 Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. My name is Heather Conley. I'm the Senior Fellow and Director of the Europe Program here at CSIS, and we are absolutely delighted that you could join us today. We are also very delighted and quite privileged that we have with us today two senior administration officials who are also, I think, two of the most important thought leaders in Washington on U.S. policy towards the Arctic. We have with us today Ambassador David Bolton, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Dave, that's a mouthful. Exactly. We also have with us Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy in the Office of Secretary of Defense Amanda Dory. The purpose of this afternoon's discussion is to take a quick look in the rearview mirror on last month's Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Newt, Greenland, where for the first time a U.S. Secretary of State led the American delegation. Secretary Clinton was joined by Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar and Alaskan Senator Lisa Murkowski, and I think it is very clear that the United States is increasing its level of engagement and interest in the Arctic. We look forward to hearing from Ambassador Bolton the State Department's reflections on the outcomes of the ministerial in Newt, and most importantly to focus on the work ahead for the next two years of the Arctic Council under the Swedish chairmanship. Secretary Dory is going to provide us with an overview of a recently released Defense Department report entitled Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage. I would argue it's more about Arctic Operations and less about the Northwest Passage. This report was requested by Congress as part of the FY11 National Defense Authorization Act, and I provide a little personal commentary. Having read the report, I found it to be a very candid assessment of the current state of American capabilities in the Arctic. I would also offer it's quite a sobering report. The report suggests that more assessment and more evaluation needs to be done about America's future Arctic capabilities, and that a balance must be found between late to need and premature investment. I would argue that further assessment is no longer required. We are already in the late to need stage, and it's time actually to make some very difficult decisions about making a strategic choice about American capabilities in the Arctic. America can either outsource its capabilities to foreign flagged commercial vessels or the private sector or to other allies, or we can ensure a minimal presence and capability in the Arctic, and that's the strategic choice that needs to be made. I hope we get into that a bit in the discussion period. The report obviously covers the Defense Department's capabilities. It does not cover the Department of Homeland Security and the US Coast Guard capabilities, which is a limitation, I think, of the report. With that wind up and hopefully good nutrition and food for thought, let's begin our discussion. I think a person who doesn't need a lot of introduction, too many in the room, Ambassador Bolton has previously served in the State Department's Office of the Legal Advisor, done lots of law of the sea, and Director of the Office of Marine Conservation. He is well-steeped in these issues, and we are delighted to have David with us. The floor is yours. Thank you. Heather, thanks very much. Thanks to CSIS for inviting me to speak. Good afternoon to all of you. The Arctic Council ministerial that took place in Nuke was a coming of age of the Council, in my view. It was an historic meeting for a number of reasons. The United States, which was the one member of the Arctic Council that had never sent a foreign minister meeting, not only sent our Secretary of State, as Wisconsin said, also our Secretary of the Interior, one of our Senators, Senator Murkowski, and Deputy Lieutenant Governor of Alaska. And yes, that does reflect the growing interest in all things Arctic on the part of the United States. But it wasn't just our presence there that made the meeting important. The outcomes were quite significant in my view, and I'm only going to touch on a few, for reasons of time, mostly. The item that caught the most press was the signing of the first ever legally binding agreement to emerge out of the Arctic Council process. This was an agreement to cooperate on search and rescue throughout the Arctic. There were people in the room who were involved in those negotiations, as was I, and it was quite a thing. It's not only the first legally binding agreement in the Arctic coming out of the Arctic Council. It's the first ever legally binding agreement among these eight countries on any topic. And I think we'll set the stage for future work, and we'll get to that in just a moment. A couple of other things that the Arctic Council ministers did of a sort of institutional nature will also strengthen the Council as it heads into the future. There was agreement to establish a permanent secretariat for the Council, which should contribute to continuity, efficiency of administration, that permanent secretariat will be established in Trumson, Norway. And we also made progress on a more difficult question of admitting observers to the Council. Just as the interest in all things Arctic has increased significantly in the United States, so too has it in a number of other countries, including countries that are not members of the Arctic Council. They would like to be observers. The Arctic Council ministers adopted new criteria on which applications for admission as observers can be assessed and set in motion a time frame within which the observers will be considered. For the future, the Council took a number of steps, and I'd highlight two in particular. They mandated the establishment of a new task force to develop an instrument on oil spill preparedness and response throughout the Arctic. There are such instruments for other regions of the world, and there are some global commitments we have as well relating to oil spills. That do apply in the Arctic. But their notion was there should be an Arctic focused instrument to deal with the very real possibility that there could be a spill of significance in the Arctic and that at present we are not adequately prepared individually or collectively to handle such a spill. That task force's work will proceed in conjunction with ongoing work on oil spill prevention that is being undertaken through one of the existing working groups of the Council. Another initiative launched is to look at this concept of ecosystem based management in the Arctic. There's a term that a number of us have been dealing with here in the United States, a number of other nations as well understand what this means. The basic concept is to look at the full range of human activities, taking place within a given ecosystem, try to manage them in a way that makes sense for the entire ecosystem. We are trying to do that at home as part of the President's new National Ocean policy, including in the Arctic. The Arctic Council has begun work to try to figure out what this can mean for the Arctic as a whole. So those were some of the big ticket items coming out of Nuuk and it was a great pleasure to be there. The Swedish Chair, which is now taken over, does have an ambitious agenda for the next two years that will cover these items and just mentioned and a number of others. Before seating the floor to Amanda Dory, I would just like to mention a few other things going on in the Arctic from where I sit that are not directly connected to the Arctic Council, but there's still of significance. One is that the United States is continuing to figure out how far out our extended continental shelf goes, including in the Arctic. Later this summer, for I think the fourth year running, the United States and Canada will combine forces to Coast Guard Cutters, our Healy and Kamenez-Louis Saint Laurent to do joint mapping of the area of the Beaufort and Chuck E. Seas. Of course, until we are a party to the law of the Sea Convention, the United States is hamstrung in its ability to secure international recognition of just far out how just far out our continental shelf actually extends. But we are nevertheless doing the research and hopes and anticipation that we will be able to establish that claim in the near future. We also have an unresolved boundary in the Beaufort Sea with Canada, and we are working toward a resolution of that, another meeting of experts to consider that boundary situation will take place in Washington later this summer. We are also looking at the question of fisheries expanding into the Arctic and thinking about ways to work with our Arctic neighbors to manage future fisheries taking place there. There is much else going on. Those are just some of the highlights from my perspective. I am going to stop here because I much prefer to save the rest for a dialogue session that will follow after Amanda's presentation. Thank you