 Good afternoon everyone. It's my great pleasure to welcome you to another seminar within the context of the War Crime Research Group series of the War Studies Department. Today we're extremely happy and honored to have Professor Jennifer Treyhan from NYU who is going to talk about her last book on the existing legal limits to the Security Council veto in the face of atrocity crimes. Before I start our discussion with Jennifer I would like to briefly introduce her, not that she needs a long introduction. So Jennifer is a clinical professor at NYU Center for Global Affairs where she directs their conversation, I'm sorry, in international law and human rights. She has published, is one of the most prolific writers, scholars with many review articles and book chapters on the topics of international criminal law international justice in general including on the very interesting international criminal course crime of aggression. Her last book we are going to discuss today was awarded the Book of the Year award of 2020 by the American branch of the International Law Association. We're also Jennifer serves as one of the US representatives to the committee of the International Law Association regarding the use of force. Additionally Jennifer has served as an amicus courier before the international criminal court on the appeal of the situation regarding Afghanistan and she also serves on the council of advisors on the application of the Rome statue to cyber warfare. Now after this sort introduction today we are going to discuss with Jennifer her last book about the existing legal limits to the Security Council veto power in the face of atrocity crimes. So Jennifer if we can initiate this discussion I would like to ask you how do you identify what is the main problem with the exercise of veto power by the Security Council but you identify in your book and thank you very much and welcome. Thank you, thank you so much Maria for that introduction and thank you also for inviting me to be part of this speaker series. I'm honored to be speaking at King's College London War Studies Department and so yeah my book starts by identifying a problem and I shorthand is vetoes in the face of atrocity crimes I mean atrocity crimes to be genocide war crimes crimes against humanity. So if we look back historically we can see that the US the UK and France used their veto related to apartheid South Africa it didn't result in complete paralysis of the council because there was eventually mandatory chapter seven sanctions imposed but it likely delayed the dismantlement of apartheid. In Rwanda it was somewhat different we have veto threats the word genocide must not be used there were and again it is those same three countries and the fear is there then triggering an obligation the need to do something and here there's also simply the unwillingness it's not that the veto is blocking intervention there wasn't willingness to try to intervene to stop the genocide so it's operating somewhat differently. Regarding Darfur Sri Lanka and Myanmar it's really more the veto threat and the veto threat can act just as effectively as a veto it can absolutely shut down discussion and in the world doesn't really know why why is the council being so passive in the face of mass of atrocity crimes. So for instance in Darfur we see accelerating war crimes crimes against humanity and the crimes have even been charged as genocide with a death toll eventually of 450,000 and the Security Council meanwhile because of the veto threats of China is weakening sanctions it's weakening the mandate for the deployment of peacekeepers and we have a very delayed deployment of a hybrid force due to the veto threats. Regarding Myanmar again it's mainly veto threats we do have one actual veto in 2007. 2007 the rest of the council was ready to condemn the crimes being committed and the problem is when you can't even get out the condemnation you know the council won't be able to ratchet up to other measures and it also sends a proverbial green light to perpetrators on the ground you can't even be condemned you have a protector on the Security Council so it's more harmful than just that one resolution failing. Regarding Syria we have a very dispiriting list of 15 vetoes some are double vetoes there by Russia sometimes joined by China. They prevent recognition of crimes and condemnation of crimes they block referral to the International Criminal Court they block a variety of measures related to chemical weapons use including a chemical weapons inspection regime known as the Joint Investigation Mechanism and when that was first imposed there actually was a decrease in veto use so these inspection mechanisms seem to have been alleviating some of the attacks lessening fatalities and then when we have the three vetoes actually up the renewal of the mechanism you have accelerated chemical weapons attacks so here on this one I do think we can draw a fairly direct correlation between the veto on the East River and fatalities on the ground in Syria and we even have blockage of humanitarian assistance for instance to Aleppo under siege so I put all together I think it's very clear that these vetoes are costing lives and these are all situations note that we would have nine other members of the council ready to impose some other measures so nine is a required number otherwise for something to pass within the council so the rest of the council has some measures they would like to try to prevent or alleviate the commission of atrocity crimes and the veto is being the blockage there thank you very much Jennifer for this initial introduction for an identify for setting up the the main question of your book now my second question would be how how do you address that problem this program from a legal perspective what is your response how do you think that this problem legally speaking could be addressed and this is