 Good afternoon. Welcome to the New America Foundation. My name is Peter Bergen. I run the international security program here So with a lot of pleasure that I get to introduce Hannah Armstrong who's a research fellow at New America and is writing based in Algiers and writes about North African Sahelian politics. She's in the middle of writing a book. Who's it for? Hurst which is looking at the question of Rebellion in that region and it's kind of conflation with terrorism and counterterrorism issues She previously served as a Fulbright fellow in Morocco She's written for the New York Times and New Republic the Financial Times and she holds an MA International Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies, which In many ways is the best school for that subject in the world. I think maybe you saw Bond would be a competitor So Hannah is going to kind of give us a 20-minute or so Kind of set up and then we'll engage her in Q&A. So, thank you for Hannah Do I need to talk into this or is that come on? Okay. Thanks very much for coming. I Was speaking with an Algerian friend about a group of luxurious villas in central Algiers and he described one as being so big you cannot see it It struck me that this was a very apt description for the Algerian Pouvoir or power which consists of The executive branch the intelligence services and the army The head of the intelligence services is sometimes known as the God of Algeria This means in some ways that the power is everywhere and nowhere all at once Making it notoriously hard to pin down the inner workings of the Algerian system Having said that I'm going to try to speak today about how Algeria has coped with the tumultuous past few years Which have seen governments in Tunisia Libya and Mali overthrown and Which have spilled cross-border instability and terrorism throughout the Sahel? At the end the instability on Algeria's borders has actually helped the Bouddhaflika regime to stay in power and to convince a population Still traumatized by the civil war in the 1990s that stability equals continuity But while external threats are helping to promote internal cohesiveness Algeria is very aware perhaps more so than Western countries, which have a bit more physical distance to cushion the blow of the risks that these new threats pose to Algeria and to its neighbors and Is therefore working to resolve conflicts in Libya and Mali through peaceful dialogue and negotiations Nevertheless peace remains a distant prospect for both of these Saharan countries and the entire region has been made extremely Vulnerable by the deteriorating security climate in the Sahel that has accompanied the so-called Arab Spring I'd like to start by looking at how threat perception has changed in Algeria since the 1990s So during the civil war of the 1990s the threat to this state was internal and overwhelmingly concentrated in the north of the country where 90% of the population resides You'll recall that following an economic crisis protests in Algeria were violently suppressed leading to an overhaul of the single-party system and a sudden political and economic liberalization The Islamist Feast Party had sweeping victories until the military canceled the 1991 Parliamentary elections and banned the party which was driven underground and waged a bloody insurgency against the state Algeria today views itself as post-Arab Spring and is watching uncomfortably as very similar stories unfold in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia The threat to Algeria today Is judged to be at its uncontrollable Saharan borders It sees itself as being beset on all sides with risk Algeria borders seven Saharan states as you can see here counting the Western Sahara Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya and Tunisia That means it has nearly four thousand miles of borders with these countries in desert That's about twice as long as the US border with Mexico, and we all know that that can be pretty porous Most of these borders have been closed and the border crossings have been placed under military control Even Morocco a stable tourist friendly kingdom is ranked as high risk by foreign ministry officials On account of the cannabis trafficking But also mainly as a result of the long-running spat between the two countries That's primarily about the Western Sahara So since the Arab Spring, it's the southern Saharan part of Algeria, which makes up 90% of the whole territory What holds only 10% of its population that has become the key to protecting the country From the threats which are now judged as being external and hailing particularly from the conflicts in Mali and Libya So to sum up the national security disposition has had to reorient itself from focusing on internal northern threats To looking at external southern threats Which has entailed a militarization of Saharan borders as well as enormous investments in Deploying auxiliary land and air forces to patrol the desert Let's look now at Algeria's principled stance against intervention and its warnings and attempts to prevent Interventions in both Mali and Libya. I Think this is particularly relevant now as France is pushing for yet another intervention in Libya Which is backed by some West African countries who feel that the chaos that the first intervention resulted in will best be cleaned up with a second intervention Algeria has a constitutional stance against foreign interventions Which it considers an attack on national sovereignty and a neo-colonial tactic of interference As one high-ranking Algerian diplomat told me It's something that is part of our deeper convictions that shape our foreign policy good neighbor policy peaceful settlement of conflict and the strict