 In Europe and the Pacific, we really appreciate you taking the time to talk to us. Well, we just get wired up for sound here. That's not a spy operation or anything. In case you, after, would have any one of these. It's going to be a little bit of a transcript. Thank you, everybody. Mr. President. I hope you're going to oppose colorization. This is an awful record question on the city. Help your friends, Mr. Stewart. Yes, but I had a visit with him on that subject the other day. I hadn't known all the facets of it, nor have I been able to see enough pictures that have been done, but I think it's clear that there are some artistic rights involved there. Right. And when you think back to some of the... I don't have to think back. As a matter of fact, up at Camp David every once in a while, we run movies, and I've taken to running for our people and our staff up there. I have them come in for the movies. I've taken to running what I call some golden oldies, and they have become fans. Okay. But when you see some of those pictures and the magnificence of the black and white photography and all of the shading and all of that, and it's just wiped out in the colorization. Let me change, if I may, to politics. You've spent more time with Mr. Gorbachev than any other western leader has, and you know about his political position as a politician in his own country. What are your advisors telling you about how serious this nationalist threat from the Armenians and the others is? Well, we don't... I don't think that anyone can give really a proper estimate of that. It is something new, and I do know that he... He still, he was born and raised in that theory. He still believes in the communist theory of government. At the same time, I think he's very sincere about Glasnost and wanting to make some changes. In my own mind, from what I know and have read about Lenin and what he referred, it seems to me that Secretary General Gorbachev is... He's going back beyond Stalin and actually is advocating some of the things that Lenin talked about that were not as restrictive and single-minded as Stalin was. The ideas that Lenin had, that you could actually live together capitalism and socialism side by side, as a matter of fact, even use the term ones that you could learn, that the communists could learn from it. Well, an aide of yours told me that he told your wife at dinner here, he's at the table, that this was his system's last chance. Has he ever said that to you? No, but we have talked earlier just that in some of our earlier meetings. We were talking about, well, here we are both with the great military machines and we are not armed or we do not mistrust each other because we are armed that way. We're armed that way because we mistrust each other and we have to find ways to reduce that mistrust. Do you think he has the room for maneuver to make deals that can reduce that mistrust? What has been successful so far? I don't know how far he can go. There's no question but that his bureaucracy, there are great elements that are opposed because they see their own fate involved in some of the things that he's proposing. You know, a lot of our friends in Western Europe say that we should try to help Mr. Gorbachev, you know, by extending credits, by not criticizing him, help and reform. Do you think that's the right approach and do you think we can influence change inside their country? Well, I think we've been on the right approach. First of all, we have been not dealing alone in disarmament or reduction of the arms but we have been dealing in that. I think that he sees an advantage to his own country in that happening but I think also that our success has been because we sought the peace and freedom through strength. But for example, do you think the United States should expand trade now with the Soviet Union to help him and should there be some limits on that? Well, we do have trade with them. We have some limits with regard to high technology and so forth and I think until there is a better assurance with regard to the use of military and so forth that we have to maintain those. On Afghanistan, apparently because of your convictions, the United States is saying very firmly that we will not cut aid to the Mujahideen until the Soviet Union cuts off aid to the Kabul regime and one of your advisors told me yesterday that the United States will not leave the Mujahideen worse off than the Kabul troops. Now what are you going to tell Mr. Sheva Nazi about this? Well, that's exactly what we've said, that their withdrawal must be irreversible and we certainly will not do anything that endangers the Mujahideen. Does that mean you might even consider increasing aid to the Mujahideen if there's a problem? I don't see any need for that but certainly we will have to continue it as long as there is a threat to them. Talking about the chance of trouble in Honduras, how do you rate the odds for the kind of trouble that you don't want? I mean, what are the odds that U.S. forces could find themselves in some kind of conflict or combat with Sandinistas? Well, we certainly did not send these ladies down there for that reason and we sent them at the request of the Hondurans who wanted the show that we are staying with the agreements that we've made about support for our neighbors and friends down there and this group has been pointed out is more than 100 miles away from the scene of the present conflict. But I think it also shows what we have been trying to tell some in our own Congress about this situation that yes, we were supportive of the RESP's plan and yes, we wanted to send, want this to be settled in a political way, this whole affair down there. But it's been plain to us from the beginning and even beyond the beginning that the Sandinistas are not going to give up their totalitarian rule in any kind of an agreement. As a matter of fact, they have actually publicly stated that Ortega has said they will not give up their power. Now what we're talking about is a kind of civil war within Nicaragua in which the people are asking for what was promised in 1979 at the overthrow of Samosa and that was a pluralistic democracy. And as a matter of fact, the Sandinista organization pledged its support of that in return for some aid they got from the Organization of American States. I don't know whether this is known to you or not, but the revolutionaries appealed to the Organization of American States if they would not ask Samosa to step down in order to end the killing. Well what I think is hard for Western Europeans sometimes to understand is how deep your concern is about Central America and is there not some comparison between what's happening there for the United States and the Europeans own situation? If the threat became grave enough, is there a risk that America would have to divert some of its defense energies? Well, yes there are situations in which this could happen but you have to remember that the Sandinistas themselves have publicly and repeatedly stated that this revolution of theirs is not going to stop at their border but in other words they're going to spread revolution. We do know that they have through Cuba and the Soviet Union and other people that have joined in like Gaddafi and so forth. They have been given all the help that can be given to them to sustain that power and something that our media didn't pay very much attention to. After our freeing of Grenada, we seized just great amounts of paper and much of this was documentation from the Soviet