 So I have been working as a freelancer in crypto domain for last 3-4 months, got interested in the area of crypto economics and found that it is really very fascinating one. So most of the people talk about Bitcoin and how it is increasing at a fast rate, right? But the underlying technology which is supporting Bitcoin is blockchain. So and I think the real innovation which is there in this whole ecosystem is the blockchain and the really interesting thing about that is the crypto economics which is the innovation which they have designed on how to innovate decentralized systems to make them work in to follow a protocol, right? So how do they incentivize actors for which they do not have any control over and make them follow a particular protocol act in a certain way? So I think that is the biggest achievement of this blockchain revolution. I think that has a great future and that is why I have been exploring crypto economics and I see there is a lot of potential in this area and how we can use it to solve many problems which we face currently, right? So and this talk is basically just my learning which I have gone through in the last two, three months. So I just thought I should share with the community and see what and learn more about it. So feel free to stop me and ask questions because I am also learning as we go. So I'm sure all of you have got a message something like this that go ahead and register R R with your mobile number so that you can use it and this otherwise will not be useful. Right? So when I see this message I think that why? Why should I do this? Right? Because I don't really have any incentive to go ahead and attach my adha to a mobile number but because I am a law abiding citizen I will do it. So what's the mechanism by which this is being forced on me? Yeah. So it's a combination of penalty sort of thing and a coercion, yeah threats, coercion that people say that something bad will happen to you. So the government is making me do certain things by giving threats, coercion, right? But how do people in Bitcoin world follow a particular protocol, right? Because in Bitcoin everybody is anonymous, everybody knows each other, there's no central government or police authority which follows everybody should do this, do this and basically everybody can do anything they want to but still surprisingly Bitcoin works, right? So that's the key question which I'm trying to address here or trying to learn more about that what is the thing which makes all these miners from China, from US, from different countries to work together and make Bitcoin a success and follow something which Satoshi Nakamoto has written in his white wiper some eight years back, right? Why are not people debating? Given that there is no governance, nobody is saying go ahead otherwise something will happen to you, no coercion, right? So that's the key question which I'll try to address. So the answer to the question is incentives, right? The Toshi has designed this protocol in a way that provides incentives to each person, each actor in the ecosystem which makes him follow the protocol and it's in his best interest to follow that protocol. He gains, so he has designed incentive mechanisms which I'll talk about later on why he should be following the protocol and not following the protocol is not the right thing to do, right? So this is a brief outline of the doc. So I'll go about what is crypt economics, then discuss some features of crypt economic systems, then how you can go about modeling crypt economic systems and then we'll go get into mechanism design which is basically nothing but how do you design incentives for systems and then I'll get into some examples with Casper protocol and some questions around mechanism design for blockchain projects and if time permits we can do and co-a Q&A. Yeah, yeah, it's absolutely fine. If you don't understand anything, I understand that something may go overhead and people may not understand it, so that's fine. So just a quick show of how many people here have heard about blockchain? Okay, cool, everybody. How many know about proof of stake, proof of work? Okay. Sure. And how many have any background on game theory? Cool, no problem. So just this is just for my own information. So, okay, so what is crypt economics? So crypt economics is basically application of incentive design mechanisms on information security problems. So problems in which you need to make certain set of people follow a certain things which are cryptographically secured. So this set, this primarily comes in the area of decentralized systems where you want trustless people, trustless nodes to follow certain things, right, because if you know someone, you can trust them, then you don't need to use cryptography and have the details in a secret and follow it, right? But if you are broadcasting something in the wild, you need to ensure that it reaches the right person. And for that, we need cryptography and because all the nodes are decentralized and you don't need anybody to trust a node. So you need to have people to trust each other through cryptography. So crypt economics is that part of the study where you design incentive mechanism which uses for protocols which use cryptography for the functioning of the protocol, right? So Bitcoin is a great instance for a crypt economic system. So what is the, what is the work which Bitcoin does, right? So Bitcoin transfers value from one party to another through in a trustless manner and a decentralized manner, right? So one party doesn't need to know other party. He just needs to know the public address key and then they can transfer value. And all this happens in a way, in a decentralized way. There is no centralized system like a bank whom you trust. So as of now, all the banks which we know, they exist because it is the party which we trust, right? Which we know that they won't fail us or they won't do something wrong. But amazingly, Bitcoin achieves the same task without you needing to trust anybody. Basically, you trust the protocol, right? And for that to happen, we need to ensure that everybody follows the protocol. So that's a, so, so Bitcoin is a good instance of a crypt economic system. And for any crypt economic system to function, there needs to be certain set of things which should available, right? So it should have a particular state which everybody agrees to. So basically that is consensus. So how many people know what consensus? Okay, can you tell what is consensus? Yeah, basically it's right. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, so basically the whole system needs to agree on what is the current state of the system, right? That what are the parties, what are the balances of each party, what are the transactions they have done? For a central system, this becomes very easy because we trust that party. So whatever he says is right. But for a decentralized system like Bitcoin, it becomes particularly challenging. So Bitcoin uses a consensus mechanism called Nakamoto Consensus, which is nothing but basically saying that the longest chain is the correct chain. So if most of the people have built their blocks on a particular chain and it becomes the longest, that is true. So but the problem with that consensus is that there is no finality, right? So say six months down the line, somebody comes up and says that this is the biggest chain which is there and proves that he has done the maximum proof of work, then that will become Bitcoin. So the only consensus, only way the way by which Bitcoin achieves consensus is through the longest chain. So at any point of time, the longest chain is the truth, right? So how many know people know how does Bitcoin mining happen? So in Bitcoin mining basically, so there are transactions. So when people transact from one person to another, they so say I am transacting to him one Bitcoin, right? That's a transaction. So what do miners do is that they collect all these transactions from the public and they include it in a block. So a block is nothing but a set of transactions which is added to the blockchain, right? So in Bitcoin, the database is a set of blocks which are arranged in a chain. Is that, does everybody? So yeah, so miners. So everybody, every node has a whole, every full node has a complete chain copy of the chain which is there in the Bitcoin network. So they basically, when the node starts, it copies from some other full node. Node is just a server, yeah. Node is just a server with a piece of software running, yeah, trusted servers or any full node. So suppose there are 10 full nodes working which have complete copy of the Bitcoin, you will, when you install the software, which is basically the Bitcoin daemon, you will get