I assume this is a question that many many of our participants you know they have in your mind yeah yes thank you thank you and sorry I think I left the U.S. off the list I don't mean the U.S. to be off the list the U.S. also frequently uses this veto related mainly to Israel and I do mean to address any veto in the face of atrocity crimes so what do I propose to do about this so I'm trying to in my book take a critical look at the legality of this practice and the veto is found in article 273 of the U.N. charter so I have three independent legal arguments and I do kind of mean them hierarchically so if we find the veto in the charter we actually have above the charter the notion of use code so that's my first set of arguments my second is based on the remainder of the charter what else does the charter obligate and then my third series of arguments relate to treaty obligations such as genocide convention and Geneva convention obligations so and please know I'm here giving like the three minute version so my arguments are about 120 pages in my book so the full version can be found there um so briefly the first argument use programs so we say genocide war crimes crimes against humanity are all protected at this very highest level of the law so what does it then mean and it seems that how we're reading the veto is you know absolute carte blanche we have you know no qualms about how or when it's used um and you know no questions asked um it's just this absolute fiat and we really don't care what is the context well I say a minimum is inconsistent to read this obligation found in the charter which is lower on the hierarchy of norms than the protections that we say you know that genocide war crimes crimes against humanity are protected very highest level of law at minimum it's inconsistent a more aggressive formulation is our vita sometimes seems to facilitate these these crimes another way of formulating this first argument is it reaches um the articles of responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts the i'll see an article 41 one recognizes a duty of states to cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach of an obligation arising under a preemptive norm of general international law so if you're vetoing in the face of these crimes your it does not appear that you are cooperating to try to end um the commission of these crimes so those are kind of my three ways of formulating my first argument the second argument looks at the UN charter which is framed by its purposes and principles so the charter in article one says we need to respect international law human rights and cooperate in solving problems of the humanitarian character and in article two it talks about the charter being um respected and obligations under it observed in good faith and good faith is generally required under international law so you know how do these vetoes measure up to these requirements and note article 24 two of the charters since the council as a whole is bound by the charter so if the council as a whole is bound individual permanent members can't have greater powers so they they must be bound as well but they're also bound because states are bound by the terms of the charter and the permanent members are also states so they're bound in that way so they are bound to respect these obligations and and this is an argument that one sees more often at the UN states seem more interested in this argument and it has been made that the vetoes are simply violating the UN charter um my third line of argumentation and these are pretty much raised as independent arguments looks at the genocide convention and 1949 Geneva conventions to which all permanent members are parties and and specifically in the genocide convention it looks at the obligation to prevent genocide in article one and in the 1949 Geneva conventions it looks at the obligation to ensure respect for the Geneva conventions which is also found in certain of the additional protocols and certain permanent members are bound to the additional protocols so I only apply this argument to them to the extent their parties to those protocols so if we look at the ICJ and the Bosnia Serbia case that shows there are serious obligations related to the obligation to prevent genocide so um first um it is triggered when there is a risk of genocide so when does not need to wait until genocide is occurring so this is obviously true if you want to try to prevent atrocities you don't need to wait till they fully manifest so when there's a serious risk of genocide then there is a essentially a due diligence obligation and it's based on a state's capacity to influence so here I would argue that the permanent members have particularly strong capacity to influence by virtue of being permanent members but they often also have bilateral relationships with the countries where the crimes are occurring and it would apply there too and note it's not just an obligation to prevent genocide in your own country but the ICJ is very clear here they were dedicating Serbia's responsibility vis-a-vis genocide in Bosnia which was at the time an independent state and they're quite clear it is an obligation that is owed externally these same um are basically true of common article one the obligation to ensure respect for the Geneva conventions in the wall in Nicaragua cases the ICJ says these are external obligations again not limited just preventing Geneva convention violations in your territory in great breaches in your territory but more broadly than that and the ICRC also says these are due diligence obligations so it may be really hard to define well what exactly is required of due diligence because obviously the council has some measure of discretion you know it can use article 40 41 and 42 measures and these are a variety of measures so I think it's easier to say the vetoes were seen seem to be the antithesis