many men, the voice of the greater number must be considered as the voice of them all. For if the lesser number pronounced, for example, in the affirmative, and the greater in the negative, there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the affirmatives, and thereby the excess of negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the only voice the representative hath, and a representative of even numbers, especially when the number is not great, whereby the contradictory voices are oftentimes equal, is therefore oftentimes mute, and incapable of action. Yet in some cases, contradictory voices equal a number may determine a question, as in condemning or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemn not, do absolve. But not on the contrary condemn in that they absolve not, for when a cause is heard, not to condemn is to absolve. But on the contrary to say that not absolving is condemning is not true, the like it is in deliberation of executing presently or deferring till another time, for when the voices are equal, the not decreeing execution is a decree of dilation, or if the number be odd, as three or more men or assemblies, whereof everyone has by a negative voice authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative voices of the rest, this number is no representative. By the diversity of opinions and interests of men it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute person, and untapped, as for many things else, so for the government of a multitude, especially in time of war, of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called, which I have before defined, to be him that oneth the action of another simply. The second is he that oneth an action or covenant of another conditionally. That is to say, he undertaketh to do it if the other doth it not, at or before a certain time. And these authors conditional are generally called sureties, in Latin, fide yosores and sponsores, and particularly for debt, pre des, and for appearance before a judge or magistrate, and why this, and chapter 16, and first part of man. This recording is in the public domain. The second part of Commonwealth. The final cause and or design of man, who'd naturally love liberty and dominion over others, in the introduction of that restrained upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealth, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby. That is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war, which is necessarily consequent, as has been shown, to the natural passions of man, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and observation of those laws of nature set down in the 14th and 15th chapters. For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and in some doing to others as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like, and covenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature, which everyone had then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely, if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men, and in all places where men have lived by small families to rob and spoil one another has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of nature that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honor. And men observed no other laws therein but the laws of honor, that is to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives and instruments of husbandry, and as small families did then, so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families for their own security, enlarge their dominions upon all pretenses of danger and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders, and ever as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbors by open force and secret arts for want of other caution justly, and are remembered for it in after ages with honor. Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men that gives them this security, because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other make the advantage of strength so great as it's sufficient to carry the victory, and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear, and is then sufficient when the art of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the event of war as to move him to attempt, and be there never so great a multitude, yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgments and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defense nor protection neither against the common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength they do not help but hinder one another, and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing, whereby they are easily not only subdued by a very few that agree together, but also when there is no common enemy they make war upon each other for their particular interests, for if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice and other laws of nature without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same, and then there neither would be nor need to be any civil government or commonwealth at all, because there would be peace without subjection. Nor is it enough for the security which men desire should last all the time of their life that they be governed and directed by one judgment for a limited time, as in one battle or one war, for though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavor against the foreign enemy, yet afterwards when either they have no common enemy or he that by one part is held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve and fall again into a war amongst themselves. It is true that certain living creatures as bees and ants live sociably one with another, which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures, and yet have no other direction than their particular judgments and appetites, nor speech whereby one of them can signify to another what he thinks expedient for the common benefit, and therefore some men may perhaps desire to know why mankind cannot do the same, to which I answer, first that men are continually in competition for honor and dignity, which these creatures are not, and consequently amongst men there arises on that ground envy and hatred and finally war, but amongst these not so, secondly that amongst these creatures the common good differ not from the private, and being by nature inclined to their private they procure thereby the common benefit, but men whose joy consisted in comparing himself with other men can relish nothing but what is eminent, thirdly that these creatures having not as men the use of reason do not see nor think they see any fault in the administration of their common business, whereas amongst men there are very many that think themselves wiser and abler to govern the public better than the rest, and these strive to reform and innovate one this way another that way, and thereby bring it into distraction and civil war. Fourthly that these creatures though they have some use of voice in making known to one another that desires and other affections, yet they want that art of words by which some men can represent to others that which is good in the likeness of evil, and evil in the likeness of good, and augment or diminish the apparent greatness of good and evil, discontenting men and troubling their peace and their pleasure. Fifthly irrational creatures cannot distinguish between injury and damage, and therefore as long as they be at ease they are not offended with their fellows, whereas men is then most troublesome when he is most at ease, for then it is that he loves to show his wisdom and control the actions of them that govern the common wealth. Lastly the agreement of these creatures is natural, that of man is by covenant only, which is artificial, and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required besides covenant to make their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their attentions to the common benefit. The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will, which is as much as to say to appoint one man, or assembly of man, to bear their person, and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety, and therein to submit their wills every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord, it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man, I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth, in Latin, Civitas. This is a generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal God to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisted the essence of the Commonwealth, which, to define it, is one person of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants, one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence. And he that carried this person is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power, and everyone besides his subject. The attaining to this sovereign power is by two ways, one by natural force, as when a man maketh his children submit themselves and their children to his government as being able to destroy them if they refuse, all by war subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other is when men agree amongst themselves to submit to some man, or assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him against all others. This letter may be called a political Commonwealth, or Commonwealth by institution, and the former a Commonwealth by acquisition. And first I shall speak of a Commonwealth by institution.