 Yn y gwrth gweithio yma ar y dyfodol 2 o'i ddysgu cyfrifonol 47 deilio ar yr Unig ofyllai Ffwrdd ac yw'r cyfrifonol. Yn y gwrth gweithio yma, os yw'n gweithio ar gyfer gwahonydd yn gwybod yn y cyfrifonol multipolol, ac wrth roedd ni'n gweithio fynd o'r cyfrifonol multipolol, ac mae'n gweithio'r cyfrifonol. Yna, yng nghymru, mae'r ffordd y gallai gweithio trafnol yn gweithio'r cwrs yn cyfrifonol yn cyfrifonol ond y dynamic yn cyfrifonol. Ac mae'r dyn ni'n gwneud gweithio o bobl fod yn eistedd y cwestiwn yn werthio gweithio gweithio gweithio'r panell gwell. Rwy'n gweithio am y cwestiwn ar y cyfrifodau fagoraf Facebook, ac mae wedi eu gwaith o'r gweithio am y ganlygot o perthynu Rydymol i'r reliant ac yn gweithio'r paru. A hynny'n ddod ato gweithio, mae'r ddigwyd yn gweithio'n gweithio. Mae'r teid�isce..! Mae'n holl, mae'n holl gwneud ni'n cyfrifodau llyfrnol yn duol, mae'n gweithio'n byw hwnnw i'w gweld ei ddweud â gweithio'r hanfodol. Rwy'n gweithio. Wrth gwrs, mae'n ystafell yn gweithio'r ddebyg o'r ffrindwyr o'r rhaglen o Chynoiaid yma, yn dweud y ddweud o'r ffrindwyr yn mwyaf o'r gweld ac yn cyfwyrddol yn cael ei ddweud a'r gweithio'n gweithio yn dweud. In a week where we have an incoming president about to take the reins in Washington, we have a very different view of global politics. So the question is in a changing world order, growing doubts about US leadership capacity and a transformation of societies, how would a global governance system fix our multi-polar world? First of all the obvious question I need to ask you Professor Mahibani, who is the Dean of the Leiquon U School of Public Policy National University of Singapore Mae'r dyddion rhywbeth yma yn ymweld i'r ysgrifennid? Mae'r ddysgu'r dysgu'r ysgrifennid yn ddiddordeb cyfnod yn maes gael y byddai. Mae'n ddiddordeb i'n ddiddordeb gyda'r d Seddartadol yn 1980. Yn ymgyrch ymweld i'r ddiddorol, y Unedig Ddweud Gwyrd yng Nghymru wedi 25%, ac China's share was 2.2% less than 10% in the United States. In a development that almost no one noticed in 2014 in PPP terms, China's GNP became larger than that of the United States. And the speech that President Xi gave today at the World Economic Forum was actually amazing. It would have been inconceivable even 20 years ago, 10 years ago, to have a world where the president of America says, America first, and I don't care what happens to the rest of the world. And you have a leader from China saying, let's work together. We are in the same world and we have to come together. And that's a dramatic transformation. But the problem we have, and if you want me to be slightly provocative here, I would like that very much. Is that the Western mindset hasn't woken up to the new reality of a multi-polar world. The West still believes he can continue to dominate the world. And my favorite example, I hope you don't mind me saying this, is that the Europeans believe the head of the IMF must be a European. The head of the World Bank must be an American. Excuse me, those rules were made in 1945 in a different world. Today is already 2017 and you still haven't had a single Asian or African run these places. So clearly these rules are out of date, but the West insists on staying on, sticking with rules that it created when it dominated the world and now refuses to share the power. And that's the core of the problem we face. So a quick follow-up question to that. As you say, these institutions have been going around since 1945 and not much has changed. Multi-polarism has been slowly growing, as you said yourself, over decades. So how is it going to translate into change in the coming years, in the short term, or is it not? Well, I think you could have, of course, two kinds of change in the world. Revolutionary or evolutionary. And I actually believe you can have evolutionary change. And for example, one big good change that has happened is that the G7 has become practically defunct and has been replaced by the G20. And overall, on balance, the G20 is a much more representative group of a multi-polar world and the G7 basically represents antics from the past. So that's a kind of evolutionary change we need to see. But you've got to change the composition of the UN Security Council. One of the most provocative things I say is that UK and France are only permanent members of the UN Security Council only because they won World War II in 1945. OK, you know, over 70 years have gone by. Surely it's time for UK and France to make way for India or Brazil or Nigeria on the Security Council. So that's the kind of painful changes that have to be made. But the trouble is, you know, in any feudal society, once you have the privilege of sitting on the royal chair and you're used to your permanency, you don't give it up. So that's what we need to do. We need to really edge these people out and say accommodate the new world that's coming. I'm going to say we don't have to have a war to see those changes in 1945. It goes to your conjure way. I'm hoping the common sense will prevail. Sure. The chair of the Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, of course, before that, you were a member of the government in Nigeria and also a senior figure at the World Bank in Washington, D.C. But first of all, I'd like to talk to you about the global side