 All right. Good morning. We'll go ahead and get started. Keep us on time here. So, morning, I'm Major Kimber Nettis, and I am currently the Deputy Director for Cyberspace Professional Continuing Education at Wright-Patterson. And for the last year and a half, I've been researching multi-domain operations, and during that, I've really developed a passion for MDO. But along the way, I've also developed a couple of frameworks. And part of that was just because I was trying to bin all of this information that I was receiving. And I don't know if you guys have read all the articles, and the Air Force is doing this, the Army is doing this, but I was really just trying to bin what everyone was doing. So, these frameworks are going to show us potentially some blind spots that we have to. As I was binning the information, I was asking the questions, you know, what is missing as well. So, we'll start with a quick overview. We're going to quickly cover the Evolution Warfare. I won't spend too much time on that, but that's just going to set a foundation for what we're going to talk about today. We'll then cover the current state of multi-domain operations, and then get into those two frameworks that I discussed. So, first, we're going to take a look at the vision that's kind of inspired us in the Air Force. So, in this quote, General Goldfein is talking about the military advantage being dependent not only on information, but decision quality information. And no surprise that the Air Force has been focusing in on multi-domain command and control. That was my first hurdle, was what's the difference between MDO and MDC-2. So, he's very focused in on MDC-2. But let's take a look at how warfare started. This slide is just going to be a quick representation of how warfare or competition has changed over time. This first picture here is basically showing linear battle, and it's basically my army against your army. We stand, shoot each other like gentlemen, and go back to base and sleep, and then go back and do it again. So, then there was a change in technology, and I'm oversimplifying this for now, but there was a change in technology such as machine guns or tanks. Now, what did that do? It forced us into the trenches. So, then there was another change in technology that completely changed the nature of warfare, and that was the airplane. So, the airplane introduced new concepts such as air-to-ground strikes, reconnaissance by air, and strategic bombardment, which then led to nuclear deterrence options. So, the airplane introduced the air domain, and it eventually changed how we were organized. The Air Force was born out of the Army Air Corps. As technology changed, it changed how we approached warfare. Charles Darwin, he's often misquoted as saying only the strong survived, but what he actually said was those that adapt survive. Today, we are seeing countries utilizing cyber attacks on our civilian infrastructure. Our civilian infrastructure must also be considered when looking at our military readiness. The Department of Homeland Security has identified 16 critical infrastructure sectors, which include things like the financial sector, dams, healthcare, water systems, and information technology, just to name a few. And each of these sectors can have a tremendous impact on our way of life if they are attacked. Our adversaries are utilizing new cyber and space technologies in order to affect another domain, which has really always been there, but never officially recognized as a domain. And that is what we're going to call the human or cognitive domain. And those of you who are at Dr. Riley's presentation this week, he was basically the one that I read about, and this is where this domain comes from. And I agree 100% that this needs to be a domain. So Dr. Riley, he's the director for the multi-domain operations strategist concentration at Air Command and Staff College. And he has said that a domain is something in which you need access into and an area in which you can make an effect. So air, space, cyberspace, they're all great examples of this definition, as is this cognitive or human domain. So today we see countries utilizing cyber attacks in order to make effects on the human domain, such as Russia targeting French elections, meme warfare against the US, or Russia hacking the Olympics. So getting back to Darwin, he said those that adapt survive. We need to realize that we're not fighting the same war that we've been fighting since 2001. A lot of things have changed in our operational environment, so that's what we're going to cover really quickly. The first thing that has changed is the battle space. So we have been used to seeing the rear, close, and front line, which is represented in the middle. However, that battlefield has extended back to the home station, and that's represented by the strategic support area. So this is a framework that was created by the Army, so this is how they view the battlefield. And they absolutely have identified that the battlefield has extended back into our home stations. And this is due to the cyber and space technologies, which allow targets to be affected from anywhere in the world. We covered this briefly already, but the domains have changed and shifted in importance. So Dr. Riley at ACSC, again, he's a proponent of the human domain. But then we also need to realize that there is an expansion of the cyber domain, which I am so glad General Holmes mentioned this this week, because as a cyber professional coming to a cyber conference saying that this needs to be the EMS domain, I thought I was going to get skewered. So glad that he said that, but for the rest of this presentation, the cyber domain will be represented by the EMS. So the technology has changed. So earlier in the presentation I stated that technology has shaped how we fight wars and how we are organized. So we see new technologies today, such as