 I'm Steve Morrison from CSIS. We've had a very rich morning, and now we're bringing things together over the lunch hour with a discussion around the big picture, around what are US choices. We're going to extend the reach of discussion into some broader security issues that connect to this. We've already heard a good deal of discussion around. Some of that, we are joined by three very distinguished and diverse personalities who kindly agreed to be with us. Mike Gerson from the Washington Post and the One Campaign, Dr. Zahir Salul, president of the Syrian American Medical Society, and our colleague here, Kathleen, Dr. Kathleen Hicks, head of our international security program. I'm going to offer just a few remarks and then turn to them to kick things off. We, in reading through the commentaries from Mike and from Zahir and from many other people over the last six months around the evolving humanitarian situation, there's a couple of things that just jump out. And most of that is pretty negative. It's a strategic despair to borrow Mike's term. It's a numbness. It's missed opportunities. It's a sense of risk aversion and miscalculations and missed opportunities. There's a certain pain and excruciating crisis of conscience around the responsibility to protect the lack of progress in UN Security Council Resolution 2139, passed almost four months back. There's a sense that Assad is succeeding in the use of attacks, deliberate attacks upon civilians' war crimes as a tool of war with no accountability or limited accountability. We've seen the diplomacy collapse. We've seen Brahimi leave. We've seen the security situation become more chaotic and more inviting to an expansion of radical Islamist. And this week, we've seen, of course, a very dramatic change, which is the projection of ISIS power into Nineveh province, capture of Mosul, fall of Mosul, following projection into Fallujah and Anbar province in the previous period. So we have a new strategic dimension to this. We heard from Jacob Elhilo that this creates yet another set of uncertainties and key questions that have big humanitarian consequences. So we wanted to focus our discussion here in getting the wisdom of these three individuals around where the picture is going and what are the opportunities for positive pressure and interventions here. We know there's been a strong convergence of opinion around support for the notion of arming moderate opposition. That becomes a question of who and why and how as a practical matter. We know that there are real risks in all of this, and we'll hear more from our speakers. Risks of reprisals, risks of not being able to guarantee security of partners. We know there's been a decline of some NGOs' capacities. We know that there's been kidnappings, hostage-taking. People have been in groups like Mercy Corps expelled from Damascus. We know that there's a risk of being caught between of the humanitarian operations being caught between a continued violent effort from the Assad regime and then on the other side, Islamists extremists who are hostile to these operations as well. So with that word of opening, let me turn to our speakers. I've asked each of them to roll through some initial opening thoughts and get the conversation going. We'll just move Mike, Zahir, Kathleen. Thank you all for joining us. Sure. No really pleasure to be here. I'm going to start a little bit just by previewing my column tomorrow, and it's more venting on the mode of the strategic despair. But I want to broaden the venting just a little bit. Because we've had the kind of testing. I think we've had the testing and exposure of two viewpoints when it comes to the Middle East right now. One of them was expressed very recently in the president's West Point speech on May 28, where the president actually used the Middle East as a model, an example of restraint, talking about the success of risk aversion in some ways. Now it's a more complex picture than that, because he does admit there are problems. But he talks about, you know, warned against putting American troops in the middle of a sectarian civil war. He talked about decimating al-Qaeda's core at the same time that the non-core, whatever it's called, was taking cities in eastern Syria. Talked about ramping up support for opponents when they really have not felt much of that help and are now, many are deeply skeptical. Talked about the counterterrorism partnerships fund, which seemed to lack urgency compared to the events that were taking place at the same time. And I think we've seen some of the results of this cumulative serial risk aversion in this process. And that is the refusal to arm responsible opposition, which has meant there is no pressure to have serious negotiations on the part of the regime. You talk with officials that were involved at Geneva, and there was really no plan except to hope for the Russians and the Iranians to provide diplomatic favors, which didn't happen. And many countries in the region that have wanted to be involved, Turkey, the Gulf States and others, have felt relatively leaderless and sometimes been irresponsible in this process and their support of some office. And then the odd inconsistencies of the policy where we are supporting with advanced weapons, the Iraqis who are fighting militants in Western Iraq, but are not supporting people who are 100 miles away across the border in Syria who are fighting the same enemies. And it's giving them strategic depth and causing all sorts of problems. So, and now we're seeing some of the results with militants who are operating on both sides of the border and destabilizing the Iraqi government in significant ways. So I think it's fairly clear that there are risks to risk aversion and that keeping the US out is not a sufficient definition of American interests in this region. In fact, just to drive the point home, I think it would have taken tremendous affirmative effort just to achieve containment in this situation in Syria, involving a balance of power that would encourage some kind of power sharing arrangement between non-horrible elements of the opposition and non-horrible elements of the regime, which has really remained serious, only hope that I can see. I'll throw in though that I've seen another argument that has come more from the conservative side, that somehow it's not a bad outcome for Assad's forces and Sunni militants to be killing one another, fighting one another. You often hear that argument on the right. And we're just seeing in this immediate context that it's both immoral, it's countenance in this slaughter of innocent civilians, but it's also stupid. It's only a stalemate if it doesn't produce a crop of battle-hardened extremists who destabilize neighboring countries