and what role you think that will take. Well, the global south is already a plain, a very important role just to follow up on what Kishore just talked about. I mean, if you look at the fact that in terms of contribution to economic growth, that emerging countries are contributing more than 50% to global growth now, President Xi said it. Yes, so more than China alone, as President Xi mentioned, is contributing 30%. That's right. So it's not what role the global south play. It's the fact that the global south is playing a very important role already. But the frustration is that this role is not being recognised. And as you said, there's been a evolution of systems to move us from a system of the G7 to G20. But even the G20 lives out significant important countries that are also contributing. So I think we need faster development and growth than that. We need a global governance system that recognises the contribution of developing countries in a much more robust way. So coming on to the economic institutions, I think if we didn't have them, the global institutions would need to invent them. We still need those institutions. But the problem is that now they are not fit for purpose. They are not following the changes that are first happening. One, on the differing economic shares. Two, on the first move of knowledge and technology. You know the fact that the world and the workplace is changing very fast. And we need a global governance system that will help developing countries also adapt faster. So it's anomalous that not only in terms of the leadership of the institutions, but also in terms of the shares, what do you call it, the shares of different countries in these institutions. You cannot have a situation where smaller European countries have a greater share instead of the World Bank or the IMF than China. That's what President Xi was talking about, or India. So we need to adjust all these systems so that countries can feel an ownership of these institutions. And then secondly, we need to adjust the institutions themselves to recognize that knowledge is moving really very fast. That the world of the future will involve much faster move of technology, of automation, of artificial intelligence. All the things that are going to change the workplace. And therefore developing countries need to have a much more flexible approach to their development. And the institutions need to be able to guide this. Richard, you're an economist. Globalisation is likely to take a different path in the years ahead than it has in the decades previously. How do you see the course of change over the coming years? And again, what's your view on how this can best be governed? So the course going forward, I think actually there was a big change in globalisation in 1990, when globalisation started being driven forward by knowledge crossing borders, as you were saying. Not just goods crossing borders, and up to that point, and really the whole 20th century, it was goods crossing borders, we governed the goods crossing borders, we set tariffs, that's how we controlled globalisation. But now companies from rich countries are taking their know-how and combining it with low-wage labour in nearby developing countries. And that's completely changed the nature of trade. It's made international commerce more complex. In some sense, all the things that moved within a factory in rich countries are now part of international commerce. And we do not have the right governance structure for that at the multilateral level. It's been put in some bilateral agreements. But I think just to take your question directly, I think we're in for a pause on multilateral trade governance, at least until this anti-globalisation rage calms down in the United States, or comes to fruition. But we're in for a pause. Have a quick show of hands to see who has any questions to ask. Gentleman, let's take a question from you, sir. Let everybody else have a microphone if you could just, for the benefit of our audience online as well, let us know where you're from, please. Hi, my name is Sushil. I'm from Kishore's hometown, Singapore. And it was not a question planted, but I'll still ask the question. US, I think had a share of IMF contributing about 25% to IMF. I think it had come down to 22%, 22% and a bit percent. Do you think, you know, you guys talking about forming different institutions in the future, having different kind of countries going to joining that future, but with the new administration coming in and probably looking at or re-looking at, and being a big contributor at 22% or 25%, where do you think that will leave the new world? Let me come in. I'm an expert on IMF, but I think the figures you have as far as the United Nations budget, because in the UN budget, you know, this has gone down from 25% to 22%, but it is still underpaying relative to other countries, because in the UN, your share is supposed to represent your share of global GNP. In the United States, the share of global GNP is still around 25%, so it is underpaying, but that's not so important so much as the IMF. Of course, in the IMF, the shares matter a lot because that's your voting share. And that's where the United States refuses to go below 17%, because it doesn't want to give up its veto rights in the