observance of non-intervention and non-military action of our army outside of our borders in 2011 before NATO began supporting Libyan rebels trying to overthrow the Qaddafi regime Algeria no great friend of the Qaddafi's was warning that any intervention would have dramatic consequences for the region and Would inexorably result in the rise of tribalist militias and cross-border terrorism, which is of course exactly what has happened With Mali Algeria was already involved in a negotiation process Prior to the French intervention there in January 2013 Algeria was working to bring radical Islamist and secular toric rebels to the table to agree upon one set of demands to Negotiate with the Mali and government When the Islamist Ansar din group suddenly withdrew from those talks and mysteriously began a new offensive on southern Mali Which was what prompted the then-president Diankuno Traure to ask France To help them to help stop the militants before they would reach bomb echo Algeria is sometimes said to have cooperated with the French intervention by opening its airspace to French warplanes But this has not been confirmed At any rate Algeria stepped in in the months after the intervention to launch a comprehensive dialogue for peace Inviting all of the actors including civil society tribal elders drug traffickers and former Islamist rebels to algears for talks There is a strong awareness in Algeria That as long as a political status of northern Mali remains disputed the security situation can not be improved As the UN peacekeeping force deployed there in Manusma is quickly finding out Attacks have been quickening their pace and even elected officials are now being targeted The Western counter-terrorism strategy in the Sahel has been memorably described as whack-a-mole You beat them in one place and they pop up in another Algeria's position partly out of principle and partly as a concerned neighbor under threat is That it is more important to do the complex legwork to find political solutions For Algeria the problem in Libya is that the NATO intervention broke the state's monopoly on violence and handed it to militias to fight over Meanwhile other countries including Qatar Turkey the UAE in Egypt Are arming and funding or otherwise supporting militias in Libya Algeria on the contrary is pushing for DDR and working overtime to promote dialogue between parties of conflict in Libya and In Mali that will resolve the political issues at the heart of these security crises This is proving so far in the short term much easier to do for Mali than for Libya And I've been around for a few phases of the Mali negotiations in Algiers if people want to ask questions about that in the Q&A I'm happy to talk about that Let's look now at some of the spillover that Algeria has experienced due to the conflicts especially in Mali and in Libya So Algeria stands on intervention in its neighborhood or its backyard is not just principled It's also based on an accurate assessment of how it stands to be affected by foreign military interventions or crises There are two striking examples of how the threat of spillover has in fact been borne out The first is well known and is the attack on the Tigenturine natural gas plants at Inaminos Which is just next to the Libyan border as you can see over there When you had a few dozen terrorists who took hundreds of people hostage on one of Algeria's most significant extractive industry installations These militants who belong to Moktar Bel Moktar's al-Murabitun Brigade Cross over from the Libyan border to wage their attack Securing the Libya-Algeria border was once the task of the Algerian and the Libyan forces Now that the Libyan forces are no longer there or able to protect the Libyan side of the border The Algerians can only do their best to control what happens while you have militias and terrorist groups on the other side Areas now such as southern Libya and Derna on the coast Are viewed as Africa's newest and most dangerous terrorist training camps with links to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and Even to Boko Haram in Nigeria beginning to crystallize The second case of spillover is one that has received much less attention But I want to look at and it's also one that's more directly linked to the French intervention in northern Mali It took place at a little border town called Bourges-Bagy Moktar Which you can see just north of the Malian border and that's marked on the map here The French During the intervention had allied with Torregrubbles in the north and were relying on them to call in air strikes against terrorist militants and At one point the Idnan Torregrubbles called in French air strikes against the Barabish Arab group Which was another rebel group that was also engaged in trafficking And so the Torregrubbles basically used the French to wipe out their rival traffickers who According to them had no connections to the terrorist Mujah group whatsoever So this inflamed tensions between the Idnan Torregrubbles and the Barabish Arabs throughout the region which Spread from the town of Inhalil which is just on the Malian side of that border Into Bourges-Bagy Moktar on the Algerian side of that border It led to the killing of 20 people in this small town and the Algerian had to the military had to be deployed one final risk to Algeria That goes along with this change in the national security Disposition relative to new external threats is the risk of a war of attrition The costly deployment of resources to police these borders Against an invisible enemy is a drain on public finance risks lasting many years and Takes money away from more important investments in infrastructure health and education Now this may