of due diligence for crimes against humanity I don't make a treaty-based argument when there is a crimes against humanity treaty and I know professor Leila said out we'll talk about this next week in your speaker series so when there is this treaty there it is the current draft has an obligation to prevent in it I do think there is currently an obligation to prevent crimes against humanity but it has to be derived from general legal obligations it doesn't have a similar treaty source so I think there are clear legal arguments to be made and states need to invoke these they need to use these at the UN anytime it seems that a veto or a veto threat is coming they need to use these legal arguments to try to stave this off states could also work towards trying to have a general assembly resolution issued recognizing some of these existing legal limits to use of the veto or they could send this to international court of justice for an advisory opinion on a question such as is all veto use while there's ongoing or the serious risk of genocide crimes against humanity or war crimes consistent with international law so they really could tee up this question and ask the ICJ about the current state of practice thank you very much once more I found particularly interesting the call the idea of the advisory opinion you know and I was thinking very much Beth last week's presentation speaking about imagining and creativity and to be able you know to utilize to instrumentalize all the methods and the means you know that we have as as lawyers having said that if I can take a little bit if I exercise my authority here as a chair I was wondering what are your thoughts you know if we move from this general framework to to more case specific situations and I'm asking about Syria for example because I know that many of our attendees and myself as well wonder how do you think you know that your legal proposition you know could apply hypothetically in in the Syrian scenario thank you yeah so the Syria vetoes I think have really you know called out that we really need to do something about this and I think that the frustration at the UN was absolutely palpable and really agonized speeches by some of the permanent members and elected members on the council where these vetoes happen and they're incredibly distressing I mean if we focus for instance just on blockage of the referral of the situation to the international criminal court and that was a double veto by Russia and China and at the time of the the blockage of that referral you had in the it's the May 22 2014 you would already have the huge chemical weapons attack in the Al Gouda region the sarin gas attack with thought to have killed over a thousand with three thousand suffering from neurotoxic symptoms the independent international commission inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic had already found a huge number of war crimes and crimes against humanity by government forces and affiliated militias and then war crimes as well by anti-government forces so a huge laundry list of incredibly dispiriting crimes including targeting medical personnel and hospitals denying medical access destroying cultural heritage laying siege to towns in order to make conditions of life unbearable it's it's a horrible read to to read the agonized reports of the independent international commission of inquiry of these crimes occurring so in the face of you know I won't read the long list but it's about you know 20 suspected war crimes and you know 10 suspected crimes against humanity huge numbers of crimes by a number of parties you then have the blockage of the referral so you have basically there's no jurisdiction over your situation as a whole so what does this do here if there could have been any deterrence created absolutely squandered because it's saying to perpetrators there now is no jurisdiction over the crimes as a whole and jurisdiction for the crimes of the whole what would have it would have meant the international criminal court could have looked at the whole situation and analyze who are our worst perpetrators what are our worst crimes and brought those cases instead where we are Beth is right we need creativity then unfortunately where we are now is the triple IM gathering the evidence together and really waiting for individual perpetrators to walk into countries that will exercise jurisdiction it means there can be some cases against isolated perpetrators but what it deprives you of is looking at the worst crimes and the worst crime worst perpetrators and kind of doing a methodical approach to accountability and if people wanted the atrocities against the Yazidis told by a tribunal at large that was also squandered because the ICC couldn't have done these cases and again what is happening is yes there will be isolated ISIL trials within Europe but a lot of ISIL are being tried in the region they're tried on quick trials and they're often tried for terrorism charges so they might have been implicated in atrocities vis-a-vis the Yazidi and the genocide against this Yazidi but they're largely being tried in very brief trials no due process and many quickly executed so not only do I believe that is wrong to begin with but it is also depriving us of being able to focus on these crimes in one tribunal yes there may be isolated cases so that has been the harm of that one veto which I think you need to measure against these legal obligations and say there are legal problems with that veto and in it I'll just say briefly that in addition to the three arguments I outlined because related to atrocity crimes there are additionally obligations to investigate and prosecute crimes there are additional legal arguments that can be made specifically when we have blockage of the referral thank you Jennifer I can see I start collecting questions for the attendees excuse me for the attendees I'm saying