that address of one of the full nodes, then you can just copy that the whole chain to your server. Yeah, so that each and every transaction, yeah, it's very, it's very weak. So generally, not everybody runs a full node. They are simpler light nodes, which people can, like in general people can run, but people who verify or validate transactions, they run a full node, yeah, miners are running full node. So light node is basically, they will say that the chain till this point is finalized. So stay till now, I'll just explain him and then, yeah. So basically, light node is basically, suppose there are 1500 blocks in the full chain, right? So the light node will say, till 1200, I know what is it. So they don't bother about it, and then they will copy only 300 blocks. So basically, they assume that the 1200 blocks are final. But in actuality, those are not final. But there is very little, very exponentially low chance of those being not final. So for all practical purposes, they are only concerned with the last 300 nodes. No, you'll have to download the full node. Because if you're trying to get money out of it, downloading 160 GB is not a big deal, right? But if I'm trying to just authenticate to a site or like transfer some money from another, I don't want to download 160 GB, right? But if you want to make money, it's better to run a full node. I think you will be required to run a full node. So all the transactions are done through any node, right? And then they broadcast the transaction. So everybody broadcasts basically every node they know, they transfer to that. And then in the protocol, it's such that the next node which receives it also forwards it to the other nodes. So basically, a typical broadcasting mechanism, right? So by that mechanism, if one full node gets one transaction, he will broadcast to other nodes. So this will spread out and everybody will know it. Yeah, so that's the- So basically, this is also an approximation. So this is also not if you go to the theory part, the solution which Satoshi has proposed is also an approximation, but the surprising part is that it works. And to your other question that what happens if I change the software, right? So basically then you will not be doing a Bitcoin, you will be effectively doing a fork. You will not be running with the same protocol, right? And you will be doing with a fork. So the currency which you create or the block which you create will have no value. Others will not validate it. So your value depends only if other people build blocks on your block, right? That's the key of Bitcoin. If you build a block, it doesn't have any value. But if other people agree that the block which you have built is correct and then build blocks over it, then you get legitimacy and the transaction which you have put in that block are valid. So in that scenario, you will publish some notes or blocks, right? But because you have a bug, other people will not build blocks on your chain. So that means that your block is basically not valid. No, but they will verify. So basically, basically it means that you are out of consensus. So nobody respects you. Yeah, so if it's only you, then you are out of consensus. If it's everybody, then it's a different Bitcoin, right? Yeah, it's a big problem. I think we'll take this offline. Yeah, I think we'll take this offline because it's being live streamed. Yeah, so basically our Bitcoin mining works is, so all these transactions are there, right? So miners will collect all these transactions and then they will try to create a block. So the problem, how they create a block is that they have to find a solve the cryptographic problem to build that block. So basically it's nothing but a SHA256 of the transactions, which satisfies the particular difficulty problem, difficulty level. So the SHA256 should have a certain number of leading zeros. So yeah, no, so but yeah, so this is there because you need to validate it, right? Otherwise, anybody can create any transaction and then say, how, where is the, where is who is, how do you maintain source of truth? So in Bitcoin, this is the longest chain is the source of truth, right? If there's no block or no block chain, then who says that what is the right? Yeah, so exactly. Yeah, so I'll come to your point. That's a valid point. Why? I'll come to that. So let's let Park your question, I'll come to that. So basically he solves the cryptographic problem and then he adds a block to it. And if that node is valid, then he gets a Bitcoin. So that is the basically the reward for the miner, right? So, so the reward for miner is that he gets a certain number of bitcoins as of now 12.5 bitcoins per block for. So basically, bit miner provides a service of maintaining consensus, maintaining the source of truth. And he gets a reward of Bitcoin, right? So to his question, right? So why is proof of our necessity? Why do so much math Apache find a solution and then and then add it to block, right? So the problem with decentralized system, it's they are all able to civil attacks. So civil attacks is basically in any reputation based system. If you can create, which is a public decentralized system, you can come up with new nodes, which can like alter the state of the system, right? So suppose there are now 10 nodes. Now anybody can create a 12th node, 11th node, 12th node, right? And they can start publishing transaction. How do we know that they are following the protocol? Yeah, basically creating picker. So you can, you can, so that's what is happening in Twitter, right? As of now, everybody is creating new accounts, new accounts, new accounts, because nobody is controlling it. The Twitter is a centralized service and then they are doing anything they want. But what is the insight of Satoshi was that if you make them work to do something, then not everybody will come and do random things, right? Because they have to pay something to do something, make it costly. So now, because there's a cost involved to doing things on Bitcoin, it is in the idea, it is advantageous for people to follow the protocol and work in a correct way. So yeah, and, and basically the last point is the following the protocol should be the equilibrium, right? So this is equilibrium in the sense of Nash equilibrium that given that what other parties are doing, you should be doing what you should, what is the ideal state for you is to follow the protocol, right? So actually, Bitcoin protocol is not in Nash equilibrium, but we'll come to that later. So yeah, that's just a choice, yeah, that's just a choice, it's a design choice which Satoshi came up with, basically he designed it to be a currency, right? And I think he thought that the currency should not increase, like there should be some monetary policy. He chose a monetary policy which was this deflationary monetary policy, basically you cannot issue new coins. So the miners will not get rewards from the 12.5 Bitcoins which they get from the protocol as of now, but they will get reward from the transactions fees. So in each transaction as of now, we attach certain transaction fee which we are ready to willing to give to the miners so that they include the transaction in the, in their block, right? So one second. So earlier, because there were very few transactions, people were just happy getting the 12.5 Bitcoin and transaction fees were very low, right? Now if number of transactions, people who want to do transactions on Bitcoin network increases, then people have to incentivize the miners to include their transactions, right? And only when a transaction is included in a block, it becomes valid. So people attach transaction fees. I think you might have heard that recently, Ethereum transaction fees have become very high or all this Bitcoin and Ethereum networks, the transaction fees have become very high because there are so many people who want to do stuff and only one block is created in only 10 minutes. So for Bitcoin, one block is created only in 10 minutes. So basically you need to incentivize miners to do that. Yeah. So once the 21 million mark is reached, people will make money from the transaction fees. So the idea is that the transaction fee will become the main incentive for miners to include transactions. So yeah. So there is a trade-off there basically. So that's where the intelligence of miners software comes in. So basically ideally they should choose certain number of transactions, right? But a block only consists of a particular number of transactions. So they cannot use new transactions. So if they add a new transactions, they have to repeat the whole work again. So suppose as of at point X, there are five transactions which a miner is including in the block, right? So he takes this