 So, I'm going to talk briefly about the current policy and its effectiveness. If you're here, you probably know what we're talking about, but just to set the reference points, January 27th, the first executive order, covering seven countries. They probably sound familiar from the visa waiver program changes before. Also a ban on Syrian refugees. This ran into legal troubles, so we get travel ban version two on March 6th, which drops Iraq from the list, and also drops the explosive ban on Syrian refugees, although they're still covered by a secondary halt and cap, which applies to all refugees. So, the first thing I want to talk about is I'm going to focus on effectiveness, but the travel ban is neither moral nor wise, nor is it effective. It has numerous costs that we have here, ranging from disruption to U.S.-Iraqi relations at the time when we were just getting started with the Mosul operation in a serious way, to really fueling this war on Islam narrative that may help radicalize people within the U.S. and actually make the terrorist threat work, to a disruptive rollout of the program that both disrupted the way our airports functioned for a while, as well as just being evidence of what seems to have been a failed policymaking process to produce us. The impact on individuals themselves who are affected by it, the impact on states that is at the core of some of the legal challenges, and then finally we have sort of the foundational question of its erosion of the individualized suspicion. Now, it's possible that legally the ban will be narrowed sufficiently to people who those protections do not explicitly protect, not citizens. However, it still caused for concern that we're narrowing our understandings. But what about its effectiveness? Well, the initial justification that was laid out was, well, we had 9-11 in which 19 foreign hijackers entered the U.S. and killed thousands of people in a matter of hours, and then the executive order also lays out that numerous foreign-born individuals have engaged in terrorist activities since that attack. So let's take these one at a time. First, the 9-11 attack. Certainly, it was the failure of border security to not pick up that there were 19 hijackers who entered the U.S. However, there's two important points there. The first is that the travel ban was none of the countries that those hijackers came from, so it actually would not have prevented the 9-11 attacks. And the more important point is that we reformed our immigration system, our funding, as well as engaged in a variety of efforts against the terrorist threat, both abroad, military operations across the world, as well as at home, as well as just building a variety of databases that we now check immigrants against and people asking for visas. So really, even the executive order's language acknowledges that the system we had before 9-11, which really failed, is no longer in existence. It, however, claims that we are still seeing foreign-born attacks and foreign-born terrorist activity inside the U.S. So in fact, the ban would not have prevented a single death inside the U.S. since 9-11, nor as we saw would have prevented 9-11. At New America, we looked at 402 cases of terrorist activity of any kind, motivated by jihadism in the U.S. We found 13 people who committed an act of deadly violence inspired by jihadist ideology in the U.S. Every one of them was a citizen or legal resident, hence not covered by the travel ban. About half of them, actually more than half, were born inside the U.S., some, like Carlos Bledza's families, an African-American convert, can trace his background and his family's military service back to, at least, the Civil War. And of those who came from abroad or were born abroad, none of them actually came from the travel ban countries. And some of them came as children as jihadist and Arab did, others committed their attacks at least a decade or so after they entered the U.S., like Hashem Hidayat. So, it's really unclear how the travel ban would have affected any of this. Faced with the simple fact that administration and its supporters have pointed to the larger world of terrorist activity. If they can't find a deadly attack inside the U.S., what about funding or non-lethal attacks? Well, we looked at those 402 cases, each one since 9-11, and 84% were citizens or legal residents, not covered by the travel ban. That's at the time of charging. 72% were citizens. And about half, or at least half, at least 48%. It's probably higher, we have some we couldn't figure out. We're actually born American citizens. We also looked at the non-lethal attacks. Once again, about half were born in the U.S. And the remainder don't really track well with travel ban countries. You can see that there are three cases where the individuals were born in the travel ban countries. I'm going to talk about each of those now. None of them really provides a strong support for the ban. So first, we have Mohammad Tehariya Zar, who in 2006 drives a car in two fellow students at the University of North Carolina, sort of a precursor to some of the deadlier attacks we've seen lately. Now, he was born in Iran and came to the U.S. However, to put a sort of frame on your sense, we have one case of an individual from Iran committing a non-lethal attack into the U.S. And more than 300,000 Iranians came to the U.S. In just a period of, I believe, 2006 to 2015, not even the entire period we looked at, let alone people who came before 9-11 and conducted attacks. In addition, he was a naturalized citizen, which gives you a sense of how long he had been here. He came to the U.S. at the age of two and almost two decades prior to his attacks. Actually, more than two decades prior to his attack. So really, his entire radicalization occurred inside the U.S. It was homegrown