 Good afternoon, everybody. I'm delighted to welcome you to this IIA webinar and of course, I'm particularly delighted to welcome Dr. Alexander de Hoop Schaefer, director of research on Atlantic security and director of the Paris Office of the double marshal fund, who has been very generous in taking time out of her schedule to speak to us today. Just some housekeeping. Dr. de Hoop Schaefer will speak to us for about 20 minutes or so, and then we will go to question and answers with our audience. You will be able to join the discussion in the Q&A on Zoom, which you should see on your screen. And please feel free to send in your questions throughout the session as they occur to you and we will come to them when Dr. Schaefer has finished her presentation. I should mention we will have to end the presentation at 10 minutes to two due to Dr. de Hoop Schaefer's schedule. We will also during the question answers ask you to identify yourself and your affiliation and a reminder that today's presentation and the question answers are both on the record. And you can feel free to join the discussion using the handle at IIA in Twitter. Let me now introduce Dr. Alexander de Hoop Schaefer, just before I hand over. She is Director of the Paris Office of the General Marshall Fund of the United States and Director of Research for Transatlantic Security. She's also the Managing Director of the Transatlantic Trends Annual Survey. And before joining the Marshall Fund, Alexander holds several positions in the French government and academia and advised international organizations. She served as Senior Advisor for US foreign policy and transatlantic relations on the policy planning staff of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She has also been an advisor from 2010 to 2013 to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. I could go on with many more qualifications and memberships of boards, but suffice it to say that she, her expertise is regularly sought by major companies and international organizations in anticipating global risk. She also has a degree in war studies from King's College London. I think we could not have chosen a better time Alexander to invite you to for the title of the discussion today on transatlantic relations post 911. Thank you very much for the past several weeks. We are really anxious to hear your assessment of where we go from here, given the turbulence of Afghanistan, etc. So with great pleasure, I hand over to you to give us your presentation. Thanks for your kind introduction and very happy to be with you. I remember going to your Institute a few years ago around the French presidential elections and it's always a pleasure to be able to to interact with you and your, and your colleagues so in fact yes the context is really quite quite particular and gives a lot of relevance to the discussion we'll be having today. You know I sit here in in Paris as the director of a transatlantic think tank. And I must say that since the end of August would be withdrawal from Afghanistan and then the August Alliance we have been awfully, awfully busy. But these are really fascinating times and I'm also eager to hear your, your perspectives on on what's going on and how the transatlantic relationship is being reshaped in many, many respects. So I'm going to try to be brief so that we can have a conversation. Basically I have three, three main points. One is, what does America is back mean for allies for European allies and the transatlantic relationship, what does it mean for us. And what does it mean in terms of our relationship with the new Biden administration. The second point I want to make is obviously that probably we have underestimated the scope and depth of US recalibrating its foreign policy priorities and underestimated the implications that this might have also for us as European allies. So I will dive deeper into, you know this recalibration that the United States is undergoing, and also linking that to us domestic politics because I think once again, we look at President Biden we listen to his speeches but we may be not pay enough attention to what's going on in US political class and within American society and how these deeper trends are also shaping and reshaping US foreign policy priorities and therefore directly impacting European's relationship with Washington. And the last point is really linked to a paper that my Deputy Martin Conce and myself wrote at the very beginning of the Biden administration, which was really to invite our American counterparts to maybe be more ambitious in terms of the transatlantic agenda and the transatlantic partnership and more generally which is, which was a proposal to move away from the sort of repetitive, sometimes boring burden sharing debates and to move towards a more ambitious transatlantic agenda which would more be about risk sharing and responsibility sharing and that obviously requires both sides of the Atlantic to actually better understand each other, better understand their respective priorities and also to better coordinate their policies in areas where they both have common or different strategic interests. So that's basically the three points I want to make. You know, Mary just just mentioned it, I mean in recent weeks, the transatlantic alliance has endured several serious stress tests. I think this is a time where the relationship is being tested not only by external security geopolitical challenges, but also internally, right. And the mishandling of consultations with the French over the submarine deal with the Australians marks to mean the third occasion in the last eight months or so, in which the Biden administration has shaken alliance relations. You know, the other two are the lack of operational coordination with allies over the withdrawal from Afghanistan. And before that, the frustration and anger in Central Eastern Europe over Washington's willingness to accommodate Germany on the Nord Stream to gas pipeline. And GMF has an office in Warsaw, and I can tell you that this was really deeply felt in countries like like Poland. I did the feeling that Central Eastern European countries have been circumvented, and that this was a deal that was decided between Washington and Berlin. And so when you add these different episodes Nord Stream to Afghanistan, and more recently the August alliance, there is an increasing debate in Europe across European capitals, whether this is a pattern or not of US decision making process. There are a lot of questions and a lot of debates at a time, especially where, as you all know the president Biden arrived and said, you know, my aim after the Trump mandate is actually to recommit your alliances to multilateralism and cooperation, in particular with European allies and so the August alliance, adding to the, you know, to to to precedent episodes. There is now a