transaction and then calculates the source the problem and gets some basically source the problem, right? But if you include a new transaction, say six transactions, then the whole problem changes. It's a new problem. And the nature of the nature of the cryptographic problem is such that it's state independent. So whatever work you have done till now is lost. Which transactions? Yeah. Yeah. Basically, which the miner will have to decide on what is the trade-off he chooses, right? Because if he so for example, if he he's working on this problem, right? He creates this block, he takes one, two, three, four, five and then he's trying to solve this problem. Meanwhile, he comes to know that some other miner has solved this problem and he has transmitted that to everybody. Now, this whole problem is lost. There's no point solving this problem again because this is solved. So we'll start again solving 6789 transaction and then try to solve for it, right? So your question is valid that they will try to include transactions which are has high transaction fees, right? But they cannot just like add transactions as they come in because the problem becomes as the add transactions, the problem changes and and the particular problem is such that it is stateless. So the whole work is lost. It's not that if you have solved for this, then if you add one, then it is only incremental work. It's a completely new problem. So so basically we're talking about network latency, right? So so that's that's one of the design calls which Satoshi had taken that each block will be created in 10 minutes. So even if there is a network latency or something, he expects that everybody will be able to get in one, two minute, one minute or 30 seconds every note in the internet or in every place will be able to get all the notes, right? So the network latency doesn't affect Ethereum is much closer to that. No, so Bitcoin protocol adjusts the difficulty such that one block is created in 10 minutes. So for example, if the hash rate of the a minor's increase, basic minus increase, they will change the difficulty so that they cannot produce new blocks earlier than 10 minutes or 10 minutes. So that's what, right? So so they will everything is captured in actors. How how are the technology improves? Hashtag improves, right? That is the goal of this technology. And if hashtag improves the protocol will monitor key how many blocks are getting created in in 10 minutes. If it's around 10 minutes, then it's fine. Otherwise it will change the difficulty level of the problem. So now it becomes a higher, more difficult problem, which they have to solve. So they will try to balance it to keep it 10 minutes. Of course, there are many questions around why this should be should it be 10 minutes and all. So basically this is a design choice. This is not something in its own protocol. It's it's as of now it's written in the protocol. So pool is nothing but a set of minors who contribute that their hash power and say in a group solve the problem. Because if if I am a small, short, I mean, and I have a small one, say, a sick, I may not be able to solve any problem because it's too tough. So they will. So it's better to for them to pull together and give a smaller part of the problems to each of each of the people, each of the members in the pool, and then see and solve the problem, right? So otherwise if I have a very small hash rate system, then it may be that I am not able to solve any problem and I don't get any reward, right? Yeah, for one block, huh? So for for the purpose, they will divide about themselves. So pool is a pool is out of the system arrangement. It is not in the Bitcoin. So for Bitcoin, anybody who solves this problem, I will give you 12.5. So moving ahead. So these are the features which a crypto economic system should have. So basically these are parameters on which we should analyze the system. So for example, how stable is the system, how persistent it is, how optimal it is, whether it's robust or not. So this is basically something like car. So when you buy a car, car is also a system, right? And when you buy a car, you think about what is the top speed? Or what is the mileage? What is the, say, safety measures and all this thing. So so for any system, there's these are the features which we measure that system based on, right? So stability is basically is following the protocol and equilibrium or not. So this equilibrium is in the sense of Nash equilibrium. So why should this is the basic question which I asked earlier that why should all the miners follow the protocol? So for this to happen, following the protocol or acting in the correct way should be an equilibrium. If they, if they deviate out of it, they don't have any incentive basically to deviate out of it. So as, as you know, Nash equilibrium is something that if you know what other people are doing, if you know about the strategies of other people, other players, then the strategy which you're playing should be an equilibrium. Basically you don't have any incentive to change your strategy given that you know what other people are doing. And similarly it's for other people, right? So that's the concept of equilibrium. If, if everybody thinks the same way, all the miners will think that what is my equilibrium? So they will. So that protocol should be designed in such a way that following the protocol is the equilibrium. The next is persistence. Basically, if there is any perturbation on the system, will the, will the system recover or not, right? So this is, this is basically something like, say, the cost of mining changes, say, hashrate, a sick miners become very fast and hashrate improves. So, so does, does the protocol become bad? So if there was not the difficulty level adjusting thing in Bitcoin network, then, then it would become out of protocol, right? Because then the blocks will be created in less than 10 minutes and the whole system will go away. So that is persistence, that the system should be able to adjust to different variations outside perturbations and reach back to equilibrium again, right? Optima optimality is basically it's following the protocol getting doing what I am trying to do, right? So for Bitcoin, transferring value from one party to another is the goal, goal of the protocol in a decentralized and trustly manner. So the Bitcoin protocol should be designed in such a way that that, that goal is achieved. So that is optimality. And robustness is basically how much can the system be pushed that the system falls off the equilibrium or how much can it push and distill it can recover, right? So an example of this could be, suppose the price of electricity changes, right, or a hashrate becomes very hard and and difficulty cannot be changed that much. So the system can fall out of equilibrium, right? So how or if you want to mount an attack, what is the cost of attack to mount to make the system fall out of equilibrium, right? So everybody might have heard of this 51% attack, right? On Bitcoin, basically, it says that if 51% of people collude together, then they can build, they can make the protocol go heavier, right? Because they can build on a chain which they select and then keep on building on it, right? So that becomes the whole consensus. So basically, so if you evaluate based on robustness, then Bitcoin protocol is not robust to 51% people colluding. It is robust to less than 50% people colluding. But as it becomes 51, it is not robust, right? So but surprising part of that is still they didn't mount any attack, 51% attack. Yeah, so basically they, yeah, group of minors or single minor, they have huge farms, hash rate, hash power, 51% of hash power, total hash power, it's not, yeah, computing bar. So basically their capacity to solve problems, those cryptographic problems, all are Chinese. So basically that's one of the criticism of Bitcoin network that it's actually not decentralized. It's fairly centralized. Yeah, so it's fairly centralized. Yeah, but also the incentive is to keep the system working, right? Because that's where the value they derive the value from. If Bitcoin is not there, then all these minors are broke. So that's why that's why the 51% attack didn't happen when G hash had 51% power because they thought that they will not get anything out of it, right? So in a way it's robust, but still if somebody doesn't care about the incentive, suppose it's China government, they want to just destroy Bitcoin, they can do it, right? And then efficiency, efficiency is basically how much efficiently are you able to provide this system? So Bitcoin's network provides a service, right? But what is the cost with society is incurring. So for this case, for Bitcoin, it's the