very much. Ambassador Bolton, thank you very much, and I know we are going to have a spirited conversation. I would like to start a spirited conversation on unclose ratification, so I will put that marker out right now. Thank you so much. We are delighted again to have Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Amanda Dorey with us. She has previously served as Principal Director of Policy Planning with responsibilities for strategic development, and she has served as the chief of staff for irregular warfare and building partnership capacity for the Quadrennial Defense Reviews Executive Roadmap. That is a really long title, Dave. That may be yours, but my favorite part of Amanda's resume is that she served as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow, and she was based here at CSIS from 2002 to 2003. We will work on Dave's resume to have a little CSIS in that resume, but without further ado, Amanda, thank you and welcome. Thank you, Heather. Those were the good old days of being able to be the convener and kind of tee up some terrific dialogues and do some independent research. Whenever I come back to CSIS, which is not often enough, it is remembering the kind of intellectual freedom that you have, which is a little bit different than when you're serving in government, but I appreciate serving in government as well. I'm pleased to be here today in that capacity. I don't want to sound too nostalgic, right? Thank you to all of you for coming today to engage in some give and take in part oriented on the completion of a report that the Department of Defense just did, as mentioned in response to House Armed Services Committee tasking in the committee report of last year's NDA. I'd like to acknowledge Esther McClure, who's here in the front row from the strategy staff, who was the lead author on the report, and I would agree that it was very well drafted and who really pulled together the effort across all the many DOD components who had equities in this issue set, and that really includes multiple combatant commands, that includes all the services, multiple OSD components. We of course worked closely with the intelligence community on the intelligence assessments that are underlying this, so you can imagine that the kind of multitude of players who were engaged in pulling this together. You think of Esther as the ringmaster of all that, and so I just wanted to express my appreciation publicly to her for that, and thank you for hosting Heather as well. Just a few introductory remarks. The report did look at some specific areas, and I'll go through those because the report is structured that way. It's available on the DOD website if you don't already have a copy of it or haven't had a chance to read through it, but my presentation today will step you through those five areas that were directed, and some maybe have more interest to others. There's a degree of inside baseball as far as some of the areas, but I think there are many inside baseball players here today, so that may work out well. Playball, exactly. So the report is structured around looking at the context for DOD Arctic operations in the future, answering questions about needed capabilities and capability gaps, asking questions about the Unified Command Plan, which is our organizational approach within the department for addressing Arctic issues from a joint force commander perspective, asking questions about basing in the Arctic, and then last but not least, certainly, is the whole issue of ice-breaking capabilities. So I'll step through each of those sections quickly to give you a flavor for it, and then, again, as Ambassador Baldwin indicated, look forward to discussion and give and take. Let me see if I can downslide. Will that do it? Okay, very good. So just a few of the trend lines that we focused on in the assessment. The issue of boundary disputes, for example, the trend lines are positive as far as peaceful resolution of those, and we've had recent examples, and we just heard about the continued engagement U.S. diplomatically with Canada to resolve a dispute there. But our assessment is that those types of disputes will continue to be resolved diplomatically and peacefully, and that the parties have committed themselves to doing so. So the potential for a boundary dispute that turns hot in some way is very low. In terms of resources, that's what many communities have their eyes on, and the potential for future resource extraction. One of the things in our assessment that came to light is really the difference between what you may end up reading about in press accounts as far as potential resource conflicts and where, when you look at the projections for oil and gas resources, where those lie relative to EEZ claims, and the vast majority of those really lie within undisputed EEZs. So there is potential, but a low potential in terms of conflict over resource extraction in our view, and the industry itself is really taking these steps slowly, but surely to look at what resource exploration will take very challenging and arctic conditions, and I think some in the room here would be able to speak to that in great detail, but it's not undersea drilling in this type of climate is not straightforward, and our assessment was that arctic operations in general, whether they're extractive in nature, or whether they are commercial in nature, or military for that matter, remain high risk in operations because of the climate in the arctic, and that is unlikely to change in the decades ahead. A few other trends to note, and Heather touched on this briefly, but the commercial shipping issue, you know, that receives again attention in the press because you have some shipping underway at this point, but it's mostly point to point within the arctic. The potential for the transpolar shipping is really some decades in the future in our assessment when you'll have ice diminished conditions for a limited period of time in the summer, and the scientific community continually assesses and reassesses when that might happen. I think when we started our work, the best assessment was in the mid-century timeframe, it's moved in a little bit since then, maybe closer to 2040 or 2035, but it is still some distance in the future before that looks like it would be a viable commercial prospect. Obviously, potential dividends, great dividends in terms of savings of money and time for those types of routes, but again, our assessment is that this is not something that will begin to climb in a significant way for quite some time. Tourism and fishing, on the other hand, are certainly increasing and our assessment of those trends brought to light the issues that could be associated, for example, with search and rescue incidents or disagreements over fisheries. These types of incidents are quite possible and there have been some, there's a picture of the grounded tourist ship from last summer and with all of the challenges that accompany that, but with the new search and rescue MOU, we have the sectors in place, we have the agreements in place to support those kinds of activities going forward. But our bottom line was that the increasing human activity and Arctic use, those trend lines when you look at them are really not military-related trend lines, they're commercial-related trend lines for the most part. In looking at the strategic assessment and our national security objectives in particular, we drew very heavily on the National Security Presidential Directive 66, which is also the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, which states U.S. Arctic policy and derived from that a desire to end state for the Arctic that you see here on the slide in terms of a secure, stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded and the U.S. homeland continues to be protected. Our sense, based on increased access over time, given melting sea ice and the increase in human activity I've already alluded to, at present there is no military threat in the region, but there are competing political and economic interests, and those may result in disagreements in the near term or in the longer term. We do have in place the bilateral institutions and the multilateral institutions to mediate those in our view, so we have the Cooperative International fora to work those, but our assessment is that the relationships among the Arctic states will remain stable and cooperative as we work together to improve both the human security and environmental security. It's important here to highlight, and I think we'll have a chance in the Q&A to go into this further, but the differing missions and responsibilities and authorities between Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security and the different timelines where those begin to manifest. So you will hear a different perspective from Department of Homeland Security and from the U.S. Coast Guard based on their here and now responsibilities as far as ice breaking, maritime security, law enforcement, environmental