 Welcome to the Stator Bounties Roundtable. The first thing I'll say is that I asked them for two hours of the schedule, assuming that there might be a lot of things to talk about. I'm hoping it will take probably less than two hours. You can get the rest of your day back to basically a really nice day before the typhoon. So yeah, the workshop will be kind of open-ended and at any point, you feel like you're no longer interested, like don't hesitate to get up and go. That becomes a busy place. But really the intention here was like, we've been trying to build Stator Bounties for a long time and really tried to make it a collaborative effort across different projects in the community rather than it just being like us writing smart contracts. And so to that end, we wanted to have a place for people who were using it or projects using it or interested in using it to talk about it and to share their ideas and their thoughts, problems, issues, and kind of thinking about what's next. So just a quick agenda. I think this is a generally good flow for how the conversation might go. I'm just going to begin by stating some of our original intentions behind Stator Bounties and why we started building it in first place. Then we'll launch into this group conversation about current issues. I'm sure you guys will have some thoughts there. And in general, just issues we've been seeing. And then finally, better modes of collaboration so that again, it doesn't become like us just writing smart contracts. But we really do want it to be this interoperable and open contracts library that anybody can use for basic incentives right now. So the original intentions that we had, when we started building Bounties Network, the first thing that we did was actually write standard bounties. And the reason it was kind of these three main points. Number one is that we wanted to have this generalized tool for incentivizing anything. People have been talking about bug bounties for many years. People had started talking about code bounties, but it became a button. And originally, actually, Bounties Network was a product for bug bounties. But at some point, it became clear that the same mechanism could and therefore should be applied to any type of activity. There's no point in limiting it, especially at a contract layer. And what really makes more sense is that taking this idea of tokens and incentives on Ethereum and kind of letting people point that towards any type of action they wanted to see. And so to that end, so far, we've seen a lot of stuff, like Git-wise, really popular, and of course, code bounties were made very, very important. But also, we've seen a lot of interesting bounties in the design space, community development, translations, copywriting, but then also social impact and people experimenting with new ways of just shaping human action using bounties and basic incentives. So that's been pretty fun. The next main attention, and this looks really, really important, is to have a shared interface for interoperable bounties on Ethereum. What I realized pretty early on was if you look at marketplaces right now that are like Upwork or Fiverr, when someone posts a task, and I call this a market order for work, they have to post it to each of these websites. There's no way, and of course, they have their own very siloed marketplaces. But with Ethereum, we have this idea that we can have this shared order book across all these platforms. And this is something that simply wasn't possible before, a shared order book that we don't control and you guys don't control, it's just there for anybody to consume. And that's an incredibly powerful idea and one that really differentiates what we have with Ethereum from these two technologies where we would have to run that. So I think that's something super important. And then finally, and also really interestingly, and something we're starting to see more of, I think especially in the next year, it's gonna be this idea of the composability of our contract, specifically that other smart contracts could programmatically interact with standard values, whether it's creating bounties, creating submissions, accepting submissions, contributing or any of the above. And so those are kind of the three main ideas behind why we started. These kind of remain generally the same. And we've been experimenting with different pieces of them, but like I said, it's always, the aim has always been for it to be a group effort and for other teams to be able to help us towards that end. And so we're excited that we have you guys here who are really interested in helping us do that. So with that, I want to launch you to our primary discussion. I think that's gonna make my course interesting, which is like current issues we're facing right now. There's been like a number of issues with like some of the assumptions that we had there, especially around the ideas. And so I think it's like worth discussing some of them. I can like initiate the discussion and then if anyone ever has anything they want to say just like raise your hand or add hopefully, there's not too many people here so we can just kind of like converse in a more natural way. And I'll be taking notes as well and these will end up being published somewhere that we're being reported to. So anyone who wasn't here who maybe probably didn't look to current last night can still be part of the conversation. But with that, I'll start with kind of like the first major issue that I've noticed and that I persist to this day, which is around the idea of like the interoperability among different platforms. And this is really hard because like bounties in particular, you know there's different types of action points or features that different platforms will want to add. If a bug bounty platform might require users to like perform an additional step or I don't get quite, they added like the idea of like applying for tasks and then you have to get accepted and then you can. And then this poses an issue for this kind of idea of interoperability because those features are often not built in the context of that contract and therefore they can't, those actions can't be made on those other platforms. If that application nature is built in like a web2 manner, if that bounty ends up on another platform, users won't apply, they'll just do the work. And of course that ends up being pretty crap. And so one of the challenges that remains is like how do we maintain interoperability as time goes on. And it seems like a lot of that comes down to like information sharing, but nonetheless it's like something that's like worth noting and discussing because it's like I think a major hindrance to the idea of teams working together. And then the other one that's like also kind of like self-evident but I'll add again is just that it's like it remains very much like not in, you know when you talk about marketplaces sharing those order books, right? It's kind of not in the best interest of any one of those marketplaces to do that. They're incentivized to like maintain their competitive advantage by keeping that data private, right? And that's why all the web2 companies do that. And so for us right now like that's still kind of the incentive of all the marketplaces. And there's a reason why you know bounty zero X and some of the other bounty related platforms on Ethereum haven't used the standard because they don't want to have this open data. And so that's one of the challenges we face is like whether it's you know relying on intrinsic incentives and having those teams just like vision aligned and like this is better for our users we