AI, hypersonics, drones, micro technology, to name a few, and all of these are going to change how we fight in the future. So the thing that we need to realize about this portion of it is that modern technology is about time compression. So it is about ensuring that our outer loop is smaller than the enemies. So AI is supposed to help us make faster decisions, quality decisions. Hypersonics is going to allow us to strike the targets faster. And this is all about what technology is about and changing the nature of warfare. The next element that has changed in our operational environment is in the information realm. So with the assistance of modern technology and social media, we are no longer reliant on the traditional gatekeepers of information such as Fox, CNN, those big companies. Now when an event occurs, we have instant access to that information brought to us by whomever is on the scene at the time on platforms such as Facebook or Twitter. A good example of how the cognitive domain is increasingly becoming a more critical domain can be seen in the book War and 140 Characters. How social media is reshaping conflict in the 21st century. The author, David Patrick Canacos, I'm going to butcher that, I'm sorry, he describes how Twitter is now the main source of vital timely information in the Russia-Ukrainian conflict. He's a reporter that's on the front lines of the conflict and he consistently gets his most up to date information from users via Twitter. There are pros and cons when it comes to this kind of speed of information. He writes about seeing the vastly different reports from the pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian sides. Same event. As a journalist, he's concerned about writing the facts of the situation, yet he sees false information retweeted thousands of times. He stated that it wasn't propaganda that he was witnessing, but a reinvention of reality. And social media is at its heart. He also stated that he saw a mass enlistment and that included non-combatants and civilians, which brings us to our next thing that has changed in our operational environment, and that's the participants. The participants in conflict have changed significantly as well. We no longer have the luxury of knowing who exactly we are fighting based on the anonymity of cyberspace. We have people labeled hacktivists who insert themselves in situations that they deem important, and they can have very real effects. We also have seen the little green men who are supposedly pro-Russian citizens or freedom fighters. They have no patches like the photo that you see above them, and they can be anyone. So as a result of effective strategic deterrence, we are seeing a rise in more elements of warfare below the threshold of warfare. Acts that are committed in anonymity to avoid conflict or through grey zone or new generation warfare. Patrick Canacos writes this statement in his book. The enemy realized a long time ago that they cannot compete with the United States in a battle of military versus military. Therefore, other means of competition became the way to win the battle of resources and power. He went on to say, I began to understand that I was caught up in two wars. One fought on the ground with tanks and artillery, and an information war fought largely, though not exclusively, through social media. And perhaps counter-intuitively, it mattered more who won the war of words and narrative than who had the most potent weaponry. So now that we've covered what has changed in the operational environment, let's take a look at the current state of MDO. The National Defense Strategy says that the Department of Defense's enduring mission is to provide combat credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Today we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive advantage has been eroding. We are facing increased global disorder characterized by the decline in long-standing rules-based international order, creating a security environment more complex and volatile than we have experienced in recent memory. Interstate strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security. The NDS also states that its increasingly complex security environment is defined by rapid technological change and challenges from adversaries in every operating domain. The last few wars that we've been fighting have been largely in an uncontested environment, but we have not had to struggle against the complexities brought forth against a near-peer or peer competitor. The enemy is different, technology is different, and society is different. Cyber and space technologies are everywhere and utilized by more than just the military to conduct operations. Terrorists do not need an entire intelligence center such as Nasik. Now they just have images provided by Google Earth available anytime. They do not need an entire team of individuals to identify military personnel. They can now utilize Facebook's face recognition software. Remember when that came out and it tagged you automatically? That was a little scary, wasn't it? So additionally, command and control around the globe is easy if you have a Gmail account or a gaming console, internet access. Hidden military bases can be discovered simply by tracking the running routes in the Strava app. The services are tackling multi-domain operations with different initiatives. Commanders are trying to wrap their heads around what MDO means to them and their units. General Robert Brown from the Army has stated in a recent conference that all formations will have to become multi-domain or they will be irrelevant. So we also have to look at where our blind spots. What are we not considering? I've heard concerns about knowing what objectives we are trying to teach the forces when it comes to multi-domain operations. How do we know that we're choosing the right scenario to exercise when everything about the battle space or the enemy is