security and fisheries. Those are here and now issues for the Coast Guard and we are working closely with them to define what those requirements will look like across both departments in the period ahead. But again, this report focused exclusively on Department of Defense. In terms of DOD missions, the primary missions today really relate to domain awareness and understanding what's happening in the Arctic and regional security cooperation with the different Arctic partners. Over time, the maritime security and strategic sea lift missions will increase in importance as access and activity increases. Based on that mission assessment, we looked at DOD capabilities and we do have some capabilities that are exclusive to cold or Arctic operations, specialized gear like the C-130s that have the skis on them or the submarines that have the Los Angeles class submarines with the reinforced sails to break through ice. We also have cold weather training installations and cold weather capabilities for army and marine forces. So we do have specialized capabilities that are relevant to the Arctic. But a lot of the capabilities that you could envision in the future of being employed in the Arctic are general purpose types of capabilities, whether it's air lift, whether it's other types of aircraft, eventually surface ships. So there's flexibility in terms of employment of DOD assets and capabilities. The gaps that we identified in the near term are the ones that you see here on the slide and the first has to do with communications and the limitations on communications based on satellite geometry and other considerations magnetic and solar. So some of the challenges that any Arctic nation experiences in terms of communications in that environment, the GPS as well is not optimized for Arctic operations. It's capable but not optimized. And so the combination of that with limitations on navigation charts means that navigation is a challenging prospect. So that's a second gap area that we believe will require attention in the near term. And then the awareness across all domains, so taking into consideration air domain, maritime as well as land is quite limited given the long distances, the sparse populations and the challenging environment. So those were the types of gaps that were really front and foremost as we did our assessment as far as in the near term, which for purposes of this report was in over the next 10 year period of time. These gaps, if you look at them are the types of gaps that lend themselves to multi agency solutions that lend themselves to multi country solutions. And it's our view that we have an opportunity here to really work collaboratively on Arctic domain awareness and pacing our investments based on based on need not being late to need but being being in time with with need. Just very quickly on the unified command plan. This is a internal DoD organizational document that assigns missions to our combatant commanders, the joint commanders. And they have assignments that cover the globe. Clearly, I think this audience would recognize this is not an infringement on sovereignty is not assigning any of these countries or areas to them in a ownership type of perspective. But it is saying that the combatant commander is tasked with with relationships with with the relevant countries and in the in the event responses required to pursue that. But the primary purpose of focusing on UCP in this report was that up until 2011, we had three different combatant commanders. We have Pacific Command, Northern Command and European Command who also who all had Arctic Terrain. And in 2011, we simplified those relationships so that European Command and Northern Command now have Arctic responsibilities and and pay com no longer does. This was something that was agreed across the department and fully coordinated. It simplifies the the command arrangements. And for the first time, we identify Northern Command as the lead for Arctic capabilities. And this is something that we'll back to Heather's comment about the investments needed in the future. This gives us the opportunity to have North com as the as the lead within the department in terms of developing integrated priority list addressing gaps that that are perceived and in the Arctic. So this simplification we think was that was very useful. And we walk through that in the report. I quickly in terms of the Arctic infrastructure, it has certainly diminished in the Arctic since since the end of the Cold War, based on the regional threat assessment and reorientation of departmental priorities, we will of course continue to look at that based on the expanding opportunities and access in in the department. When we look at global posture, we look at it on a global basis. And we have to think about what that what the trade offs are from one region to another in terms of where we may have fixed installations, where we have rotational forces undertaking activities with partner countries, and where we have various types of agreements and access arrangements. So when we talk about posture, we're including all of those at the same, same time. Our existing Arctic infrastructure is included in the report that is concentrated in Alaska, as you would expect, as well as the agreement for the use of Tule Air Force Base. And those at present meet our current operational and contingency plans needs, but that's something that we will also continue to to assess regularly in consultation with the relevant combatant commands to ensure that they do have the the types of posture arrangements in place to to support their theater security cooperation, as well as as any contingency requirements. But given the long lead time for construction in the Arctic environment, that this is something where we will need to be careful not to be late to need given extended timelines. But the one kind of vision in terms of basing and physical infrastructure, this really lends itself to public private types of partnerships, for example, or multi agency type of partnerships, given the potential for shared use and also the the significant costs of construction in the Arctic. On icebreakers, I'm sure this will produce additional discussion, but as I mentioned before, in terms of ice breaking capability, Department of Defense at this point relies on commercial ice breaking capability, as well as well as agreements with with Canada to provide the ice breaking support that is specific to the department's needs. The Coast Guard, as I'm sure the entire audience is aware, has the lead ice breaking responsibility and is in the process of upgrading existing icebreakers, of which we have three in total total inventory at present. This is an area where a joint assessment will be important going going forward to address what the needs are for ice strengthened vessels as well as icebreakers in the years ahead. One of the things that we felt was important to highlight is when you tend to focus on numbers of icebreakers as some kind of metric, it's important to keep in context the relevant interests and relying those and taking into consideration the level of population and activity and coastline that particular countries have vis a vis their Arctic terrain. Last but not least, I would just close with saying that our senses that we we benefit from a coherent and consistent Arctic policy within the United States grounded in the NSPD that I cited earlier. Our assessment is in terms of threat levels, military threat levels, they are low at present and and we project that into the future. This is given the commitment of the Arctic states public commitment to to peaceful resolution of disputes and the active diplomacy that is underway there. And when you look historically at the last 50 years and how that has played out, our sense is in the near term our objectives are achievable with current capabilities, but this is something that we'll again need to attend to closely over time to ensure that we are just in time and not late to need as far as as Arctic capabilities. And with that, I'd like to stop and turn it over to Q&A. Amanda, thank you so much for that very comprehensive look at both the trends and capabilities. And I know you've given us a lot of good good food for thought and and for discussion. I have to say I'm going to keep with this baseball analogy. I like it so much. So I've placed these two in the batting cage and that means that you get to pitch some fast balls, curve balls, some straight balls, but I get to open, I get to do the opening pitch if I may beg your indulgence. But I hope we have a really good discussion. We've got plenty of time. So we've got plenty of experts in the audience. So I know we're going to have a great discussion. What I heard from both your presentations and I am struck by this, it's it's the increasing role of the private sector in the Arctic, whether that's the private sector's role in the international oil spill and response agreement, whether that's requirements of capabilities. In the report it talks