should be doing it or maybe thinking about some extrinsic incentives it still remains kind of like an open problem that's like worth noting and shared with you guys. And if you guys have any ideas on how that might be solved I'd love to hear what those people think. But yeah those are my kind of first few problems and things that are kind of on my mind. I want to open the floor. One of the problems you guys know about StatorVan is that we've used it and one of the problems that you guys are trying to solve is that there are major problems that there are things that we've had to coat around in things. For example like for the Aragon, we've integrated them a bit for our Aragon application like just for other people I don't know about it. So you can manage this, that's like that. It's like that's the time sort of thing. The way the Bounty's contract currently works now is you have to like transfer tokens into the Bounty's contract. But what would have been more efficient for our A's case is cause like for some of them it's like not like die or it's not like ether, it's just like your DAO's tokens and you decide to like mint them on a case like B2B6. So for our case you might want to mint people tokens after they've been overcast. Because as soon as you have tokens that are blocked in another contract and these are governance tokens and that affects your voting form. And you kind of like don't want that to happen. So what we've done now to solve for this is like the Aragon Token Manager app will have a whitelisting feature or yeah whitelisting where we can add the projects app to say any tokens that are in this way now that's a different feature. But that's gonna be the eventual feature. Where yeah you blacklist certain contracts from being considered a token manager. So cause right now the standard Bounty's contract is considered a token holder if someone adds the projects app. But once we build like a blacklisting feature it'll say we can solve that you know internally with an Aragon Token Manager. So that's kind of like on our future roadmap and we have like user requests for that type of feature cause it also affects a few other of our applications. So I guess the question there is like the tokens would be minted when the work is accepted. Yeah, yeah and then we also want like the other like ideal scenario like you get like you get like some dye and you got some of the dows tokens. And I think right now there are, I think, I don't know like I don't know if there are ways I haven't fully explored this but as soon as people can solve that I assume types of tokens are committed to tasks. I don't know but that's kind of like my part. So yeah, to the second question it's actually really funny we ran into an issue with like WET3, like WET3.js. So basically Solidity had added 2D arrays into and it was like an experimental feature for as part of their experimental ABI encoder. And neither WET3.js didn't use it and didn't support it. And so we were like just at the time just not able to test it when we first launched Caterbinds 2. And so we made this trade off of whether you could like have multiple people per submission or you could have multiple tokens per submission. And we decided it made more sense to fail with the multiple people because collaboration seemed more relevant at the time. At the same time I think this is like a really really valuable like feature and like one we've been thinking a lot and so I think like yeah in the future that's where it's going to be huge. Kevin, is that something where we're going to do it where it's non-handled in a contract where you have to win the bounty and then trigger something in tokens with an error? Because I mean that might be like one way we can solve it within our platform, but only now. We could do that. Yeah. It was just we would have to, I mean we would have to modify the token manager for like a meta-controller where you have multiple controllers per challenge. Yeah, so yeah there are ways that we can like customize error on to like work around and so then it's like that's the thing that we're doing. It's like okay instead of writing the bounties and contracts in a way that like works with our use cases like we're doing like always work around and so that's the most efficient way of us to retain the contract and meet what our users demand. So like yeah, it starts the, yeah it starts standing in the way of our users Yeah, and I'm sure it takes more time for you guys. No, I totally get it. Yeah, it's something that's like that is itself an issue. It's like standards take more time in there. Like this is so more expensive actually. Yeah, so I appreciate you guys continuing to do it. My question with regards to the minting tokens this is something like I haven't spent a ton of time doing it so I want to just talk it through but the first thing that comes to my mind is with regards to the idea of like the tokens being blocked in the contract. I know one of the reasons this is valuable or like interesting people is that it kind of gives them more guarantees around like the money and kind of the way you get it. And even just like psychologically speaking you know it's like when you're at like a market and you're bartering with somebody if you like take the money out of your hand and you're holding it in front of them you're much more likely to be incentivized when you have money than if it's like in your wallet. So I guess like my question is I have anything that interplays with the minting idea and is there maybe a way to go at the same time or you know to at least ensure that people feel the same levels of like guarantees about the mintability of the tokens? I think it could be considered a like special case for an alfranco. So if a token is not transferable it doesn't have to be passed to standard dollars and you can't about it so you have to act as a amateur. Well the user can be more secure if there is something that's on the contract. I guess the question is though it's like it's only like I don't know if you guys have built the arbitration system in there yet but like unless you have that there's no way or even if a token is barring the standard balance contract out or if there's any way that you can get them that they don't have arbitration there. So yeah I know you're right and then that would be like a stronger guarantee which is like you have a stake and you're both playing 1,000% and it's like a much weaker addition of of like trust basically of like trustability I mean but in that like they don't know that their submission's going to get accepted but they can like understand and trust that like at least the issuer has the money you know and like whether or not they're honest enough to pay is a different question but at least we know they're like liquid enough to try and again but again we've never tested that, we've never tried it and so I think it might be worth experimenting at least with like the idea of not having that and see how much does it change this behavior how much do they really care about that because you're right ultimately if they don't get paid they're still not really close to platforming that. So. Is there a plan to add to that? Yeah so that's actually a really good segue into the Delphi discussion so just to give you guys a background at some point last year you know every time we like talk about bounties and we talk about how it works people are like oh so who accepts submissions and they say well the people who create the bounties are the ones who like act as the more goals who may accept submissions because this is kind of the obvious one and of course in the contract