all sound very grave indeed, but let's turn to how the crises on the borders may actually be helping Algeria by promoting internal stability The domestic situation for Algeria looking forward might surprise you The political and security situation is much more stable than one would expect I would say In light of the president's age and infirmity and the crises deepening on the borders Political instability in Tunisia and civil war in Libya may represent a challenge for national Security, but they have worked as a political opportunity and the Algerian regime has used these to its own political advantage There's some precedent for this The proliferation of the threat of terrorism not only in North Africa in the past few years, but across the West since 2001 Has strengthened the legitimacy of the Algerian regime Which was under much greater scrutiny before the attacks on the Twin Towers for its role in the massacres of civilians during the black decade President Ablaziz Bouteflika came to power in 1999 on a platform of peace and reconciliation and Astutely used the attacks of September 11th to rehabilitate Algeria's image within the international community By stating repeatedly that Algeria had been on the front lines of what George W. Bush had just started calling the war on terror For already at least a decade More recently Bouteflika used the argument that stability equals continuity To convince Algerians to vote him in for a fourth term despite his obvious infirmity and In defiance of article 88 of the Constitution, which allows for a suspension of the presidency In the event of a serious and lasting illness that would prevent him from fulfilling his functions In the lead-up to April elections last year The Algerian papers kept reporting that the president was meeting with the army chief of staff to discuss border security Indicating that the army supported the fourth term of Bouteflika Algerians had to take the word of the official press agency as Bouteflika was unable to utter one coherent sentence in public He is 77 and suffered a crippling stroke in April of 2013 One retired Algerian diplomat called this a form of security blackmail this tactic of convincing Algerians That the stability of the country was contingent upon the continuity of the Bouteflika regime So I think that the internal situation being relatively stable I'm looking forward, you know, there are two things that I think it's important to keep an eye on The first is protests in the south and the second is the problem of oil and gas prices plummeting Which is something other countries are experiencing as well So unlike in urban areas of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt Protests in Algiers have occurred on a much smaller scale at least in the time that I've been in the country Protesting is still illegal in Algeria due to the crackdown on civil liberties that took place in the 1990s Opposition to Bouteflika taking a fourth term Was expressed by the barricades movement But failed to draw more than a few dozen people to Protests and was easily controlled by police Some even felt it had been infiltrated by the intelligence services to channel opposition sentiment But in the south something interesting is happening Protests are regularly erupting in the gas and oil-rich areas such as Waghla, Lahouad and Ainsala And Tamanrassat as well, sometimes in Jannet too So regularly that the Algerian press has begun describing the south as having entered a permanent state of protest I think the term resource regionalism which Jeff Porter has used to describe similar trends elsewhere in the Sahel Like in Libya and Mali gets at the essence of what is happening here These are southern Saharan populations Who feel that the bulk of their country's massive wealth is drawn from their region While their level of development fails to reflect this Usually protesters specific demands center on state jobs and housing Now this is in no way to say that a separatist uprising is in Algeria's near future And on the contrary southern populations are both ethnically diverse and committed to Algerian nationality But it does test the limits of the state's authority to resolve complex internal issues and Has added fuel to some politicians charges that there is a vacant place where the proof or or power once was Now the second issue to watch out for is one that is causing anguish to a few other countries as well And that is the plummeting price of oil and gas that has fallen over the past six months from $120 a barrel to around 50 something Algeria depends upon oil and gas receipts for 98 percent of its exports and has already dipped into its $200 billion foreign exchange reserves and there are fears over what might happen if wealth can no longer support the extensive welfare state The Prime Minister Salah recently announced austerity measures such as a freeze on new public sector employment But there are signs that the country has learned from the oil price slump in the late 80s When sudden austerity measures helped prompt waves of protest that the state violently suppressed Setting the tone for the black decade in which upwards of a hundred and fifty thousand Algerians were killed Thank you. That's all for my sort of opening Diagnostic So you mentioned the black decade of the 1990s, you know, I mean at that time I remember talking to Robert Fisk who was covering Algeria in the mid 90s and he said he'd have to like go around Algeria in an armored car and it was very dangerous for Westerners So you live in Algiers. How what's what's the level of threat that you face? You know, we feel completely safe the thing you you first notice about Algeria when you arrive is that there are police everywhere