about dual use military civilian. How do we put the private sector at the table for some of these discussions? We're assuming their assets will be involved. We're assuming their economic and commercial interests are involved. But how do you bring them into the complexity of these international discussions? How do you make sure that your understanding, how the economic drivers will shape the region? So I just would love, and particularly in the next two years, as you explore the agreement, the capabilities question, how does that figure in? And Ambassador Bolton, you open the door. Could you please tell me from the administration standpoint where we are on Unclose? I had to ask you open the door. So with that maybe I'll start turning it to you. And then if you can reflect on both questions. Thanks very much. Yes, human activity is increasing in the Arctic and a lot of that is in a sense private activity, the private sector. Including the private sector in international negotiations for the Arctic is actually not that much different than including them for other regions. We do this. The place where it will become most interesting to me in the next two years is on this oil spill, preparedness and response, also prevention work. It is critical that the industries involved in oil exploration and development, shipping and the Arctic participate in this. There are a couple of different modalities to include such expertise in both the task force and in the working group. One is they can we can perhaps find a way for them to be invited as experts in this process and speak in their own name. That actually is the mode I would think best. Another option is individual delegations, the U.S. delegation, the Russian King, etc. delegation could invite people from the private sector on to their delegations and provide expertise in this way. But the oil spill instrument that we are working toward must reflect the input from private sector, also other stakeholders as well, including the permanent participants, environmental community. There are a lot of people with the stake in this exercise. With respect to the law of the C Convention, here's what I can say. This remains a top priority for the administration. We want the Senate to provide advice and consent now to the convention. We think it is fundamentally in the interest of the United States to be a party for the Arctic and for many other reasons as well. And we are looking forward to working with the Senate in the coming months to try to make this happen. We know there are a lot of new senators whose views on the convention may not yet be fully known. We are eager to educate them about the advantages we see in the convention. And I'm hoping, in a sense, third time is the charm. Twice the convention went through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but didn't make it to the floor. This time I'd like to see a different result. As you know, the Department of Defense continues to believe that the laws of the convention is critical to protect our interests into the future. And it was something that we highlighted in our Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010. The report again stresses the value and the importance that we place on law of the convention. So I'm I'm sharing the optimism that, you know, the third time is the charm as far as advice and consent of the Senate on the how to take into consideration that the economic and commercial interests. I I think Ambassador Bolton nailed it in terms of the diplomatic engagement piece. I think another aspect is is to think about those the various commercial interests and and to what extent they're they're working the congressional side of the house in terms of whether whether it's issues like law of the convention or whether it is the possibility for future investments, infrastructure in in U.S. Arctic. There there's there's there's a certain mutually reinforcing element to this in terms of the the raising raising awareness of the Arctic as as a important strategic interest is, you know, that the U.S. is an Arctic state and that we do have very important interests there. And, you know, beyond the Alaska delegation, it's very important for other members of Congress to to understand what those interests are. Thank you so much. Well, now we would love to open it up to you. If when you raise your hand, if you could also mention your name and your affiliation, if you have a question that's specific to to one of our guests or to both, that would be terrific. And I don't want to place the admiral on the spot, but we've been talking about the Coast Guard a lot and the Coast Guard hasn't had a say here. And I want to offer if you'd like to have any comments about this or you can also pass as well. Would you like to say a few words at? Well, let me let me get to make sure you get a microphone here and then we'll turn to our questions. But I I feel we're talking about you and not letting you talk. Well, you saw where we stand with our polar capability in the Arctic. And we currently have our two polar cutters are laid up. Neither one of them are in an operator operational capability. And one is actually being laid up long term. These are 40 year old ships. So we have campaigned, you know, we've looked at what is the national mandate for polar capability. So it's one thing to write a strategic document internal to the Coast Guard. And so we're not working with the National Ocean Council, which I am the Department of Homeland Security representative to that. And then there's an Arctic region to that. But what is really lacking is we look at the various governance structures that are out there. We have a DoD policy, we have NSPD 66. We have we have tribal concerns out there as well. But what we don't have is a whole of government approach to the Arctic. So we're working with the National Ocean Council right now to look at beyond. We have a national maritime strategy, a national maritime security strategy, but we don't have a national Arctic strategy. So what we really need to do is bound and frame the nation's Arctic strategy and first start from a strategic framework first. And especially as we look at competing budget demands of what is, you know, our our equities in the Arctic going out 10, 20, 30 years and beyond. I thought the work that Esther in DoD did, I think you really captured what, you know, the realities of today are, but but what are they going to be tomorrow? Currently, the United States does not have a capability to do the break in in McMurdo. We've been using the Odin in the past to lease, but the Baltic had severe icing last year. And then the Odin may not be available to do that break in, which is very critical to that mission in McMurdo. So those are some of the very near term. But what we really need to do is think the long term, which is oftentimes from where I sit is very difficult to do when you're dealing in one year, two year budget cycles. And what you're really trying to do is forecast 20 years beyond and think with that end state in mind, not just fiscal year 13 or as we build the 14 budget. So we look at the National Ocean Console as an opportunity to bring interior energy, National Science Foundation, Department of Commerce with NOAA, Coast Guard, Department of Defense, Department of State, and really go at it whole of government because the Arctic does mean different things to different people. But we do look at Shell. I'm not sure if we have a representative here from Shell Corporation. But, you know, once they get through their NEPA process, they will be doing, they will be drilling in the Arctic if it goes according to plan within the next two years. I was a federal on scene coordinator for the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. I was down there for seven months. This time last year, I had 50,000 people working for me. In Barrow, Alaska, there are beds and bunks for 30 people. So when you talk about infrastructure challenges in a very pristine and very fragile ecosystem, and as we're looking at this from a Washington perspective, I've tasked our 17 district commander to do that tribal outreach to the indigenous people of this Arctic domain. And let's not leave, you know, leave them out of the equation either. So we have a good engagement strategy. But right now, we are vulnerable. So it really gets back to the question of what is industry doing. And so our mandate to industry is you've got to provide that capacity in the event of a worst case discharge in the Arctic. We're working very closely now with Beamer. That's the follow on to minerals management service. So whenever they approve a lease, we know what that worst case discharge is going to be. And then what is the response protocols to respond to a spill that may release 50,000, 60,000 barrels per day, if left unchecked. And that was the nominal range of the Deepwater Horizon. So those are some of the issues that are ongoing. But I think first and foremost is getting a whole of government approach. And so