and board planes and go other places. We all know there are hundreds of people fighting in these forces from Germany and the UK and France and other places. So the challenge after years of relative inaction is for this administration to adopt a role that it doesn't seem to have much appetite for, which may involve saving the Iraqi government and actively encouraging support for Syrian opposition to equalize the playing field and bolstering state institutions in Lebanon and a variety of other countries. And so that to me, we're gonna test that in fairly short order. We need to have a comprehensive regional approach to prevent this from spilling out in ways that are even worse than it is now. And so that's what I'm writing tomorrow. Thank you, Mike. Saka. Let me start with this Arabic saying. For those who understand Arabic, I'm gonna say it first in Arabic, then I'll try to translate it. It's difficult to translate sometimes Arabic to English. The saying is, tamahad al-jabalu fa waladah fa'ran. Tamahad al-jabalu fa waladah fa'ran, which means that if you hear a mountain thunder, if you hear the noise coming from the mountain, you expect that something big will come out of the mountain. And in that saying, it says the mountain delivered a mouse, a small animal. So sometimes when I talk with my friends in Syria, colleagues in Syria, and I tell them about my government, the United States of America, sending medical supplies and medications and so forth, and that we spent $2 billion in humanitarian assistance, which I'm really very proud of. They tell me great, but we expect much more from the United States of America being the superpower of the world. So people in Syria are looking at us for much more than humanitarian assistance. We're talking about Syrian doctors, Syrian engineers, Syrian attorneys, women, and all of them understand that we can deliver much more than what we have done over the past three years and so forth. And this is a picture which I chose just to give you an idea about what we are saying and what we're facing every day in Syria. This is a child, his name is Abdullah, 12 years old in the city of Aleppo. Aleppo is divided in half between an opposition-controlled area and government-controlled area. So this is the largest trauma hospital in the opposition-controlled area. This is a child who was playing in the neighborhood when a barrel bomb fell in the neighborhood. He passed out, he was brought to the emergency room, and the physicians who are there, who are trained by our organizations, the hospital was supported by medical supplies and medical equipment by our organizations, paid by tax money, and they were trying to insert a chest tube in him, but they did not have local anesthesia. So he was screaming. He said, I wanted my mother, I wanted my mother. And then he said to the physician who was trying to insert the chest tube, I kissed your hand if you can stop hurting me. They did not have local anesthetic, which is something which is very simple, but because of the shortage of supplies, they did not have it. His life was saved, but many other children are dying every day in Syria, and also civilians because they do not have access to healthcare. They do not have to access to hospitals that they can be treated and saved. This hospital was by the way bound by a guided missile, but fortunately it only destroyed the upper floors so they can still, the emergency room can operate and so forth. So if we look at our policy in Syria, and we can judge this policy based on the stated goals of the policy from the beginning. I'm a physician, I'm a critical care specialist, so when I talk with my students and residents about what we are doing in this critically ill patients, what are our goals in treatment? They tell me, first of all, save the life, save the kidney, save the brain, save the heart, and then we try to judge scientifically whether we are accomplishing this. The stated goals of our policy in Syria were first of all, of course, to end the crisis, secondly, to de-legitimize Assad by applying diplomatic isolation and economic sanction. Thirdly, to contain the crisis within Syria and protect our allies in the region. Fourthly, hopefully to reduce the humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people. So are we accomplishing this? And maybe you can add to it is the prevention of chemical weapon use in Syria that was additional policy that was added after the Ghouta August 21st attacks. If you look at each one of them, and you can judge yourself, I don't have to expand on this, you will see clearly that our policies or stated goals of policies are not working. If anything, they are getting, I mean, whether it's the humanitarian conditions in Syria or de-legitimizing Assad or prevention of chemical weapon, if anything, it's getting worse. Recently, there have been several incidents of using chlorine gas instead of saring gas in Syria, which lead to the same consequences, scaring the population, killing some people, and making some people more displaced. So chemical weapons has been used. The humanitarian situation is getting worse. I was just gonna throw some numbers. I'm sure that each one of you have a lot of numbers about what's happening in Syria. We estimated in the last two years that 200,000 Syrians have died because of no access to medical care, have died of chronic diseases of high blood pressure, related complications, heart disease, cancer, chronic renal failures because they do not have access to medications or healthcare. And these numbers are not mentioned in the media. By the end of this panel discussion, we will have additional 3000 Syrians who are displaced inside Syria and outside Syria. Every day, according to the United Nations, 9,500 Syrians are displaced inside and outside Syria. So definitely the humanitarian situation is not getting better. If anything is getting worse, I've been in Aleppo several times in the last six months and every time is worse than time before. The only positive aspect that I've seen this last visit to Aleppo, that ISIS was not present in Aleppo. In October, it was present and people expected ISIS to control Aleppo. This time they were not present. It was actually safer for me to come from Turkey to Aleppo, except for the threat of the barrel bombing, which is tolerated compared to what ISIS can do to you. They could nap you and so forth. And also people are turned off against ISIS. They hated this organization. In October, you would say half and half. Some people would say, oh, this could be a good group that is fighting Assad. Now everyone knows that this group is first of all very extremist. They're not compatible with the Syrian culture and society. And if anything, they're coordinating at some