IMF. You need 85% to make a decision. And in the case of the Europeans, even though their share, the global GNP has gone down, they refuse to adjust their shares to new realities. And I think that's that, frankly, all of us, the core of the problem, because the European states refuse to admit that they have to make painful adjustments in a world which is no longer dominated by them. And of course, if you appeal to Europeans on altruistic grounds, nobody's going to give up power on altruistic grounds. So my argument for Europeans giving up their power in places like IMF is that it is in your interest now, because if you live in a small global village and you want to create an orderly global village, you want to make stakeholders of the others, give them a greater share of running global institutions, then they become responsible stakeholders. And you get a more orderly global village, which is good for United States, which is good for Europe. So in some ways, the United States and Europe are shooting themselves in the foot by insisting on retaining these shares, but Gosi is much more of an expert on these voting shares. Yeah, no, I think you've said it on shares. There's also the question of seats. I think that's where the issue of the Europeans is not only about the share, but you get seats on the board, and that gives you much more of a voice. And I think when you look at it, you find that the European countries have multiple seats, France, UK, constellation of the other European countries. They have many more seats in comparison to their global economic power. What is being argued is that, yes, move on the shareholding, but also move, that will move you on the number of seats on the board, and the Europeans will need to give up some of this in order to accommodate the emerging markets. And that's where there is a problem, that this is not even the African countries. If you look at the number of countries that are represented by one seat, sometimes 24, 25, you can't really get a voice in that kind of situation. So we really need to look at all of those factors across the board. There's been some movement in the IMF. Again, President, she mentioned that, but it took a long time for the US to vote those change, and they're not really major to accommodate China a bit better than was the case. It would be much harder on the President Trump. Gentleman in the front row there, microphone please. Hi, I'm William Sa from Chang Kong Graduate School Business and Professor of Finance from China. So my question is about the globalisation, anti-globalisation trend now in the whole world. So as President, she mentioned that free trade benefits everyone. However, within each country, like in the US, in Europe and also in China, there's a serious wealth income distribution controlisation that 1% of the people have, more than 99% of the wealth of the rest of the people, more than that. So what's your view that what will be the new economic order trying to kind of reduce this kind of wealth distribution within your country? This is a subject of your book recently, Regis. Are you a perfectly placed person as well? Thank you. Yes. So the way I like to say it is the rage is rational, the reaction is not. And in this old view of globalisation, where globalisation means more goods crossing borders, when globalisation is causing troubles, there's a natural reaction to try and slow down the goods crossing borders. But if what's really going on is that the know-how from G7 firms is moving to a few emerging economies and completely changing the nature of manufacturing all around the world, those kinds of 20th century remedies no longer work on these 21st century problems. But you hinted at the answer itself and that is the correct reaction to this is domestic policy, not global policy. And I think it's worthwhile pointing out that this rage, the narrative of anti-globalisation, that needs some nuance. If you look at just for example the United States, where there are some very angry people, insanely angry and upset willing to throw out the baby with the bath water. But in the UK, they were also angry probably for similar economic reasons, but they chose a completely different path. They chose to leave the EU for some reason and now just recently, just in the last hour Theresa May said she's going to leave the single market, which is quite a radical thing. But she's embracing globalisation, so it's completely different. Now then you look at Japan. Japan has had all the shocks, automation, globalisation, everything, and there's almost no anti-globalisation feeling in Japan. And it's because the Japanese government and the society, it's a particular society, makes people think they're part of Team Japan and they therefore have a fighting chance to benefit from the gains and the pains of globalisation, not separating all the gains going to the rich and then everybody else taking care of themselves. So I think a lot of that narrative is a US problem and the solution has to be to have better complementary policies domestically. Richard, just a follow-on question there. It's true, is it not, that globalisation works when it's better, it's good for everybody, and as you have in the, I've just come from a press briefing with Mr Scaramucci, he's a member