 Section 49 of Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Patrick McAfee, Evanston. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. Case Studies, Chapter 10, Part 1. 10. Atomic Veterans. Human experimentation in connection with atomic bomb tests. In 1946, the United States conducted Operation Crossroads, the first peacetime nuclear weapons tests, before an audience of worldwide press and visiting dignitaries at the Bikini Atal in the Pacific Marshall Islands. In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. And in December 1950, shortly after the United States entered the Korean War, President Truman chose Nevada as the site for continental testing of nuclear weapons. Testing of atomic bombs in Nevada began in January 1951 and continued throughout the decade. Further testing of atomic, then hydrogen bombs, took place in the Pacific. By the time atmospheric testing was halted by the 1963 Test Ban Treaty, the United States had conducted more than 200 atmospheric tests and dozens of underground tests. The rules governing nuclear weapons tests were not spelled out by law or handed down by tradition. They had to be created in ongoing interplay between the new Atomic Energy Commission and the new Department of Defense. The tests were important to many governmental agencies, but, of course, critical to the AEC and the DOD. The AEC, as the source of weapons design expertise, was interested in the performance of new bomb designs and, along with DOD, in the effects of the weapons. The DOD and each of the armed services had particular interests in the use of the tests to learn how atomic wars could be fought and won, if, as seemed quite possible at mid-century, they had to be. Along with civilian agencies, such as the Public Health Service, the Veterans Administration, and the Department of Agriculture, they shared an interest in civil defense against the use of the bomb in wartime and the impact of the bomb's use in peacetime tests as well as war on the public health and welfare. The bomb tests inevitably involved risk and uncertainty. Safety was a basic and continued concern, and the development of radiation safety practices and understanding was therefore an essential part of the test program. At its core, the test program was established to determine how well newly designed nuclear weapons worked, but officials and researchers quickly saw the need and opportunity to use the tests for other purposes as well. More than 200,000 people, including soldiers, sailors, air crews, and civilian test personnel, were engaged to staff the tests, to participate as trainees or observers, and to gather data on the effects of the weapons. The committee was not chartered to review the atomic bomb tests or the experience of the troops present at the detonations. However, early in our tenure, we heard from veterans who participated in the tests and their family members who urged that we include their experiences in our review. In testimony before the advisory committee, atomic vets and their widows stated forcefully that all those who participated in the bomb tests were, in a real sense, participants in an experiment. It also was argued that biomedical experiments involving military personnel as human subjects took place in connection with the tests. The interest among atomic veterans and their families in the activities of the advisory committee and the government's commitment to investigating human radiation experiments was intense. When the Department of Energy established its helpline for citizens concerned about human radiation experiments, for example, bomb test participants and their family members were the single largest group of callers among the approximately 20,000 calls received. That the bomb tests were, in some sense, experiments is, of course, correct. The tests of new and untried atomic weapons were, wrote the Chief Health Officer of the AEC's Los Alamos Lab, quote, fundamentally large-scale laboratory experiments, end quote. At the same time, although there was a real possibility that human subject research had been conducted in conjunction with the bomb tests, the tests were not themselves experiments involving human subjects. The committee reviewed the historical record to determine if human experiments had taken place in connection with the tests. We found that somewhere in the range of 2,000 to 3,000 military personnel at the tests did serve as the subjects of research in connection with the tests. In most cases, these research subjects were engaged in activities similar to those engaged in by many other service personnel who were not research subjects. For example, some aircrew flew through atomic clouds in experiments to measure radiation absorbed by their bodies, but many others flew in or around atomic clouds to gather data on radiation in the clouds. The Defense Department generally did not distinguish such research from otherwise similar activities, treating both as part of the duties of military personnel. The experience of the atomic veterans illustrates well the difficulty in locating the boundary between research involving human subjects and other activities conducted in occupational settings that routinely involve exposure to hazards. The more the committee investigated the human research projects conducted in conjunction with the bomb tests, the more we found ourselves discussing issues that affected all the service personnel who had been present at the tests and not just those who also had been involved as subjects of research. This occurred both because of the boundary problem just described and because critical decisions about initial exposure levels and follow-up of veterans were generally not made separately for research subjects and other personnel present at the tests. Legislation passed in 1984 and 1988 that provides the basis for compensation to some atomic veterans similarly does not distinguish between those veterans who were research subjects and the vast majority who were not. In this chapter we present what we have learned about human experimentation conducted in conjunction with atomic bomb testing, as well as some observations about the experience of the atomic veterans generally. In the first section of the chapter we focus on research involving human subjects. We begin by a review of the 1951-1952 discussions in which DOD biomedical advisors considered the role of troops at the bomb tests and the need for biomedical research to be conducted in conjunction with them. We then look at a research activity that was given the highest priority by these advisors. The psychological and physiological testing of troops involved in training maneuvers at bomb tests and officers who volunteered to occupy foxholes in the range of one mile from ground zero. We next turn to the so-called flash blindedness experiments conducted to measure the effect on vision of the detonation of an atomic bomb. Finally we look at research in which men were used to help measure the radiation absorbed by protective clothing by equipment that humans operated and by the human body. We noted the outset that while the studies all took place in the context of the atomic bomb and therefore involved some potential exposure to radiation, none of them were designed to measure the biological effects of radiation itself as opposed to the levels of exposure. A basic reason this was