that you know you know I'm doing blocks of questions but I have one more question if I may ask you before you know I go I was thinking how do you how can I say how do you assess you know your your proposition with regard to R2P and the discussion uh surrounded R2P the critique the confusion to what extent it is a little doctrine can we talk whether it has changed anything uh the initial idea about the veto you know that it was coming from the committee of state sovereignty and your thoughts about that and then I promise I'll yeah so um these ideas of looking critically at the veto um I look my book really focused on the legal questions but the original Canadian convened commission international mission on intervention and state sovereignty they also saw that we need veto restraint for R2P to be able to work so one of our early calls for veto restraint is actually in 2001 it's in the the the first important R2P report by the commission and they recognize that only then are we going to be able you know to have R2P work and then this is really echoed in calls by the s5 small five group of states they propose resolutions then we and there are a variety of proposals for veto restraint and and the two most prominent ones we have today are the french-mexican initiative joined by 105 states and the act code of conduct joined by 122 states all calling with different formulations for some measure of veto restraint so we do have broad recognition the veto is a problem the veto is a problem in terms of R2P it's blocking R2P where was R2P in Syria I would say it was blocked by the veto simple answer um so we do have calls for restraint but where it gets us um is and I think it's important two of the p5 have endorsed voluntary veto restraint because France leads the french-mexican initiative and both France and the UK are parties to the code of conduct but the US Russia and China are not so when three of the p5 don't endorse any veto restraint we have no veto restraint so I would say um R2P is is entirely being blocked um now by the veto um and I didn't know if you were also asking about um humanitarian intervention um because I know the UK is still also bullish on the humanitarian intervention something I also talk about in my book do we still have a doctrine of humanitarian intervention um and where is it in related to relationship to R2P and of course we started with you know the Kosovo intervention which seemed maybe the high point of humanitarian intervention um and although the the international community basically coming out with it was morally justified if not strictly legal so they kind of really hedge on the legality formulations and that's kind of why we go into the development of R2P and the first pronouncement on R2P the Canadian one is is maybe the the best in my mind because it says you know if the council isn't acting don't be surprised if others do so I think they leave a little opening for regional actors or even in horrific situations you know maybe a state acting alone but then later reports seem to shut that down and they just say no we need the security council to to exercise R2P so that kind of brings us back to well what if the security council is paralyzed by vetoes and that's where we I think we are and I know the UK still claims there is a doctorate of humanitarian intervention joined by Denmark the US and France seem to have endorsed this the US with 27 strikes into Syria in response to chemical weapons use and then 2018 we have US UK and french strikes they seem to be acting in a doctrine of humanitarian intervention without the US and France explicitly articulating this but it's certainly not the entirety of the international community and why do we get to this difficult place because the council is paralyzed so I think we wouldn't get to having to make these humanitarian intervention stretches and arguments if we didn't have security council paralysis and going way back to Kosovo you know if we didn't you know if they hadn't faced a presumpted veto by Russia and possibly China as well you know they could have gone to the council for authorization for the Kosovo intervention knowing it would face the veto of course they didn't so if we chip away at the legality we I actually might be solving you know the problem with how R2P is blocked today and then those who want to kind of go around and use humanitarian intervention I think we potentially don't have to reach these difficult questions if we just had the council and the charter functioning I think as design because I would argue already in 1945 when they created the veto power they made it subject to the UN's purposes and principles and even in 1945 there were early notions of use Kogan's so even in 1945 they didn't create a veto absolutely unlimited if you go back to the charter negotiations there's nothing about vetoes in the face of atrocity crimes it was really to have unanimity in decisions to use force and you know the whole field of IJ didn't really exist in 1945 so they didn't really reach all these questions today but I think it's really important as one considers this also to reflect you know we're not bound by a 1945 reading of the UN charter it's the charter as it has as situated within our system of international law as it exists today thank you thank you Jennifer reminding us of the UN charter as a living instrument and having said that I can see the Q&A we have about eight questions if it's okay I said just make two rounds of questions if it's okay with you so I'm trying to put them together to pair them there are two questions dealing asking particularly about China you know and the question is how is the security council currently dealing with with China and the the situation with let atrocities take in place in China and there is a question that is tied up to this one asking that even if legally the security council operates to what extent