 Well, thank you very much, Madam Minister, for this excellent introduction to our debates and thanks to the Emirates through you for their hospitality here today, especially in those tragic circumstances that you have alluded to. So now, I'm going to say a few words myself, and as usual, I will alternate French and English. Well, English, French and French, okay, or French and English, French, okay, that's clear. When, it's okay everyone, the helmet, around 2005-2006, I was thinking about what was going to become the World Policy Conference, the utopia of liberal globalization, which had taken place at the same time as the fall of the Soviet Union, had already lost part of its momentum. My way of presenting this utopia in a few words is in the form of a sort of chemical reaction, abstract chemical reaction that could be called the formula of Fukuyama, the name of the theorist of the end of history. Well, the real theorist of the end of history is Hegel, of course. So this equation is something like, democracy plus market economy, leads to peace plus prosperity, in both ways. Democracy plus market economy leads, as in a chemical reaction, to peace plus prosperity. Intellectually, the equation falls flat on two counts. First, none of its four terms is completely and unambiguously definable. Second, even if assuming such definitions did exist, they would tell us nothing about the historical processes likely to pave the way for democracy and the market economy on one hand, and peace and prosperity on the other, when the starting point is far from an ideal objective situation. There is no such thing as spontaneous generation in life in this or in any other realm. The first great reminder of reality was the shock of September 11, 2001, when the effects spread instantly across the entire planet. Since that day, we know that it is enough for small fanatic groups to exploit a religion at their end and to resort to the method of terrorism to increase hatred and finally instability everywhere in the world. The end of history ideology would have held up only if major territorial, economic or other conflicts had been settled first. But then, assuming that such a situation could even be imagined, Fukuyama's formula would amount to a simple tautology. For example, the harmonious pairing of democracy and the market economy would necessarily imply a social contract capable of addressing the sense that wealth and power are unjustly distributed, a tall order about which great intellectuals such as the Indian economist Amartya Sen have extensively written. Since its origin, the World Policy Conference project relies on an objective and not normative vision of the world. Contemporary globalization is a unprecedented reality in history, because it comes from the United States from a wave of technologies that have not ceased to grow for a good 60 years. This wave is characterized by the instantaneous transmission of information in always larger quantities. According to the image that we are making, the same capacity is the best and the worst of things. It can favor evolution in the direction of common good, as in that of the detachment of hatred. But then, while progress is not built separately, hatred depends on the way of the epidemics. It ends up being extinguished, but only after the foes that maintained it have disappeared, long after, sometimes. Three simple ideas have underpinned the WPC project from its outset. The first is that the objective foundations of globalization are irreversible. This means that all of us must adapt to it the best we can. Not by tearing down borders in the literal sense of the term, which would be the quickest way to bring about the shock of civilizations that kept Samuel Huntington up at night. But by fostering cautiously openness to others, cautiously openness to others, so that everyone can benefit from the diversity of an international society that is heterogeneous by nature. In reaction to the consequences of too much openness, we risk closing ourselves off from other to such an extent that the world might again be divided into blocks. What I am expressing is the concept of reasonably open world. The second idea is that of governance. This term is rarely defined with precision. It is not about a world government that is still unconstitutional for a very long time. It is not about international law either, as if the regulation of the international system could be delegated by the states to judges, as much potentially to artificial intelligence. For a long time, the same regulation will only be able to rely on a collection of state groups and institutions that will work in a coherent way to ensure the structural stability of the system. In a simple term, the objective is to never be too far away from a balanced, non-foggy, but that is constantly moving under the action of multiple social, economic, political and others, since the change is indistinguishably linked to that of time. The balance I am talking about does not identify with a simple relationship of force. The demand for structural stability implies the search in common for a balance between the fundamental interests of each party, which forces each one to take into account, from the point of view of others, how much even, how much even, it proves some aspects of it. I do not hesitate to declare Kisingerian at this point. Good governance means not allowing imbalances to grow so severe that conflicts could not be resolved by peaceful means. Without