so was the determination of the DOD and the AEC to keep exposure levels of test participants below those at which acute radiation effects were likely to be experienced and therefore measurable. In the second section of the chapter we discuss issues of concern to the committee that affected all the atomic veterans. We review how risk was considered by AEC and DOD officials at the time the tests were being planned, the creation and maintenance of records related to bomb test exposure, and what is now known about the longer term risks of participation in the tests. We also discuss the legacy of distrust among atomic veterans and their families that stems in part from the failure to create and maintain adequate records. Finally we conclude with a discussion of what the atomic bomb test experience tells us about the boundary between experimental and occupational exposures to risk and some lessons that remain to be learned from the experience of the atomic veterans. Human research at the bomb tests. The Defense Department's medical experts, advocates of troop maneuvers and human experimentation. As we saw in the introduction, in 1949 when AEC and DOD experts met to consider the psychological problems connected to construction of the proposed nuclear powered airplane, the NEPA project, there was a consensus that America's atomic war fighting capability would be crippled unless servicemen were cured of the mystical fear of radiation. When routine testing of nuclear weapons began at the test site in Nevada in 1951, the opportunity to take action to deal with this problem presented itself. DOD officials urged that troop maneuvers and training exercises be conducted in connection with the tests. Whole military units would be employed in these exercises and participation, as part of the duty of the soldier, would not be voluntary. DOD's military experts simultaneously urged that the tests be used for training and, quote, indoctrination, end quote, about atomic warfare and as an opportunity for research. The psychological and physiological testing of troops to address the fear of radiation was the first of the research to take place. This testing was largely conducted as an occupational rather than an experimental activity. In a June 27, 1951 memorandum to high DOD officials, Dr. Richard Mealing, the chair of the Secretary of Defense's top medical advisory group, the Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, addressed the question of, quote, military medical problems, end quote, associated with bomb tests. The memorandum made clear that troops should be placed at bomb tests, not so much to examine risk as to demonstrate relative safety. Quote, fear of radiation, end quote, Dr. Mealing's memorandum began, quote, is almost universal among the uninitiated and unless it is overcome in the military forces, it could present a most serious problem if atomic weapons are used, end quote. In fact, quote, it has been proven repeatedly that persistent ionizing radiation following air bursts does not occur, hence the fear that it presents a dangerous hazard to personnel is groundless, end quote. Dr. Mealing urged that, quote, positive action be taken at the earliest opportunity to demonstrate this fact in a practical manner, end quote. He continued, a, quote, regimental combat team should be deployed approximately 12 miles from the designated ground zero of an air burst and immediately following the explosion, they should move into the burst area in fulfillment of a tactical problem, end quote. The exercise, quote, would clearly demonstrate that persistent ionizing radiation following an air burst atomic explosion presents no hazards to personnel and would effectively dispel a fear that is dangerous and demoralizing but entirely groundless, end quote. Dr. Mealing's proposal to put troops at the bomb tests in order to allay their fears may well have been an echo of what the military already had in mind. The Army's 1950, quote, atomic energy indoctrination, end quote, pamphlet, a primer for soldiers, showed that the military was concerned that misperception of the effect of an air burst could be damaging in combat, quote, lingering radioactivity will be virtually non-existent in the case of the normal air burst, end quote. It reassured the soldiers. The greater danger it told them was the probability that, quote, an unreasoning fear of lingering radioactivity, end quote, would take, quote, an unnecessary toll in American lives, end quote. While the tests provided an opportunity to allay fears, they simultaneously provided the opportunity to gather data. In this regard, Dr. Mealing appeared to be ahead of his military colleagues in expressing concern that the military was not taking adequate advantage of the bomb tests as an opportunity for, quote, biomedical participation, end quote. In February 1951, in fact, following tests in Nevada, he had urged the DOD to incorporate, quote, biomedical tests, end quote, into plans for future bomb tests. Mealing's suggestion that planning for biomedical tests be undertaken wound its way through the Secretary of Defense's research and development bureaucracy and fell into the lap of the civilian-chaired joint panel on the medical aspects of atomic warfare. Under the chairmanship of Harvard's Dr. Joseph Alb, the joint panel was the gathering place for the small world of government radiation researchers and their private consultants. Its periodic, quote, program guidance reports, end quote, laid out the atomic warfare medical research agenda, summarizing work that was ongoing and that which remained. At its meetings, participants heard from the CIA on foreign medical intelligence, debated the need for human experimentation, and learned of the latest developments in radiation injury research of the blast and heat effects of the bomb and of instruments needed to measure radiation effects. In September 1951, the joint panel considered a draft report on, quote, biomedical participation, end quote, in bomb tests, quote, it is of course obvious, end quote, the report noted, quote, that a test of a new and untried atomic weapon is not a place to have an unlimited number of people milling about and operating independently, end quote. Planning was therefore in order. There were, the document explained, basic criteria for experimentation at bomb tests. For example, quote, does the experiment have to be done at a bomb detonation? Is it impossible or impractical in a laboratory, end quote. The document turned to, quote, specific problems for future tests, end quote. The list of 29 problems was not intended to be all inclusive, but was, quote, designed to show the types of problems which should be considered as a legitimate basis for biomedical participation in future weapons tests, end quote. The term human experimentation was not used and most of the items could be performed without humans. However, the list included several examples of research involving human subjects. 11. Effects of exposure of the eye to the atomic flash. 24. Measurements of radioactive isotopes in the body fluids of atomic weapons test personnel. 27. The efficiency and suitability of various protective devices and equipment for atomic weapons war. 28. Psychophysiological changes after exposure to nuclear explosions. 