politically you see it comes back you know to what extent politically that could be feasible there is a second question which is about your third legal argument which is about the legal obligations deriving from particular international treaties and how is that related to famous 103 article of the UN charter and if I can add can I add one more question if that's okay the third question is is about the state parties to the UN they confer authority you know to the security council the question is to what extent you know in order for the security council to act on their behalf to what extent do you think that the misuse of the veto power could be understood as a bridge of this principal agent uh relationship and I stop great um perfect thank you so I'm afraid to say in the first question I'm very pessimistic how is the council going to address the atrocities um occurring against the weaver um I think in the same way they address the atrocities related to Sri Lanka and Myanmar and largely dark form by inaction by inattention um potentially not even having meetings um and being you know abdicating responsibility um I I'm very pessimistic um yeah you know the the China China's veto um and here I actually hope the other members have the courage to put resolutions to the council so that China has to use the veto and the world can see you know the problem of the veto power how China usually deals with it is a veto threat and because of China's significant economic um weight and countries bilateral relationships with China they seem unwilling to do the right thing and they they don't push these awkward questions to China so they don't you know propose a uh Myanmar tribunal when they know there will be a veto I wish they would I wish they would put some of these you know put resolutions condemning the crimes against the Uyghur make China veto and then the world will see um what is happening um so it's very frustrating the veto threat I think you know um it's not necessarily picked up in the media and one you know doesn't understand why the council and then it looks like the whole UN system is dysfunctional um it looks like the council is dysfunctional um when in fact you might have 14 other members on the council who actually want to say something um or 13 or you know at least more than nine or more um that it could pass um article one or three of the UN charter yeah that actually says the obligations um under um um I have the chart here so let me get it right um basically it suggests that charter obligations can trump other obligations and and I do have I do discuss it in my I do um I count for this in my book I did in today's shorthand version of the remarks um and I basically um argue that yes um but within limits um you know the council even in it like a chapter seven um resolution the council doesn't it has certain constraints we wouldn't expect the council to be violating fundamental rules like distinction and proportionality if it authorized a military intervention you know we you know we wouldn't expect the council to authorize genocide so even under chapter seven um the security council is not above all law and these are very very fundamental norms that I'm talking about when I talk about genocide and war crimes crimes against humanity and I think the 103 needs to be read in that the third um question um in the q&a um I absolutely agree it is something I've also written um members confer responsibility on the council to act on their behalf um yeah are they really acting um on the behalf of states um absolutely it is a breach of um you know the privilege of the veto others write it we give the phrase abuse of rights abuse to draw um you can and you know it's a privilege of the veto absolutely it is a power conferred um by the other members to act on their behalf is that what they're doing with their vetoing chemical weapons inspections I don't think so the referral resolution um to the ICC of the crimes in Syria I think was co-sponsored by 66 or 67 UN member states um no the council is clearly not acting on their behalf so the third question um I actually do also write about here I know too many questions for you excellent thank you so much uh so we can proceed with the second many many interesting questions I see a very interesting question from my colleague Dr. Natasha Kurtz so uh Natasha uh questions asked about authority you know the issue of authority so if one can decide the genocide they say so crimes against humanity are occurring or or there is a risk of occurring don't we still have the problem of who should intervene and under whose mandate which is that also prevents action uh so it's an issue of authority uh there is question there is one question about um about Syria again uh um I guess uh why Russia and China are so against anything about Syria um there is uh another question about the duty to prevent uh one of our attendees with uh questions asked why you know it's not uh clearly uh identified in the Geneva conventions and then should they stop here and then go maybe stop there thank you yes yes so um the first question if genocide and crimes against humanity are occurring who would intervene so I guess I'm still um thinking that we need to operate within um the framework of the charter system so I'm not suggesting we're going beyond the charter system um I I'm just questioning the legality of some of these vetoes um first I'm not my book is not mainly making a case for intervention um in terms of large-scale military interventions I don't think they've gone that well in many of our instances so um a lot of the measures that have been vetoed are lesser um and but I'm saying this is really the start of the problem if you can't condemn crimes um in Darfur um it was weakening sanctions you know on the government of Sudan um you needed an oil embargo if you really wanted to put pressure on the government of Sudan which