And those are the ones you can see So, you know, there's there's some elements of criminality, but I think that in the north the Dangerous aspects has I think it's really over and I kind of tend to you know Buy the argument that Algeria is a post-arabic spring country. Do they have a free press of any kind? The press has been very critical You have you've got all sorts of opinions in it Do they see you I mean how do they? I mean how do they conceptualize Western reporters and asking Sensitive questions about their security. I have I have an interesting status. I'm not a I'm a researcher not a journalist So that puts me in in an kind of unusual position and one which people get suspicious about as well but you know, Algerians have a tendency to sort of feel lots of conspiracies and Ask lots of questions and you know I think that the country has been closed for for many years And they're starting to sort of slowly open up. I think that's a really good thing But compared to countries like Morocco or Tunisia People are much less used to interacting with Westerners who are in their country. You know, there's also no tourism in Algeria So I think it's it's good to sort of be there and interact with people Are they do Algerians feel sort of some form of self-satisfaction when they look over the The border into Libya and see all the chaos going out there there and the fact that a Q I am took over half of Mali and Tunisia. There's sort of a certain amount of unrest Do they you know, are they grateful to the regime? You know understanding that of course that it's an authoritarian regime I think I think there's an element of we told you so I think the regime is is you know has an element of we told you so that they pull out in meetings with diplomats quite a bit But I think that that's cut short by the the very real dangers that the chaos on their borders represents for Algeria now the two brothers in Paris who conducted the attack on Charlie Charlie a newspaper Were both of Algerian descent What do you make of that and and secondarily why is it that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb which after all is a Francophone pan at North African entity that has never that they didn't hook up with a Q I am that they chose al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Why is it also that you that a Q I am really doesn't have a history of attacking on the West Okay, I mean for the first question. I think that this is really this phenomenon is really born and bred in France Yeah of what these two brothers are doing and the fact that there's even You know a West African who seems to be mixed up in it a Cooley buddy You think he's Seneca Lee's or what it could be Malian he could be from Cote d'Ivoire. Yeah, you know definitely francophone West Africa And I think that that's much more related to you know Politics in France than it is to Algeria But I was speculative if I was a friend francophone Terrorist in the making why wouldn't I go to a francophone country knowing that a Q I am is there? Why is there been so little kind of back and forth between? This group in North Africa and France itself Well a Q I am I mean a Q I am in North Africa has really been pushed It's has very little presence in within Algeria. You had one offshoot group that has allied with the Islamic State now So you have the rivalry between al-Qaeda and the Islamic State which is starting that's the group of a headed the 55-year-old French Correct. See a tourist. He was like a mountain guy. I think he was a mountaineer So, you know those where did that event had take place that was in the Kibili mountains in northeastern Algeria Yeah, and so the I'm gonna mangle the pronunciation, but the Anna menace gas facilities in south eastern Algeria And What about talk talk to us a little bit about that event? I mean What was the what was the motivation there or how successful was it did it help a Q I am or give us a sense of a Q I am Relative strength right now, you know, I'm not I'm not the best person to talk to you about those sorts of things But I think that you know the the goal was to strike at Algeria You know that group which is led by multiple motor still has ties to is less transnational perhaps and still has ties to We still has a desire to hurt the Algerian regime and that was a really big blow on the Algerian regime So I think that you know they they intended in the beginning. I think to blow up the gas plants They had worked with the interesting angle for me about that attack is that they were able to tap into local networks of disaffected people who were unhappy with the stagnating development in the south and You know helped the reports on the attack afterwards showed that you know, they were able to work with locals Drivers and people who were who had sort of worked on the plant that gave them information So when the attackers came in they knew exactly where everything was and you know, they were going to blow up the plant They knew how to shut off the electricity They had very detailed information and did that proceed or follow the French incursion into Mali? It was just after and they said that it was in retaliation for the French incursion And it was but it seemed like something that had been planned for a while So how would you assess the success or a failure? I mean, it seems pretty successful the French went into northern Mali After all part of the French Empire until relatively recently they were greeted as an army of liberation Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb lost control Give us your assessment of how that operation went and the likelihood of it sort of sticking as it were Basically, they liberated the three main towns from you know, Jihadi