level with Assad. That's the perception within the Syrian society. Maybe I can end on this with my comments and then we can expand later on. Thank you. Thank you, Kathleen. Thanks very much, Steve, for inviting me here. I think I'll just start by saying that the hardest thing I think for the American public and for certainly the Washington establishment is to admit how wrong we were in terms of our sense that Assad was going to fall with relative speed. Put that on the scale of the amount of time that we've been looking at the Syria crisis. And so the set of factors that may have guided US policy decisions in the past just aren't true anymore. And that's a very hard reality, I think, because what it means today is that the most important thing the United States can try to do is get to the negotiating table. Get Assad to the negotiating table. And he's operating from a position of power and that's where we see all the continuing humanitarian crises stemming from, that struggle. So let me talk a little bit about what I see going on in the broader region with respect to the humanitarian and other terrorism related aspects of Syria and then just a few thoughts on how you get to that end state which is decidedly difficult. We have trouble applying American power today in the Middle East and Syria as the absolute quintessential example of that. We have trouble with our economic tools of statecraft, the sanctions which are significant that we have applied, seeming to have the pressure that we expect it to have. Our diplomatic efforts seem stymied and weak, frankly, in the midst of the inability to pull the opposition together in the midst of other international actors and what they've chosen to do, Russians and others. Our cultural norms are really at stake here where we are a country that is seen as upholding both humanitarian principles and rule of law and certainly the chemical weapons principles and those are at stake. And then of course there's the military tool where the United States is not looking for another place to engage in Islamic public in any kind of struggle. We are not looking for another place to spend blood and treasure, American blood and treasure, after a very difficult period for the United States and yet we don't seem to be able to craft a solution set without it. So what are the consequences of that? Like as I would say, if our de facto policy has been to contain the crisis to Syria, we failed at that. So I think we start there maybe in terms of a public discourse. The evidence is overwhelming, certainly what's happened in Iraq, I'll just start there because that's the most obvious place from Al Nusrat and then ISIS and now ISIL and the takeover of Mosul is certainly evidence enough that the crisis in Syria and our efforts to use these powers have not succeeded. Of course you have the refugee and humanitarian issues that have spilled over with which you are all very familiar, particularly for Jordan and Turkey but others. You also have Syrian Turkish skirmishes both on the border and in the air and those could continue and worsen and create larger crises. You of course have Israeli strikes in Lebanon that are linked to the Syrian crisis. You have accusations of Iranian equipment flying in also linked to the Israeli role. You have what seems to be essentially a slow hollowing out or breaking down of the convention on chemical weapons particularly if you think about the chlorine barrel bombs as a form of chemical weapons. You see that not really being enforced which has significant implications presumably down the road for countries that may choose to use those kinds of weapons and of course you have bringing us back to August of last year the red line issue and the question of what credibility consequences are at stake for the United States as we've seen play out in other locations whether it was in Ukraine, whether it was in East Asia and in terms of maritime disputes there's this continuing sense that what we have done in Syria is or not done has bled out into broader issues for US foreign policy. So I think that is part of the argumentation the reason I'm running through that it's part of the argumentation about how you get a consensus to start to build around the Syria problem. This is not just about Syria as severe as it is just for Syrians. It's about a broader US foreign policy dilemma and that's not even touching on these longer term trends of Shia Sunni divides that are significant and worsening again with the Iraq example being the most recent. So what do you do about it? Let me just end quickly on that. As I said at the beginning I think the key is to acknowledge that this isn't about getting rid of Assad in some sort of quick almost quixotic manner with a unified opposition. We're not there, we've tried a long time and I think the difficulty now is to admit that we need to get to the negotiating table and how do you do that? I think a lot of the pieces of how you do that are in place in mild ways and I think they need to be stepped up significantly. One of course is pay medical assistance food for the moderate opposition. I think you have to strengthen that moderate opposition in order to give the population an alternative because they don't wanna line up behind Al Nusrah or any of these other groups. Extremists who are proving themselves out to be both untrustworthy and not role models for the kind of governance that they're looking for. And then I think you have to carry out the decisions that have already been made to train and equip the opposition. Again, really not so much in terms of significantly changing the military balance but changing the military balance enough that you can get the humanitarian crisis on the table as a negotiating issue so you can get to some kind of a solution. And then I'll just conclude by saying from a security perspective, we have to continue to just be laser focused on all those neighboring countries. Jordan, we've been worrying about a lot. I think we've done a decent job with Jordan. Iraq, obviously not so great a job with Iraq. A lot more work to be done there are very complicated and then the other neighboring states. So I'll leave it at that. Thank you, thank you all. Let's talk a bit about arming the moderate opposition and I'm gonna ask Zahir to say a few words. Who are they? What are we giving them? What do we need to give them? What do they need and how quickly will that actually in your view change the equation? Realistically, I mean the editorial pages are full of a very diverse group of people making the case for this as something that needs to be done and should be done. Can you say a bit more about who, why, how does this get done and how quickly do we see results? Well, I mean thank you, Steve, for