of the transition team, the president-elect. And his comments, I think, were quite apt. When you have people who are anxious, people who are feeling they're not getting a particularly raw deal, they stop thinking about what's good for the wider community and they start looking in and looking what's good for themselves. So we're seeing a period where people aren't prepared to think about the long game or think about Team USA. They just want to think about getting their own highs in order to raise in their own living standards. Yeah, absolutely. Well, I think it is something US specific. So it's always been true, as an economist I can tell you, markets are good at efficiency but nobody says they're good at justice. So the assignment is market for efficiency, government for justice. The government has to look after the winners and losers. Globalisation by its very nature opens up new opportunities for your most competitive citizens, your most competitive firms, but it means more competition for your least competitive citizens and your least competitive firms. So there's always a pain in the game with globalization. And the key to keeping a consensus for going forward is that you have some sort of social contract that helps people believe that they can seize some of the opportunities and they won't just be on the competition end. And that's what I think has really fallen down in the United States. There's been a lot of progress on globalization, but a falling back of the social policies. And that's not how it was in the 20th century. In the 20th century, post-war, they put in social security, raise income tax, regulation, antitrust, all sorts of social policies in the United States, the great society, advanced with globalization. In the last 20 years, there's been advance of globalization, but a retraction of the social state. And I think that is one of the reasons why anti-globalisation is so strong in the U.S., but not so strong in many other European countries. I think that is the key. The social contract has been broken. May I add something to that? I think Keeshawn wants to add first and Gezi, you're very welcome after that, and please we encourage dissent and disagreement here. So gentlemen there, please first. Well, this morning I was on a panel on restoring trust in governance. And as you know, all the indicators of the WPP report that was being discussed then is that trust in governance is going down. And my own theory as to why trust is going down in governance in both America and frankly also in Europe because your populist movements in Europe too, is that the European politicians dare not tell the truth to their own populations that the world has changed. In the past we could do everything by ourselves, dominate the world, run the world, no problem. Now power is shifting, China has joined WTO, the more workers competing all over the world, we have to change and adjust and adapt. And the simple message, if the western politicians could have the courage to tell their people we have to change, we have to adjust, we have to adapt, and guess what after we do that we can do well too. But the fear of telling the people the hard truths is the real reason why trust in governance is going down and that's why you have this anti-globalisation protest. It's a result of the dishonesty of western politicians. Yn geizi. I just wanted to add to this, the trust issue I think is very important but I wanted to say that I think this conversation, it's amazing to me that it has come to this, there's so much attention now on anti-globalisation. But we have to remember that in the countries of the south we have also been pointing out for a while that there are benefits and costs, there are winners and losers to this game. And we began to feel part of the impact, the not so good parts of globalization quite early on and let's say in my country the textile industry that used to be quite robust. We lost thousands of jobs from about 100,000 down to about 20 also within a short period of time. And that was because we had competing fabrics that came in from China for instance that were less expensive machinery and equipment in South Africa that was competing. But I don't think that gained traction. The discourse then was, well, find a way to deal with it. So I'm fascinated that now the same phenomenon has hit the developed countries, the US, the UK and they now see the winners and losers. Everybody is now focused on globalization. But the lesson from this is exactly what President Xi said. It's not to lament or try to push back because it's here to see. It's to say what are the challenges and how can we come together to solve this so that those who are losers can be made to see that there's a path forward. And what do I mean by this? This is not going to change, automating or whatever, automating jobs artificially. I keep coming back to it. It's going to also add, it's not just globalization, we'll keep changing the way that the world works in the future. And if we do not say to our people that we have to be flexible, we have to do continuous learning and training, it has to be a learning generation going forward. So you can move from one skill to the other. If you're a loser here in this aspect, you can move to be a winner by following