constantly changing? So I have a couple of frameworks to propose as a means of binning a lot of this information and also to serve as a tool to see where our blind spots may be. And what educational and operational objectives that we could use in the future. Alright, I'm going to warn you the first one is an eye chart. They're available back there in the back if you want. This one is also a means of understanding the MDO initiatives at the various levels of war and also if those efforts are offensive or defensive in nature. This framework also considers the civilian sector as our military readiness depends largely on our civilian entities as well. This chart is not all inclusive. It just highlights some of the examples and I'll cover those in each area so don't look at it and say you forgot this. There's just a few examples in each box so we're going to cover some of those now. The black shows the current operations, the blue shows what initiatives are out there and the red shows what we may be missing and then the green offers some historical examples. Again there could be a lot more information on there but we're just going to cover a few of these today. So as stated the Air Force has chosen to concentrate at the operational level and create the 13 Oscars within the AOC construct. This is to ensure strong offensive posture against the enemy. You could argue there's a few defensive measures in there as well but it's largely offensive. This initiative lies at the operational level, again very offensive in mind. General Goldfein has stated that multi-domain operations is his third big rock and he has stated that MDC-2 is the key to success in a future war. It's the connective tissue in a joint fight and that is the complex and it will require a broad effort. He established the Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team to address his high priority mission areas. He has also established the do a little war games. We have a representative here. Just last year with players from the 505th AOC training unit with joint coalition and AU students from Air War College and ACSE involved in that matter. The initial objectives were focused around command relationships, force presentation and operational level TTPs to optimize MDC-2. And finally we'll talk a little bit more about that 13 Oscar career field that General Goldfein has created. The 13 Oscars will primarily be assigned to the Air Operations Center which is at the heart of MDC-2 operations. The first class just started this May in Hurlbert. The Air Force needs experts who understand not only command and control but also someone who understands the basics of all domains and the processes through which they interact. Someone who understands operational level planning and can coordinate with joint partners. The Air Force also needs continuity within the AOC construct in order to make this effective. There are currently no experts within the AOC because experience is rarely built upon. Once someone leaves, most never return back. Now the Army has chosen to focus their MDO initiatives at the tactical level. They have created the I2Q's tactical units. This unit is the first to combine long range targeting, hacking, jamming and space under one command. I2Q stands for intelligence, information, cyber, electronic warfare and space. Sounds pretty familiar if you've heard some of the briefs this week, right? The first unit is based out of Fort Lewis to counter China while the next unit will be in the European Theater. What about the defensive side? What are we doing defensively? So the Army is leading the charge in defensive MDO but there's also one unit in the Air Force that is doing something in this defensive MDC-2 arena. The 88th Air Base Wing at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base under Wing Commander Colonel Thomas Sherman is reshaping what the wing structure might look like in order to support defensive MDC-2 at the installation level. Just as an Air Operations Center relies on the C2 structure in order to support the operations in the air, the installation security relies on a well-established C2 system with unity of command under one commander. The effort at Wright-Patterson is twofold and involves a new organizational structure called the Mission Operations Group as well as a new fusion function for C2 called the installation command and control cell. Currently, Wright-Patterson is conducting a 90-day sprint whereby the existing communications group has been re-branded the Mission Operations Group Provisional with two assigned squadrons, the 88th Operations Support Squadron, the OSS, and the 88th Communications Squadron. There's also two attached squadrons, the 88th Security Forces Squadron, and the 788th Civil Engineers Squadron, and one attached staff agency which is the Wing Information Protection Agency. This organizational alignment creates a single multi-domain group of air, land, and cyber focused on installation protection and defense, ensuring a safe, secure, and resilient installation protecting the people, the critical infrastructure, and the information. At the conclusion of this sprint, the Wing is going to assess the results and determine the next course of action. Colonel Wynn, the 88th Mission Operations Group Provisional Commander, stated that the Air Force must see the installations as war-fighting platforms like an aircraft carrier that capabilities are launched from. Our nation is hemorrhaging intellectual information and certain installations are critical when it comes to deploying passengers and cargo to the AOR. So the second experimental element at Wright-Patt is that fusing of all of the base's operation centers, such as the Base Defense Operations Center or the BDOC, the Airfield Management Operations, Fire Dispatch, and the Cyber Intelligence Operations Center or the SIOC, to create a whole of installation situational awareness. Wing Commander