was committing the part of the um the crimes um through its air power because the jonja weed were on horseback and they were doing the crimes um at um at that level with um and this is so all of the air flights and bombardment um by the Sudanese aren't necessarily the Sudanese military if you would really wanted to um put constraints on it would have needed an um you know oil embargo um and then even when they had an arms embargo it first it exempted the government and then they just never enforced it so um I'm not really one making a case for large-scale military interventions I'm saying that the council has a variety of tools at its disposal it needs to rash it up and use these um and it is still primarily I'm addressing the council doing this I'm not really making a case for doing this outside the council system um but I'm trying to make um the council function more effectively um if we kind of try to block some of these vetoes and then it puts you know more of an onus on you know the other members of the council to propose to propose measures and even when they're um even even military intervention there can be um limited military interventions so before you would reach um large-scale military intervention um Maria you took down the second question and I'm now forgetting it remind me what was my second question yeah uh yes I have to scroll up oh no uh why Russia and China ever again um I really um so on Syria I mean you know Russia is involved in the situation um and it is extremely strong ties to the Assad regime so um Russia sees this as an important strategic interest to prop up the Assad regime and help the Assad regime win the war I mean Russia's actually involved in the situation um any China vetoes I think are more um you know not wanting to see aggressive measures against atrocity crimes um not necessarily because it related to the Syria situation but not wanting to see aggressive measures against atrocity crimes because that may be would set the foundation for similar aggressive measures related to Myanmar or the Uyghur so I think for China it's more um you know oh sovereignty we must you know uh so there but but Russia and just to go back um for any historians in the audience to go back to the drafting one of the real contentious issues in the drafting of the charter and I have a chapter on this in my book is that in the early negotiations and the veto the veto was negotiated between Stalin, Churchill and FDR right it's it's really very very high level um at Yalta at Dunbarton Oaks China somewhat also brought in but it's mainly the three discussing and they are then in the negotiations calling it the principle of unanimity and the UK and the US strongly felt if a country was involved in the situation it shouldn't have the veto and wouldn't we have a different charter system if they had prevailed on that so and it's Stalin saying no no even chapter seven across the boards and p5 involved in the situation they have the veto and they ended up going with the the USSR approach to the veto when they got to San Francisco so um so here um we're not really surprised by the Russian vetoes um uh related to Syria and as I say um China I think it's it's for really other reasons um and then the last question was um why don't we have any specific duty to prevent um in the Geneva um conventions I haven't specifically focused on this um there is a general obligation to ensure respect and the even the 1949 ones have grave breaches and common article three violations so ensuring respect to me implies you try to ensure these crimes do not occur um I don't know that I can hinge it precisely on kind of the same language um that we see in the genocide convention but I think the same notion can possibly be derived um also from the Geneva conventions wow that was so rich I do I mean I can you still uh can we do it one absolutely very wonderful because I don't I don't want to overburden you but there are so many questions and very interesting questions from the attendee so I think one set of questions is very much related you know around the veto idea so there is a question which asks to what extent do you think if the veto rights are taken away uh could that lead to some states pulling out of the UN altogether and um there is another question which is about it's more critical question uh the the attendee asks if by focusing very much on limiting the veto power actually that hinders the possibility to focus on broader and more structural security council reforms and also there is a question which goes back to um when we have a violation you know of the of a legal framework uh what does that mean for the normativity of the legal framework such as the genocide conventions when it is vetoed in the security council so I can stop here if that's okay with you sure um um so I don't think the veto is going to be taken away yes um it is in the UN charter um I'm arguing for looking at what international law has to say about the veto and reading it in light of the obligations of international law it is in the UN charter so um you basically don't get rid of the veto without amending the charter a charter amendment is a high majority plus agreement of all p5 so amendments are veto proof so the veto is here to stay unless we don't have the UN um so I'm not really arguing for you know throwing you know our UN system out the window I think we work within the framework of the UN system and I'm not trying to argue for getting rid of the veto but reading it in light of existing legal obligations um broader reforms um they there is there's been you know years of debate um enlarging the council and a whole series of other reforms you know more more permanent members permanent members without veto um a huge variety of proposals um you know I don't I don't think my initiative helps or hurts those I mean this is happening there is a committee its nickname is the