29. Orientation flights in the vicinity of nuclear explosions for certain combat air crews. By the end of the decade, human research would be conducted in all these areas. At the same September meeting, the Joint Panel also considered a, quote, program guidance report, end quote, on the kinds of atomic warfare-related research that needed to be conducted in the laboratory as well as in the field. The areas singled out for immediate and critical attention included the initiation of, quote, troop indoctrination at atomic detonations, end quote, end quote, psychological observations on troops at atom bomb tests, end quote. A section on, quote, biomedical participation in future atomic weapons tests, end quote, concluded that the next step should be, quote, 4.1 to complete present program and plan for participation in future tests in light of results from Operation Greenhouse, a prior atomic test series. These plans should include studies on the effect of atomic weapons detonations on a troop unit in normal tactical support, end quote. Thus, while it was well known at the time that troops participated at the bomb tests and were subjected to psychological testing, it now is evident that the DOD's medical advisors advocated the presence of the troops at the tests for both training and research purposes. The doctors were not alone in attaching high priority to such research. The Joint Panel's September guidance punctuated, perhaps echoed, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project's mid-summer 1951 call for a, quote, systematic research study to provide a sound basis for estimating troop reaction to the bomb experience and the indoctrination value of the maneuver, end quote. End of Section 49, Recording by Patrick McAfee, Evanston. Section 50 of Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Patrick McAfee, Evanston. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. Case Studies, Chapter 10, Part 2. The HUM-R-R-O-H-U-M-R-R-O Experiments. Just two months later, in November 1951, had a bomb test in the Nevada desert. The Army conducted the first in a series of atomic exercises. This exercise was designed primarily to train and indoctrinate troops in the fighting of atomic wars. The exercise also provided an opportunity for psychological and physiological testing of the effects of the experience on the troops. Desert Rock was an Army encampment in Nevada adjacent to the nuclear test site. At the exercise named Desert Rock 1, more than 600 of the 5,000 men present would be studied by psychologists from a newly created Army contractor, the Human Resources Research Organization, HUM-R-R-O. HUM-R-R-O's research was directed by Dr. Meredith Crawford, who was recruited by the Army from a deanship at Vanderbilt University. The identity of all the participants involved in the HUM-R-R-O experiments and the further DOD research discussed later in this chapter is not known. The numbers of those who participated must be reconstructed from available reports. The highly publicized bomb test was well attended by military and civilian officials. Quote, Las Vegas, Nevada, Time Magazine reported, had not seen so many soldiers since World War II. The hotels were jammed with high brass. Out on the desert, 65 miles away, 5,000 hand-picked troops were getting their final briefing before Exercise Desert Rock 1, the GI's introduction to atomic warfare. The detonation representative, Al Gore, father of the current vice president, told the New York Times was, quote, the most spectacular event I have ever witnessed. As I witnessed the accuracy and cataclysmic effect of the explosion, I felt the conviction that it might be used in Korea if the ceasefire negotiations broke down, end quote. To render the experience more realistic, the observers and participants were told to imagine that aggressor armies had invaded the United States and were now at the California-Nevada border. An atomic bomb would be dropped with the troops occupying a position 7 miles from ground zero. After the detonations they would, quote, attack into the bombed area, end quote. At their home base two groups of troops, a control group that would stay at home base and an experimental group that would go to Nevada, had listened to lectures and seen films intended to indoctrinate them about the effects of the bomb and radiation safety. Both groups were administered a questionnaire to determine how well they had understood the information provided. Dr. Crawford explained in a 1994 interview that, quote, indoctrination, end quote, which today has a negative connotation, was not intended to suggest myths representation of fact, but, quote, had more to do with attitude, feeling, and motivation, end quote. At Desert Rock the experimental group was given a further, quote, non-technical briefing, end quote. They were, quote, reminded that no danger of immediate radiation remains 90 seconds after an air burst, that they would be sufficiently far from ground zero to be perfectly safe without shelter, and that with simple protection they could even be placed quite close to the center of the detonation with no harm to them, end quote. After the blast a questionnaire was again administered to most of the experimental subjects and physiological measurements including blood pressure and heart rates were taken. The questionnaire was designed to test the success of the indoctrination. For example, questions included answers in parentheses were those the UMRRO report stated were correct, quote, one, suppose the A-bomb were used against enemy troops by exploding at 2,000 feet from the ground and suppose all enemy troops were killed. How dangerous do you think it would be for our troops to enter the area directly below the explosion within a day? Not dangerous at all. Six, if an A-bomb were exploded at 2,000 feet under what conditions would it be safe to move into the spot directly below right after the explosion, safe if you wore regular field clothing, end quote. These answers were not correct. Answers to questions like the above depend on weather conditions, the yield of the weapon, and the assumptions about the degree of risk from low levels of exposure. For example, while an air burst where the fireball does not touch the ground may result in little fallout in the immediate area of the blast, it does not result in none if rain is present. A substantial amount of fallout may be localized. Similarly, whereas the 1946 Bikini bomb tests at Operation Crossroads in the Pacific had caused contamination so severe that many of the surviving ships were scrapped, the question and answer provided said, quote, Some of the ships in the Bikini tests had to be sunk because they were too radioactive to be used again. False, end quote. In a 1995 review of the 1951 questionnaire, the Defense Department found that, quote, changes, corrections, clarifications, end quote, would be in order for nine of the 30 questions. In January 1952, the Army Surgeon General expressed, quote, continuing interest in the conduct of psychiatric observations, end quote, offering funds for, quote, psychiatric research in connection with atomic weapons tests involving troop participation, end quote. In March 1952, however, the Army and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, A-F-S-W-P, which coordinated nuclear weapons activities for the DOD, provided critical reflections on Desert Rock 1, quote, one is inevitably drawn to the conclusion, end quote, that