needs timely and accurate information as to what is happening on the base. And as it turns out, Wright-Patterson is the perfect place to exercise this new C2 structure as they host high-level events such as the Air Force Marathon and Corona each year, requiring integrated security and coordination. Not to mention, the exercise turned real-world scenario about a year ago with the active shooter incident. Fortunately, that turned out to be a miscommunication and not a real active shooter, but it did highlight some great lessons learned. This MD-C2 element derives from the Air Force Installation Management and Support Center's Installation Weapons and Tactics Conference, 2019. Wright-Patt is one of five bases Air Force-wide that is piloting this installation command and control cell concept that was briefed to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. These initiatives at Wright-Patt are pushing the envelope on defensive MD-C2 for the Air Force. In a complex world with evolving multi-domain threats, the outcome of these experiments will help shape the future of installation defense. The concept of this experimental group came partially from a security operations center ran by the Dayton Power & Light Company. This SOC is responsible for any threat, whether it is physical or cyber. They have an excellent C2 structure and situational awareness tool that gives them on-the-minute updates to anything that is happening around their facility. The infrastructure includes different police skinners and even dark web monitoring. So what we must understand is what happens to the civilian sector affects our military readiness as well, which is why you will see this next portion of the framework. The population will be targeted before aggression turns into war. It is happening now with social media campaigns and information operations seeking to cause instability. Russia has practiced its cyber war against Ukraine by knocking up the power grid and using misinformation campaigns against the citizens, all of which are wreaking havoc in the country. Our enemy does not necessarily care about whether a target is military or civilian, as long as it meets their objectives in strategic competition. This framework states not only the current operations, but also the current initiatives, deficits, and historical examples. So again, it's not a complete framework, but just a way of looking at MDO. There are great initiatives with the National Guard cyber protection teams, which are helping to secure critical infrastructure and key resources. There are also areas of concern when looking at past and present cyber attacks. To mention one, the not-petia ransomware virus on MERSC, it left the largest shipping conglomerate dead in the water, literally, by closing 76 ports all over the world and stranding millions of tons of cargo in 2017. We use those commercial vendors to transport all of our personnel and cargo into theater. So whether it is protecting our critical infrastructure and key resources, or ensuring technology integration with local and regional emergency operations centers, in case of chemical, biological, radiological, or even nuclear attacks, we must be ready and in tune with our civilian counterparts. Alright, now we'll cover this next framework quickly. This second framework looks at all of the domains to include the human domain that we talked about, and then lays all of the cross-cutting sectors on top to show the touchpoints. You will notice that the cyber domain lies within the larger electromagnetic spectrum. The cross-cutting sectors are a combination of military, government, and commercial entities at the local, state, and federal level. These sectors exceed the traditional confines of purely military endeavors or domains. These cross-sectors include space technologies, cyber, nuclear, intelligence, information operations, and electronic warfare. One cross-cutting sector that may be surprising is the civilian sector. It is understood that the military does not necessarily get involved in a conflict unless Congress declares war. Making it an area that can affect military operations or hindering them from starting at all. Commanders can utilize this framework and ask some basic questions at each touchpoint. A touchpoint is where each of these sectors interact with the domains. They can ask, what is my offensive posture, what is my defensive posture, and how can I integrate with the other domains. For example, we will look at the often forgotten nuclear scenario. Russia has been talking more and more about the use of tactical nuclear weapons in theater. So a commander overseas, or even stateside, can ask the questions. If we are in a defensive posture and tactical nuclear weapons are used, how would it affect my maritime operations? We will start from the bottom and go to the top. Are the troops on the ground prepared with the equipment needed to continue the fight in a nuclear environment? What equipment will still operate that did not get taken out by the EMP blast? How will we see too if equipment is inoperable? What if we have a plane land from a Hatter mission taking out wounded soldiers from such a blast location how will we protect our base and our equipment from the radiation on the plane and on the people? How will the use of nuclear weapons affect the will of the American people, of NATO, of our troops? This is just looking at the nuclear example in a defensive posture. We can ask the same type of questions but with an offensive posture mind as well. I'm going to also cover some other touch points just to give you an idea of the questions that you can ask on this framework. So as a planner, planners need to think about things both offensively and defensively. So circle one, this is influence of public opinion regarding the legitimacy of elections. Were we attacked during our last presidential election? Can we have defended better? Can we