you can have anybody who now can be an acceptor and you can have an array of them and so it's like you know you can't have third party more goals and you can't have this idea of like not the issuer or not the creator of a bounty we didn't want to accept but ultimately it's like an addressing contract. And so enough time to people ask us you know like what about if people screw each other over what are you going to do? And so last year we started building a project that we called Delphi and the idea is that it would be like a staking project social staking and the idea that each user might have a stake of tokens that they have locked up and that whenever they interact with different counter parties that those in the event that they kind of like renege on any of their responsibilities or don't give people for their work that they might be able to open claims against each other and some third party group of arbiters will be kind of voting on those claims. We spent a ton of time on it. Unfortunately a couple things happened one we you know the bear market kind of forced us to really focus and you know really buckle down on the kind of our core competencies. And two we kind of realized like we're still very early that we didn't have any of these disputes happening on our website to begin with. And so while it was nice for us to kind of know that like eventually this is something what it like it will look like we didn't need it at the time. And so that code is still open source is all available if you're curious. But nonetheless we kind of like put it up hold for that moment. What's interesting is as of like a week ago my motivation to rebuild Delphi has gone out significantly. And so like this weekend during the typhoon I'm probably going to rewrite the contracts just because like and I'll give you the kind of background for why a lot of what we've been what I've been thinking about at least is like with regards to the Ethereum ecosystem like so many different teams are building these like different puzzle pieces right. Like for us one of the puzzle pieces is bounties and we know that that's so useful. And like Aragon you know his dows and the different systems there and like there's just so many different pieces that need to be put together. And we know that like no single team is going to be able to do that and like build all of those pieces and put them together nor should any single team right. That's like the Facebook approach. That's like why we're doing this in the first place is to have separate teams doing it. But it seems like a lot of the issues around getting people to do that are kind of based on the idea of like trust, you know and like responsibility and collaboration. And these are social problems. These aren't like partly you know you can't write a protocol to do that you have to like change the way people act. And so to that end the idea I have and I don't know if this is going to work but the idea that I have is that if we could just start having teams and individuals stake on their values and say like we commit to being a drug you can take our money if you can catch us not doing that. You know we're like we agree to be collaborative. If we stop being collaborative again you're going to be open to good success. And so just like having us put our money where our amounts are and say like these are, this is what we stand for and like we're not just saying it but you can really hold us accountable for that. And in the hopes that other teams might start doing the same thing and that we can maybe lead by example and have different teams in the ecosystem kind of all come together and say like we actually do stand for this and not in a way that we're like going to dispel these values but not like walk the walk. But in a way that's like trustworthy enough that you can open claims against us and like get a reward, get some more money if we don't fall for it. So to that I'm actually going to be building this soon. And so hopefully you guys will hear about it and maybe use it for you because I'm sure you guys have values and you guys want to kind of espouse for this period as well and make sure people can recognize you for yourself. And yeah, when we have that hopefully that will remove the need for having standard values contracts and you need to have tokens, right? Because then you're just kind of opening claims against the doubt itself rather than needing like this contract. You know it becomes just like information sharing layer it's up to us. It's very interesting because like even like in Aragon like one aspect of what's being built now is a court which will have arbitration but the way the court is going to work is like an agreement between two parties and there has to be like a battle on both sides or something like that. I don't, like I wish someone that has been working on the court this year. But this way it's more like these are our values, this is our money, you know. And that's like much simpler and it doesn't require the people that are working on the bounties to have the money that are right. Right. So that's when I was like worried about the court that would work with arbitration because it assumes that people in parties need to like to see the law which doesn't apply to like bounties for people in my mind. They don't have to just begin with it. Yeah. Yeah. It's like the primary use case of people that are like in life. You know, that's a great thing about bounties. I mean, people that are learning how to court and they want to like get into Spain so they don't have to just have a thing to work in parties or if they're like they're important and they feel like way too complicated and that's for like crypto projects which is like a new way to develop the balance of grace, you know. Yeah, we have a simple mechanism for the bounties which is less than 1,000 dollars. Right. And so a couple things that you said are very interesting. The first one is actually, our original Delphi contracts did kind of require both sides to stake at some point. Like if you wanted to open a claim, you would have to stake and then you would get that money back if your claim was right. But that was a requirement. At this point, I want to see if there's a way to make it like generally sound from a game theory perspective but at the same time not required the current parties don't want to do that. But more importantly, this kind of like new view I have of staking is like it's not an agreement necessarily with like other people. It's like an agreement you have with yourself. And you're asking other people to just hold you accountable for like what you've already agreed to. The other really interesting thing that I'll talk about and this actually gets to kind of like the question about who is going to be the arbiter of these claims, right? Like who is that arbiter? Which is a really, really, really tough problem. When we originally were working on Delphi, our idea was that we would use like a TCR arbiter or plurality token curated registry. And the idea is that like you would have a token that could be used by token holders would like curate who was. To token holders. Exactly, yeah, yeah. To curate who is fit to be an arbiter within a certain leader list. We stated that for a while and as time went on, I talked to like Dina, I've been a lot, he gave me a lot of gripes about YTCR stock and like plutocratic voting is not a good idea. And eventually I came around and realized like, yeah, he's right and that is ultimately is not a very good mechanism. What's interesting is like if you guys know the Claros project, that's kind of what they do. It's not exactly