the results, though measurable, were highly indeterminate and unconvincing. The limitations of evaluation were inherent in the problem. Handicapped by a preconceived notion that there would be no reaction, it took on the form of a gigantic experiment whose results were already known. No well-controlled studies could be undertaken which could presume even superficial validity, end quote. In a letter to the AEC, the A-F-S-W-P went further, owing to the, quote, tactically unrealistic distance of seven miles to which all participating troops were required to withdraw for the detonation, end quote. Troops might get the wrong impression about nuclear warfare. In 1994, Dr. Crawford reflected on the logic of testing for panic in an environment that was thought to be too safe, quote. No troops, end quote, Dr. Crawford recalled, quote, were exposed anywhere where anybody thought there was any danger. So you might ask the question, so what? I've asked that question myself and I've thought about it. It was the first Hume RRO project. It was really pretty well agreed upon before I got up here from Tennessee. So we did what we could, end quote. Despite the reservations about the 1951 study on May 25, 1952, the Army conducted its second Hume RRO experiment at the exercise called Desert Rock 4. It was similar in methodology to the first experiment and involved about 700 soldiers who witnessed the shot and 900 who served in the control group as non-participants. This time to add more realism, the troops witnessed the blast, an 11 kiloton weapon that was set off from the top of a tower from four miles from ground zero. By the end of the second research effort, there was even more reason to question the utility of the experiments. Hume RRO's report on Desert Rock 4 stated that while knowledge increased as a result of the indoctrination, the actual maneuver experience did not produce significant improvement in test scores and decreases were actually reported on some questions. In both Desert Rock 1 and Desert Rock 4, the Army hoped that the troops who witnessed the blasts would disseminate information to the troops who stayed at home base. However, the troops who participated in the exercises were warned that discussion of their experiences could bring severe punishment and the researchers found that communication was at a minimum. Moreover, those who stayed home, Hume RRO found, quote, showed no evidence of great interest of extensive discussion or of any important benefit from dissemination as a result of the atomic maneuver, end quote. Meanwhile, the experience that the participants had been warned not to discuss and that was of little interest to their comrades was front page news throughout the country, quote. When they returned to camp, end quote, time reported of the first Desert Rock exercise, quote, the men were quickly herded into showers. Some were given test forms to fill out. Did you sweat? Did your heart beat fast at any time? Did you lose bladder control? Most of the answers were no, end quote. Without any direct comment on the results of the Desert Rock 1 and 4 experiments, in September 1952 the joint panel urged that the psychological research continue, quote. It is possible that inclination to panic in the face of AW, atomic warfare, and RW, radiological warfare, may prove high. It seems advisable, therefore, to increase research efforts in the scientific study of panic and its results and to seek means for prophylaxis. The panel supports the point of view that troop participation in tests of atomic weapons is valuable. As many men as possible ought to be exposed to this experience under safe conditions. Psychological evaluation is difficult and results can be expected to appear superficially trivial. But the matter is of such extreme importance that the research should be persisted in utilizing every opportunity, end quote. Indeed, a third set of experiments was carried out in April 1953 at Desert Rock 5. This time the number of participants is unknown. The final HUME RRO bomb test study was conducted in 1957 at Operation Plumb Bob. No formal report was prepared, but the experience was recorded in a personalized recollection by a HUME RRO staffer. Whether related delays, the departure of HUME RRO staff, the continued redesign of the exercises, and the failure of a fifth of the troops to return from a weekend pass in time for the events took their toll. The researchers were not given the script used in the indoctrination lectures to the troops. Thus it was impossible for the researchers to know whether incorrect responses were due to, quote, lack of inclusion of the topic in the orientation or to ineffective instruction, end quote. The research was to include exercises such as crawling over contaminated ground. Yet again, the researchers found that the safety rules in force precluded important study, quote, shock and panic would not be observed, end quote. There is no question that HUME RRO activities were research involving human subjects. The projects involved an experimental design in which soldier subjects were assigned either to an experimental or a control condition. Available evidence suggests, however, that the Army did not treat HUME RRO as a discretionary research activity, but as an element of the training exercise in which soldiers were participating in the course of normal duty. The HUME RRO subjects were apparently not volunteers. Dr. Crawford in 1994 said of the HUME RRO subjects, quote, whether they were requested to formally give their consent is pretty unknowable, because in the Army or any other military service people generally do what they're asked to do, told to do, end quote. Indeed, as HUME RRO's initial report stated, the primary purpose of the atomic exercise was training, quote, research was necessarily of secondary importance, end quote. However, Dr. Crawford felt confident that the risks were disclosed. Because of the, quote, number and intensity of briefings, no soldier to our knowledge went into the test situation with no idea about what to expect. They were adequately informed, end quote. We now know that in 1952 the Defense Department's medical experts were simultaneously locked in discussion of the need for psychological studies and other human research at bomb tests, and, as we saw in Chapter 1, the need for a policy to govern human experimentation related to atomic, biological, and chemical warfare. In October of that year, the Armed Forces Medical Policy Council recommended that the Nuremberg Code be adopted as it was by Secretary Charles Wilson in 1953. What is still missing is information that might show how, as seems to be the case, the same experts could have been having these discussions without communicating the essence of them to those responsible for conducting the human research at the tests. There is no evidence that the investigators responsible for HUME RRO were informed about the Wilson memo. Dr. Crawford, for example, when queried in 1994 reported that he did not know of the 1953 Wilson Memorandum. It is possible that HUME RRO was not viewed as being subject to the requirements stated in the Wilson memo, despite the fact that it was human research relating to atomic warfare. Although the experimental variable was participation at a bomb test, arguably the troops would have been present at the test in any event, along with many thousands