the new jobs and retraining. This is the message we have to get out. And I agree with you. If in the developed countries they don't also give this message, you'll continue to have this tension which we have now. So I really believe. But let me tell you the good news. The good news is that I've got good news. I feel that who will lead? On the human, can I just say the good news first? On the human side, I really feel we've got a set of people now in the millennials, the 20s and 30s who have got it. They've got the message that the world is changing fast and the world of work will not be what it used to be. And if you look at them, they are so much more flexible and adaptable. They no longer follow the standard career paths of lawyer, doctor, engineer. They are in this sharing economy. They are flexible skills, willing to move and change and follow jobs. This is the kind of thinking, the kind of people we will need to lead for the future. And I think we need to give more of a chance, well, these people to surface because they understand what's going on. The not so good news is that I'm not sure nation states can lead anymore. Everyone is retreating what we see is a new regionalism. You know, countries trying to establish regional spheres of influence rather than, you know, pursue a global path. So I believe we need to look at people. We also need to look at the private sector and say, where can the private sector lead? On climate change, for instance, even if there is a pull back by certain countries, I believe that the big corporations, many of them in this world have got the message. And they will continue. They know that climate change is here and they've got to adapt, whether they're financial institutions or they are in the energy sector or elsewhere in consumer goods. They have to adapt and change to fit into that. Thanks again. So we've got five minutes left. So let's try to one or two more questions. So have you got the microphone? Okay. Fine. My name is Christine Ensign and I can understand I'm one of the problems being a European politician, Minister of Finance from Denmark. And I'm actually speaking out saying we need to change. We need to acknowledge that the world order that we have seen since the same world war has come to an end. And we need to make the change. But my question is also to Mr Baldwin. You say the rage of against globalization will come to an end. I hope that as well. But couldn't you go the other way, the negative way that China will be hit by globalization? There's a breakdown of their economy right now that is slowing down the economy. They need to change that will bring some new development into China and that you could see China coming to an anti globalization age perhaps. So first of all, I don't think globalization the rage is not going to end. I think it's going to get much worse. I think with as technological progress will allow low wage workers to provide services, manual services and brain services in rich countries without crossing borders through telepresence and tele-robotics. And I think that will be incredibly disruptive in the rich countries, but provide all sorts of opportunities in poor countries. Personally, I'm not worried so much about China. China, the average Chinese person is two or three times richer than their parents. They can buy their parents house that their parents could never find. In the United States, people's kids can't buy the house that they did. So I think when you have this massive double digit growth or single digit growth for decades, in the emerging markets globalization is popular and I think will continue to be that way. What I think the problem is on the rich country side and the way your country has dealt with it with this flex security is probably the way to do it. Because after all, it's not globalization that's causing this. Many things have changed and we can't know whether you lost your job because of globalization or aging or climate change or automation or whatever. But if you lose your job, your government should help you adjust and take care of you in the meantime, as your government does. And then of course you will get some rage, these fringe parties everywhere, but they're not going to overcome the system and embrace leaders who will probably do some very, very radical things. I mean, I think in the United States where just like it was in the 20s or the 30s, backlash against the social disruption of industrialization and the widening of income led people to embrace communism and fascism, which was bad for them, but they were just so angry they were willing to reach out for non-standard solutions. So I think we need more policies like Denmark to prevent that sort of stuff. But to me, it's really a rich country problem, not a poor country problem. Quick comment, potentially another point of view from Keeshawn as we're trying to close off with the gentleman on the back row. Three very quick points. First point is that by curious coincidence, both Richard and I have published books with the same title called The Great Convergence, and both I would say are relatively optimistic books. Second point, I agree with Richard that frankly the Scandinavian countries overall have done a far better job at managing these challenges of handling, you