a TCR but it's like token holders are the curators. And I think already from what I've heard, they've been doing a little bit of arbitration around, you swap or some other exchange, they're like curating the tokens which can be added to the exchange in minutes. Is it in minutes? Okay, yeah. And I've heard there have been some like questionable rulings on their behalf of like which tokens can and can be added just because like people are biased and that like you can't get unbiased arbiters that way. Where we ended off when we kind of like sunsetted that research at the moment was actually the idea that so like for us, right, for bounties, most of the claims people would have would be with regards to like a particular bounty and most bounties are occurring with regards to a particular community. And so, and a community in this case usually is like a town. Yeah. And so, the idea that like instead of having like one global arbiter list or like the entire, you know, Ethereum ecosystem, rely on the arbiters for that particular community. And if you don't trust that community to come up with their own arbiters and like do all the stuff and have them do all that kind of stuff, you probably shouldn't be part of that community. You should just leave in like four days. Yeah, that makes sense. It's like, it's kind of like you want to do an external thing. It's like you're filing a lawsuit but it's like, okay, before you file a lawsuit you should like figure it out amongst yourselves. Yeah. There are steps to how you solve disputes. Exactly. But if you file it, this might be more interesting. If you're just constantly forking you'll never take down an arrester. For sure. Yeah. The other thing that we kind of thought about a lot and this is like, I mean, maybe it was a bit of a rationalization but we like really like to think this is true which was that like, ultimately, you know, in the context of resolving disputes and like avoiding disputes, right? That instead of just worrying about like, well, we have these disputes and we have to resolve them and kind of stay clear. We kind of went like upstream and we're like, well, why do people screw each other over in the first place, right? People, when you go to like, stay in Airbnb versus like when you're staying at your friend's house you wouldn't trash your friend's house but people do trash Airbnb's all the time. And most of the time it's kind of the strength of the connection between those two parties dictates how much they're going to screw each other over, right? And so a lot of our perspective became, okay, well instead of assuming there's no connection instead of assuming there's no trust what if we could try to like build a platform that actually builds that trust? How do we create human connection among our users rather than like assuming it doesn't exist? And this is like really, really hard and these are not solved problems. But the closest we've kind of come is like trying to get people to realize that they share a lot of the same values that they're actually going to have in common because when you do that and stay away, oh, you have kids, oh, I also have a son, like blah, blah, blah, oh, he plays soccer so does mine. And you know, like when you create that connection among people they start to feel guilt and guilt is a much stronger incentive mechanism than any extrinsic tokens or staking or anything like that. And so that's like, I mean for our platform in the short term, that's like what we've been thinking about is solving this is like just getting people to feel bad because and then it's worked, like we don't really have that many disputes, like if the community stays faulted. But again, that doesn't scale because you can get about 100 people both in trust and you can't and they're not hired. And this is like, it's funny because at the time, like a year ago almost we were like, we're not big enough, we don't need this yet, we don't have a lot. And it's only recently that we started like re-asking this question of like our users are starting to say, you know, like I'm afraid I'm going to get scammed because again, they just don't know each other. And so we're starting to think, okay, are we back at that point where we need to you know, where we've grown too big for that to still be a fair assumption. My hope is we can still avoid it. A lot of the work we're doing these days is instead of trying to have like one global kind of like bounties explorer and like registry of bounties we're thinking about them within the context of the communities. And so those communities get to know each other much more and making it easier for that to happen. And so that kind of encourages this like tree-style scaling where instead of it just being one group and then having to solve that you just continuously keep breaking people up into these like smaller groups where they can't know each other. And if you want to- So you're talking about a hierarchy? I mean like a hierarchy in like the semantic sense of information where you have like a parent community which is like graphic design and then like a sub-community which is like illustration and then a sub-community which is like anime illustrations, you know? And like I guess that's a hierarchy of information and in some ways does potentially lead to hierarchies and power depending on like the number of people and the decisions they can make. But I think it's like not necessarily that way and like ultimately in my opinion at least that kind of tree-style scaling is like from a computer science like that's the way things scale. And so that's like the perspective I have on this thing. But then I can see why the hierarchy would be- But what we're working about on Canonizer is is it's all about consensus. None of what you're talking about matters. All this law doesn't matter. Organizations don't matter. Nothing matters if you can achieve consensus with everybody. You can all write anything. So our focus is finding out concisely and quantitatively what everyone wants and knowing that in real time and be able to track that in a consensus building way. Today everything finds the disagreement. Everything focuses on that and people fracture and split into communities. As long as we do that, we can't take down hierarchy. But at Canonizer we have support camps where you have a super camp which is what people agree on and when you find something disagreeable it's usually a minor issue. You push that down to a supporting sub camp. So when you join a camp, it's a week with camps but when you join a camp you gain editorial control. And if two people want two different things you push that out of the way of consensus in a supporting sub camp. So everyone still supports the super camp and whatever reason your focus stays up there. And the bottom line is you still need to track all those differences in the lower level sub camps. And by definition if you know concisely and quantitatively what everyone wants, that's consensus. And if you can know consensus at a scale you can take down a hierarchy. That's really, really interesting. Your project's called Canonizer.com. Dot com. Cool, I'm going to read up on this. This sounds really, really awesome. And I think, yeah, like is a big problem that I've been thinking about with regards to like the values and when you get those disagreements about values how do you resolve them? And I think that's really awesome, like pushing them down to- And then we split the voting and all of that other kind of stuff from the canonization. So when you join a camp you get control of that camp. So everyone gets a voice and it's all about consensus. So you