never-ending committee so um I'm not really optimistic again you know charter reforms are veto proof and we have individual permanent members um saying yeah we would endorse this person being added this state sorry this country being added but I don't really see agreement of all permanent members on enlargement you know I'm not really optimistic where that is going so um you know but I think that's a separate path than my argument so I think my arguments neither what is the future of pre-existing frameworks like the genocide convention if they're being blocked um well we need to challenge this blockage um you know I've thought of an advisory opinion I would love if we could have a contentious case you know I'm very inspired by the Gambia suit um against Myanmar we do need creativity um due to you know China is one of the countries with that reservation to article nine article nine of the genocide convention which means it can be it can't be brought to the ICJ on genocide convention breaches so I actually think um and I'm going to be writing about this in my my next piece but um I think we need to go back and revisit that reservation so I would like there to be a contentious case on the veto um but first I think we have to go back and revisit that reservation and that reservation you know it was our first advisory opinion can you have reservations early on the ICJ says yes and more recently that particular reservation was challenged by DRC against Rwanda and the ICJ upheld the reservation but in a separate opinion a number of the judges on the ICJ seemed to say you know it's really troubling that this day and age a country can agree not to commit to genocide but please don't take me to court over it um and really suggesting you know we might want to need to revisit this reservation I actually think we need to read go back and revisit this reservation is it really okay to agree we agree you know and it's all the the measures under the genocide convention not only you know not to commit genocide but you know to to embody the responsibilities in your domestic law and have you know trainings and you know all the measures um in the genocide convention apply but please just don't take me to court over any of them under the ICJ is you know is that still a permissible reservation because unfortunately that is still there um and so that is blocking um you know kind of an obvious kind of Gambia versus China suit over the Uyghur um is is blocked um yeah if Beth Vonskak uh last week was talking about creativity um in the face of impediments we absolutely need creativity in the face of impediments you know and I applaud Gambia and as well as the Netherlands and Canada um intervening um and supporting Gambia's application um for a suit against Myanmar and it's of course not a criminal proceeding but it is it is certainly um pushing the ball forward um and then we have you know the double I double M gathering evidence um as well as um I believe there is a suit in Argentina as well um so you know a variety of measures are being approached as well as the international criminal court potentially adjudicating crimes where they have an element of the crime occurred in Bangladesh so we actually have kind of four different things occurring um related to crimes in in Myanmar but you know the the most direct routes are again all blocked by the veto because if we didn't have the veto what you would take is the provisional measures order from the ICJ case the provisional genocide we would take the provisional measures order and one of these countries would put it in security council resolution and take it to the security council and you just get it passed and then the ICJs what is what it's um ordered to be done has the strength of the council behind that and of course none of this happens countries don't have the courage to put this to the council because they know it'll face a veto um so it's again the veto power that's really blocking what we otherwise could be doing so a lot of work needs to be done wow uh I can ask two or is it okay two or more three just a final round I know we could we could continue forever uh Jennifer I mean there are questions here regarding the role of the general assembly of course you know the uniting for peace and to what extent you know uh it could be uh complimentary or every replacement there is a question that what happens let's say if the ICJ you know we have uh what I say if it is referred to the ICJ that finds that it's exercise was ultra virus or of the p5 veto um sorry for that I'm trying to to see all the questions are in my laptop um so I think you're asking me the the second and third questions that I'm seeing in the chat function so let me try these can the general assembly use the uniting for peace to you know overcome something um so my understanding of uniting for peace was that it was done in a period of time when the general so one of the things uniting for peace did was achieve a special session which I think is less needed because the GA beats more often um I don't know that uniting for peace actually gives the GA broader powers than it already has under the charter so um I don't know if we need uniting for peace you could get the council or you could simply go to the GA as it happened when the referral of the situations here to the ICC was blocked the GA took up the and created the triple IM so you can definitely go to the GA I don't know it gives any greater powers so um they um you know they can um they primarily have recommendations um you know I I'm still reading the charter fairly traditionally that any kind of force authorization still needs to go through the security castle so yes you can turn to the GA and yes you can try to do um you know the um the GA has you know a fair measure of tools at its disposal and use the tools the GA has as its disposal um but there are certain measures that are