electricity cost with the society is incurring. The question is, is it efficient or can you devise systems which are more efficient than this or which has less cost? So we can see, we'll see later that there has been proposals by Ethereum and all to create more efficient systems. But yeah, so basically these are the five parameters based on which we can evaluate any crypto economic systems. So if the economic systems can be Bitcoin, network, the Ethereum protocol, there are several different coins. They have different protocols, right? So it's a fork. So you're saying that they cannot communicate with each other at all. So whatever people decide to build blocks on will prevail. So that's that's what the forks happen, right? That is fork basically. So Bitcoin cash and Bitcoin, right? They basically decided that we will part ways and we'll build our load chains. So that is fork. So if, if a network partition happens in which there are two separate groups equally powerful, then it will be a fork. Yeah. So it's two currencies. What are the values we perceive in the real company? There is a lot of institutionally that is associated with it. For example, why can you just bring any cookie or a dog? Right? So the value attached to a dog is something behind institutions. What are the values? Let's say RBI has quarters. Let's say we are in time. Yeah. Yeah. So when I say crypto economic, it should use some cryptography to ensure the trustless behavior, right? So in the decentralized system, which you're talking about, they don't have any cryptography. There is no trustlessness involved. People assume that there is central server which controls. So in those cases, these are not so much a problem. But when you come to places where there is a cryptography involved, where people want to work in a decentralized network and work in a trustless way, then these become very important, right? Because you don't know which are those parties and you cannot control them. So decentralized application, what do you mean? So you mean something like a central server, like decentralized servers, right? Yeah. So yeah, Ethereum falls under this crypt economic system. So all those crypt economic systems should follow these points. Basically, these are points to analyze basically the way when you go to buy car, right? And we analyze any system we analyze based on certain parameters, right? For car, we analyze what is the top speed, what is the mileage and what is the safety parameters, right? So for any crypt economic system, so even for a DAB or so DAB is basically nothing but a new sort of crypt economic system. So if a DAB is based on Ethereum network, then they are basically using Ethereum protocol and if they're creating their own protocol, then there is a new crypt economic system. So we should analyze it based on these parameters, right? He is following the protocol is stable equilibrium or not. So I'll come later on and show how you can design ICOs where it will not reach the objective which you want because the incentives are not aligned. Basically, you're not thought well enough about the mechanism design problem about. Yeah, but for your point, every DAB or every Ethereum based network should be analyzed based on decentralized decentralized and trustless, which is basically comes through cryptography because if you decentralized and it's controlled and it's everybody knows each other, then it's not much of a problem. So how do we model this system, right? So in last slide, we looked into what are the features or what are the parameters based on which we should analyze them, right? But what are the things or what are the components of these cryptograph systems? So this can be what are the level of coordination of the participants? What are the budget and cost of the attack attacks? What are the type of incentives you're designing in the network? What are the attack models? And what are the consensus mechanism use? So I'll get into detail in each of them. So just to recap till now, we have seen that what is a cryptoeconomic system? What are the features? How Bitcoin is one of the good instances of the cryptographic system? What are the features on which we should analyze it? I'll get into what are the parameters or what are the components of it? So coordination level, right? So in traditional fault tolerant research, basically of distributed system, we generally assume that all the nodes are trustworthy and they are acting in a honest manner, right? So and at least 51% are honest and working fine. So that is the general assumptions for a distributed systems and we know who are the systems and we control them but for a cryptoeconomic system, which is decentralized that things are much tougher, right? So the parameters based on which we should evaluate them are what is the level of coordination among the participants because in distributed system, we know which are the nodes and which are the participants, right? But here because we don't know which are the participants, they can either collude among each other or they can act in a shady way. Also, what is the budget? They have to attack the system, right? So so these systems can try to attack the protocol and make attacks on the system and try to make it fall out of equilibrium, right? And how so we need to also model. What is the what is the budget they can have? So like we discussed, right? That if if a simple miner is mining, he will not do a 51% attack because it's not in his incentive, right? But if China government comes, then here they have infinite basically budget and they can attack, right? So when we are analyzing such systems, we should also see who are the participants and what are the attack budgets they can have, right? What are the what are the incentives which this mechanism provides? So for Bitcoin, they can they are primarily two types of incentives. One is payments basically mining rewards and the other is certain privileges which the network provides. So privileges in case of say Bitcoin is collecting the transaction fee, right? So so when a miner mines a block, the privileges which the protocol gives it is that they can collect all the transaction fees from it. So so that is those are the incentives through which the incentive the system is designed so that they act in in the correct way. Transaction fee. The user who is transacting, they put I am willing to give so much transaction fee. So basically that depends upon the urgency they have of basically if you provide a lower transaction fee, your transaction will be included much later. But if you want it to happen quickly, then you pay a higher transaction. So they are they are basically website which which say or guide you saying that this is the current transaction fee or if you specify this much transaction fee, it will confirm you say 10 minutes or 20 minutes. There are guidelines which people say based on past transactions. It's it's a BTC. It's absolute amount. It's not it's absolute amount. It's not that if you are trying to transfer 100 BTC, then you pay higher amount and only one BTC, then you pay lower amount. It's just for for the purpose of the minor. It's just one transaction. No, not not the time one transaction, right? So as I mentioned here, they have to include transactions in the block and each transaction is independent. So either you are transferring 100 BTC or 1000 BTC doesn't matter. It's one transaction and for that transaction to be included in the block, the minor wants some fees. Right? Yeah. So incentives can be payments or privileges. Now there can be different attack models which which can be there. So they're primarily three. They're primarily three attack models which will analyze one is uncoordinated majority model. Basically an uncoordinated majority model. We assume that the participants are acting in their own interest. They are not like self interest. They are rational participants. They don't have more network power than particular amount. So basically they are a small, small participants and not a big participant and they make independent choices. Basically, they are not colluding. Right? So, but they're not this did not necessarily be honest, right? Because if they're attacking a protocol, they may be they they have to be dishonest, right? So that is one one mode of attack which can be possible or basically one vector on which we should analyze the system. Other is coordinated choice model. Basically when participants are colluding, so this is this is the vector on which Bitcoin network fails. So if Bitcoin networks get attacked by a 51% collusion, then basically it will fail, right? But it will not fail if it's it's being attacked by uncoordinated majority, but because Bitcoin network is resilient