I really do embrace the National Ocean Council, the Arctic Council as an international form for this outreach as well. And then we also work very closely with the Navy. We work with Admiral Ruffhead. I think Flake McBride, if you're here, I think I know he's working with with my staff, really trying to get out of the starting blocks of starting this national Arctic strategy, but really working again from a whole government approach. So a long explanation, if you will. But we really need to think beyond, you know, the two to three years and what and there's a lot of uncertainty as Amanda has pointed out. But right now, we are not postured for some of the potentialities that may exist in the Arctic. Thank you. Admiral, thank you very much and for providing that those insights. I think we'll start in the back sir, please. And just wait for the microphone to get to you. And then we'll start. Thank you. Thank you very much. I'm Vladimir Karamazov with our TVI television. Quick question for both guests, if I may, what's the current state of U.S. Russian interaction on the Arctic? Would you describe it as cooperative or potential conflict, especially given Russia's recent claims to the shelf and the flag planting on the seabed four years ago and all the rest of it? What's the U.S. stand in position on that? Thank you very much. Thanks very much for that question. Relations between the United States and Russia relating to the Arctic are quite good and very cooperative. As part of the reset in U.S. Russian relations that started with the beginning of this administration, we have found a lot of common ground on Arctic issues. As a personal matter, I was very pleased to co-chair the task force with a Russian counterpart, the Russian senior Arctic official ambassador Anton Vasilyev, that produced the Arctic Sertranesky agreement. The the planting of the flag by Russia on the seafloor at the North Pole was a kind of fun and interesting publicity stunt. It was not also quite a technical achievement, I might add, but it was not we did not take it as an aggressive or even particularly provocative act. In fact, Russia has submitted data in support of a claim to seafloor in the Arctic, but it honors the 1990 U.S. then Soviet Union boundary agreement and the effort of Russia to figure out how far out its kind of an anal shelf extends in the Arctic is following the process laid out in the law of the Sea Convention. So a long way of saying, I think there is no problem that I see on the horizon with Russia in the Arctic. I think we are working cooperatively and sorting through issues that good neighbors do. Just if I could ask from DOD perspective, I think it's a very similar story. We had recent recent talks between Ministry of Defense Department of Defense that are regularized series of talks and Arctic was one of the issues that we spoke about. And, you know, having engaged in that personally, I can say that that was a very open, productive conversation that's characterized by exchange of views and cooperation and not in a sense of friction. John Frim, I'm the first Secretary of Defense R&D for Canadian Embassy. And my question is not related to defense R&D at all. The Admiral touched on the subject of native peoples or indigenous peoples. I'm wondering how their voice is represented. Do they have any sort of international union that transgress, you know, goes across the borders? You know, the Arctic is a new frontier, like the West was here many years ago, and hopefully we don't repeat that kind of an approach. Thank you. I'm quite confident we won't repeat the experience of the 19th century with respect to indigenous peoples. Yes, the Arctic indigenous peoples have something truly remarkable through the Arctic Council. They are represented as permanent participants, their voices are heard independent of the governments of the countries in which they live. And yes, the indigenous peoples of the North have organized themselves into a number of different groups that cross international boundaries. One is the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, but there are others as well. They are active, they are engaged, they do care. And the governments of the Arctic, including ours, are quite committed to allowing their voices to come forward and taking on board their interests as well. And it's not just in the Arctic Council, we as a U.S. government, and I know it's true in Canada as well, have a very significant trust relationship with, we would say Native Americans or Indian tribes, including in Alaska, that we must honor in our activities that we do. Caitlyn Atram, rule of law committee for the ocean. Dave, I'm going to skip over a law of the sea question. You got spared. I actually have a question for Amanda regarding the Unifying Command Plan. Northcom's unusual, as I understand it, from the other areas in the role of the Department of Homeland Security. And I was wondering whether for maritime issues the Coast Guard will be playing a larger role under the under Northcom than the Coast Guard can play in other realms. Are there any legal problems or command authority problems with the Coast Guard stepping up to that? That's an excellent question. The Northern Command is different than all the other regional combatant commanders in the United States itself as part of the area of responsibility, AOR as we call it. And Canada and Mexico are included within the within the areas of responsibility as well. So they really have the hybrid of dealing with US territory itself and all that means to include all of the different federal players, but then down through state and local communities, given our federal system, and then engaging with foreign partners also. So they really are a hybrid. They've been that way since since day one. Department of Homeland Security and US Northern Command have very tight linkages. There's a veterans thing in the front row of some of those those engagements. But the Coast Guard is is and the DHS writ large are represented in the the interagency components out in Colorado Springs. I think very robust communication and engagement. So I don't I don't think there's a challenge with having DHS and Coast Guard's voice being heard. I think it's very helpful. In fact, the Northern Command was designated as the the lead for Arctic capabilities advocacy because of that tight linkage. And I think that will help going forward. Hi, Sebastian Tarrado from the Canadian Embassy. I was wondering if you could speak to the reference in the title of the Northwest Passage and any references in the report. Thank you. The Northwest Passage didn't didn't play a prominent role in the report per se. We did in the assessment look at what we believe would be the case in terms of increasing use of the Northwest Passage for commercial purposes, for example, and our assessment based on our understanding of the trends in the scientific community is that that's probably the the last in terms of kind of commercial trafficking that would see the kind of uptick that we would expect with the gradual warming. So it didn't there's not a kind of prominent feature, but we certainly do address that. Do you want anything? No, that's fine. Northwest, why? I actually a fantastic will take it. Can I ask a second question this time related to defense and security? Our former assistant deputy minister for science and technology also has responsibility for defense and security. And his notion was to push toward a secure North America. In other words, you know, a perimeter security. How does that, you know, figure in with the Arctic Council? How would Canada and the US be working on, you know, pushing the border of North America and defending that border essentially in the Arctic? Yeah, I'm just going to say from the from a military perspective, the the central role of NORAD when it comes to Arctic operations, I think that that's something that that the relationship has has such longevity given the Cold War instantiation. And now when you look to the the kind of changes in the security environment, it becomes all the more relevant. You know, there were perhaps those towards the end of the Cold War who who questioned the need for for NORAD. But I think as we look at the the warming trends and the opportunities in the Arctic that NORAD becomes all the more relevant. And you you have the particular operational details on how we're structured there. But in that in terms of kind of pushing out a North American perimeter per se, I think there's there's not a sense of any loss of sovereignty involved. But I think the collaboration that we have the enormous ad will continue to be incredibly germane. If I could just elaborate one of the issues that that appears in that when we talk about a secure North America, then, you know, things like immigration policy becomes important and Canada's sovereign right to enforce its immigration policy versus the US immigration policy, you know, that came to a head with the Sri Lankan ship coming to Canada. You know, when