have the fewest number of camps possible. But then we have what we call Canonizer algorithms that let you canonize things the way you want. So today the input is on everything coming in. If you're going to scale, the hierarchy says we only allow that 1% in and that's the only thing we're going to publish. But Canonizer, we flip that upside down. Everyone uses a Canonizer algorithm that's basically a way for you to slit the experts that you trust. And you use that Canonizer algorithm and only cast those votes. So you can see 90% of experts I trust want prog cap in this system. And if you can say that then you have consensus. And you have the signaling around what people think. And signaling, the current system sometimes all just about voting and disagreement and a one-time snapshot. If the camps, it's not going to be about falsifiability. What will it take? You get the camps saying what will falsify your camp? You define the experiment. You do the AV experiment. False-fice that camp. And you measure the value of that. Scientific evidence or argument is how many people would convert. Can't just signal you have to measure when people are jumping camps and what it takes. And again, then the Canonizer algorithm with default is one person, one vote. That's always terrible because the masses are far behind the experts. So you switch to an expert Canonizer algorithm and everything reprioritizes. That lets the expert find out what the popular consensus believes right now and why so they can address those issues better and amplify those in the crowd and gets everyone back on board up to track the experts. So, but it's all the bottom line is is knowing concisely and quantitative. And I believe the first crypto community learns how to communicate concisely and quantitatively so you can go real time what everyone wants and everyone believes. Not all the communities, they'll start taking down all the hierarchies. Because hierarchies are always the guy at the top makes the decision and everyone doesn't even have that huge bottleneck. But the Canonizer, you have infinite delegations so hierarchies form on every single topic and so there's no bottleneck. So you can scale that, finding out what everyone wants and finally start taking down about the community. That's really, really cool. And I think it's like the interesting thing there which like the Ethereum community needs to do better is like getting people to realize we all have the same outcomes and that will be agreed on like 95% of it. Push the disagreement to lower that with something out of the way of consensus. Exactly. And it's like if we can do that and like continuously remind people that like we actually agree on almost all of it and like it's only this little thing. But you guys keep track of that disagreement. Right, right, right, right. Because you've got to get both of what everyone you've got to find a creative way whether it's in the intersection of your stop lights with an overpass that you've got to track it and know it and monitor it and not abuse the minority guide and want something different. Right, right, right. And they need to have a set as well. And they have to have their camp and they can't be censored. Have you guys done any experiments or like thinking at least around like quadratic voting? Yeah, we're working on an Ether algorithm so people can vote their Ether and we're going to have a quadratic version so you get your vote is a square root of the amount of Ether so you get a small value. So individuals have a lot more vote than people with lots of work. And that's the thing is you can select, isolate that. So people can program any kind of voting all the kind of stuff, token voting, any way you want. You can select whether or not to canonize it other than you want to do any of that. Canonizer.com. Do you guys have like a white paper, like the immediate post? Yeah, yeah, there's a white paper there on the front page and there's a help page that tells you how to use it. Beautiful. There's a video. I'm going to have to check that out. This is maybe I'll read this during the checkbook and send. That's, yeah, yeah. Because what you say again that it all comes down to consensus if you don't have consensus, it's not that old word. Yeah, yeah. And it's funny because like the word consensus itself, like the way we use it right now is actually like not consensus at a whole 51% of people agree to something. It's like not actually what word consensus means. Yeah. It's fun. And then they always talk about rough consensus. Right. That means ignore what the little guy wants. Right. And you got to keep track of that. Yeah. That's really cool. Any other, any other thoughts that are like relevant to any of the things we've said? Like I said, I know, like what's the term? It's like almost 11. My hope was that this would take as little time as possible but that we would use as much time as we needed. Any other thoughts around like current issues or any, you know what we're looking for? What do you guys want to look for? One thing that either of us is in the dream about this function, the issue works in playing all of the tokens that are state. The contributions. Yeah, yeah. And now after hearing you just, you know, talk about more of the thought behind a lot of the community stuff, like, I understand now more that there's like a, you want to build those relationships. And so that like you don't need to enforce the fact that like those contributions can be returned to the people that contributed them. But I was thinking that like when I first came across it, it would make sense to enforce that because then you're kind of, you have more of a crypto economic play where anyone can look at a issue that's and say, hey, I want to see this implemented and not have to worry about the implications of staking a contribution against it because right now it could be, so soon by the issue we're in use of all the tokens. So the idea would be that like you could like put your money in but not have to worry. Like if this submission wasn't accepted then do any of your money back to it? Yeah, so you're not contributing to an issue or directly you're basically just contributing to seeing something getting on it. So this is a really good point. This is kind of like the thinking behind why. So I'll give you guys just some more background in case you're curious. So basically there's a contract or a function in the contract which allows the issuer or the creator or the controller really of the bounty to take all the funds out at any given moment. And the reason for having this function was that at any given moment if they wanted to they could like civil attack the contract, create a new address, create a submission, accept their own submission and drain the money out of that way. And so we said well if it's gonna be possible we might as well make it possible in like a simple and easy way that way everyone could see hey they withdrew it versus like wait hold up why is there all these weird new submissions from new users out of nowhere? And that confusion would just like kind of enter the effort. And so I guess my question for you is like you know imagining that like a third party could contribute and it would only go to the like it's sort of like not under the purview of the issuer. You still sort of need the oracle, right? You need like somebody to say ah yes my question you should show it in deep go to that person, you know. And the only way to do that is by having each of those contributors be able to be their own wallet well if they want it. But of course that becomes like really time expensive and like extremely gas