and really had nothing to do with his origin in Iran. The travel ban really would not have prevented this, except by aspect of chance. It could have just as well been someone else. Then we have Dehradon, who recently was engaged in a stabbing in Minnesota, born in Somalia. Once again, we see there's a large number of people to frame this, about 70,000 according to Pew. Once again, like to Harry Azar, he's a naturalized citizen. Like to Harry Azar, came as a toddler to the U.S. And once again, he committed to attack about two decades after he entered the U.S. So this also doesn't seem to really support the travel ban. Now we have the case that most closely supports the travel ban. Abdul Razak Ali Artan, he came to the U.S. as a refugee in 2014, was born in Somalia, which would seem to support the travel ban's claim. However, when we dig deeper into this case, we see a couple of things. First, he looked Somalia for Pakistan as a child, and then entered the U.S. from Pakistan. If we look at that, which he did as a teen, if we look at that, if he radicalized abroad, which we really do not know if that's the case, it most likely occurred in Pakistan when he was of a greater age and not in Somalia. Pakistan is not covered by the travel ban. Perhaps more importantly, he was radicalized according to his Facebook post, claiming the attack, in part by listening to N.W.Locky's sermons and arguments, which L.W.Locky was born in the U.S. He's a natural born citizen. He spent the large part of his adult life inside the U.S. or at least traveling back and forth, taught in the U.S. And his ideas, which draw explicitly upon American history, have radicalized a wide range of Americans, including natural born American citizens, like some of those we've talked about before, like Carlos Bledsev. It's far from clear what exactly was unique about his origin in Somalia, if anything, that explains his care of activity. So the Department of Homeland Security actually somewhat agrees with these key points. As we can see here, they did an assessment based on the travel ban. They found similar to us that about 50% were actually U.S. citizens or born U.S. citizens. That they say that country of citizenship unlikely to be a reliable indicator of terrorist activity. They also found that the foreign-born individuals came from 26 countries. They're not centered in the travel ban countries. And indeed, for three of the travel ban countries, Iran, Sudan, and Yemen, they only had one individual among those. And Syria, where the original travel ban, banned any refugees from coming, had zero cases. Another Department of Homeland Security assessment on this looked deeper into some of the points we saw in those individual cases I pulled out. Among the most foreign-based U.S. violent extremists, likely radicalized several years after entering the U.S., nearly half of the foreign-born violent extremists were less than 16 years old when they came. So again, their radicalization was homegrown. The majority of foreign-born individuals who came to the U.S. came more than 10 years prior to their indictment or death, similar to Tehariah Zahra and Tahira Adam. And then we have nearly all of the parents who came with minor children did not espouse radical ideology. So it's not that the parents should have been screened out and they brought their children and just radicalized it in a community here. It's the radicalization process that is occurring broadly in the U.S. and isn't really about their national origin. So you might say, what do we care? Any entry is at least a threat that can be prevented. Well, we have a quick comparison here. Dillon Roof killed nine people at a black church in Charleston, South Carolina. He's from, born in Columbia, South Carolina. Population about 131,000, similar to some of the travel ban countries. So would we prevent Dillon Roof or would we prevent individuals born in Columbia, South Carolina from traveling throughout the U.S.? No, that would be absurd. Yet, for some reason, we take exactly these same cases and currently the Department of Homeland Security's frequently asked questions and administration spokespeople have tended to take cases that read a lot like this and put it forward as a reason to ban hundreds of thousands of people from traveling to the U.S. So let's talk quickly about the administration's numbers. You might remember when President Trump addressed the joint session of Congress. He said that the majority of individuals according to a Department of Justice study who had engaged in terrorist activity into the U.S. were foreign born. You may have also heard in numbers 72, that's that same list, but the people only from that original travel ban list. Then recently DHS said they have 300 FBI investigations of people who entered as refugees. Let's talk about the list first. First of all, this list is problematic. In 2003, the DOJ actually said they did not want to release this list because it was prejudicial. The reason it included people who were not actually engaged in terrorist activity. Many of these people on the list are simply investigations that began as terrorist activity but were later dismissed that there was no linkage. It also does not include international cases on it. It's also not a Department of Justice list. They did not code it for national origin. That's something that then Senator Sessions did. We should at least get the sourcing of that, correct? And finally, even at face value, only a small percentage of the individuals on that list came from the travel ban countries. So let's talk about those 72 individuals that Steven Miller referenced on Meet the Press when initially justifying the travel ban. Well, he looked at that list. We found four individuals on it who had actually never entered the United States. They were either