the Arctic opens up and we have a lot more ships landing in the North, you know, this this will become an issue. I wanted to if I made it follow up on on on two questions. After the search and rescue agreement, now that it's been signed, it assigns sectoral responsibility. Are there way I but I think that the problem is how to put this in practice and you don't necessarily want to practice this as you're trying to respond to, you know, heaven forbid, a major event. Is do D looking at increasing exercising tempo, Arctic Council sort of exercising, if you will, how we can work together because no one really has sufficient capabilities for a major event, how we work together. We know anecdotally, we have Operation Nanook, which the Canadians host and they invite US Danish participation other exercises. But is there a thought of how do we now that we have the agreement? How do we practice the agreement and prepare for the agreement? Any thought being given on that? And then a question, Dave, for you're not going to escape the fisheries question and manned his presentation, the trend line of the oil and gas deposits don't move around, but fishing stocks do. And I think is we're often challenged by many journalists who want to have a big headline that says conflict in the Arctic and they test us to see what kind of conflict. You know, I could imagine where you have two fishing trawlers thinking that that area is theirs and then national rhetoric picks up from there. How are we trying to sort of diffuse that when fishing stocks are going to be moving for cooler waters, warmer waters, and they won't necessarily be in the same national boundaries that we find and thoughts being given to de-conflict that. So I, Amanda, maybe the first question and Dave, the second. The first question, the answer is yes, there are now envisioned search and rescue exercises to begin to work on implementation of the MOU and those will be important in working together across the different sectors to game out what the response would look like. So absolutely, that's the first kind of step in implementation. I'd like to add to that, if I could. The government of Canada is organizing and hosting a first tabletop exercise to do exactly what you were describing to see how we could implement the Arctic search and rescue agreement in the event of an actual emergency. And that will take place this fall, actually, in a series of events and I'm very grateful to that. Another word about the agreement, the agreement at this point is signed. It's not yet in force. Actually, each of the eight countries needs to complete an internal review and notify the depository that it's ready to bring into force. So it'll be at least a few months before that happens. The other thing is that while the agreement will facilitate communication and cooperation, it doesn't in the short run translate into more assets and resources for search and rescue. But and this is maybe speaking personally, I am hoping that each of the eight governments, including the United States, can use it to that effect. We now have recognized need for greater search and rescue capabilities in the Arctic. The Arctic nations have agreed to share what they have. But as I'm most comfortable to tell you, it's not very much and it's not enough. And we're going to need more with the increasing human activity going on in the Arctic. Thank you for the question on fisheries. I love this topic. It would be easier to describe this with a map. And I'm wondering now, let me just try it without one. I turned off the computer and see that side of the room. No worries. The Arctic, please picture a map of the Arctic in your head, if you can, is not a single single region when it comes to fisheries. The area of the Arctic closest to the North Atlantic, the area of the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, the Karras Sea is the home of some of the largest commercial fisheries, certainly in that part of the North Atlantic. And there already are a number of multilateral mechanisms for managing those fisheries. And yes, the fisheries will probably the fish in the fisheries will be moving farther north as oceans warm. And the challenge for the countries and does not include the United States. It will be in adjusting those mechanisms they have for managing those fisheries to account for what's going on in somewhat more norvily waters. The part of the Arctic that's closest to the United States in Canada is very different north of the Bering Strait and throughout the entire Central Arctic base. And there is no fishing, basically, very, very limited subsistence fishing. And indeed in the United States, we close the area of the USEEZ north of Alaska to any new commercial fishing whatsoever until we have more data to understand the ecology and to manage those fisheries properly. So for our side of the Arctic, we're looking at a longer time horizon. Yes, probably there will come a day have there when stocks will be moving north through the Bering Strait, establishing themselves in the Chuck Jean Beauford and potentially Central Arctic basin, but it's not the case today. However, and this is the important point, we need to be talking with our Arctic partners even now to prepare for that eventuality. There will come a day, I think when the US moratorium on fishing in our easy north of Alaska is lifted and commercial fishing starts and it may start on stocks that we share with Canada or Russia. We need to be talking to them now, we are, to try to figure out what common management or coordinated management of shared stocks would look like. And then there is a big high seas pocket in the center of the Arctic Ocean. To our knowledge, there's never been any fishing going on and it is still covered with ice, virtually all of it most of the year. However, there is no our FMO, Regional Fisheries Management Organization or any other agreement for managing fisheries in that area were they to start up. And we, the United States have a policy that we're trying to advocate to the other Arctic countries. And that is we should agree in principle not to authorize at least our own vessels to fish in that high seas pocket until there is some international mechanism in place to manage those fisheries properly. And if we can get that commitment from the other Arctic countries and any others who might think about sending a boat up there to fish, then over a period of time as the ice truly recedes and stocks establish themselves, we can actually go about the harder work of negotiating an agreement for managing the fisheries. So that's what we're trying to pursue on fisheries. Probably more than you wanted to know. Don't you just love that? That's good stuff. It begs the question. We often I've heard the term called the donut hole, which is the international water high seas around the pole, if you will, if we're looking at our map down. And we certainly seen some some articles and things from the Chinese state press talking about, well, we might be interested in exploring and what are the policies and the mechanisms other non Arctic actors interested in that so called donut hole. Can you give us a sense of some of the long range thinking in addition to what you're saying on the fisheries that need for an international mechanism, not just in fisheries, but oil and gas or others? How is that going to? We don't have the problem today, obviously, but it will be a tomorrow problem. Any thoughts you can give in addition to fisheries on that donut hole? So while it's a donut hole, with respect to the water column, let's say beyond 200 miles of each of the five coastal states in the Arctic, there is a big high seas pocket that none of them exercise exclusive jurisdiction in. The rules are different relating to the seabed. And so when you're talking about oil and gas, it's a very different regime under the law of the sea. Coastal states can claim extended continental shelf depending on the criteria of Article 76. And in fact, in the Arctic, almost the entire seabed under that donut hole is likely to be claimed or claimable and eventually claimed by one or another of the Arctic states such that there probably will be very little if any area beyond national jurisdiction to see for if somebody wanted to go drilling for oil and gas or develop the minerals on the seabed, they would be operating in an area under the jurisdiction of a particular state. Currently, we don't know where those lines are. They're being developed and there will be fought over by lawyers and geographers and oceanographers and people like that, not by worships. But at some point in the future, there will be a set of clear lines about who owns which piece of seafloor in the Arctic. Presently, other nations are free to send ships up to the donut hole and do marine scientific research and we know that there are some that go up there. That's part of the rules of the game that we support. We would like to benefit from science in the Arctic indeed. We need to conduct much more of it