to it. And there's also a bribing attacker model which I'll get into later. So, yeah, so let's take an example of a very simple game which will illustrate some points. So this is a game which is called a selling point coin game where the objective of the game is to find true answer to a question. Right? So suppose who won the election A or B one or zero, right? So suppose and the algorithm is such that everybody there will be a set of people or set of nodes and there will be a single question asked to them who won the election and it can be either one or zero. They can vote one or zero and majority of the answer is taken as correct, right? So basically this is like this source from a set of nodes. How do you find the truth? So in this game, the truth is defined as the majority majority response and everybody who votes with the majority is given a reward P right? So basically there is incentive for people to vote with the majority majority is 51% right? No, 51% basically. So in that case, are you talking about the Bitcoin attack thing? The reality doesn't decide what is the longest, the longest chain. If the what I was telling all that if 51% people collude, then they can create a chain which becomes longest because they have a higher hash power. It's simple that if one has 51 then the other has 49 right? So the chain on which the the collusion is working will be longer is whichever is the longest chain. So the Nakamoto's consensus is very simple, whichever chain is the longest is truth. There's no nothing like majority or 51% should be acting 40% should be acting. Whatever is the thing if the longest, whichever is the longest chain is the truth. Okay, is this game clear to everybody? So, right? Okay, so let's analyze this game on a uncoordinated choice model, right? Basically, we are assuming that people are acting independently. There's no external force. So what's what's the? So this is the payoff table for payoff table for the for this game in in this model. Basically, if if you vote zero and every everybody else votes zero, you get a P payout. If you vote one, but everybody else is voting zero, you get zero, right? Similarly, zero and P. So in this scenario, what do you think is the response ideal response? Huh, but the truth is it is not a random question. It is a question of that something happened. What was that? So the Celine coin game is key who won the election BJP or Congress? Now people here know who won. Right. So be suppose BJP won. What would they vote on? So generally in this scenario, they will the equilibrium is voting with the majority, right? Because everybody will think that they will vote with the truth because truth is the default majority, which can happen. Like people will think you're okay. Like people will vote with the truth. So voting with the majority is the or or voting with the truth is the is the equilibrium here. Default option, right? Because if you if you try to try to vote false, then you will think that other people will vote truth. So basically and this is the argument which will be playing with everybody's mind, right? So basically in such a scenario doing or saying the truth is the is the equilibrium. But suppose there is a scenario where there is a briber, right? And he has the capacity to like pay certain amount to person and ask them to do certain action, right? So in this example, briber ask everyone to vote for one. And if he's saying that if one is not the majority vote, then he will compensate with people's epsilon. Basically, if suppose P was 100, then he will give 101 rupees, right? So so the pay off matrix now becomes this. If you vote zero and everybody else votes zero, you get P. But if you vote one and other people vote zero, you get P plus epsilon because the briber is giving you this one and if you vote one and there's a voting one, you get P, right? Now in this case, voting one becomes the dominant strategy. Dominant strategy means that you will do that irrespective of what other people are doing, right? Because in this case, if you vote for both conditions, if you vote one, this is higher than this and this is higher than this, right? So for a player, this becomes the dominant strategy. Now interestingly, if you vote one and everybody else is also seeing the same payoff table, they will also vote one. So basically it comes in this. So the briber is able to influence the decision without being anything. No epsilon, right? Because everybody else is also seeing the same thing and they are saying that, okay, let's vote one. Now if everybody is, you are being one and everybody is also voting one, then it's P, right? So just the presence of a briber is able to alter the result of the game without the briber having to have any cost, right? So this was the factor which I was talking about, the budget and the cost. So briber needs to have a budget of P plus epsilon. He needs to convince people that I can pay you this much, right? But the game is very weak in this sense that he doesn't actually need to pay that. It's so mounting an attack on this game is very cheap. Ha, P plus epsilon times of population, right? So, so that is the design of the game. Keep briber can reach in this model, briber can reach all the nodes, right? But this this attack cannot be mounted on Bitcoin because right? So, so in this case, just the presence of a briber is able to attack the game. So, right? So similarly, all crypto economic systems are liable to attack, right? So because it's decentralized, everybody will try to attack it. So we need to analyze how robust are the systems to these attacks. So Bitcoin has many attacks. I think these are three as a primary 51% attack. I think which we already talked about that people, if there is a collusion and 51% people work together, then they can insert transactions, right? So they can ignore choose to ignore transaction from certain people and basically the Bitcoin will not no longer be functioning. It will not be included. There's also very interesting selfish mining attack which needs only 25% collision. So basically what happens in this case is a node starts mining and finding solutions to the block, but it doesn't publish to everybody. It keeps to itself and keeps building on it, building on it, building on it is it sees that the other the true node, true chain comes close to it and then it suddenly publishes it. Now, because it is the longer chain, the other nodes have an incentive to come to it and earn money because otherwise they're not earning any money because this is the correct chain. So this attack can be mountain just by 25% of people working together, right? So, so, so this is the attack which which says that which is the default strategy should be the default equilibrium. So, so that's what the was the point I was mentioning here, right that so the Bitcoin is for Bitcoin protocol following the protocol actually is actually not an equilibrium. Ideally, the equilibrium should be the 25% attack selfish mining or nothing, but still surprisingly people are not mining mining that attack because of the factors which we discussed earlier that otherwise Bitcoin will not have value. So that is the paper like people have analyzed how key it is possible to my mountain attack with just a 25% collision, right? One more attack is ZGIST attack which is basically this is also 51% attack, but here the nodes don't censor transactions. They change the timestamps of the transactions. So, and basically the timestamps determine the difficulty of the transactions, right? So, if they if they change the timestamps that there are certain or certain number of nodes which change the timestamps then the difficulty will reduce and they can mine at a faster rate. But for this also you need a 51% collision to happen. No way though, but there's no system time. There's no system time in Bitcoin. So, all the all the nodes publish their own timestamp and based on the timestamps if you publish a earlier timestamp then the difficulty is lower. But no, but because it doesn't use system time. Yeah, it's always increasing. It's always increasing. But the crucial part is because this happens only because Bitcoin network doesn't have a system time. There's no system time. Each node mine puts their own timestamp and based on that the difficulty level or the overall time is decided. Okay, the last type of modeling problem is so we have seen about what could be what are the coordination modes? So, uncoordinated mode, coordinated mode and private attack mode. We have seen what is what are the budget and cost issues? We have seen about the attack models. Now the other important part of consensus mechanism is consensus type, right? So, the consensus type which we discussed for Bitcoin is