of other soldiers who were not subjects in the HUME RRO research. Atomic Effects Experiments At the same time that the third set of HUME RRO experiments was being conducted in April 1953 at Desert Rock 5, the Army called on several dozen, quote, volunteers for atomic effects experiments, end quote. According to the Army, all were officers familiar with, quote, experimental explosion involved, end quote, and were able to personally judge, quote, the probability of significant variations in weapon yield, end quote. They were instructed to choose the distance from ground zero they would like to occupy in a foxhole at the time of detonation as long as it was no closer than 1,500 yards. If the surviving documentation is the measure, these officers and perhaps officer volunteers in the subsequent Desert Rock series were the only subjects of bomb test research who signed forms saying that they were voluntarily undertaking risk. The exposures were meant to set a standard for developing, quote, troop exposure programs and for confirming safety doctrine for tactical use of atomic weapons, end quote. An Army report on the volunteers at Desert Rock 5 concluded that there would be, quote, little more to be gained by placing volunteer groups in forward positions on future shots, end quote. In April 24, 1953, Army Memorandum recommended termination of the program, quote, as little will be gained in repeatedly placing volunteers in trenches 2,000 yards from ground zero, end quote. However, officer volunteers were called on again at the next Desert Rock exercises at the 1955 nuclear test series called Operation Teapot. Following Teapot, the Army recommended that further experiments be conducted in which the volunteers would be moved closer to ground zero, quote, until thresholds of intolerability are ascertained, end quote. This, quote, use of human volunteers under conditions of calculated risk, end quote. The Army told the AFSWP, quote, is essential in the final phase of both the physiological and psychological aspects of the overall program, end quote. In response, the AFSWP pointed out that the injury threshold could not be determined, quote, without eventually exceeding it, end quote. The Army was essentially proposing human beings be exposed to the detonation's blast effects to the point of injury. The proposal, an AFSWP memo explained, would not pass muster under the rules of the Nevada test site and was otherwise unacceptable, quote, in particular, it is significant that the long-range effect on the human system of sublethal doses of nuclear radiation is an unknown field. Exposure of volunteers to doses higher than those now thought safe may not produce immediate deleterious effects, but may result in numerous complaints from relatives, claims against the government, and unfavorable public opinion in the event that deaths and incapacitation occur with the passage of time, end quote. If the Army wanted more data on the blast effects AFSWP declared, it should proceed with laboratory experiments for which money would be made available. The AFSWP was not opposed to the kinds of activities that had previously taken place at Desert Rock, but those activities AFSWP's memo observed in passing, quote, cannot be expected to produce data of scientific value, end quote. The Desert Rock experience was apparently repeated again with officer volunteers in the next Nevada test series, the 1957 Operation Plumbob. Although the total number of officers involved in the officer volunteer experiments is not known, it is probably fewer than 100. The Flash Blindness Experiments Beginning with the 1946 Bikini tests, experiments with living things became a staple of bomb tests. At Operation Crossroads, animals were penned on the decks of target ships to study the effects of radiation. In the 1948 Sandstone series at the Marshall Islands, Inuitak et al, seeds, grains, and fungi were added. In 1949, the AEC and the DOD began to coordinate the planning of the biomedical experiments at tests and set up a biomedical test planning and screening committee to review proposals. Presumably, the human experiments at bomb tests should have been filtered through this or some other review process designated to consider experiments. Yet, in only one case, Flash Blindness experiments did this happen. With Dr. Mealing's 1951 call for renewed DOD effort at biomedical experimentation came a revival of the DOD-AEC Joint Biomedical Planning. From the start, the AEC doubted DOD's willingness to cooperate. In a January 1952 letter to Shields Warren, Los Alamos' Thomas Shipman complained that the committee was limited to reviewing proposals from civilian groups and not the military. If, he wrote, the AEC cannot exercise a measure of control in this matter, they might better withdraw from the picture completely and permit the military to continue on its own sweet way without the somewhat ludicrous spectacle of an impotent committee snapping its heels like a puppy dog. In retrospect, Shipman wrote to Warren's successor in June 1956, the military's refusal to participate, quote, reduced that committee to impotence, end quote. Whatever its effectiveness, in 1952, the biomedical research screening group did consider at least one of the military's Flash Blindness experiments. Flash Blindness, the temporary loss of vision from exposure to the flash, was a serious problem for all the armed services, but particularly for the Air Force. Pilots flying hundreds of miles an hour in combat could not afford to lose concentration and vision even temporarily. The Flash Blindness experiments began at the 1951 Operation Buster Jangle, the series that included Desert Rock 1, with the testing of subjects who, quote, orbited at an altitude of 15,000 feet in an Air Force C-54 approximately 9 miles from the atomic detonation, end quote. The test subjects were exposed to three detonations during the operation, after which changes in their visual acuity were measured. Although these experiments were conducted at bomb tests that potentially exposed the subjects to ionizing radiation, the purpose of the experiment was to measure the thermal effects of the visible light flash, not the effects of ionizing radiation. When another experiment was proposed for Operation Tumblr Snapper, the 1952 Nevada tests, the AEC sought a, quote, release of AEC responsibility, end quote. On grounds that, quote, there is a possibility that permanent eye damage may result, end quote. It is not clear how the military responded, but the experiment proceeded. Twelve subjects witnessed the detonation from a darkened trailer about 16 kilometers from the point of detonation. Each of the human observers placed his face in a hood. Half wore protective goggles, while the other half had both eyes exposed. A fraction of a second before the explosion, a shutter opened, exposing the left eye to the flash. Two subjects incurred retinal burns, at which point the project for that test series was terminated. The final report recorded that both subjects had, quote, completely recovered, end quote. At the 1953 tests, the Department of Defense engaged in further flash blindness study. During this experiment, quote, twelve subjects dark adapted in a light tight trailer were exposed to five nuclear detonation flashes at distances of from seven to fourteen miles, end quote. The flash blindness experiments