know, economic competition and ensuring you take care of people at the bottom. And I think the rest of the world should go and study Scandinavia more and I support that fully. But yeah, yeah, I'm coming. The third point is the on China I must urge, give a word of caution here. The western media has got so much negative coverage, especially on the China's economic situation. Many well informed people in the West actually believe that the Chinese economy is going to go for a hard landing and things are going to get really bad. And then China is going to close, close his doors and all that. I mean, that's all frankly rubbish. If you're betting people, I think that's with you, any of you, there won't be a hard landing. There are many challenges and she's just been spoke about them. But the Chinese capacity to handle these challenges has grown exponentially because the quality of governance in China today is amazing. So they have the capacity to handle many of the problems, which they couldn't in the past. So China, I don't think it's going to have the kind of backlash that you spoke about in your remarks. Can I just quickly jump in on that to wide brighten out the multipolar thing? We've been talking about institutions, but China is an example of a different way of dealing with globalization, state led capitalism, for example, and dealing with the world of globalization in many poles before it was dominated by the Washington consensus by what was going on in the North Atlantic. And now we're seeing countries addressing multilateralism globalization in very different ways, sometimes very successfully. And so I think the models for dealing with globalization and multilateralism have broadened out. So it's multipolar, not just in the institutions, but also in the economic and social models. Gentleman there, if you can ask a very quick question, so we're horribly out of time. Stefan Felikikig is with government, but my comment is strictly personal. However, we addressed the multilateral question. What we're saying implicitly is that size matters. But invariably, when you look at the rankings, the happiest people live in Denmark, innovation champions in Switzerland, so it's the small countries that actually do the good job. So as a smaller country, I'm slightly worried that the world is ruled by the big guys. So I'm wondering where the place is for the smaller countries. Well, let's ask a Singaporean. Yeah, I think I would say Singapore. But I don't know if you all know this. Singapore is in land terms, one of the smallest countries in the world, one fifth the size of Rhode Island. But I would say that if you look at the record of Singapore from 1965's independence to the last 52 years, and I wrote an article on my website, you can find it saying Singapore has been the most successful country since human history began in terms of improving the standards of living of its people. For the reason why Singapore did that, it changed and adapted. As Ngozi said, you change and adapt. Whenever the circumstances change, you are a price taker or a price maker, you change, you adjust, you adapt, you let go of industries, try new ones, but keep on evolving. And if the small states want to learn one lesson from Singapore, it is that keep on changing and adapting because the world will keep on changing. Numbers one and two on our competitiveness ranking for the past few years in Switzerland and Singapore. So, I think you're part for part. We are out of time, unfortunately. One quick question for each of you, just a one sentence answer. Multi polarity, are we looking at a more hostile or a friendlier world in 2017, starting with you? Well, I mean, I actually wrote a book like Richard and the Great Convergence in which I stress that overall the world has never been in a better place. Global poverty is diminishing, global middle classes exploding. So my sense is that humanity will come together and overwrite this current, very trouble, anti-globalisation phase in the West. Same question. I think we are going to see more hostility before we see a calming down of the anger against globalisation. And the reason is that people are not still factoring in what all these changing trends mean. The shifts in technology in the workplace. I come back to that. The demographics that have so many young people in South Asia and Africa over 850 million who come into the workplace by 2035 compared to the ageing population. All these things. So my feeling is 2017 is not yet the year of settling. I think we'll see more uncertainty before we see people coming to terms. Richard, you have the casting vote here. Hostile, definitely hostile, but a lot of it's coming from Trump. And on Trump I think we all ought to take a deep breath and wait a little while. I think in one year Trump will not be Trump. There's many forces moderating him. He's operating almost independently. So I think we ought to take a deep breath. Don't do anything rash until we actually see how the US administration is going to act. Fascinating. A fascinating discussion. I hope to have you all back next year to discuss the 12 months ahead unfold. Thank you very much for joining us. We really appreciate your time. Thank you to our audience watching online and via our Facebook. This session is now over.