sort of, you know, reckoning that we need to have this in depth conversation about the foundations of the transatlantic partnership, I will get back to that in my in my final, in my final remarks, just to go back to Afghanistan. For me, the Afghanistan crisis revealed several inconvenient truths for the transatlantic relationships for Europeans, it has exposed both our inability, actually to influence the decision calculus in the United States, but also ourlessness to defend our own interests, right, evacuate our own citizens and allies, which we were not able to do without the support of Washington and this shows certainly be part of a lessons learned process among Europeans what what to do about about that. For the United States, it has demonstrated that even as it calls on Europe to take more responsibility for security and defense, especially in its own neighborhood. Most European countries still lack not only the necessary capabilities but above all, the political will to act right. And that was very much part of what Ursula von der Leyen, the EU Commission's president emphasized in her speech on the state of the European Union just a few, a few days ago. And which leads me to say I mean, you know I've been working in the transatlantic field for more than 15 years and what I see on the recurring basis is how these transatlantic relations have been characterized and still are by what I call asymmetric expectations. The United States looks to its European partners, first and foremost for providing capabilities, the famous burden sharing debate, but also for policy alignment with the US strategic priorities and European countries look to the United States for a stable predictable consultative inclusive leadership and of course security guarantees. And so most of the time these diverging expectations lead to mutual disappointment. Washington complains that European countries do not do enough, especially in terms of defense spending. I also complained that European allies are maybe not so not that reliable. When it comes to dealing with China and I will get back to that because you know in the August Alliance context we've been discussing a lot about this crisis of trust and I think it is a deep crisis of trust. But this crisis of trust is actually mutual. The United States look at the EU or European partners and say well they're too soft on China and we need to be tough. We need to build stronger alliances with the military components and Europeans are too soft and so there's and you know the fact that the EU also signed the investment agreement with China, just before President Biden was inaugurated was seen also from a Washington perspective as sort of, yeah, EU unilateralism, if I can say, and the fact that Europeans were not willing to fully align with US policy on China. And Europeans, on the other hand, perceive US leadership as less reliable, as permanently unilateral and driven by diverging views on geopolitics trade and I would more precisely say diverging views of how to respond to these geopolitical, economic technological challenges, right. I think we more or less share the same diagnosis, but when it comes to responding and dealing with these challenges. This is where the conversation becomes slightly more complicated. But that doesn't mean that it should be an obstacle for cooperation between both sides of the Atlantic. So this leads me to say you know what does America is back mean America is back after the Trump presidency that you know purposely neglected European allies multilateral organization. But I think we underestimated the fact that American was back was a very clear agenda right. China technological competition in particular, and that the EU or European allies would basically be a sort of collateral damage of this very clear US priority. I'll get back to that in the conversation part. America is back also meant, you know, reinvestment by the Biden administration in multilateral alliances the promise of consulting more with allies, but there again, I think we overestimated that in the agenda. We are still in a very American trend of selective engagement with allies with a very clear preference for ad hoc flexible smaller alliances. And we probably also underestimated the impact of Brexit on how the EU would be perceived as a partner by Washington. And with the UK out the EU from a Washington perspective, especially on hard security issues on the end of Pacific is considered as less of a strategic partner than the UK or Asian allies, you know that are part now of this quad alliance that Biden just hosted in in Washington. When it comes to NATO, I think it's always the same trend that you see in US policy. NATO remains relevant for the Biden administration, but as long as it addresses US global interests and priorities. And this is where you see the heavy China item being brought to more and more in NATO discussions, technological competition but also everything that has to do with the hybrid, hybrid threats right cyber and and all of that. So multilateral institutions remain very much relevant for US foreign policy, but only as long as it addresses US global interests and, and, and priorities. And I think that's something we need just to internalize in in our strategic thinking as well. Now, you know, there is a link between the Afghanistan withdrawal and the AUKUS alliance, I think it's part of a longer term continuum, right, the Biden administration, very much in the continuum of the Obama administration and Trump is really the president that is finally operationalizing the so called pivot to Asia. And that pivot makes strategic sense right. It's part of this broader recalibration that I've been discussing at the, at the beginning. But again, that shift in US priorities has not been easy on European allies, right. And this has created a crisis of trust, and the AUKUS alliance, for me, results in big part from a mutual frustration between the US and European partners. From the US perspective, the EU is seen as too soft. And from the EU perspective, the United States is seen as acting too aggressively on China so there is also part of that a policy, an approach disagreement that we actually need to and probably the, you know, crisis that this AUKUS alliance has provoked in France and across Europe should be the opportunity to probably have an in-depth conversation with the United States on the Indo-Pacific on the role of the EU or European powers in the region. And I think this conversation has already started to some extent. And, you know, this decision of the AUKUS alliance arrived at the time where actually the EU has been stepping up its policies on China with the screening of Chinese investment in Europe, publishing its strategy. And to a big extent China has pushed the EU to actually recognize that short term economic interests could have longer term