were the only human experiments conducted under the biomedical part of the bomb test program and the only human experiments where immediate injury was recorded. They were also the only experiments where there is evidence of any connection to the 1953 Wilson Memorandum applying the Nuremberg Code to Human Experimentation. Recently recovered documents show that upon a 1954 review of a report showing the injuries at the 1952 experiment, AFSWP medical staff immediately declared that, quote, a definite need exists for guidance in the use of human volunteers as experimental subjects, end quote. Further inquiry revealed that a top secret policy on the subject existed. That policy detailed, quote, very definite and specific steps, end quote, that had to be taken before volunteers could be used in human experimentation. But the AFSWP wrote, quote, no serious attempt has been made to disseminate the information to those experimenters who had a definite need to know. End quote. Nonetheless, some form of consent was obtained from at least some of the flash blindness subjects. In a 1994 interview, Colonel John Pickering, who in the 1950s was an Air Force researcher with the School of Aviation Medicine, recalled participating as a subject in one of the first tests where the bomb was observed from a trailer and his written consent was required, quote. When the time came for ophthalmologists to describe what they thought could or could not happen, and we were asked to sign a consent form just as you do now in the hospital for surgery, I signed one, end quote. There is no documentation showing whether subsequent flash blindness experiments, which followed upon the issuance of the Secretary of Defense's 1953 memorandum, required informed and written consent. However, given the recollection of Colonel Pickering and the military tradition of providing for voluntary participation in biomedical experimentation, this may well have been the case. A report on a flash blindness experiment at the 1957 Plumbob tests uses the term volunteers. A report on 1962 studies at Dominic I provides no further information. In early 1954, the Air Force's School of Aviation Medicine reported that animal studies and injuries at bomb tests to non-experimental participants had shown that potential for eye damage was substantially worse than had been understood. Studies of flash blindness with humans continued in both field and laboratory tests through the 1960s and into the 1970s. These experiments tested prototype versions of eye protection equipment, and the results were used to recommend requirements for eye protection for those exposed to atomic explosions. End of Section 50, Recording by Patrick McAfee, Evanston. Section 51 of Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. This is a LibriVox recording. All LibriVox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit LibriVox.org. Recording by Patrick McAfee, Evanston. Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. Case Studies. Chapter 10, Part 3. Research on Protective Clothing. In late 1951, following the first Desert Rock exercise, the government conducted Operation Jangle, a nuclear test series that detonated two nuclear weapons, one on the surface and one buried 17 feet underground. The two jangle shots were tests where the weapons fireball touched the ground. When a nuclear weapons fireball touches the ground, it creates much more local fallout than an explosion that bursts in the air. Consequently, these tests posed some potential hazard to civilians who lived near the test site and to test observers and participants. Two weeks before jangle, the DOD requested an additional 500 observers at each of the jangle shots to acclimate the troops to nuclear weapons. The AEC advised against the additional participants, declaring that, quote, this, the first detonation, was an experiment which had never been performed before and the radiological hazards were unpredictable, end quote. In the AEC's view, no one should approach ground zero for three or four days after the surface shot. The AEC seems to have been successful in persuading the Department of Defense not to include the extra observers, but the DOD did not agree to the AEC's suggestion on approaching ground zero. Four hours after the first shot, the DOD conducted research involving troops who were accompanied by radiation safety monitors. Eight teams of men walked over contaminated ground for one hour to determine the effectiveness of protective clothing against nuclear contamination. Similar tests were conducted after the second shot at jangle, but this time after a longer period. Five days after the shallow underground shot, men crawled over contaminated ground again to determine the effectiveness of protective clothing. Other men rode armored vehicles through contaminated areas to check the shielding effects of tanks and to check the effectiveness of air filtering devices. According to the final report, the protective clothing was, quote, adequate to prevent contact between radioactive dust and the skin of the wearer, end quote. The information on this research is limited. The only mention of the subjects in the report reads, quote, The volunteer enlisted men, too numerous to mention by name, who participated in the evaluation of protective clothing were of great assistance, which is gratefully acknowledged, end quote. It is likely that at the time these men were not viewed as subjects of scientific research, but rather as men who had volunteered for a hazardous or risky assignment. We know nothing about what these men were told about the risks or whether they felt they could have refused the assignment if they had an interest in doing so. The jangle activities are a good illustration of difficulties in drawing boundaries in the military between activities that are research involving human subjects and activities that are not. Although the jangle evaluation was likely not considered an instance of human research at the time, it has many similarities to ground crawling activity conducted several years later, not in conjunction with a nuclear test that was treated as research involving human subjects. In 1958, 90 soldiers at Camp Stoneman in Pittsburgh, California were asked to perform, quote, typical army tactical maneuvers, end quote, on soil that had been contaminated with radioactive lanthanum. The soldiers were then monitored for their exposure to study beta contamination from this non-penetrating form of radiation. In 1963, soldiers were again asked to maneuver on ground contaminated with artificial fallout, this time at Camp McCoy in Wisconsin. The plans for the 1958 maneuvers, which were administered by the Navy's Radiological Defense Laboratory, had been submitted for secretarial approval, as was required for biomedical experiments involving Navy personnel. In accordance with the Navy rules, the soldiers signed, quote, written statements of voluntary participation, end quote. During the 1963 experiments, the Army processed the activity under its 1962 regulation on human experimentation, AR 70-25. This rule, a public codification of the Secretary of Defense's 1953 Nuremberg Code Rule, also required secretarial review and written consent. Cloud penetration experiments, quote, what are the dangers to be encountered by the personnel who fly through the cloud? How much radiation can they stand? How