administration And killed a bunch of people And why and Marlians were not happy about sort of being subjected to Taliban style rule, right? They were not no They were they were extremely it was very oppressive and there was one region in which it was less oppressive And then there were two regions in which it was very oppressive and people were executed and had hands chopped off and It was you know, it was it was creative in ways. It was destructive in other ways What what's happening in Tunisia right now Because it seems to be the if there is a country that's semi-functional as opposed to Arab Spring It seems Tunisia they had a recent election. They got rid of the Islamists Tunisia seems to be doing well the Islamists sort of stepped back and said, you know We we know we're not wanted. We're not going to interfere They have a very strong political organization Algeria has been you know, there's an interesting polarity now between Algeria and Egypt that's developing with respect to Tunisia and Libya So in Egypt, you have this strong eradicationist stance towards anything Muslim Brotherhood or Islamist And that's partly why you know, Egypt is facilitating airstrikes on the Libyan Islamist groups The Algerians in Benghazi and in Dharana, yeah with the Emirati airstrikes The Algerians having gone through their own phase of eradicationism in the 90s Have now come around to a phase of you know, feeling that The best way forward is dialogue and to bring everybody to the table and that when you have this situation that most of these Countries have where you have several kinds of radical Islamist slash jihadi groups What you have to do is try to disentangle the ones that could be brought to the table from the ones that are you know radical beyond The possibility of negotiation. That's a very interesting point because Egypt also went through the same kind of experience in the 90s where they had a sort of domestic Islamist insurgency and then it kind of peaked and then they you know kind of became Had more of an accommodation, but there you used the word eradicationist as an interesting Do you think I mean to me it seems like a huge I think that's going to backfire for the Egyptians In a fairly catastrophic manner over time. What do you think? I think so, too I mean the Algerian perspective is that Egypt is doomed to repeat the failures of of Algeria Which is actually some kind of horrible insurgency stroke civil war or something Yeah, and we hope I mean everyone hopes that that's not the case But it's it's incredible how repetitive this this course seems to be Tunisia seems to have escaped that so they they get Known as the success story and what is going on in Libya? To the extent that it can be ascertained Libya, you know Libya. I know less. I know that Algeria has has reached out to All of the groups and that Algeria is making behind the scenes a good reputation For its efforts to try to promote dialogue. I think that there's a certain appetite for another intervention in Libya Some of the West African countries support that and that's based on a sort of knee-jerk reaction to you know These these fundamentalists are running around nobody has a hold on what they're doing the weapons in the region are incredible Golf countries are pouring money into it Something has to be done. What would that intervention look like and who would participate? I have no idea Algeria is doing everything it can to try to prevent that from happening and their their feeling is that you know There needs to be a state there needs to be something there needs to be a power structure put into place Could you imagine a role for the African Union or anything like that or is that out of the question? I think it would be I don't I think it would probably be a good idea But I don't see it happening because I mean I mean what's going on in Libya right now So if not unanalogist of what went on in Somalia, right? And I mean the African Union seems to have been quite successful in Somalia. We have an actual Somali government now You so you can imagine but that made that would take I guess some some time to put together and so Morocco how what's your assessment of kind of the regime and Again, it seems to be one place that's doing sort of semi well Yeah, you know Morocco is very stable and you know very everything everything seems to be going well They have some protests from time to time, you know and some identity issues, but I think everything the protests are allowed Protests are allowed there. Yeah, they're more they're more Open to protest and the Algerians are and his King Mohammed is it come out in Mohammed the 6th Is it he is he a constitutional monarch in a sort of 18th century English sense or what is he? I mean he he or 19th century maybe English sense Can you say can you say more about that? I mean, you know, I mean there's sort of like The 19th century English monarchy where there was a monarchy, but it was constrained by parliament and public opinion and the media It wasn't an absolute monarchy. He's he has more power than that. You know, I mean he has you know He has control over the military. He's the head of the you know the religious Well, I mean the Queen is still the head of the Church of England All the economic all the economic interests in the kingdom, but so what is he but has he done anything? Why is it that he it's interesting that the monarchies the Jordanians and the And the Moroccans Seem and some of the Gulf states seem to be doing better. What why do you think that is one when diplomatic spoke within Algeria Said that you know, she thinks it's really the authoritarian It's not necessarily related to being a monarchy, but it's the really strongly authoritarian You