putting all of this burden on me. Of course, as a Syrian physician, I know everything. When you ride with a taxi driver in Syria, they will tell you everything about what's happening in the world and so forth. So Syrians are, by nature, expert on everything, you know, so. So I will mention a few things. I watched the movie Return to Homs the day before yesterday for the first time. I'm from the city of Homs, by the way. My family still live there and I recommend you to watch the city of Homs because it gives you a very realistic, it's a documentary, a realistic narrative about what happened from the beginning of the crisis when people started to have demonstrations, non-biode demonstrations and how some of them carried arms and then eventually some of them became extremists. So you will see evolution of one of the, not actors, the main persons in that documentary. His name is Basat Saarout, we're witnessing tonight at the World Cup, the beginning of the World Cup. My team is Argentine, by the way. And he was the gold keeper of the Syrian national team. So he was a big shot in Syria. He started to go to demonstrations and have the slogans that we want freedom and we want change and so forth. Then he carried arms and he became a leader of one of these groups, the moderate groups, the FSA. And then you had defected soldiers from the army also who joined these groups. And every city you had people or groups or battalions that wanted to protect the neighborhoods and wanted to get rid of the regime that they considered army and they considered oppressor and so forth. And they protect the dignity as they were saying. So these moderate groups with time because they felt that the international community that gave them a lot of slogans to support and rhetorics to support whether it's Turkey or Saudi Arabia or even President Obama, they interpreted the messages that we were giving them that we will support them, that we will send them arms, that we will send them medical supplies, that we will send them cash money so they can sustain themselves and their families. And we did not do that. We did not deliver on this. Unfortunately, many of them now became An-Nusra and ISIS. Some of the same people who started non-violent then they carried arms and they were the moderate now. They became extremists because this is the only game in town that is fighting Assad. And the most disciplined people who are fighting Assad are right now, the An-Nusra, not ISIS. It used to be ISIS in the past. But we still have a lot of moderate oppositions. We're talking about the fighting oppositions, of course. We have differentiated between the political oppositions in the outside and the inside fighting battalions. We still have a lot of moderates who are controlling large territories, whether it's Aleppo or Idlib or Dar'a in the south or Konaitira. And these people need a lot of support from cash money, simple cash money, to just the green light. They need the green light. They need the understanding from our government that we will support them and let other government to support them. That's what they are looking for. And they're not, until now, they're not getting these messages clear from our administrations that we will be with you until you have political transition and until you force Assad to compromise. We are not getting that. Mike? Yeah. I would only add just a maybe small anecdote that illustrates some of that point. When I was in Zatri at the last time at the end of last year, I met with a group of new refugees. I think they'd come from Dar'a area. And asked them about these divisions and their sympathies were clearly with the FSA. That's like the home team. And they talked about ISIL as foreigners. They, you know, as non-Syrian in their approach. But then I asked them about al-Nusra and the response was they give us food. They give us help. And so there's been a huge imbalance here in the way that this is treated. The encouraging thing in all this is that I talked with some like US officials when I was there. And everybody talks about Syria as a stalemate, as a military stalemate. But in fact, it's quite fluid internally. So overall it's a stalemate, but internally it's quite fluid. And FSA makes gains in some areas and has along the border. The Jordanian border and so from that side, you talk with US officials that say, I think we can isolate the people that we can help. We should help in these circumstances. It's not hopeless. We can disaggregate. They think that it's possible. And then you talk with some aid officials who, and others, some who work in the country who express a very deep skepticism that the Islamists are much better fighters, that they'll take the weapons, that this is a hopeless task. I was told the story by someone who should know when I was there the last time that the FSA had been, certain area had been trying to take a series of checkpoints from the regime checkpoints, major roads or whatever, and for weeks or months. And I don't forget which group there are many. But in Islamist, much more militantly, Islamist group came in and took some of the points with suicide bombers and did it in a couple of days. And there's just an impression on the ground that they're really good, that they're very effective. And so those are the combating tendencies when you're there. I mean, there's a, can you disaggregate? Can you make these decisions? And I think, to your point, that a significant number of US government people seem to think they can, that this is not an impossible task. But the efforts just seem to have been very incremental. Now, what's the change that in terms of the fall of Mosul and suddenly the notion that this conflict in Syria has broken out, it's expanded, it's projected out? Does that, does that, in your view, does that create back pressure on, in some ways, to open the cross-border and the cross-line relief in some fashion? Is it, what we heard this morning from Yaqou El-Hilo was, there is a very intense and active debate going on in the UN at the Security Council around these issues. And it was hard to know whether that's on some trajectory or whether that's just a continued churning. But the strategic situation has changed right now. And does that open, does that create greater opportunity to put intense pressure on that particular point and to push towards a Chapter 7 Security Council resolution or to push for compromise on cross-border? I mean, definitely there is a thriving civic society in areas like Aleppo and Idlib who need sustained support from the international community so they can overcome and they can challenge the extremists. We're talking about civic councils that are elected by the population in Aleppo and Idlib in many of the villages in