much heat can the aircraft take? Can the ground crews immediately service the aircraft for another flight? If so, what precautions are necessary to ensure their safety, end quote. The Air Force felt that it was essential to answer these questions. To do so, it carried out experiments, including some with animals and a few with humans. At the first atomic tests, the military used remote controlled aircraft, called drones, to enter and gather samples from atomic clouds in order to estimate the yield and learn the characteristics of the weapon being tested. Military pilots did, however, track mushroom clouds, gathering information and plotting the cloud's path in order to warn civilian aircraft. During a 1948 test, a cloud tracker piloted by Colonel Paul Facler inadvertently got too close to a cloud. But after the accident, Colonel Facler commented, quote, no one keeled over dead and no one got sick, end quote. Colonel Facler's experience, an Air Force history later recorded, showed that manned flight through an atomic cloud, quote, would not necessarily result in a lingering and horrible death, end quote. Some of the trackers had sniffers on their aircraft to collect small samples. The Air Force conducted experimental sampling missions at 1951 tests and later permanently replaced the drones with manned aircraft because drones were difficult to use and they often did not get the quality samples of the atomic cloud that Atomic Energy Commission scientists desired. By Operation T-POT 1955, the AEC considered the testing of a nuclear device, quote, largely useless, end quote, unless sampler aircraft were used to obtain fission debris that would be used to estimate the nuclear weapon's performance. As the sampling mission became routine, a new mission in the clouds began. At T-POT, the Air Force performed the first manned, quote, early cloud penetration, end quote. The phrase was used by the Air Force to refer to missions conducted as soon as minutes after detonation of the test weapon. The main purpose was to discover the radiation and turbulence levels within the cloud at early times after detonation. Like the first sampling missions, the first early cloud penetration missions were conducted by unmanned drone aircraft. In 1951, Colonel, now general, E. A. Pinson, an Air Force scientist who had earlier conducted tracer experiments on himself and other scientists, placed mice aboard a drone aircraft. In 1953, he flew mice, monkeys, and instrumentation in drone aircraft through atomic clouds. Pinson concluded that the radiation risk from flying manned aircraft through atomic clouds could be controlled by monitoring the external gamma dose. But the Air Force was not convinced and asked Pinson to follow up the animal experiments with studies with humans during Operation T-POT 1955 and Operation Red Wing 1956 to confirm the results. This research appears to have involved a small number of subjects, perhaps in the range of a dozen or so. Pinson designed the human experiments to, quote, learn exactly how much radiation penetrates into the human system, end quote, when humans flew through a mushroom cloud. The Air Force had pilots swallow film contained in small watertight capsules. The film was attached to a string held in their mouths so that it could be retrieved at the end of the mission. When the film was retrieved, the researchers compared the exposures measured inside the human body with those measured on the outside. They found that the doses measured outside the body were essentially identical to the doses inside the body. This was a critical finding because it meant that surface measurements would be, quote, representative of the whole body dose, end quote. For the experiment, the AEC test manager for T-POT waved the AEC's test exposure limit of 3.9 rentgen and permitted four Air Force officers to receive up to 15 rentgen's whole body radiation. The exemption was, quote, based on the importance of the project to the military effects test program and the fact that radiation up to 15R may be necessary for its successful accomplishment, end quote. When the Air crews entered the atomic clouds, they measured dose rates of radiation as high as 1,800 rad per hour. Since the crews were in the cloud for such a short period of time, however, the actual doses were much lower than 1,800R. The maximum reported dose received on a single mission was 17R, higher than the 15R authorized for the project. Since the Air crews flew on several missions, two of the crew members received more than 17R. A year later at Operation Red Wing, where the atomic and hydrogen bombs were tested, the Air Force conducted another series of experimental cloud penetrations. Part of the Red Wing experiment was to measure the hazard from inhaling or ingesting radioactive particles while flying through a mushroom cloud. When mice and monkeys were flown through clouds during earlier tests, they were placed in ventilated cages to determine the hazard from inhaling radioactive particles. The studies found that the hazard from inhalation was less than 1% of the external radiation hazard. As General Pinson put it, quote, In other words, if the internal hazard were to become significant, the external hazard would be overwhelming, end quote. To confirm this finding, Pinson undertook a similar experiment with humans, and again, as with the teapot experiment, Pinson was a subject as well as a researcher. To perform the experiment, no filters were installed in the penetration aircraft. Again, it is estimated that about a dozen subjects were involved. The military this time set the authorized dosage, the maximum dosage to which Pinson could plan to have people exposed, at 25R, and a limiting dosage in which case a report had to be filed at 50R. During the experiment, quote, Maximum radiation dose rates as high as 800R per hour were encountered, and several flights yielded total radiation doses to the crew of 15R, end quote. To measure the internal dose of radiation, the scientists analyzed urine samples and used whole body counters. The project, as Pinson's final report noted, marked the transition from animal experimentation to human measurement, quote, Although a considerable amount of experimentation had been done with small animals which were flown through nuclear clouds, the early cloud penetration project of Operation Red Wing was the first instance in which humans were studied in a similar situation, end quote. The results confirmed those of the animal experiments. The internal hazard of radiation was insignificant relative to the external hazard. Consequently, the researchers recommended, quote, That no action be taken to develop filters for aircraft pressurization systems, nor to develop devices to protect flight crews from the inhalation of fission products, end quote. Experimental purpose, military tactics, money, and morale. Why was the Air Force interested in showing that atomic clouds could be penetrated soon after a detonation? Most important, the military wanted to assure itself that it was safe for combat pilots to fly through atomic clouds if need arose during atomic war. But the research did not make much of a scientific contribution. Researchers had already established the levels of radiation in atomic clouds by flying drone aircraft through them, and there was nothing path breaking about humans being exposed to