expensive even because they're always like generate transactions. Have you thought a little bit about like how that might get solved or anything? Way to book the script off of me. Yeah. Take your time. These are just like hard problems. Yeah, they're hard problems. That's why I'm curious because it's like a good idea. Yeah. My thinking behind that was like that is something that occurred to me but if we're able to ensure that money only goes towards the person who implemented the task that's like one less thing that a contributor needs to look into because like obviously you're going to wonder who is able to accept or confirm these things anyway. But that's a problem. That's your question. I don't really have a good answer. What is something like the deadline expires? Like there's kind of an array of contributor adversaries and the values and you can claim your funds and then it makes sure that you're not involved with that value of the contributor. Is that not, that's not possible? No, no, no. So right now, yeah, you can do that. Okay. It's just like the, in the event that like even if the deadline doesn't expire or if it does like the issuer can still do that before you. And it kind of really gets to this idea that like ultimately when you contribute to somebody's bounty that they create, thank you guys for joining us. That ultimately like you have to trust them, you know, and that like their money is at their mercy, whether it's basically because they're the worker and that instead of like trying to assume that we like can live in a world where we don't trust them, it's better to like face the fact that we trust them, accept that as a premise and then like figure out how to act in spite of that. But you can't, yeah, going back to what you said, yeah, you can refund contributions after the deadline. You can't do it before. You can't do it before unless the issuer does it for you. The issuer can also trigger refunds. So this is the other thing, is that the issuer can, if they're like altruistic, say, refund all the contributions, don't send the money to me. Send the money back to everybody else. And that also is there. And so, yeah, it is possible we just try to make it as generalised as possible that way, like if the issuers are honest, they can be honest. If they're dishonest, well at least they'll be dishonest in the open, which at least makes it easier for everyone to know they were dishonest. And that's like the best we could do. But yeah, that problem of like you have to trust the worker and like you're kind of at their mercy remains seems to remain there and one that I think about a lot when we're trying to get around, but maybe there's like some arbitration solution there where there's no sort of or if there's like if they, you know, are bad actors and that's when they come in. I'm not sure. We've kind of gotten around that as integrators by basically making the contract that we're using to integrate with you guys as the jumping off point for a lot of the functionality within the So basically the function that allows like three funds and whatnot within the Dow. Right, so everything is controlled by the Dow and so, you know, it's not like a user's address that can just do it at any point and in theory if it's a contract they can not have the ability to call the drain function which sort of guarantees that they're not realistic, right? Which is similar to the random call. And like we went out of our way to ensure that there was no way for like alternate arbiters or whatever people who've approved or added in addition to this contract. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, I mean that's like a that's a really good solution or like a better than what we have solution at least. Yeah, because then you can kind of obstruct that away and then trust the like parent contract. Yeah, so you can just tell people to figure out a way to arbitrate within their own community. Right. Yeah, and not to shill Aaron on again but like in the case where you're talking about for the arbitration in the community, that works really well with what we want to do with people getting like community tokens or including the balances too because then that will become like your white list of community arbitrators. So it's like you already, it's like right now I don't know if there's like very good mechanism of the size just like the history of who has won the boundaries but if you want to have the tokens of a towel, then they can be like the first people that you know we access to that response. So this is something that we were talking about like what our roadmap for Aragon is because like I said there's like the court but yeah we want to at least like think in these cases how you do like the internal whatever conflict resolution with where you take it. So that's something like on our roadmap to build and maybe it can connect with this other simpler thing that you're going to have this weekend. Do you have any question about that? Like it just seems like if you have like this sort of arrogant community and they're sort of the issuer of bounty you know then they sort of get to you know it seems like if the community is the issue like a smart contract essentially that's issue the bounty and so they can kind of choose who to give the bounty to already so then if they're also sort of like the court like couldn't they just issue the bounty and if they choose as a community to not issue the bounty if you go to them as like a court like how is that really different? Well what you're saying before is you put a bunch of money in like bank and we say our community has is that and if we break our rules then you can take some of the money that's in this other pot here if it's separate from the bounty but it's like probably superior to the capital that it's greater than any one single bounty. But who's the oracle? Like if you use but it's like if you use like the arrogant court then it's like separate from the community you are. In this case it's like the community, that's the first step it's like community members they resolve it so if you track who has been accepting who has been working on bounties you build like this relationship with the community and then the people who have been earning the bounties because it's probably not just like one person that's working for that community so it's like all the people that are working on the tasks will be the ones that can resolve things because you just like have to use your human relationships first not that we are all random with general matters it's like claiming bounties that's just like not how it will work at least in the context of a doubt I'm not sure in the context of like all illustrators or like doing it like based on like expertise because those people you know they might not know each other at all as if you're working as like part of a doubt amongst themselves. I actually have to, I want to go again to see Amir and Papi talk with their friends but time under you to stay here okay cool. Thank you very much. Sorry do you want to go ahead? Sure, I was playing center now but it's the problem with using like our offices or something that they're like they don't have the context for the community or are there other issues with just just using them because it feels like they're intended to solve the sort of issue like you know some criteria about the and it's a question of like what you're always adding. Yeah so I think the context is like part of the issue I think they're like trying to solve that issue like having specific like subgroups within Clara's which are like like specialists in different areas. You know