claiming to assign responsibility, it is clear in my mind that the fall of the Soviet Union upended the security situation in Europe and that the main stakeholders have never addressed the issue as such. Likewise, as events in recent weeks have painfully recalled, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been simmering on the back burner for years but was always about to boil over. The first condition for progress in the idea of governance is for states and institutions concerned to clearly share the objective. If they do not, opening up the international system increases geopolitical and geostrategic risks rather than reducing them. The third idea at the origin of the WPC is that of average power. By creating this conference, I determined to emphasize that it would not be of the Western spirit in the sense of sealed alliances after World War II around the United States or even from the point of view of culture and civilisation. I do not see any contradiction, on the contrary, between the need for fidelity to culture and the civilisation to which we attach ourselves as citizens and the respect we must manifest for others. From this point of view, I am worried when I hear the President of the United States situating his country as the natural leader of democracies against autocracies since it does not specify what a real democracy is or what a real autocracy is. As in his eyes, this ambiguity does not apply to China. The same posture compromises all progress, in the field of common goods, such as the fight against climate warming or against pandemics. The WPC refuses to have any simplistic taxonomy and its point of view does not rely on the greatest powers, whatever it may be. It hears the privilege, the voice of average powers, that is, states that, without necessarily being equipped with important resources, it is at least resolved to consecrate a party to positively contribute to global governance. The first great global shock of the 20th century came on September 11, 2001. The consequences of this event and of the American policies that ensured, especially in Afghanistan, are still reverberating across the globe. But that was just the first in a series of major events, which together revealed how fragile the international system remains today. The first WPC took place in Avion on October 6, 2008, at the same time as a critical moment in the subprime crisis when Lehman Brothers failed and the specter of the 1929 crash and the Great Depression loomed over the horizon. Those attending Avion, and some of them are here, included Jean-Claude Trichet, who is not far from here, then President of the European Central Bank, who, with his central bank counterparts, played the key role in averting a crash. Since then, the international monetary system has withstood several tests, including the tremendous structural shock caused by the West's response to the Ukrainian War. This event largely but not only fueled the return of inflation and of policies the likes of which had not been seen in 30 years, and those effects are partially unforeseeable. The second major jolt was the poorly named Arab Spring of 2011, which set the Middle East ablaze, not to mention Libya, whose breakdown contributed to the destabilization of the Sahel. One consequence of this overarching fiasco has been uncontrolled migration to Europe. I imagine that here too historians will pass harsh judgment on how these crises were managed, or rather not managed at all. More than us, the COVID-19 pandemic has bolstered societies and the economies of the world and should have helped us to strengthen global health governance, especially the World Health Organization. Unfortunately, as we will see during this edition of the WPC, the degradation of the entire international system paralyzes the necessary reforms, so that we can find ourselves in a situation comparable to that of 2019-2020. No sooner had the pandemic ended when Russia's invasion of Ukraine opened up a new chapter in the history of Europe and in the West's relations with the rest of the world. This period is all the more fraught with uncertainty, given that the war is likely to drag on or freeze over in a Korean-style scenario with immense global consequences. Finally, the aggression of a barbaric inouye of Israel by Hamas on October 7 has added to all of this an additional layer of uncertainty, full-fledged, yet difficult to imagine. The surprise has been total for Israel and its allies, and it is once again shown that we must never go back to technology to ensure its security, without talking about an additional category of uncertainty that is intrinsically linked to technological progress itself, as well as artificial intelligence, whose effects are largely unpredictable, even in the middle of the day. That, in a nutshell, is where we stand. There are very few places where personalities from the five continents, in search of effective governance that will benefit international society as a whole, can express themselves in confidence. The way forward must be inspired by deeper collective reflection on the idea of justice, because, I repeat, a sense of injustice is the main fuel for hatred. A minimum of justice, even more than material prosperity, is necessary for peace. Many, may, may, all of us, organisers and participants remain faithful to the spirit of the WPC and never forget that, however modest our contribution to peace, it is expected and therefore useful not to say necessary. Je vous remercie.