Nakamoto consensus. Basically it says that whatever is the longest in is the truth. The interesting part of this consensus is there is no finality that at any point of time, there can be somebody can come up and say that this is the longest chain which is there actually and the current chain is not the longest chain then that will become the truth, right? So, it happens like this that at any point. So, this is suppose is the chain is happening is going on, right? So, at any point people can create some other node. So, suppose two people found a solution, right? So, now both these blocks are pointing to this block, right? Because for each block you have to point to an earlier block. Now, when now a miner is creating a new block, he has a choice whether to build or here or here. Ideally, if there is only if for Bitcoin, there is only one chain, but it can happen. So, Bitcoin, you have heard of Bitcoin cash, right? So, Bitcoin cash is basically a different chain which became which took over. It's not a separate system. It's part of the same chain, but it forked out. This is a fork. So, from here, this Bitcoin cash miners follow this chain they built on this chain while Bitcoin miners build on this chain. So, chain is... Some parts are common. Yes, some parts have default. So, chain is nothing but it's just a linked list where you refer to the previous block, right? Chain is just a virtual entity. In the linked list you have to... So, there is a one chain. This is the chain. This is two, three blocks at a match. At a match, the chain can fork to two, three blocks and people otherwise end up in one single chain. Right. So, the other consensus mechanisms are practical BFT consensus and proof-of-stake consensus. So, practical BFT is basically the solution of the Valentine's point tolerance problem. I will not get into that, but just say that that this is also a solution which is being used by some coins like Hyperledger, Stellar. But the, how it differs from this is or the features of this is that this works only for... If you know the identity of the nodes. So, this works only well for permission networks like Hyperledger because for this protocol to work you will need to know the identity of the blocks and number two, it doesn't scale very much. So, only till 20 or 25 nodes this has been seen to work because the order or the number of packets which needs to be transmitted is order n square. So, if there are 100 nodes the order of packet is 10 to the power 4. Permission network is where basically a single entity is creating nodes and they know the identity of the nodes. Private blockchain, basically private blockchain and public blockchain. So, Nakaboto consensus works well for a public blockchain because there is no such requirement of knowing the ID of each block or knowing or transferring lots of packets and this scales very well. So, this is good choice for a public network while this is a good choice or this has been seen to work well in permission blocks where you know the identity and there are not many nodes like there are not million nodes. There are 100 nodes or 200 nodes. So, this works well. The other consensus mechanism which is still being developed is proof of a stick. So, proof of a stick is a general mechanism. Casper is the proof of a stick mechanism which Ethereum is planning to use or deploy. It has not been deployed yet. So, how this mechanism works is basically they ask you to deposit some amount of Ether and then the people who are the nodes which deploy or have given deposits of that much Ether are able to create a new block. So, you do not have to solve all this cryptographic problem to your question that why do you need to solve this proof of work problem, right? So, in proof of a stick you do not need to solve cryptographic problems. You have to put deposits and money. Right? Suppose and you are you can create blocks on the network. So, everybody will get chance. Suppose there are 100 value 100 nodes which deposit money they will sequentially get chance to build the node. So, how it prevents the civil attack, right? That anybody can come up and or how do the does it prevent people from mining or behaving in a rogue manner is because if the network detects that they are acting in a rogue manner it will slash that or take away their deposit. So, basically the deposit is the guarantee which they are giving we are not acting in a rogue manner. No, no. So, I think so these are design questions how much they have to deposit or not. They are still discussing that but basic idea is that if you deposit certain amount you get the right to become a node which can create the next block. So, suppose 100 nodes deposit 100 ether each now sequentially they will get the right to create that next block on the block. So, that is that is the still design. I think Casper is still not finalized. They are still researching it and analyzing based on it. So, yeah, but that is the basic idea not the most amount of money. So, no, no. So, no. So, that is basically if you are censoring transaction right that is what you are saying that you will not include particular transaction then you will be slashed right. So, the protocol will detect that this node is acting roguely that they are censoring a particular transaction they will slash your deposit. They will make you invalid. So, basically the protocol can that is the fault attribution part that they can attribute to which node is that fault. So, but why you do so that is a question. So, so, so that depends upon all the design how much they should deposit and what is the penalty right. So, so generally if it's five time penalty of what you are getting why do why you do that? So, that's a valid design question. So, that's what Vitalik Buterin and all these are still researching this. Yeah, but you will get chance right you are not the only one who is no that you can do anyways key transaction fees is high you will not take that transaction that is fine. Your balance is not decided by that. Yeah, but if you are acting in a rogue manner you are also getting slashed right. No, that may not be rogue. Yeah. So, But here you but in proof of this thing there is no transaction fee concept. How? I mean for transaction fees besides this very less it's not no. So, there are still many discussions proof of stake will not work. No, so that all depends that all depends upon how much are you taking as penalty right? Suppose it says key 10x up a penalty you have to put as penalty of the amount deposited. I have not looked into the so it's not a center. It's the protocol. It's the algorithm. There's no central regulator but your protocol will decide who will be penalized. So, it's to me also it's less of a idealistic system compared to proof of it. So, that will be the in the protocol right? So, you can see what type of transaction they are not taking up or are they not producing transactions at all? So, that fault attribution can be done at the protocol level. Okay. Let's move it. We have time. So, so, mostly done with the the modeling of the cryptomaniac parts. We have included a consensus type. I'll now switch to mechanism design where so, mechanism design is basically the superset or basically it's the original branch from which these things come up so, mechanism design is nothing but the reverse problem of game theory right? So, in game theory you are given a set of rules and then you decide what will be the game outcome of the game right? But in mechanism design you have to you are given an outcome which you need to fulfill. Then how to design the rules for getting those outcomes? That is the main question of mechanism design and it's a very interesting branch with the little study I have done. So, of course it assumes that all the all the participants are rational participants that they act in a rational way. And one of the examples of mechanism design is auction theory basically to ensure so, suppose you want to have a certain objective from the auction. What are the rules you should have? Let's take an example. So, suppose the objective of an auction is to is to have the items is to give the items to players to who has the highest valuation for the auction right? So, suppose there is an item A which is an auction and there are set of players say A, B, C, D and each one has a particular valuation V, A, V, V, C, V, D right? So, what is the ideal mechanism for that auction? And it's sealed bidding basically you don't know what each people is bidding. So, is it that the highest bidder wins and they pay they pay the price of equal to the amount of the bid or is it the highest bidder wins and they pay the price is equal to the second highest bid? Any thoughts? I stated the goal in the study. So, objective