I think like my main issue with Clara's is more around like the nature of how that list of arbiters is derived and that it's sort of like any it's like plutocratic utility and they have some randomness which like helps to avoid it but ultimately like you can still like civil attack so to speak with your money and then that's just like not a sound mechanism we know that plutocratic voting is just like really not good and leads to a lot of really big issues about this like three years ago and people are still doing it and so and I've like you know I've shared this with them and they kind of seem very steadfast in proving it out and so like maybe fatality's wrong and that does happen I'm sure sometimes but yeah my main issue is the plutocratic nature of how they derive that to your point I think it's like a really interesting question I've thought about it like a tiny tiny bit and so I'll give you like what my gut tells me which might be the wrong answer but it seems to me that like any DAO for that for a DAO for you to be able to like open things against a DAO that DAO needs to be part of like a parent community of like a DAO of DAO so to speak and that DAO of DAOs would be the arbiters and so like if I like let's say it's like there's like the Aragon community right and Aragon community post a bad tea they don't accept my submission and I say well the Aragon community is lying to me I would go to like the DAO of DAOs which manages like the reputation of the entire group whose incentive it is to maintain their their parent organization kind of reputation and they wouldn't have their own argument and so the key is like you sort of like go one step up the tree for any whether it's an individual you go to their community if it's a community like parent community and you like kind of trust them to resolve it Kleros is kind of like the parent communities are trying to be with the parent communities of all parents by using plutocratic kind of mechanisms to get a membership list I think you get a membership list with like curation practically speaking but like by having the in-group curate itself where that DAO of DAOs like would itself curate like 8 out of 9 of us think Aragon no longer spouses their values they don't align with us like we're going to keep them out of this DAO of DAOs so would it just like would the mechanism be different in terms of like the philosophy resolution process but it would just be using like the token of the holders of the DAO of DAOs instead of like the Kleros stuff would there be a different process? so I think the key is like for Kleros maybe this is changed this is based on my best understanding I know Kleros the way they come up with a list of arbiters is that like token holders vote you like apply to be an arbiter and then the token holders vote on whether or not you should be accepted within the list my view on curation is that instead of having like token holders vote on the list you should have the list vote on itself and that like people with who are in arbiters within the list will say like this new arbiter applied like do we think he agrees or she agrees with like what we think? I don't think that's how Kleros works just Kleros works that you have like a Kleros token and then basically you sort of state that right you basically lock it up and then you're given based on the amount you state then you get sort of a proportional chance of being selected to a court is there no curation mechanism for who can state them to begin with? it's open like anybody can buy these Kleros tokens and then based on the percent like the amount of Kleros tokens you have that's your percentage of being selected to a jury member? sure and that's it there's no curation they're using it to curate lists but yeah there's no curation to be a jury anybody can just like go and be a jury that's like even worse than I thought so who determines that they lose their stake? so it's an economic game where it's like supposedly the jurors are chosen at random and don't know each other and if they vote based on the majority decision then the tokens get taken away so basically they sort of it's sort of this economic you look at the evidence and you go whether I believe everybody is going to vote for what they do like a reveal so you're going to send a device to honestly or you lose your money that assumes that the majority is already on it and oftentimes the majority is right and I'm some minority guy I mean it definitely has some issues like you bring up in terms of like your voting for what you believe is like the popular opinion not necessarily like to your heart because there is this economic game also just what worries me about it the most is like it doesn't like the richest person wins like the richest person has the most share of votes and like do you want to live in the world where the richest people in our world determine like what is right or wrong I certainly don't and like isn't that why we're here in the first place like you know so yeah that's like a little worrisome to me I maybe they're right maybe they're onto something but I think as time goes on people will start to realize like wait this that probably doesn't make as much sense as we thought like I mean obviously it's very interesting if you can get like like simple for this from identity or this type of thing but even if you sort of have like a community in a DAO at the end of the day you know you're going to have token holders in that DAO and you might have sort of like some rich token holders in that DAO and would they not you know in any sort of dispute resolution process be like have like a higher weight if they haven't worked without tokens essentially so this is kind of what I mentioned earlier about the idea of like generating themselves that like for instance if you look at like mallet down when you want to join mallet down and buy the tokens you have to apply to buy the tokens and you have to like apply to join and so that can itself be a civil resistance mechanism whereby like any DAO is like this is a list of people we know are real people and you have to apply to become whatever you can just buy the token on the open market and that gives you membership no you have to like try to enter and that group determines whether or not you are a real person and so from that you can have different people can have different amounts of tokens but that can be independent of like whether or not they're on like a membership list and have been like civil verified and if they are civil verified as like real people practically speaking within some context that is a civil resistant list and so it's like civil resistant lists curating themselves from like a community level to me at least seems like a better way of doing it because then at that point you don't need to worry about blue drop receipt you've kind of like solved civil resistance right community level so then you just do like a private vote in terms of like anybody who's on the list can just vote and you just keep it private and then you reveal and then that's the decision exactly, I mean like you can do there's like interesting stuff around the voting like the actual steps having like a command and then a reveal like good but then at the same time you want to have information sharing and you want to incentivize people to share their ideas early and this is actually some weird thing we experimented with Delphi was like you commit and the order in which you commit determines how much you get but it's like this like weird recursive way of getting the payout so it's like like first I would give like one over N of the total reward