 Various objections are possible and have been made, plenty have been made. You can sort of map them on to the premises of the core argument. Of course, there are some subsidiary premises now, too, that we've mentioned. So an objection could be made to any of those. And here are some main ways of responding that we've seen so far. You might, first of all, object, and a lot of people in the first years of the discussion that the Hiddness argument did object to the premise, the premise, too, of the core argument which says there is non-resistant, non-belief or that there are non-resistant, non-believers. And there were people who were inclined to say, well, how can we be so sure of that? Peter Renningwagen in a session we were at together, he was putting that point to me and saying, yeah, it looks like we could be resistant without even perhaps being aware of it. There could be hidden resistance. And we're human beings, finite, imperfect beings. We're thinking about a perfect, morally demanding God. Shouldn't we expect that people might be a little reluctant to believe in such a God because of all the moral demands that might come with it, that sort of thing? So there could be hidden resistance. So that's sort of an argument. It doesn't have to claim that we know that everybody who seems to be a non-resistant, non-believer really is a resistant, non-believer. But how can we rule it out? How can we be sure that there are non-resistant, non-believers? And even if all we have to say is that we should be in doubt about that premise, that would already put that premise out of action philosophically speaking. So that's one objection or one kind of objection that could make, the hidden resistance objection, we might call it. A second way of objecting to the argument would be with respect to the idea of openness always. The argument says God would, if loving, always be open to personal relationship with finite creatures. And people sometimes get hung up on that word always and say, well, why should we suppose God would always be open? That seems a little extravagant. What if God were temporarily non-open? Or what if that sort of openness to relationship were postponed until the afterlife or something like that? Why should we think that God is any less good or less perfect, less loving and so on? So that would be another way of responding to the argument. And it's a way that has been used, for example, by the philosopher William Wainwright. And then there's a third way. This is the one that has been used most of all. There are many, many examples of this sort of objection to the hiddenness argument. It's now an objection, again, to the first premise, which says if God exists, God's going to see to it that there are no non-resistant, non-believers. On this objection, even if other things being equal, God would always be open. It is other things being equal and things are not equal. In fact, there are special reasons why God might, for a time, not be open to relationship. And they might have something to do specifically with belief and how belief functions, or non-belief. Something having the result that God would, for some time, not be open to relationship. And so there are various reasons that have been put forward. I'll just mention two. They're really broadly of the same kind, a moral kind. Some of the most interesting reasons that have been put forward have been broadly moral. So somebody might say, and this has been said by Michael Murray, for example, and Richard Swinburne, that people who are to be free, and of course the thing that's being valued now, the reason that's being put forward is to do with moral freedom, the value of moral freedom. People who are morally free have to have at least some impulse to do what is wrong, to do bad things. But if everybody believed in God, a perfect being who is in a very good position to punish you if you do something wrong, or maybe to reward you, you don't have to be so negative and emphasize punishment, maybe to reward you when you do well, when you do good. What incentive would there be to do what is wrong? And even if for some people there would still be that incentive, they'd still have a strong desire to do what's wrong, there might also be some people, and we should expect that there would be some people who are so sensitive, so impressionable as it were, that for them, even if not for others, at least for them, it would be hard to do what is wrong, it would be easy to do what is right. And so there's a kind of freedom that's taken away from them, they are no longer free to do what is wrong. So that's a kind of moral freedom argument. And even if it's only for some people for some time, that's all that's needed in order to put the hiddenness argument out of action, that's the claim. There's another, also an interesting way of using moral considerations to try to resist the hiddenness argument. This is a move that was put forward by Andrew Cullison, and he says that there's something peculiarly admirable about somebody who doesn't believe in God doing something self-sacrificial, for example sacrificing one's life. We all admire this when it happens, somebody who has the courage to sacrifice their life for some great noble cause, or to save the life of somebody else. There's something really noble about somebody who doesn't believe in God and has no thought of any kind of reward for this, no thought of an afterlife, the sacrifice just seems to be more impressive. And that's just taken away if everybody believes in God. This kind of move, I kind of like this move because if it works at all, it would have quite a wide effect. It would be good for lots and lots of people perhaps, not to believe in God if this kind of point has any significant force. So that too is a moral reason that might be used to say even if other things being equal, God would be always open to a relationship with finite persons. There are these special reasons why, at least for some time, God might not be. These are some examples. Okay, so we have those three types of objections. Yeah, I think most objections could be mapped into one of those three types.