is that the players who has the highest valuation for the item builds. So, if I that is suppose the that is the coke can and I have a valuation of 10 and he values it for 15, he should be getting the item. That is the objective of the game. Might be different. So, that should happen right? Because I have a suppose I think that it should be worth of 10. I will not say 10 because otherwise I don't have any utility. I will say it would be advantageous for me if I say 8 and I get that right? If my valuation is V and I bid V, even if I win I don't have any utility right? Because I have to pay the amount which I value it at. No, no. So, there is just a theoretical game where the object. So, that is the design as in this is so as I said right? Mechanism design says what do you want to achieve? Now, it's your task to design what rule should be there in the game. I am not saying you what should be the rule. Whatever. This is the rule. This is the rule. Okay. How many think one? Raise of hands. Okay. There is no conclusion. Everybody is submitting their bid in a sealed envelope and giving it to the auctioneer. Auctioneer. Okay. How many seconds? Okay. You are only one. Can you tell me why one? But will it be for everybody because they will have because they have to pay amount of somebody's. They will keep on increasing because so basically you are saying you can overbid right? If you value it for 10 you will say 100 and you win the bid. So, then somebody else can also bid 100 right? But is that ideal because why will they over value it if they think it was only of value of 10? No, no. Think it not in terms of one player of all the players right? Yeah. Who has the highest valuation for that? Yeah. Basically who wants the most? Okay. Anybody for the second? No, but, but if you say 1000 you have you're saying that that is the that overriding is the strategy right? Then he can he values it for 10 but he will not say 100 right? Because no, but then then you're saying that other people can also over value. But you will never bid it for more than you have to value right? Because you have to actually pay for it. Yeah, but, but the same thing applies for everybody else. Let's hear the argument for the other side. Are you two or one? Okay. Not necessarily. No, don't assume that. It can be 10 100. Okay. Okay. How does it change the argument? So don't. So don't bid high. Don't bid high. This is no actual price. No, no. Suppose it's not coca-cola can it's it's a monega painting. It's monega painting. It's not coca-cola. You know that you will get it outside for them. It's a painting from classical artist. Now there's no actual valuation right? It's what people value it. So that that is the question. There's no outside reference of the correct value. Yeah. So that's why that's the question right? How do you decide a strategy? Anybody for two? Okay. Yeah, but they will not go very high right? Because they have to pay that. No, no for first one they will not be very high because if they bid very high they have to pay that. How but they cannot way. If suppose if the for the painting they value it for rupees 10 they will not be 20 right because then they have negative utility. Because that is the value. If you get it for more than that then you are basically losing. You won't go for that. Okay. Okay. Somebody is a bit optimistic and motivated. Okay. But thinking that they say that the second is going to be a thousand dollars. Okay. But everybody thinks that way. So everybody consistently bid higher amounts. So that way the second one like four is going to be an action basically. We are ending that very quickly. From there you can bring the second to third. Yeah. I think there is a second with an objective here. According to which two is the correct value. Yeah. You want to give it to the player who has a higher expectation but you don't want to collect the maximum amount from there. No, there's no second. This is the only objective. No, no, there's no I'm saying there's no second. Okay. I'll I'll I'll I think it's an interesting question. You can you guys can think. No, it's one round of fitting and what says is not right. So in this solution the second is the optimum response. So basically if you are paying if this is the bidding mechanism, then the idealist optimum strategy for each participant is to bid their true valuation. So suppose if they bid their lower valuation, they had a chance of winning that bid and they would not get it because they bid lower than their true valuation and they cannot should not orbit because there will not be a utility right? Suppose they what one see in one you are not you are not should not orbit in one under bidding is more likely but there's no ideal strategy for it. So, so in one you should not orbit because you will lose you don't have any utility you should not you can just bid your valuation, but then you don't get any utility. So ideally under bidding is the strategy, but there has been no like you cannot prove that what is should be the idealist strategy. So easily it will not get achieve the objective which you want that is getting the true valuation of the object. So there is a very interesting formal proof of why for this is the idealist strategy and this is this is called by a name called wickery auction which is generally followed for such auction. No, but this has actually been observed. So if you. No, so Google AdWords use this many many true systems. I think he also uses the same thing. So good. So I think you got a feel of what a mechanism design is so how the objective of the system changes how you design the rule, right? So I'll just get into Casper. So this is the proof of stake algorithm which Ethereum blockchain is designing. They have not deployed it yet. So as we discussed it is based on a certain amount of taking certain amount of deposit from the nodes and then if they behave wrongly we will take away their deposit. So one of the common problems with such proof of stake problem consensus algorithms is nothing at stake, right? Because in nothing in proof of stake you don't have to do anything to build blocks in build a block as compared to proof of work where you have to solve a problem to to add a block. So there are very interesting scenarios which arise. So for example, if if there is no suppose there is no deposit and slashing conditions, right? You don't there's no fun of taking away the deposit. Then in that case suppose at a point there are two two folks in the chain and one has a priority of 0.9 being correct and other has a priority of 0.1 being correct and suppose each block gives a reward of one either right? So if there is no deposit and no slashing conditions, then the ideal strategy is to vote on both block, right? Because you will get a expected value of one. While if you vote only on the correct block, you get expected value of 0.9. So this shows that why if you don't have any stake then or if you don't have any deposits then proof of stake doesn't work. That's what there's no cost in creating a block. That's that's the definition of just create because there is no cost in creating a block, right? You just there's no mining. Proof of work handles this challenge because in proof of work you have if you plan to build on both chains you have to divide your computational power, right? So the expected so if you want to build for both chain you have to solve the problem for each each transaction set and so your expected value becomes 0.5. Basically you can succeed in this and this with half probability. So your expected value becomes 0.5 while building on the correct chain your expected value is 0.9. So basically proof of work ensures that people build on the correct chain. Is this clear to everybody? Right. So now how does penalizing violators affect, right? So in this case suppose we are giving a penalty of 5 to people who are acting rogally. So the protocol determines this guy is acting rogally. So we'll slash of their deposit of say 5 ether. So in that case as you can see if he votes on both the expected value is minus 4 while if he votes correctly then expected value is 0.9. No, so this is like has a stake and this is like the what Casper is for, right? So this is a very simple demonstration of how proof of work like proof of stake with penalty is able to achieve similar result as proof of work. Of course there are many advanced discussions which we can have key how exactly proof of work the equilibrium. Yeah, okay. So so here basically you have so basically Casper designing Casper is also a mechanism design problem, right? So the objective of the designers of Casper. So Casper is nothing but the proof of stake I'll go with Ethereum is designing. They want people to build or