know, I mean I could go either way. Mubarak was authoritarian. Well, so is Gaddafi, right? It's a totalitarian right. I suggest the reason why maybe I don't know I mean If you look at I mean that the monarchy seem are more legitimate I mean King Mohammed the 6th says he's a director sound the Prophet Muhammad, which he probably is There's been the I don't know how long the Moroccan monarchy has been around But I mean these other the Gaddafi's the Mubarak so military dictators who came to power readily recently And so I made them but the monarchy it is a fact that the monarchy's have been less affected by these popular revolutions So what do you what do you ascribe that? I mean, I can do the only thing I can say from my experience is that you know during the four years that I lived in Morocco Pete there's a very very strong attachment to the monarchy that you'll find in sort of every individual there You know people don't criticize the monarchy not because they'll get in trouble if they were to you But because you know, there's this sort of They accept it and and they like it and that's that's their Government of choice. Let's open up to Q&A. If you have a question just wait for the microphone identify Hear me. Yeah, you'll come on when you start talking. Okay. My name is Ilhan Kagri and I affiliated with the Muslim Public Affairs Council and I'm currently working on a human rights Sharia compliance report card from nine Muslim countries and Algeria was one of them And I finished that report a year ago. It's up on the mpec.org website if you're interested in in taking a look at it There's a lot of footnotes a lot of information about the laws of Algeria and the constitutions things like that But the question that I wanted to ask you is What do you think about what's going on inside the Sahrawi refugee camp and what Algeria is doing with that? Is there any movement in terms of trying to move those people integrate those people change the Politburo rule over that camp and is it you know potentially a source of you know violent extremism and secondly You know the the great sieve that's coming from Syria There's are the Syrians making it to Syrian or Iraqi refugees making it to Algeria because they're certainly you know Even making it to South America. So what's going on with that and a follow-up other Algerian form fighters going the other direction to Syria in Iraq Okay, you know as far as the the Sahrawi refugee camps go in Tindu What I can say is try to dispel a couple of the popularly held myths, you know, I've been several times to the camps I've had several I've had all the freedom in the world to walk around freely speak to whomever I would like to speak to You know the there's this sort of a couple of myths out there One is that the Polisario is the puppet of the Algerian regime. They're an extremely independent I would say a very democratic Organization, you know, all of the refugees are involved in administrating the camps. They have regular elections And you know as far as radicalism and terrorism coming out of the camps There were a couple of Sahara ways who were involved in the jihadi groups that took over northern Mali My my information is that they actually come from the Moroccan occupied part of the Western Sahara and not from the refugee camps So this is another myth that we often hear especially in DC, you know that the Refugee camps at Tindu far just pumping out these disaffected 20-something Jihadis and as far as I know, you know, there hasn't been a single person who's come out of the camps and and embraced Jihad they're involved in this peaceful struggle now And that's really, you know embraced by pretty much everybody in the camps that you talked to there's really overwhelming solidarity about Using non-violent means of resistance for the Polisario Syrian refugees, I think, you know, Algeria has taken in quite a few at some point. There was a security risk Linked with that they uncovered some sort of network You know, I don't I don't know much much more about it beyond that and then in terms of foreign fighters I think that this is the best evidence for Algeria's claim that it's in a sort of post-Arab spring state You know, you have a couple of thousand from Tunisia 1500 from Morocco And Tunisia is of course very small compared to Algeria, which is about the same population as Morocco and you had a few hundred I think it was under 300 fighters who were said to have gone from Algeria to Join up with the the Islamic State So, you know what I think that that really with that really indicates and set and at least half of those my information is that The some of the ones who were counted as Algerian were actually actually came up through France and Belgium So the numbers are even smaller So I think that it's you know, it's really strong evidence for the fact that Algeria has moved on You know, you still have conservative Islam at the heart of the society The society is very is very conservative in many ways, but the idea that you can use, you know, jihad and radical means Within the political sphere has just been is is out of vogue in Algeria great Gentlemen here my name is Nate Mason. I'm an independent consultant and previously served at the US Embassy in Tripoli I guess two questions one is when you mentioned threats to the to the regime. You didn't mention the recent Protests by actual security forces, right? The police have been protesting against corruption within the ministry and actually walked off the job protecting embassies in the capital causing a lot of Nervousness among some of the foreign diplomats. So just wondering if you could say anything about that and then secondly if you have anything to say about Economic reform