captured abroad or extradited here in the past trial. At least 20% had no tied to terrorism even by the government's acknowledgement. Going back to this really isn't a list that should be used to understand the terrorist threat. There were only three attack plots. Two were monitored by informants. Both of them entered during the 1990s before we were focused on terrorism. So if there was an identifiable threat, we'd probably catch it now. But we weren't looking for that kind of thing then. And one entered as a child again. The other wasn't a jihadist case. That's the odd Iranian who was involved in a plot detailed to Saudi ambassador. There's questions there. We don't really know what's up with that plot. If that's going to be used to shut down travel from a number of countries, it really needs greater explanation. And finally, 19 were Iraqis and the travel ban no longer applies to them. So 300 refugee investigations. First, an investigation is not a case. Most of these are closed. As you can see by, oh, there's somewhere between 1,000 and 10,000 investigations a year at least. Many more if you're counting even lesser types of investigations. The following up on tips, et cetera. And we found only 402 cases that have actually been charged since 9-11. In addition, about three million refugees entered the, there are about three million people that entered as refugees in the US and more than 100,000 from the six travel ban countries alone. And when as the sides of Washington posed the US Refugees Commissions Program said that they've only got about a dozen who were arrested or kicked out due to terrorist threats. That were present at the time they entered the country. Less than a fraction of 1%. But let's talk about one of the cases that has been put out by DHS who justifies the 2010 Portland, Oregon case in which Mohamed Osman Mohamed, born in Somalia, plotted to attack a Christmas tree, festivity in Portland, Oregon. Indeed, he was born in 1991 in Somalia. However, like many of the cases we've seen before, he entered as a kid. Actually his family entered in 1993. He was two or thereabouts. They came prior to 9-11 when we massively beefed up our security infrastructure. And decades before he actually was indicted in this case. His radicalization occurred here, not abroad. He became a naturalized citizen like others we looked at. He was caught in a sting operation which though not dismissive of this, and this may well have been a real case, raises questions about how reliant we should be on it. Especially in regards to any particular details of how that plot played out. In addition, it just shows that there are other investigative measures that are already protecting the US. We don't need to prevent it at the area where kids at the age of two entered the US. That's what we have informants and tips and the FBI for. And finally, his father who did enter the US as an adult from Somalia provided a tip to the FBI regarding them. So just to close out, this isn't just an issue of data. In fact, I would argue that administrations claims makes two fundamental errors about the jihadist threat today which is both a concern for why exactly are they approaching it this way but also are they effectively analyzing the real threat. First, the internet knows no visa. Really the radicalization today is occurring on the internet. We found 44% of these cases either were posting jihadist material online in their social media or having encrypted communications. That's actually somewhat misleading because at the beginning of the decade it was very few people and now it's almost everyone. In fact, assistant attorney general for national security record says that she can't remember a case that day after going currently where there's not an online radicalization time. So let's take a quick look at the anatomy of an ISIS attack in the US. This is the Garland attack. Who did it involve? Well, two US-born citizens, Nadir Sufi and Elton Simpson, born in the US. They had support according to charging and court documents from a third US citizen, also born in the US, Dr. Thomas. And then they were in online communication with Wishaid Miski who was a legal permanent resident from Somalia who had left the United States years ago to fight with Al-Shabaab, never intended to return and was in communication over the internet with them, and a Brit who was operating from Raqqa, Syria. The travel ban would not have prevented any of this. This is what the greatest likely threat from ISIS really looks like in the US, or at least the most organized today. The second main threat is that political violence has a long history in the US. It's simply wrong for us to assume that when an individual is from abroad, that's what defines their terrorist activity. For example, we've been tracking deadly attacks by a variety of ideologies in the US. Well, Jihadists have killed 95 people in the US. Far-right extremists have killed, I think it's 51 now. In fact, for a number of years they had killed more people than Jihadists. We also now have a range of sort of violence that is quasi-political, but not really. For example, an armed man showing up at Khamid-Ping-Pong after reading sort of some fake news reports. We have our mass shooting problems. This is from Mother Jones. Find sort of a death toll from mass shootings and other attacks, only those inspired or referencing Columbine. Not dissimilar from those we have seen from Jihadist attacks. So that's all I have, but I just want to leave you with a return to, we've seen why it's not really effective or it doesn't address the problem, but it also would appear to make the problem worse and imposes a variety of costs. Simply instituting an ineffective policy to assuage our fears or to follow through on a campaign promise is not a no-risk proposition. Thanks.