follow the chain as the equilibrium and behave honestly, but they don't want to use proof of work, right? So that was the problem they had and so introducing a penalty was a way to make people or actors act in in in accordance with the equilibrium protocol. No proof of work has problems like electricity and there's no finality, right? Energy cost. There is no finality. You can always fork like any time you can go ahead and fork the problem. So proof of work also has problems, but it's working as of now, but there are it's not the optimal solution for the problem, right? So proof of stake is another attack at solving that same problem in Bitcoin. It has recently I don't think there is supposed to be a metropolis update, but that is an update. That is the update of the protocol. So basically what they are saying is they want to slowly shift also to proof of stake also. So out of 100 blocks 99 will be using proof of work. One will be proof of stake. So but that change still has not happened. They are planning to do that metropolis. Still it's it's in pipeline. It's then wrote that right. So this is the last part. So till now we have discussed primarily Bitcoin and Ethereum, how, how, how crypto economics effect the mechanism design for that. I just take a very quick example of token design. So token design is what mostly all the ICO projects are working on either they release their own token or they use the RC 20 token. So token is nothing but a digital proof of value or value which the company or the project releases and they use it primarily to incentivize certain behavior so that the protocol or the people act in the way they design it to be right. So, so designing designing that system is also a mechanism design problem, right? Because you have you have certain objective in mind and then you have character in a stick using token and penalties to to make people follow that protocol or not. Right. So, so I'll just take a quick example. So suppose we want to design a content portal where our objective is to create good content on different topics. Basically suppose as of now we have problems like in Facebook we see a lot of filter bubbles we see the content only which I want to see which I see right. So suppose I want to create a content portal which has the property that all the content in is authentic. So I can create a suppose there is a system which I design or protocol which I design in which say there are three topics and there are people who can post based on that those topics right. So suppose there are topics like cryptocurrency politics India and people can post on that and other people can take that token say suppose this is a CP token and vote on that whichever post they like or whichever post they think is the true correct post right. So and if your if your post become very popular then you get rewards in terms of the token right is is the simple it's very simple design which basically you back assign certain tokens to that basically you are saying that I back this article with my 10 tokens suppose you have 100 tokens basically the more like if you get if that yeah in a way so so token is your vote basically also you have because you have invested more in that token your intention would be that you would like to keep the system fair right. So wait wait I'm not saying I'm not saying fair fairness and all I'm not getting it I'm saying key I'm saying key if the objective of the system of the token design is to ensure that correct or true post come are are getting populated or come up are coming up and so what do you think will happen in the system. So basically suppose this is the topic one topic to and this is post one post two and different different post at the model of likes likes is basically suppose he backs it with five tokens or people back with five token one token two token okay so so basically so the simple mechanism which I said right so what it will lead to is people will vote only on those topics which other people are voting on because they will think that because other people are voting on and if he votes on and if it gets more like then he will get more tokens right. So the in this sense the the problem which I started with fails right because so so the the the the system which I designed or the protocol which I designed failed to achieve my objective of of getting the post which are true and correct because people will act in a way that the likeness they will vote on those post which will get like likeness rather than post which are actually true so this is a bad example of creating token design systems. But actually esteem it is one of the platforms which is doing this by and basically they follow similar protocols. So so so this agree agree. So it is like a token sort of credit agree. So basically this system doesn't work and so how can we fix this any suggestions? How do you know the previous office? But there's no so that's what so in this system in this system truth is not the selling point selling point in the sense but how do you know that is correct? Okay, any other suggestions? Okay, so basically I don't have answer for this. This is this is just an open question but then they don't so the ha so just not showing the likes will it solve it? That's correct. No, but in that case in that case default is the truth becomes so it's a it's an open problem which I am still thinking about thanks for giving me suggestion. So I think that's it that's all I had so just to summarize I think what we have learned is that incentives are very powerful tool to motivate the behaviors of human beings or rational agents or even irrational agents. What we should take care in take in mind is that following the protocol should be the equilibrium when you design such incentives like we discussed in the last example following the protocol it doesn't achieve the objective right when the system which we designed. So whenever you're designing such crypto economic systems we should always think that does it achieve the objective which you want and is it a robust to the external incentives right so as we see saw in the selling point example game just the presence of a briber causes the system to behave in a very different way rather than like achieving that the truth right. So these are some of the key points which you should think in mind of course crypto economics is a very big field and I welcome all of you to study more and give me more solutions these are some of the readings which if you want to look into so this is very interesting course or mechanism designed by a Stanford prof it's slightly more technical but if you're interested you can go through two three initial lectures and he'll give you very good basis of how to think about it proof of stake FAQ is a very good source in which he discusses how what are the problems he's thinking about when looking into designing Casper and discusses different issues which we have seen and there's a crypto economic reading list in which there are many links which you can refer to. So it's a design problem. You can also be like this should it be like this should it be like this. Yeah, so it's it's it's a good problem. You need to think about what you want the system to do right. So do you want so asymptotic cause so so one of the asymptotic yeah, so one of the good thing is of asymptotic or is because you push initial tokens it attracts more people into the network. It rewards earlier doctor while it's if it's linear it doesn't reward the early early doctors. Yeah, you it's you don't have to choose how much early adopters you want to know. So these are you can also release all the tokens early like upfront and say these are all the tokens which can be and don't worry about monetary policy and the actual value definition will happen in the secondary market. That can also be option. There are also third type of token issue mechanism which is called continuous supply basically that as of now most of the tokens which you have seen are cannot be bought right basically once they are created they are not burned but you can also but based on like certain conditions key if supply increases that much we'll find this much. So so so all these options are open. You just need to think about what do you want to achieve but why do you why like so so it again you understand agreed. So so for example for Bitcoin the objective was to make it a store of value rather than to use it as a currency. So in that case if you're trying to make it. Yeah, no it will not finish. I said it will depreciate those are on this way. I think those are 40 40 I think is 20 40 or something about that. So basically exponential right exponential like this actually we should do we should do a python simulation for this and