my personal experience seems to indicate that there's there's a lot of talk, but I hear the same things From Algerian government officials, but if you see any any real economic reform on the horizon Yeah, those are great. Those are both really good questions You know the the strike of the police was fascinating And it's probably the most I would say the most significant event that's taken place politically since I've been there You know, it's hard to know what to make of it It began as a strike of riot police in Gardaia that was related to this issue of southern protests that I've touched on This this thorny Religious ethnic problem that the Algerian government has not been able to solve and it's just making worse And it's what is that from there's there's some clashes between two different, you know the Berber a Berber Group in the southern town of Gardaia and you know that an Arab group in the same southern town So the you know the riot police I guess had been overextended down there and we're eating tuna cans and Didn't have breaks to go home and see their families in the north So they went on strike and the next day it was in the capital and you had police marching on the presidency Which in Algeria in a place where you can't even protest was a very significant event You know what to make of it It's it's really hard to say, you know There's some people who would say that that kind of shows you that there's some inner Discord among the the workings of the poor and that maybe one branch was trying to show the other branch or destabilize the other branch I'm inclined to kind of agree with that sort of argument Everything's very tightly controlled in Algeria and to see something like that happen It's is probably means that someone was behind it. It didn't feel spontaneous in some in some ways And for your second question about economic reform I think that you know the Algerians have been speaking for years about Diversifying their economy and that's really what needs to happen If there's anything that's going to force you to start acting more quickly. It's this sudden drop in oil prices, right? Does that mean it will happen? You know, there's a stickiness in the Algerian State that's related to you know the bureaucracy and the immense public sector So I think it's really hard to move things forward, you know, Morocco is a country Which is able to has a relatively liberalized economy and is able to move through innovation and create things kind of quickly And in Algeria everything takes a lot more time. So I think that they're sort of Institutionally hampered but probably have a much higher incentive now So my research showed that women in Algeria have a lot more power and Participate a lot more than other Muslim or Arab countries in government and just in the economics sphere Did you find that do you feel that? Maybe part of the difference of you know this reconciliation this idea of More conciliatory approaches is coming from the fact that women are more participatory or just in general What do you think about the The role of women in in government and in policy Um, you know, there are a lot of obstacles to to Algerian women Having you know strong decision-making roles But the Algerian women that do have a very very have very very strong personalities You know, I think that there's one kind of strange statistic the the women in Algeria outnumber the men by something like Any Algerian will tell you this that it's something like 65 35. No one really knows why this is It may be it's not true But Algerians all are sort of convinced that it's true And the weird thing is when you walk around the streets, all you see is men You don't see women, you know, the men really control the public space So that would sort of lead you to think that there was there's really a situation where women have are being Subjugated and kept in the homes and things like that But you know, my experience doesn't really bear that out, you know, if I found the women kind of more Militant and opinionated and you know, if you look at the medical schools, there's more women enrolled than men Same thing with law schools, you know, the journalists are all women So it's there's some contradictions there and and I'm not really sure what's what's at the heart of it But it's an interesting. It's a very interesting country Hi, my name is Luke Williams. I'm from the National Democratic Institute I just like to hear from you how you think that the decrease decreasing price in oil will be felt in the government and by people in the coming months and year Yeah, well, they've announced a freeze on public sector employment That's already a problem because lots of the protests in the south are about getting public sector employment People in the south feel like, you know, if you have if you're working for the state, you've got a great job You've got a salary. You've got a pension the only other option For getting a job in the south around these oil rich and gas rich areas is working as a subcontractor Which means you have no You're extremely vulnerable, you know, nothing is guaranteed You're low you're low paid and they can fire you from one minute to the next and of course no question of pension So the idea that, you know, every citizen will somehow get a state job and free housing is something that's sustaining You know, Algeria and it's not possible So yeah, that's gonna be that's gonna be problematic, you know What will it take for the citizens to sort of internalize that knowledge that it can't really happen? I don't know The perception still seems to be that it's working, you know, and people get Algeria gives you a house You know, you can you just get the state just gives you a place to live