ourselves to know what's going on up there. Hi, Clay Akin from ITTA. I was wondering, given the high representation of NATO members in the Arctic, what role you see for NATO and what they're doing right now in terms of the Arctic? An excellent question. The various, whether it's NORAD, whether it's NATO, whether it's EU, whether it's the Arctic Council, there are a variety of institutions, clearly with Arctic-related interests. And we, US and DOD, for the ones that are military-related engage in all of those in discussions that are underway about Arctic and Arctic capabilities. So NATO is one of multiple venues where we are engaging, in this case, through European command that has the responsibilities for NATO and for Russia. So NATO is a viable form in which to discuss Arctic issues as are all the various bilateral fora available to us. Like she said. Thank you. I'm Brian Mueling at EPA. I confess I'm a little unsure how I want to phrase the question. So let me provide the context. Both of the speakers spoke about the, I guess, unavoidable role of the private sector in helping with future development of some of the infrastructure needs that we've got, domestically, high-ray and in all of the other Arctic countries. And I appreciate the ambassador's comment about how we're still looking at whether we bring in industry reps as members of delegations or as individual delegations in domestic or international negotiating venues. The question I guess I have is this. What are Shell and others telling us regarding their willingness to be more focused on pollution prevention and not just on pollution response? As an example, I point to black carbon emissions from diesel fuel combustion or the combustion of any other fossil fuel. It's a part, black carbon is a major constituent of particulate matter emitted from this stuff. So it's got very clear human health impacts, especially in the densely populated areas near industry or transport or whatever. But it's also got what appears to be a really, really significant climate forcing risk. And based on the science that's coming out so far, it also appears that gas flaring may be one of the major sources of black carbon emissions in the Arctic, along with prospects for increasing emissions of this stuff associated with increased access for shipping and whatnot. So the question is, is Shell or anyone else in the private sector saying anything about their willingness to go that extra mile while still being profitable so that we minimize the potential for this kind of unintended consequence for human health and the environment? There almost certainly are people in the audience better positioned to answer that question than I am. In fact, that would be a good question to ask a representative of Shell. And I don't really know about the broad sweep of what Shell might be saying about, for example, gas flaring. I can tell you that they are very interested in working with the Arctic Council initiative on oil spill prevention preparedness and response, all three aspects. They believe they say that they have a lot of expertise to contribute and they want to work cooperatively with the governments to establish a reasonable set of standards. But I'm not an expert and have not talked very much with Shell or the other oil companies. So I can't really say much more than that. Perhaps somebody else in the audience knows more. I will provide a shameless CSIS plug on July the 12th. Our Energy and National Security Program is hosting a conference on Arctic Oil and Gas Development. We will be, Senator Rokowski will be a keynote speaker. The Deputy Secretary of the Interior is speaking and I believe, I'll double check my, that we will have a Shell representative to talk about some of these issues, really trying to explore that out. So that's a stay tuned and come back and see us y'all on July 12th. We'll continue that conversation. Yes, sir. Thank you. I'm Tom Gutting, Defense At the Shade to Norway. I would like to offer a small comment to that question regarding the oil industries. Likeliness will be prepared to avoid oil spills. Before coming to the United States, I used to be operational commander for the Coast Guard in the Bar and Sea. And in that job, I interacted a lot with the Norwegian oil industry and also with Norwegian fishing interests. And obviously, on the Norwegian agenda, it is of extreme importance that the fishery industry and the oil industry will be able to operate and work together. So this question is frequently addressed in Norway. And I would like to say that the companies that I have interacted with, they are thoroughly actually addressing this question very, very seriously how to avoid accidents happening. So I would truly say that it's very high on the agenda with the industries that I am aware of. And of course, also Norway, we do have a great interest now with both Russia and France when it comes to developing oil and gas prospects in the Bar and Sea. So this issue will be of the highest and most utmost interest in the time to come. Thank you. Yes, sir, right there. John Koicev, former delegate to the United Nations Infinement Program. And I just would like, we know that in the military area, awareness in all of the domains. And I have a comment that in the environment, in the ecosystems, it is the same. And we are talking now in a long-term perspective. And we mentioned fisheries and oil industry, hand-in-hand working, doing miraculous things. And there remains an uncovered area, which is the pollution from land-based sources. And when you looked at the map, we are not densely populated here, unfortunately. But the land mass, the so-called Eurasian land mass, there are 11 major rivers. And there are huge concerns like nickel steel and others. And the task is humongous. But on the other hand, there are probably possibilities to include also this issue, to convince all the counterparts that building waste water treatment, industrial waste water treatment plants, is not that difficult because they require few basins. Yes. And then you neutralize the water, and then there is no pollution of the major rivers, which might affect the ecosystems. And the second, if that's a question to all of us, in 1990, we had the first inter-parliamentary environmental conference. Senator Gaule and John Schmitz and John Kerry. And isn't it time also with our NATO parliamentarians to think about maybe an Arctic work panel to begin with, and to include also these questions, which were at UNEP, they were the Barcelona process. There was pollution. There was everything. But to combine it on an inter-parliamentary basis, which would include United States, Canada, and our parliamentarians from the NATO countries, why do I ask about this question? Because a few days ago, there was an appeal by the European parliamentarians to prohibit a tactical nice step, to prohibit any tankers which carry heavy crude oil from entering the area. As just supposed to tankers which carry light-fraction oil. And I don't know what are the relationships we get besides the National Council. Where is the legislative branch? How to involve everybody so that the constituents are the ones which will decide whether we will sign the LOS or not? On your first points, I would just simply agree with you that land-based sources of marine pollution are a problem everywhere and including in the Arctic. But some of the solutions to them are at hand and can and should be implemented. I don't know if there are any of my colleagues from Capitol Hill here, but I do know there is a very active group of Arctic parliamentarians who do meet regularly to do some of the very work you are describing. My understanding is that they include parliamentarians from among the eight Arctic countries. I don't know if, for example, members of the European parliament from outside the Arctic European countries also participate. But there is at least this one mode for the legislatures to try to work together within their sphere to deal with some of the emerging Arctic issues. Perhaps there need to be additional ones too, but that's the one that I do know of. So let me stop to ask if there are anybody, is there anybody here from the Hill who might speak more to that? Guess not. Anyway, that's what I do know. And you could be in touch, for example, with the offices of either Senator Murkowski or Senator Begich to learn more about the Arctic parliamentarians. Yeah. Good afternoon. Yes, I'm the ambassador of Iceland. I've just returned from the very high north of the United States, all the way up to Barrow, which was, for you, David Bolton and me, very interesting to visit. Because for me, coming from a wailing nation, to enjoy some of the marvelous whale products that you He just handed me that. That your countrymen produce up there. But on a serious note, and it was very interesting the whole, whole trip, absolutely a wonderful eye opener. Now, and then many questions that have been answered and asked here that I would say are very, very pertinent. Let me kind of develop a question. The Arctic Council comprises of eight sovereign states and then the six permanent native peoples groups. The question was asked about the relationship between Russia and the United States and all of us. And it is quite clear from being up there that that relationship is very, very close and very good and nowhere, perhaps, in the world as close and good as up there for pure need, if you look at the harsh conditions and so forth. So another question was asked about NATO's role and so forth and so on. Could it be that the very, very close relationship between Russia and the United States up there is precisely the absence of a role for NATO? And could that relationship be jeopardized by increasing such a role? And I think also, actually, this question could be expanded to the role of the EU. The roles of these two organizations, the Russians, don't particularly want to expand up in the high north. So I think I have spun together a question. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I'll start. Your question is an excellent one, that the benefit of the Arctic Council is it is the place that brings together all of the Arctic states. And you're highlighting that there are other venues where Arctic interests are of interest, but they don't include all of the Arctic states. So I think from our perspective, there's great value in the Arctic Council because of its inclusion of all of the significant players that doesn't foreclose working in other venues on Arctic issues and discussions. But they are necessarily incomplete if you don't have all of the Arctic states included. So I think that's certainly been a big part of the emphasis for the United States as well as the other players on Arctic Council. So I agree with that entirely. I would add, as follows, the range of Arctic issues is of legitimate, some of them at least, are of legitimate interest to states outside the Arctic shipping. Let's take shipping, for example. There are a lot of other countries beyond the Arctic aid who have a legitimate interest in what the rules for shipping in the Arctic will look like. And indeed there is an exercise through the Intrational Maritime Organization where a lot of nations outside the Arctic aid are engaged in developing a new polar shipping code. Climate change is another issue that has a certain locus in the Arctic that is a little bit different from how it plays out elsewhere. But what happens on climate change in the Arctic affects the rest of the world. And so the rest of the world has an interest in Arctic climate change. And then on the other end of the spectrum there are certain issues that are located in the Arctic that are not even of interest to all Arctic states. I'm thinking of a boundary dispute between two neighbors. That's just up to them to figure out, really. There may be some consequences for others as a result, but it's really not even a full Arctic aid type issue. So there's not an easy answer to this question of who should legitimately have a seat at the table. The European Union, as a union, is interested in becoming an observer at the Arctic Council. And there are some interests that the union, as a union, has in the Arctic that I view as legitimate. But that is also true of some other nations, Japan, Korea, China, perhaps others. And the trick for us will be, as Arctic nations, to figure out how to accommodate these legitimate interests in the future in a way that still maintains the integrity of the Arctic Council. I don't know if there's a clear answer to that yet, but we're grappling with this now. I don't know if that's a good answer to the question, but that's what occurs to me. May I just, as a think tank side note, Mr. Ambassador, to your questions. We too have been struggling with the security question, because when you look at where security, hard security, let's say, can be discussed in the Arctic, it can't be discussed at the Arctic Council because it's not provided. It currently cannot be discussed really within NATO because of the concern of some members that this is inappropriate to a point of concern about Russia. So I'm being told where I can't talk about it. I need to find an answer where I can talk about it, because you run the risk, if you can't talk about it, of misunderstandings. And as Arctic nations understandably move, Arctic brigades are created, troop movements are shifted around, primarily for border security issues, because borders are now needing to be protected. Sovereignty is projected. We need a place. And your question about NATO, what role, if there is a role, is really one I think that needs to be thought out. And I think, and hope, and another shameless plug, CSAS is thinking through some of these in the year program, is thinking through what, if any, I would also encourage the administration to use the US-Russia relationship and put the Arctic more fully as part of the bilateral component, particularly modernization of Russian Arctic infrastructure. They have a very ambitious development strategy. Is there a way for the US to support this? Is it a way for other Arctic nations to support a modern, transparent infrastructure for Russia? This is a huge element of their own future development, and we should explore that. So I think it's an untapped area. And as Ambassador Bolton has said, I think this is an area where there is extraordinarily good cooperation. I think we should explore and be creative to see what else we can do. Sorry, shameless think tank plug. Yes, ma'am, you had a question. And we'll make you our final question. Wow. My name is Renee Tytuska. I'm with the NOAA National Weather Service. Amanda. Thank you for this weather today. Thank you. I had everything to do with it. Of course you did. Amanda, I was very interested, in particular in your report to Congress and the fact that you pointed out the shortfalls in ice and weather reporting and forecasting. So this is a multi-fold question, maybe for both of you. Has this been identified as a challenge by other Arctic military organizations that you're aware of? And if so, is this being addressed? Also, how will this impact the SAR agreement? And so that's what I have. I don't really know the answer to the question, to be perfectly honest. There are lots of questions you could have asked that I would have been able to answer. What I do know is that, yes, in the SAR case, accurate weather data and forecasting is critical for a successful launch of a rescue mission. And my understanding is, especially in light of the harsh conditions that typically exist throughout the region, there is a lot to do to get accurate data into the hands of the right people in a timely way that probably does not now exist adequately. But that's all I know. I'm sorry. I'm not gonna be much more helpful beyond saying that the relationships within the National Ice Center and the multi-agency components within the US working collaboratively together on those types of forecasting and data collection, I'm not aware to what extent there's a kind of international network that plugs into the National Ice Center. I don't know, everyone may have more on that. But I think the needs are common across multiple states and that would be the type of thing if we can envision something like an Arctic domain awareness capability over time, that that would be the type of data that you would be sharing in a multinational type of fashion. Well, we have a program called the Endwood that I didn't really interact over 400 relationships across the globe. Maybe I think it might be a little bit. And so we have a thinking that goes off, well, and they will defer, they render assistance and they do it almost on a daily basis. Certainly we see values in the Arctic domain that have an high ambush participation if you're such a person, that you have to come to the rescue of the Titanic, but what we don't get are the weather observations. And so we don't have a set of data base. We don't have a drift model for the current weather observations because they're very critical for us to do our sort of planning. So it is a vulnerability right now that there are some leveraging lights and systems such as handlers to make sure that they make sure that they're right and that they're doing the right thing. So I would just offer that as a potential workaround in the world. If we might get to that, because we're doing this still, how best we can in this fall. That's a critical element. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you. It's a great question and good follow up. Well, I want to thank you. Excellent questions. The batting cage was busy up here and you threw some great questions at them. I really want to thank Amanda and Dave, thank you for sharing your expertise and your knowledge. I always learn a lot when I listen to you. So I'm very grateful. And we look forward to future CSIS events, which will keep focus and hopefully Washington policymaker focus on this important region, the Arctic. Thank you for joining us today.