strategic implications and probably the big eye opener has been the COVID-19 crisis, which revealed to us in a striking way how our dependencies on China on many critical aspects, industrial, pharmaceutical could have deeper political strategic consequences. So this has, I mean, really accelerated what I see as a European awakening regarding China. And this European awakening on China should have been seized by the Biden administration to faster more transatlantic dialogue on this issue, right? And not consulting France or European allies on the AUKUS alliance was a totally wrong approach. And I think there's a recognition today at the Biden administration level that this was probably not well handled. What this confirms as well is US geopolitical priorities. There has been an acceleration these last, I would say, five years because of China's increasing influence and stepping up its military capabilities in the China Sea and more broadly. And so there is, you know, a recognition that for example the Australian decision on the submarines was very much driven by China, right? And the fear of China in the Indo-Pacific region. And so there is also a discussion to have with our Asian, Asia Pacific allies in the region of how the EU or European powers can fit in the strategies of these Asian partners as well. So basically I would say, you know, there was a clear preference we see today from the part of the Biden administration. Again, it's not something new, it's something recurring in US foreign policy for smaller groupings of allies. And specifically, allies that align with US priorities and policies. And the Australian move is really a move that translates into an alignment with US policy vis-à-vis China, not only from an industrial interoperability perspective but also from a political, diplomatic, strategic perspective. And to a big extent, you know, Francis' offer in the Indo-Pacific region was precisely to be an interesting partner for Asian allies who are a bit concerned of aligning too much with the United States or you know, escalating tensions with China and the sort of more balanced approach that France and European partners propose in the region, I think still is a relevant and interesting political, industrial and strategic offer that we can make to these partners. So we'll have to see whether the, the, I would say middle term, longer term consequences on Europe's partnership policy in the region, whether this will push, you know, countries like India or others to become more concerned and say we need to, you know, align more with the United States or this will push these countries to keep this sort of more balanced poster in the region. So these trends are going to be interesting to follow. Lastly, what I wanted to conclude on and, you know, discuss that in the introduction is, you know, when you think of the AUKUS alliance, you think of the Afghanistan withdrawal, a sort of reprioritization of US foreign policy objectives. For me the big question is, in terms of the transatlantic partnership, do we still operate as, you know, burden sharing partners, that is to say a division of labor approach. And that is sometimes felt here in Paris that, you know, the US approach in terms of cooperating with Europeans is, you know, Washington saying we're going to focus on the big one, which is China, the Pacific, the tech competition, all of that. And therefore Europeans should take care more of their neighborhoods, southwards and eastwards. So a sort of division of labor based more or less on geography. I think this is not a satisfying way of working with Washington. It's neither satisfying for Americans or Europeans, because in fact, you know, Europeans have also interest in the Indo-Pac and Americans have interest in the South for neighborhood of Europe, of Europe as well. And for a big reason, which is that Chinese influence is increasing as well in Africa or in the Middle East. And so the so-called big power competition also plays in more regional settings, right? And so these are conversations that we also need to have with our American partners. Very lastly, and then I'm eager to have a conversation with you. How do we move from, you know, burden sharing to risk sharing? And, you know, as I've mentioned at the beginning, I think this is a much more ambitious approach to the transatlantic relationship. For now, the US desire for risk sharing is not that clear, but we need to move more and more towards that. And hopefully the, you know, the AUKUS alliance and the discussion, you know, that it has generated between both sides of the Atlantic should be the opportunity to have these deeper conversation. At a time where the US, you know, considers China and Chinese assertiveness to be its main geostrategic challenge. There is also a need for Washington to understand that a degree of so-called European strategic autonomy may be necessary for both French and American interest, right? And us Europeans, I think we also need to recognize that the United States is going through what I will call a deep identity crisis and abroad and which actually brought Donald Trump to the White House four years ago. There is a sort of crisis of confidence in the United States about its own power and capacity to shape events on the international scene, and that this will lead the United States to be much more selective on the international scene and to have a more narrowly focused type of engagement in international affairs, which, you know, is basically called US vital interest, right? So in that context, and I'll conclude on that, I think that Biden's foreign policy agenda should be compatible with Europe being a credible strategic player. Having a different way of approaching global challenges today, and that the EU, you know, non-alignment on US policies or approaches should not be seen as weakness or unreliability from the part of our American colleagues, but as something that should, in fact, trigger a constructive conversation and see how the EU or European partners can actually bring added value complement the US policy in the Indo-Pacific, because it's not just about the military dimension, it's very much about tech, about economic relationships, and this is probably where the EU also have a lot to bring to the conversation. So hopefully the anger that this has provoked, especially in Paris and rightfully so, it will just be the beginning of that type of deeper policy conversations, right? And once we get there, probably we will be defining in a more concrete way the sort of risk sharing approach I've been talking about, trying to define more common approaches or coordinated approaches on issues or regions where we have interests and where we actually need to be working together instead of competing with one another. So I'll just end here and very happy to engage with you in the conversation.