these areas. And these are the largest population areas in Northern Syria. We have similar situation in Daraa and Southern Syria. If we have sustained comprehensive cross-border effort that overseen by the United Nations, then definitely that will lead to improvement for all of the humanitarian situation. You will see a re-settlement or repatriation of the refugees coming back from Turkey, stoppage of the displacement of the population, and then for time for the civic society to breathe so they can start rebuilding and thinking of development. As long as we do not have the presence of the international community in Aleppo and Idlib, and Northern Syria, and in Daraa, then situation will continue to deteriorate and people will only hope that ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra will continue to fight Assad. Definitely in Bab Salama and Bab al-Hawa, which are the major border crossing from Turkey to Idlib and Aleppo, if we can have the authorization of the Turkish authorities to let the United Nations to do that, then we can reach about five million people in Northern Syria in Idlib and Aleppo, and that is very significant. Thank you. I'm gonna ask Kathleen, you wanted to say something. I was just gonna add on that. You know, on the Iraqi-Syrian border, there were already reports that the, this whole extremist who went into Mosul took a tank back over the sand line in the border and erased it in a symbolic gesture of the removal of the border between Syria and Iraq. So my only point was going to be more that the, first of all, the cross-border element is de facto already in play, and it doesn't all, it's not all for the good, depending on which border. I agree on the Turkish border. There's a lot of opportunity here, I think on the Iraq border, and potentially that will grow. There's threat as well as opportunity there. I would just throw in that I'm not, a lot of this is whether Assad feels isolated by this, and I'm not sure that he does. I mean, he's given interviews in the last couple of days saying, well, this proves the threat of Sunni extremism. And the US is coming around to my position, and much of the world is increasingly in my camp. And sometimes the delusions of dictators matter. And in this case, I'm not sure he feels more isolated by what's going on, so. And clearly, he continues to hold the threat of reprisal, right? I mean, there are four million people being served from the Damascus side, and that threat has been used continually to block UN agencies from winning compliance with Turkey or others for cross-border operations. Why don't we open to our audience for comments and questions? We'll bundle together three or four. Just put your hands up, and we'll start over on this side, sir, right here, and then two doors down. Yes. Hi, I'm John Glenn with the US Global Leadership Coalition. Thank you all very much for a dispiriting but important conversation. I guess part of what I'd like to pick up on is what the US role and how we're looking at this, in part seems to be to be shaped by the challenging sense we have that the US alone could somehow change and make the situation different, which makes me wanna ask you about the prospects for other players and other partners with which to do that. The UN may be one, but let's just put out right away with Russia as Assad's sort of backer. That seems unlikely, doesn't mean you don't have to do it, but I'll put out there, at least there's the action in NATO this morning that Turkey is requested to convene. There's a question I have about other Gulf states who have interests that might align, and even for that matter, is there any opportunity for the horrible things that have happened this week for the government in Iraq, for al-Maliki to suddenly change to come around in there? Because I think the challenge is the clear sense that we can't simply make things different on the ground alone, and yet this isn't some sort of broad call for everyone to get together and hold hands. It's instead a more strategic question about how we can get other people who have interest in that region to be moving forward. Thank you, could you just hand that over to... Hello, Eric Ashcroft, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and my question is about arming the moderate Syrian groups. Do we have a sense of what type of arms and how much of it we would have to actually supply to materially change the balance of power, especially given the fact that Assad still has international backers? So I guess what would be the risk that we would just maintain the same level but everyone would have better weapons? Thank you, sir? Yeah, Ken Meyer, cord world docs. It's widely understood that Saudi Arabia has been supporting the rebels, and it's well documented that the rebels have engaged in a number of acts of terror. Do you think it would help if the State Department placed Saudi Arabia on the list of state-sponsoring terrorism? And in fact, if we armed the rebels, as the panel seems to think would be a good idea, might we not have to place ourselves on that list? Ron Wallman up front here. Thanks, I'd like to hear a little bit more about the notion that Assad is in collaboration with ISIS. I'd like to start off. I'm going to start with some comments. I mean, maybe not direct response to the questions. I mean, I'm going to use a page book of Assad's responses usually. He doesn't answer the question. By the way, he's my classmate. We graduated from the same medical school. I met with him after he became a president three times. And the first time I met with him was one year after he became a president. And we were doing our international conference in Syria, Syrian American Medical Society. And he said that he would love to become a doctor, not a president. And I told him, I heard that there is openness in Syria and that you're trying to make a change. And are you planning to introduce democracy in Syria? And he had this very long response. Most of us were yawning at the response. And then he said, the Syrians are not ready for democracy. And I think he was asked the same question by the Wall Street Journal two months before the first demonstration in Dar'a. And he said the same thing. So it looks like he is in a mindset that he's convinced. I believe that he convinced that what's happening right now is a global conspiracy against him and against Syria. And he's fighting the good fight. And I think he believes that. Now, in terms of arming the opposition, I think what we need to focus on is arming the Syrian people with the tools that will help them to rebuild Syria. And also to protect the population, the civilian population. I think this is a very basic moral thing to do. When our government intervened in Bosnia, in