influence foreign elections to oust our opposition party? Is this a good use of the domain? What other legal and ethical matters bear discussion in this regard? Circle two, an electronic combat attack aircraft against early warning radar. An EC-130 can jam an enemy's radar enabling other operations to take place unnoticed. Circle three, adjusting the content of an online news site to sway readers away from group fundamentals. Have any of our websites been hacked? Do we ever do this to the enemy? We can affect the EMS and cognitive domains through information operations. Circle four, a carrier strike group. How does the American public react to the movement of a Chinese aircraft carrier? How do we hope to influence the thoughts of the enemy population if we move a carrier strike group near someone's shores? In circle five, a recent article entitled with just $60 in internet access. Researchers found and tracked NATO troops and even tricked them into disobeying orders. Illustrates the importance of the commander realizing the entirety of the operating picture. The researchers are with NATO Strategic Communication Center of Excellence and they used open source data primarily social media to identify 150 soldiers, locate multiple battalions, track troop movements and even persuade service members to leave their posts and engage in undesirable behavior during their military exercise. Taking each of these items individually can have results, but combining them can be synergistic. Unfortunately, a JFAC doesn't have or retain the authority to execute operations from all the sectors into the domains and C2 authorities for MDC2 become complicated very fast. So to dive into that thought just really quick, we're just going to take a look at past current and future multi-domain operations. So in the past, MDO was single domain led, coordinated effects and had archaic C2 processes and domain superiority was required. In present MDO, multi-domain operations today are largely air operations supported or augmented by space and cyberspace. Most operations today are layered and synchronized but not integrated. And authorities for space and cyberspace are retained largely at the strategic and national level while authorities for air operations remain at the operational level. Situational awareness capabilities are not designed to provide integrated understanding of the battle space and C2 constructs do not provide the necessary agility to synchronize effects. Future MDO will be operate, the operating environment will challenge our ability to operate effectively in any one of these domains. Motivating the integration of air space and cyberspace capabilities and effects to achieve mission success. This is going to have to include the whole dot mill PFP way of thinking to include everything. To include facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, all of those things. And MDC2 will be executed through a combination of regional and global command centers with staff who are well versed in the operational art. So I hope that this framework gives you an understanding of how the cross cutting sectors affect all of the domains and how we can utilize this tool to look at our operational environment and prepare both offensively and defensively for an adversary that is adapting and changing their tactics, techniques and procedures in all of the cross cutting sectors. So today we've covered the evolution warfare, seen how technology has changed the battlefield and how we fight and sometimes how we're organized. And we have covered the current state of MDO and looked at a couple of different frameworks to help us identify future efforts when it comes to military exercises and operations. So I will open it up to any questions. Yes, I swear I didn't plant it. I mentioned how policy can be dictated by the will of Congress and that hit me because very recently I learned at one of these many meetings that Silicon Valley would actually rather do business with China than the DOD. And when I brought that up somebody said sometimes we get in our own way. I don't know. I feel like you hit it right on the head there with that presentation. I wonder if you had any personal thoughts on that? Yeah, so and that's why the civilian sector is so important because our adversaries can target specific areas to make effects that maybe we're not even considering. Maybe it is the Silicon Valley. That's another one we'll have to think about. But they can target our military leaders. They can target our population. They can target things that we're not even thinking about because we don't fight that way yet. Good question. Thank you. So honestly the only place that I really have authorities that I've really thought about that is in this other framework. And I just kind of honestly just have a couple of examples. So when it comes to DHS they lack the authority to mandate actions for the civilian organizations, right? So that's just one thing that popped in my head. Again, not all inclusive critical infrastructure, but that's really kind of the only place that I've really thought about the authorities. And either one of these frameworks you can absolutely start thinking about those things and plugging them in there, right? So again, these are just frameworks to help bin all of that information. And I will definitely take that into consideration. How do we think about that? Oh, absolutely. And that's great. And I'm sure the gentleman in front of you can talk all about that. So he's here from the Do Little Wargames, but those are the things that we're considering when we do these exercises, right? So this is a multi-domain fight and the commander needs to have availability of different effects. And if he's going to, you know, this level for this authority or for this effect and then he has to go over to the sector for this, that does create some complications and timelines that we have to consider as planners. And this is the first time that I've briefed these frameworks. No, absolutely. That'd be great. Awesome. Thank you. Yes. Are you familiar with the app works challenge on multi-domain operations? So I wanted to go to that conference. I heard that they were tackling some things more on the technology side, but if you have anything else? App Works published a challenge. 