and then the next person would get one over N of the remainder and so on and so forth and what N is would have to depend on how many hours you expect to have voting on that thing but ultimately the result would be that after I've voted after I've committed my vote it's in my best interest to share why I voted the way I did even before I reveal and so like because you do ultimately want people sharing like their different perspectives people are wrong sometimes they don't have perfect information we should assume that and so having like the whole point of having a group vote the whole point of like what I would call the Delphi was what it's called like the Delphi method is like something that's existed for like 20 or 30 or 40 years and it's actually a way that like companies like do finance forecasting basically get like a group of experts they independently like come up with their own ideas they come together they share those ideas and then they go separate again and then they vote but the key is they like did an initial vote they like came to their own ideas then they come together and share why they why they thought that and then they separate but then that's like a really interesting tool for like the actual process of the vote but with regards to like who can be a voter I think like they're self curating groups and then just having within those groups people opt in right like if I'm one of the arbiters but you know there's some like arbitration lawsuit or something about like maritime law and right I'm an expert in corporate law and I don't know shit about maritime law I will opt out to do that because I know if I ruling correctly and like my peers within that group see hey Mark keeps voting on things we know he doesn't know anything about like we're going to kick him out and so it's like you have the group curating itself and like constantly like getting rid of like viruses that's like people really and like you have like and not like opt in idea you know of like where people only like they opt in to do the things they know they're good at to me seems like a pretty okay solution if it's simple if it's simple resistant yeah is at least not TCR or how do you do it? no so it wouldn't even have to be a TCR right like this was actually Dean Einemann this is what Dean suggested because he hated TCR so much he's like stop doing this TCR is assumed that like token holders curate the list and what he said and what we were talking about is like lists curating themselves and then you know if you guys ever watch the TV show Survivor right you have like the tribe votes and like you are no longer in our tribe like you've been voted out of the tribe and it's that idea of like the group decides whether who stays who's enters into that group and who leaves it's not some like third party group of people who have a lot of money over like old governance or anything it's like we are the group we decide who is in our group whether it's admitting new people or kicking people out you could have one person one vote yeah you could have like based on the amount of time you've been in the community you might be able to get more votes like there's a ton of different mechanisms you could like experiment with but when you have because the key is that list just becomes like a civil resistant list of membership that you could do like one person one vote you could do like based on your history of like how often you vote maybe you should get more votes because you're like an active voter maybe you don't want that maybe you want to disincentive there's so much experimentation that I don't know the right answer but the key the cool part is like the civil resistant list because then you don't have to worry about the token balances or anything you can start to know that like these are real people that the group knows that they're real people and if the group starts letting you think people the sort of they know that the integrity of their group goes away and I think this gets into a really interesting point of like how we see high quality people in the world come together is that they sort of like coagulate together high quality people want to be around other high quality people and they will do the work it takes to make sure that the only people they hang out with or spend their time with are other like smarter talented people they don't want to be associated with people who are connected and this is one of the big problems with TCRs was like if you were like a restaurant a TCR of restaurants like there could another crappy restaurant could be promoted above you by the token holders and by association because you're on the same list together your reputation might go down because the TCR's reputation goes down and you are on that TCR and so it would like drag you down but alternatively if those restaurants on that list were the ones curating it if the restaurants decided among themselves which was the best restaurant you don't have to worry about food critics coming in and tasting your food whatever the restaurants themselves know like who is the best and then I think at least that's like a much better path than this food and credit voting again like we haven't experimented with them we haven't had the time yet I'm hoping maybe Claros will realize maybe they were a little wrong and like we'll try and experiment that way eventually if they haven't talked about it I know those are my thoughts on that when you think about what makes an arbiter what is an arbiter and that's able to trust and so that's what we formalize as canonizer by the infinite delegation system so when you come to a topic that my kids can delegate to me I can delegate to my friend he knows more than me my friend knows world-class experts so you get these high trees so it's infinite delegation but it's also real time Vitalik gets this huge tree Vitalik ever seems up everyone can instantly jump to something and so you just have to formalize what's the essence of everything then track and measure it and then it becomes really expensive to do on chain I assume I mean I don't know I assume gas is really so when you do all of their consensus building and everything on off chain then you can use chain and that becomes the oracle to join this stuff on chain because the chain can say we're going to use this particular canonizer algorithm to make the decision and so everyone joins and makes those trees and we're going to use quadratic either voting and so that gives the people in the tree this law people as much vote as the people in the box and then you determine at a time XYZ time we're going to make this decision and so you're watching the tree form and everything and someone screws up right before and everyone changes to another person the vote happens using the desired canonizer algorithm whatever it is both at home and there we are and then that becomes the oracle and that becomes the unfortunate step on chain yeah if we do the consensus building on chain that becomes the oracle to drive any other thoughts it's now 1117 the sun is shining up there then it seems like our conversation has come to like a natural conclusion thank you guys for coming it's been a pleasure to have you guys I don't know a lot of your faces here I'm Mark you've seen around the conference like I love talking about this stuff as you guys can tell if you have any ideas of like what we should be working on you guys want to work on it maybe even help whether you know I work at consensus consensus is great they fund our project and so if you guys need funding for your project maybe I can help give some advice on how you can get that thank you guys