Kosovo, I didn't hear that much criticism of what we have done. We protected the population. We saved Bosnia. We saved Kosovo. And we can do the same thing in Syria. When we were talking about 162,000 Syrians killed in three years, when we were talking about the largest humanitarian crisis in our time, when we were talking about half of the population being displaced and we're doing nothing as a ward, I think this is really shame on us. So we should have done much more than what we have done from the beginning of the crisis. But until now, we have this debate whether we need to arm the opposition or not. We should have no flying zone to protect the Syrians from being bombed every day by barrel bombs. We should have moved maybe earlier, much earlier, to prevent Assad from using chemical weapons. He's still fooling us and using different type of chemical weapons that he did not declare in the treaty. And we are believing them. We're actually hiding these news reports because we don't want to immerse ourselves. So yes, I believe that we have to arm the Syrian people with the tool that to protect themselves. This is our duty as the superpower in the world, as the international community. The United Nations has the responsibility to protect civilians. We're not doing that. We don't hear that debate in the media and in the public about the responsibility of protect civilians anymore. I think it's shame on us that we are letting this go when we're still debating bits and pieces of the policy. Kathleen, the question John raised about our broader strategy of engagement with other countries. Yeah, let me touch on that. And then I actually like to take on a couple of others. Yeah, the United States has been for some time very much. I'm sure as you know, John engaged with the Gulf States, certainly with NATO, particularly particular allies within NATO are more concerned about Syria maybe than some others, and they have been quite active. We have, for example, both the Germans and the Dutch have deployed Patriot batteries in a defensive mode on Turkish soil to help protect Turkey. That's one example of states that have chosen to step up their responsiveness. And the United States, by the way, is done the same. So yes, they're absolutely part of the solution set. I think, in particular, on the Gulf State piece, they are. The issue, I think, is how much can we, how much Suasion do we have to point them in the right direction? This, in some cases, gets to the other question about how the Gulf States and the Saudis are engaging in the region, and particularly in terms I'm assuming of arming. So I think the more we step in, and again, I am not saying this easily. I don't believe the United States should be stepping in everywhere in the world all the time. But I think, as I've laid out, there are reasons here for us to move ahead off of the policy we have had. And we do have, if you will, on the books, the policy of providing some arms and assistance. And here's where I think we can provide a helpful, normative role in terms of who gets armed, how we think very hard about that as do the Europeans. And I think we can bring, as we have skin in the game, so the saying goes, we can help to shape that more than is being done today. So let me jump to that piece, which is both the question about the material balance power and the, I'll just say, on the issue of the US being a state sponsor of terrorism, I wouldn't consider the US arming the German opposition and World War II a state sponsor of terrorism. So I see no analogy here to what the US would do and the way in which we do it. And frankly, I'm very convinced of the care that we take, at least in this administration, and how we do those things. There's no way that we, if you believe in just use of force on any level, you know that there are consequences you can't take all control of. But you have to do it with a just mindset about how you're trying to change the lives, frankly, of people on the ground and save lives. And I think that would clearly be where the US mindset would be on the material balance of power. That has been the number one issue that has stymied us for years. And that's why it brought up the time scale issue. If you thought Assad was going to go quickly, then it didn't make any sense to arm, because the throughput it takes, the degree of size and scale of a program to arm, and to do it in this very careful way, make sure it's going to the right people, vetting the right people, getting the equipment there, that has never looked to make sense because of the time scale. I'm suggesting that that has shifted over time and that, you know, I'm not sure it'll make a huge material difference, and I said that very explicitly, but I think we can make enough of a difference to shift the calculus of actors. That includes Assad and includes the extremists, includes those states outside the region who are maybe arming the extremists, and it could include Russia. So I think to the extent that we are able to start putting into practice a responsible program that we've already stated we're going to do, maybe already are doing on some level, but make clear that the United States is intent on shifting that over time. It probably won't significantly overnight shift the balance. The throughput is very difficult, but I think it can make a difference, and I think it's time we try. Mike. I guess I'd strongly agree with your point that if the theory is that when America stands down, others stand up, it often doesn't work that way, okay? If the theory is America gets engaged leading other allies, it works better in a circumstance like this, and one of the explicit reasons that members of the administration that I talked to early in this process wanted the US more engaged in arming moderate rebels was to provide that kind of quality control and leadership in this circumstance. And the Saudis in particular, and they're mentioned, and they have huge problems, but part of their frustration has been they go ahead and do things. They haven't felt like we've led. When I was there last, there are Saudi trucks every night that go across that border into Syria. And aid people aren't quite sure exactly what goes on, but they have had huge frustration with US policy and they've done a bunch of things themselves. I think the US could play a much more strategic role in determining how that works, so I agree on that side. On the arming side, it's an unfortunate reality that a single Russian cargo ship bringing arms to the Syrians is more than what we're talking about in months of arming of the rebels. But that doesn't necessarily mean that it's hopeless, so people I've talked to recently, you know, they would wanna get started just by the ability to shoot down a