levels of radiation under 25R. General Pinson later noted, quote, There are no research people that I know of that gave a damn about manned early cloud penetration experiments because this is a negligible contribution to research and science. Scientifically, you know, this contributes less than I suspect anything I've ever done. Its only virtue is the practical use of it, end quote. From the scientific perspective, the data would not likely be of great use. From an immediate practical perspective, human data were felt to be essential for reassurance. Should the Air Force have been satisfied with the wealth of data it had from the drone experiments? In retrospect, Pinson found the question difficult, quote. There's reason to say, well, you should have been satisfied with the data that had been gathered with the drones. But, you know, these are hard-nosed practical people that put their life on the line and in military combat where the hazards are far greater than in this modest exposure to radiation, end quote. The budget also played a key role in cloud penetration research as well as the related decontamination experiments, which will be discussed shortly. The Defense Department declared that the knowledge gained through its cloud penetration experiments would save, quote, the taxpayers thousands upon thousands of dollars, end quote. Because there would be no need to develop special protective clothing or equipment which had been thought to be necessary. As in the case of the Hume RRO experiments and the troop maneuvers, indoctrination and morale were important forces behind the experimentation, quote. Perhaps the most important problem of all, end quote. A popular men's magazine of the day wrote about the teapot experience, quote, might be a psychological resistance of combat pilots and crews flying into the unknown dangers of hot radioactive areas, end quote. The press, therefore, depicted the teapot experiment as a message to the world. Pilots can fly through atomic clouds safely. Research, consent, and volunteerism. Like the Hume RRO experiments, the cloud fly-through experiments were treated as occupational rather than experimental activities. None of the participants signed consent forms and waivers to dose limits were sought and approved under the process followed for the non-experimental fly-through activities. In 1995, General Pinson said that he had not been aware of the ethical standards declared in the 1953 Secretary of Defense memorandum. If he had been, he, quote, would have gotten written consent from the people that were involved in this, end quote. A 1963 Air Force History of the Cloud Sampling Program does not describe the process of crew and pilot selection, but does provide a perspective, quote. The Strategic Air Command pilots, picked to fly the F-84G Sampler aircraft, were pleased to learn that they were doing something useful, not serving as guinea pigs as they seriously believed when first called upon to do the sampling, end quote. Did the personnel understand the risks? Some of them surely did. The aircraft carried airmen and scientific observers. Because the scientific observers were the very scientists who designed the experiments, they certainly understood the radiation risks as well as anyone could be expected to. In this way, the cloud fly-through experiments exemplified the ethic of researcher self-experimentation. As Pinson recalled in 1995, quote, if you are going to do something like this and you think it's safe to do it, then you shouldn't ask somebody else to do it. The way you convince other people that at least you think it's all right is do it yourself, end quote. The non-scientists were briefed and informed that the risks from their radiation exposure would be minimal. A pilot in the cloud tracking activities recalled one of the briefings, quote. The scientists line up at a briefing session and tell you there's no danger if you will follow their instructions carefully. In fact, they almost guarantee it, end quote. But many of the pilots seemed to have been neither worried at the prospect of risk nor excited at the prospect of glory. Pinson, for example, described the attitude of the pilot who flew his aircraft as, quote, matter of fact, end quote. And at Operation Teapot, Captain Paul M. Crumley, project officer for the early cloud penetrations, stated, quote, we consider these flights routine. Neither the pilots nor observers are unduly concerned over the fact that no one else has flown into an atomic cloud so soon after detonation, end quote. In conjunction with the Teapot cloud fly-through experiment, the military also conducted an experiment on ground crews, quote, to determine how soon the same aircraft could be resurfaced and made ready to fly again, end quote. The Air Force used the contaminated aircraft from the early cloud penetration experiment. The research sparked a debate between the Air Force and the AEC over the costs and benefits of safety measures, a debate that was itself resolved by further experimentation. In one part of the, quote, experimental procedure, end quote, personnel, the number involved is not reported, rubbed their gloved hands over a contaminated fuselage, and in another part, quote, the bare hand was also rubbed over a surface whose detailed contamination was known and a radial autograph of the hand surfaces was made, end quote. None of the survey team exceeded the AEC's gamma exposure limit of 3.9R. Concluding that aircraft did not need to be washed down or decontaminated after they flew through the atomic clouds, Colonel William Kiefer, Deputy Commander of the Air Force Special Weapons Center, proposed that decontamination procedures be eliminated except in extreme circumstances. This change in procedures might cause overexposure, Kiefer wrote, but they would be acceptable as long as dangerous dosages would be avoided. The proposal was not warmly received by the AEC. Los Alamoses Thomas Shipman complained that the goal should be to reduce exposures to zero. Harold Plank, a Los Alamoses scientist who was in charge of the cloud sampling project and who wrote along on many of the cloud sampling missions said, quote, Kiefer simply could not understand the philosophy which regards every radiation exposure as injurious, but accepts minimum exposures for critical jobs, end quote. Kiefer suggested a compromise, test the proposal with only one or two sampler aircraft. Plank objected, but the AEC test manager promised to, quote, do everything possible to obtain a waiver of AEC operating radiological safety requirements, end quote. The Air Force carried out the study during the 1957 Operation Plumbob. An additional plane was flown through the atomic clouds created by five events to determine the hazard from the Air Force's proposed procedures. The study showed that decontamination would be necessary to prevent overexposures at test sites. In the end, the Air Force was unsuccessful in its attempt to change the decontamination procedures for sampler aircraft. We do not know how the Air Force viewed this activity. Given that it did not treat the cloud fly-throughs as an experiment, it is unlikely that the Air Force considered the ground personnel activity to be an experiment. There is no record of what the ground personnel were told or whether they were volunteers. End of section 51, recording by Patrick McAfee, Evanston.