317 companies responded. Unlike some app works events, this was for an open and so large as well as small business could respond. They took 100, sit toward the best, put them through several days of evaluation, and from that selected 30 companies in two weeks, those 30 companies will be doing a set of demonstrations to a government audience of capabilities that might be of interest. If government folks are interested, I'll stand in the back. If you'll give me an email, I'll put you in touch with the App Works people. Awesome. And so I'll just hang on to that for a second. So since I've been doing this research, I'm sorry. I don't speak that loud sometimes. In my research, I've noticed that there's a lot of great MDO initiatives across the board, not just the Air Force, but Army. And so I set up an MDO working group back in April, and I just brought all of these pieces together, and everyone was just so thankful to know, like, who's doing what? And it brought a lot of things to the table. So we hope to do another one of those soon to include even more people. But part of that is I've put together a website. So I was going to show you, but the internet does not like our website for some reason. It's just aphid.edu. So if you go to aphid.edu and go to the School of Strategic Force Studies, it's labeled EX, and then go down, scroll down to MDO. You'll see some different MDO resources. And some of them, I have recent events, and you said aph-work. So even though I couldn't go to your event, I still posted it as an upcoming event. So please feel free to send me anything MDO that you have, and I'll post it so that the community knows. Yes. Two, joint staff signed out of J-Walkram that re-branded MDO into joint staff directed, which is good. So that means there's synergy across the staff in the next 24 months. From your perspective and in your research, is there a whole of government approach to this? Because you illustrated the values change to the homeland, which we've never had to confront before, but now we do. That's DHS, that's DOE, that's FNI. Who in the branches of government are even having to do this discussion? So I did put a few initiatives that are on here, and that's mostly with us reaching out to our counterparts that we can or should, right? Because the other sectors of government should handle things from their arena as well, if you just look at the elections meddling. So we had CPTs go in and protect us from that, and I've heard different classified briefs, so I don't know how much I can say, but they protected us from elections meddling, and that's something where we did work with the government as well. So I would say the other part is when it comes to the government, who's responsible for different things? So that was elections meddling from a foreign counterpart, but I don't know if you've heard the recent news stories about Google and their algorithms, and how do you tackle that? Well, I would say that's not necessarily a military problem. You know, there's other sectors of government that should be doing something about that, right? Yes. Right. We did. Right. And I would say there is another example. So you saw the Texas sign that just came up in the last brief. When the governor established it as a national emergency, you know that emergency, then you get to bring in other assets, not just maybe the military assets, but you have different assets that can now come in and help with endeavors such as that. And as we see more grace-based attacks and acts committed under the threshold of war, we're going to be seeing these and kind of trying to decide, is this a military endeavor? Is it not? Where do we step over the line? We're going to have to figure that out in the next coming years. Yes, he is. Right. Exactly. Yes. Sounds like a mission support group. We don't want to call it an emergency operations that are NDLC2s that are yet. Are we using that term too broadly, or shouldn't it be more narrowly coded? So, I'll hit back on the 88th, but for this one, honestly, you could make one that's all gray zone effects or things that are happening under the threshold of war. What are the things that we can do? What objectives can we hit? What effects can we make? All gray zone. And then I would say once we're in conflict, I'd say you have a lot more effects that you can create and each of those touch points is going to have a lot more options to it. But when we're in the gray zone conflict, I think this whole chart can just be gray zone choices that you can make. Now, with the 88th, why I think that MDO is a part of that. So, what Colonel Nguyen and Colonel Sherman have done is they've really consolidated all of those operation centers to have that MDC2. And it is multi-domain because you have air, you have land, and you have cyber. You say, where's land? Where's the army at? Well, army doesn't own the land domain. So, who do you think is the land proponent? Security forces, right? So, it's a whole of installation approach to protect the base. So, it doesn't matter if an attack is cyber or if it's some other physical threat. The point is that there's one operation center that is focused in on that command of control and believe me, those exercises highlighted the lack of command of control that was happening. So, I'm interested to see what's happening in the threat working groups and everything that they've been doing in the last 90 days because there's been some great achievements. I'll write that. Well, thank you guys for coming out today. I really appreciate it.