few helicopters. And having that just begin to change the calculation of the regime when they move people in the material that they have to think about it, because right now it's not even part of the calculation. That would be a big advance with a fairly small military investment. So clearly when you're not doing much, there are some things you can do that would give both the regime and the Iranians and others pause as they conduct operations within the country and I think that's part of the hope, so. Ron had raised a question around linkage, allegations of a linkage between Assad and ISIS. I don't know much about that. I would say that Assad has benefited from making this conflict more sectarian. You agree with that? Oh, definitely. And so it's a odd alliance of interests with some other elements here. And I know from having government experience that Assad was either actively or passively allowing a lot of Sunni foreign fighters to go through Syria into Iraq. That direction during the Iraq war was a major problem. And you certainly look the other way at least in that circumstance, but I don't know the detail. I mean, there are a few things about this issue that in the first speech that Assad gave in the beginning of the demonstrations, like one month after the beginning of the demonstrations, he mentioned that there is a conspiracy and we have a foreign fighters and we have terrorists. At that time there was nothing like that. And this became self-fulfilling prophecy that I think he created. He released from the prison of Adra, near Damascus, the leaders of current ISIS and knowing that they will go into the other side and they will organize and so forth. I mean, I can tell you that in Aleppo, everyone knew, for example, where is the headquarters of Jabhat al-Nusra, which was never bombed during the crisis. Everyone knows that Al-Raqqa is the center of ISIS in Syria and Al-Raqqa is barely being attacked by the Syrian government. I mean, this kind of, which gives you an idea that whether there is direct collaboration or Assad is trying to indirectly let them get stronger, so he can tell the world, see, I'm fighting terrorists on your behalf. Thank you. Len, and then in the back here. We started this discussion with the West Point speech, which seemed to shut the door on any further action. And since then two things have happened. One is Ambassador Ford has gone very public showing the kind of fractures within the administration. The second is the Iraq crisis. So I'm wondering if any of you can illuminate the debate that's going on, if any, within the administration. Thank you. Yes, please identify yourself. Yes, hi, my name is Mary Zell. First of all, thank you so much to our three panelists. My question is primarily for you, Dr. Hicks, and I'd like to push a little more on this shift, what you mentioned as shifting the balance. And so the goal of arming the moderate opposition that many of you have mentioned is to shift the balance to create a stalemate, to push the sides to a negotiating table. I think we're all on the same page there. But several of the panelists have also alluded to the role of Russia. And so my question is, if by arming the opposition, don't we risk contributing to a sustained proxy war that could go on for decades, rather than actually shifting the balance? And how do we meet that challenge and how do we plan for that? Thank you. Yes. Others, why don't we come back then? Who would like to jump in? I can start on the proxy war question. Look, I think that is overstating it. I think if your question is, could there be, could be looking at decades, or maybe a decade, of conflict, I think that is a possibility. We're looking at that now. I do think we are, as was mentioned, it's very fluid on the ground. So stalemate isn't quite the right term. And I certainly am not saying arm to a balance that creates a stalemate. I'm saying arm and create dynamics that create less of an imbalance so you can get people to the negotiating table. And again, my thought would be to put humanitarian issues at the forefront of that conversation at the negotiating table. So you may not resolve all political or military issues, but you may create enough of a shift that allows more humanitarian assistance than you have today. So are there risks in arming? Absolutely, absolutely. And we have been in that position for many years. I'm suggesting that I think there's enough evidence that this is not resolving in and of itself and that the crisis is getting out of control and that arming is one piece of a solution set that can help to start, save lives over the long term. Yeah, I'm not necessarily the right person to talk to about divisions within the administration, but I do know that this has been a two-sided argument since the very beginning. I mean, there were serious voices on both sides of the arming debate that emerged into stories about this question whether it was Petraeus and Hillary Clinton or certain White House staff on this issue. So it's been a fully debated issue within the administration. They've just come down pretty decisively on one side. And I think that reflects the president's view on some of these key White House staff. Having been in government, I actually find many of the individual decisions that have been made in this crisis to be understandable given the political and geopolitical context. And then my concern, as I was trying to express at the beginning, is just that when you add them up, serially, they add up to real confusion about the role that America wants to play in this debate. On the proxy war question, I don't think that's been the issue. I think right now, to put it bluntly, a lot of people that are in essence proxies of one side in this struggle don't feel like they've had reliable sponsors. While the other side has been all in 100%. Whether it's the Russians or Hezbollah or the regime, they have been committed to military victory using the most brutal methods of modern warfare you can possibly imagine. And under those circumstances, I agree that it's a moral commitment to give the ability to people to defend themselves when they are the objects. What strikes me when I talk with refugees when I'm there is that civilians casualties are not the byproducts of the conflict in many ways. Civilians are often the targets of one side of this conflict which is a violation of the rule of law, of war. And represents crimes against humanity. So there is a moral element here as we engage in this and with helping people to defend themselves when they themselves, when neighborhoods are targets in this battle. So on that line, what should be done now? I mean clearly there is mounting evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity. What are you