simply blocked by the veto um what happens if we have a veto that's ultra virus so um what happens next is a great question so um you know I guess first I'm just arguing you know in the abstract we need an advisory opinion and that's you know that's probably advisory opinion and I hope to be so lucky that we could actually get there one of the consequences would be you know as the question rightly poses you know if you're violating you know use Kogan's um it shouldn't actually be void double it should be void um so what do we do and um um you know what happens on the council um you know absent a ruling in a concrete case um I'm afraid we might just have an advisory opinion I mean I still think we should try to get an advisory opinion you know what does it do in and you know in the next specific situation so ideally I would have an advisory opinion and then we would actually have a contentious case to figure out and then you know really have a declaration um you know I don't know if you could go to the ICJ for very quick provisional measures and kind of a ruling we'd have to have a situation that can be brought um you know is this particular veto ultra virus um and then a ruling by the court um yes you know um or whatever I don't know how the court will rule on this so there's obviously um a range of potential rulings that could come out of the international court of justice so um so you know I can't quite foresee the future but I'm imagining you know maybe the advisory opinion and then maybe later a contentious case a specific veto being questioned um and I don't know that each other you know uh that's void um I I think we might actually need the more sound way of doing it so oh thank you uh for putting up the link to my book yes of course of course I know many people and uh we we are all very much interested in in your book and as a as a reading but also as a component of teaching but but I want to ask something if I may can I ask you absolutely the last question because I think you addressed all uh in a kind with your final answer somehow we address what happens you know if it is if the security council is found to act ultra virus you know um my my question is more general and more theoretical and I was wondering you know as a writer when you were writing and you were focusing on the legal existing on the legal limits you know how did you find this interaction with with politics with between international law politics and if I can say ethics as well so I'm curious as an academic you know to ask you how did you address all these issues because I'm writing on international law but I see all of the time you know and also that was very um obvious from the kind of questions you had you know that it was this mixture of yeah absolutely I agree with you well I I said I'm in New York and when I go over to the UN uh which I used to do periodically pre-covid um that there is a large measure of politics going on it is just absolutely obvious and I think you know we we all see that and I also teach basic international law and I don't just teach international law in a vacuum but international law within a context mixture of the law and and then the political component um and often the law trying to push back against the political component and it's it's difficult because I'm obviously trying to look at um what are often seen as just very political questions you know isn't it all politics and you know in a real legal framework so taking a very um political body the security council and subjecting it to legal scrutiny but you know we're lawyers so that's what we do um you know I don't operate so much in the realm of of politics as well how does this measure up to to legal scrutiny and I think you're you're right it also raises um all kinds of moral and ethical questions you know as I say um you know if you read some of the statements after the Syria vetoes um you know raising my book launch events I had my humble Abdullah of Syrian justice accountability center speaking of of what was going on in Syria on the ground um to the people and and you really convinced uh of the farm um and there really is sometimes a direct linkage between the vote within the council and fatalities on the ground so I do think you're absolutely right there are moral and ethical issues here again I'm a lawyer so I do the legal side of it um a bit absolutely it's it's all wrapped up in one oh that's another note Jennifer I would like to thank you so much on behalf of the work study department at the work crime research group uh it was a real pleasure it was a real honor to have you uh to discuss with you your last book you can find on the on the chat the link of Jennifer's last book uh to respond to all the questions we had more than uh almost 15 questions you know and and you managed to respond to all of them and yes international is a curious mixture and teaching international love it is a challenging task I can say that thank you so much for this extremely rich and intriguing and thought-provoking um uh discussion uh it's a discussion that goes beyond the the usual political limits to the security council it's a legal discussion and I hope that we will have the chance in the near future to see you uh to meet in person again whether in New York or in London or in Salzburg or in the Hague or somewhere else and I will look forward to your next pieces of work uh that you briefly uh mentioned and once more thank you very very much for being with us uh this morning from New York afternoon uh in London thank you so much Marie it was an absolute delight thank you I look forward to seeing you next time in person as well thank you all very much uh once more thank you very much Jennifer and uh have a nice day New York a nice evening for the for the London uh people thank you all thank you thank you very much for accommodating once more thank you all bye bye thank you thank you