which is pretty unusual So you have to wait, you know, you might have to wait five to eight years for it But, you know, they're constantly building social housing and they give it away for free. So is it gas or oil or both? Any other questions? Hi, I'm Sarah Foyer. I work across the street at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy So you didn't mention in the possible things to look out for the possible passing of Bouteflika, which I guess people have been talking about for a long time now, but I'm just curious whether that's because you actually maybe don't think it's gonna turn out to be such a shock to the system or Kind of just your general thoughts about the whole question of succession. Thanks. Yeah, absolutely I mean, this is the really fascinating contradiction at the heart of Algeria right now Is that the state seems stronger than ever and the president can't appear in public and you know Can't even deliver a two-minute speech They have to do these tell you know these choreographed clips from time to time to show people that he's moving his hands and speaking You know, there's a microphone and some speakers behind him I think that you know, there's some sort of internal consensus that he should be there now and Is there the same internal consensus over what will follow? I don't know But I suspect that there will be and I think that it's also, you know, like I said before I think that the crises on the borders are sort of helping the Algerians to stay together Because there's such clear Depressing evidence of what happens when you don't They're also really committed to institutions and to a strong state And I think that both of those things are kind of overcoming individual egos and interests For the benefit of the country That would be my assessment Muhammad al-Kawas from UTC. I have written a lot about Algeria The what do you expect if the president drop dead tomorrow? What will happen in Algeria? Yeah, I mean, that's a that's a great question. You're good. It's mine You know, I don't know with the military sees power with there. There's no vice president. There's no error pattern There's no error pattern People throw around a Yahya as a likely successor. Do you see he's he's a former prime minister? He's got good relations with the military Some popularity You know, it's not clear but in the end is it boutique or is it the institutions who have the power it's the institutions So, you know, if he were to suddenly drop dead, I don't think that would I don't know how much it would it would really change So, do you think the resistance to confront Le Pouvoir and bring on some sort of change is Fear of a Pandora's box in terms of, you know, well, we're not quite sure what would happen afterwards And how it might get really really bad afterwards Yeah, I think there's definitely I think there's definitely some fear people have the memories of you know The 90s was it was very recent and there's really a very strong sense of collective trauma You know one security official official who I spoke with remembers that when he went to university, you know It was there was a fatwong going to university So they had to bring their books to school in a plastic bag instead of, you know Carrying a book bag because you would get assassinated if you had a book bag in the streets And everybody, you know, remember seeing people get shot in the streets and you know the feeling of insecurity So they're I mean the was a GIA. What was it? GIA at the time? They were beheading people in the 90s, right? That's maybe where this thing began. Absolutely. Yeah And people were getting beheaded people were getting shot, you know, women were getting raped people were getting massacred Both sides were doing it and there was, you know, a lot of terror and a lot of people were getting killed and going to jail I think of the wider global jihadi movement the lessons they took away from that was don't behave like that Of course ISIS is behaving like that, but I think there was a recognition that that you know was counterproductive Absolutely, I think and I think Acme is Al-Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb really represents the lessons that they took from that because if you look at how they administered You know the three groups with links to al-Qaeda and Islamic Maghreb who took over two-thirds of Mali and administered it for nearly a year there were very few beheadings there were very few decapitation, you know very few how do you call when you cut off someone's limbs and Amputation, thank you. And you know as the AP uncovered a bunch of documents that belong to a couple of the leaders, you know this was based on a very Calculated strategy of winning winning public support popular support and I was really I mean when I went into to gow in northern Mali two weeks after The French had bombed out the jihadis. The people had had pretty good memories of jihadi administration You know except for the few who had had a hand cut off others would say, you know, yes I had a youth group You know the state has done nothing for us the jihadis helped us clean out the sewers, you know Another one who is a woman who is a school teacher, you know, she said it was you know I said well what about the girls in school and things like this and she said it was you know The girls were on one side the boys were on the other, you know, I were a veil anyways, you know, what do I care? I mean it wasn't a democratic administration, but there was you know, there were efforts towards state building But I think it get overlooked with all the focus on the sort of just immediately destructive aspects of being a jihadi Well with that then I'd like to thank Hannah very much can we