advising in terms of actions that should be taken now to sort of lay the groundwork for accountability eventually? Should this be a priority or is this seen as something that's a bit really a bit too long-term and a bit extraneous? Do you see this as something that really should be a priority? I think it is a priority and I think it is actively a priority. That's been my experience. I've been out of the administration for over a year but that is my memory and is that exactly those issues are being cataloged. I think the execution of that as we all know would be incredibly difficult but the dossiers, if you will, are built and being built and taken account of and I think the president's very committed to protecting civilians and I know that's hard to hear in those kinds of situations and using the rule of law as we can to do that. The question is whether you'll ever get these people as it has been a question in every conflict from Bosnia and before but I do think that's a priority if ever you're able to get to prosecution. I mean the only thing that I would like to add and miss that in order to have reconciliation in Syria and prevention even worsening of the humanitarian situation, I mean you can foresee definitely a scenario where you have a huge displacement of the other population right now in Syria that are so far been spared by the crisis if there is no sense of justice. So I think accountability and putting the war criminals especially leaders of war crimes to justice in some type of tribunal is very important in order to preserve what's left from the fabrics of the Syrian society and prevent further revenge attacks and under against minorities that are perceived as supportive of the regime. We're talking right now about a sense in Syria that without the support of certain elements of the Syrian society the regime would not have sustained this brutality over the past three and a half years. So there should be some type of justice at that international level. I would only add that there are some recent examples of Syrians themselves who have smuggled out pictures of torture in order to provide evidence of what went on and I think that's often important not just to the international community but to Syrians themselves. In our earlier panels, earlier round tables we tried to close with coming back to the speakers and asking them to reflect on what do you think is the basis for hope looking forward. What do you look to as the light in the picture that you think we want to leave us with as a positive end to this conversation? Mike, you wanna? I would only say that the hope I've had is not been reading articles about the strategic situation in Syria which is pretty depressing. It's going to Zatri and visiting people in the communities, community-based refugees who are, Zatri is not a hopeless place. These are not people that are in a, I've been to hopeless refugee camps and this is enormously vital, highly educated, people that wanna get back to their country. They have high expectations. It's a different population. Sometimes refugee populations are dispirited and the morale is broken. Many of these are middle-class people that wanna get back to build their country. And so I don't end up, I haven't ended up, you hear horrible stories, but I haven't ended up, when I visit with refugees, they're not despairing in many circumstances and that to me is the source of hope they wanna build their country. So, I just wanna reiterate and emphasize on this issue and I just wanna mention that Syria is not a Congo or Sudan. With all respect to Sudanese and Congolese, Syria historically have a sense of history and unity. Syrians overcome many tragedies and disasters throughout the history, whether it's recent or in the past. We have a large middle class. We have educated urban people. Woman in Syria status is much more empowered than other Arabic countries like Yemen or Libya and so forth. We have a large Syrian diaspora in the United States and Europe and the Gulf States who are ready to contribute and to help in rebuilding the society. We have 7,000 Syrian American physicians. Many of them are members of SAAMS who are ready to provide their skills and training and wealth and they've been doing that over the last three years to help rebuilding. We have a large diverse society. We have 29 different ethnic and religious groups in Syria. We have a large Christian community that is considered and perceived as an asset to Syria. Syria used to be an oasis in the middle of very stormy Middle East in terms of interfaith relations between Christians and Muslims. We're proud of our heritage, we're proud of our diversity but we need to be given the chance first of all to end this crisis and transition hopefully into a system that allows Syrians to show the region and the world that they're able to build their society and they're able to become a modern society where everyone is respected, everyone has equal rights. When all of you have iPad and iPhone which is the product of a Syrian immigrant or a son of a Syrian immigrant, Steve Jobs is a son of a Syrian immigrant and he succeeded because there is a system in this country, this is a great nation that allow you to nurture your creativity and so forth and we believe that many Syrians have that in them but they need to be given the chance. Thank you, Kathleen. Well I'm struggling to come up with a different one because I agree, I think the greatest hope is in the Syrian people themselves and their traditions and their ability to live in a multiple religious society and to coexist peacefully. I will just say on the US side, I guess it won't sound like it's hopeful because it's born of a lot of negativity but I do think we're in fits and starts moving toward this recognition inside the United States of the importance of the Syrian crisis for the rest of the region and for US position and credibility in the world. I think we're moving in fits and starts to this importance of showing other countries in the world as well as the Syrian moderate opposition that we do care and that we do wanna take on some kind of a more substantive leadership role than we have and I have great immense faith in the American people and their incredible generosity. The dollars were mentioned before but I think that will continue both in terms of what is given in official aid and in terms of American supporting NGOs that are out there working the front lines. Great. Well thank you, this has been a very rich and I think in the end, very constructive conversation and thank you for taking time to be with us. Please join me in thanking our speakers. So we're adjourned for the day. Thank you all for coming and being with us through these series of roundtables and discussions.