Union about what their goals were here in the Mediterranean and they used Nicaragua as an example of what they were holding up. Now we brought all those papers back and put them in a hangar out at Andrews Air Force Base and made them available for anyone to come in and see for themselves. Well, there in black and white is the fact that this is a communist base, a Soviet you might say. Could it become a kind of Eastern Europe? Could it become to the United States like Eastern Europe is to Western Europe? Yes, it very well could because this is their goal. They have Cuba and now they this is as I say this has been carried out as or portrayed as a communist base here in Latin America. And we could even go back to that man Lenin I quoted earlier and find that he spoke of the expansion of communism and you know the Marxian dream that communism must the goal must be a one world communist state. And Mr. Gorbachev has not abandoned that in your view. Except that I must I have to say that he unlike the previous leaders has never made that statement as all of the others did in a pledge to the communist Congress that this was their goal. He has not said anything of that kind. Now what he may believe I don't know but back going back as I said to Lenin there he cited that the final battles would come in Latin America and then as he put it once they had seized that they wouldn't have to take the United States. He described it as it would fall into their outstretched hand like overripe fruit. You know that Poles in West Germany show that Mr. Gorbachev is more trusted there than you are. How do you explain that? What can you do about it? Well they've they've had quite a disinformation network for many many years long before him. But also he has well he's been outspoken now in his desire for reduced armaments and so forth. And in his I have read his book Perestroika and if he really means to carry that out it means quite some dramatic changes and I could see where the Polish people would believe him. There has been propaganda that has tried to portray us as the war maker. If you will remember I am the originator of the idea that became our INF Treaty. But when I first voiced it the Soviets not under Gorbachev he wasn't there then. They walked away from the table and said they refused to negotiate. Then they came back and in coming back they announced it as if it was their idea. Let me ask you two quick questions one about Japan and one about arms control before I leave. I know you have a close and good relationship with Mr. Nakasone and Mr. Takeshita. What should Japan do to help shoulder more of the security burden in the Pacific and around the world? Well they have been doing they have been increasing and taking on more responsibility but you have to remember also that they are bound in by certain of the treaty clauses limiting them at the time when a war was over and in order to keep them from becoming a military threat. Would you change that sir or would you ask them to give aid to people? I think well they are they're giving aid in a number of the... Should we change the treaty? At the moment I don't think that's necessary but I will say that they have under their own rules they have increased their willingness to take on some of their own defense. If Mrs. Akino has problems in the Philippines what do the military think we should do about our bases? What contingency plans do we have? Well I don't know we're waiting we hope that when the time comes for renewal that there will be a renewal and we think it's every minute and much as in their interest as it is in ours when you look at the placement now of the greatly enlarged Soviet fleet throughout the Pacific and how nearby there is a Soviet military and naval base I think that it is that it's imperative that we continue with those bases. The bases have become more vital than ever. Yes. Last question if START is not ready for the Moscow Summit sir would you consider another summit later in the year when the treaty is ready? Oh if they sign a treaty yes. Certainly. Let me just say it is turning out to be a much more complicated treaty the START treaty than the INF treaty was and so there's a time limitation there and we don't want anyone negotiating against a deadline because that way you can come up with a bad agreement. So we're hopeful that if it could possibly be all the things worked out in time for the summit yes if not why then I think this summit would engage itself in helping to further the things where there was still disagreement. And then yes I would support the idea of getting together for a signature just as we did here with the INF. Well on the START agreement you said of course that SDI would never be a bargaining chip but some people talk about the possibility of a schedule that mutually agreed for SDI research that would not slow down the US program but would reassure the Soviet Union. Is there room for compromise there or is SDI still off limits as far as you're concerned? Well you have to remember that Mr. Gorbachev recently to one of our anchor men here in national television stated that they were doing the same thing we were and they've been doing it for 15 years and they've also spent something like 15 times as much on it as we have so far. So we're not using this or looking toward SDI as a means of achieving a first strike capability and what we believe is that the acronym for the Mutual Assured Destruction Plan which is supposed to be our detente, MAD, it is truly MAD the idea that we consider each one of us with a gun pointed to the other's head and the gun cocked and think that someday there might not be an accidental pulling of the trigger by one or the other that it makes sense to say if it is possible to have a defense that could make these ballistic missiles obsolete let's have that defense. And I have even proposed that it should be shared. I know that sir. So you think that SDI will not be an obstacle to the start? No, I don't. As a matter of fact that didn't seem to be when we were having our earlier talks here about start. Thank you Mr. President. Thank you very much for your time. And your forthright answers. It's a great help for us in Europe and in the Pacific to be able to get a chance to hear you on some of the directly interest our readers. I was expecting you to ask about NATO. Well I'd be glad to hear what you'd like to say. Well I think it's in this most recent meeting most, well it was just a very successful meeting and it showed that the bond is tighter than ever between us and of course I pointed out to some of our allies there in NATO I have thought in recent years that many of the wars of the past that have so divided Europe came about because in the settling of a war they always laid the foundation for the next war and the seeking of vengeance and so forth and after World War II this time probably built around the Marshall plant that didn't happen and to look around that table and see you're not just looking at your erstwhile allies you're looking at the enemies you hated so much in that war and there we are bound together that common bond the protection of freedom and I think it's a miraculous thing and I think it's something that none of us should ever abandon. And you felt that there was a meeting of minds there that showed us Yes, very much so. Yes, don't walk away with your... I might tear your hand here. I'll let a specialist take that. Thank you very much. Thank you again. Good to see you. No, no. Very nice of you. You're sorry. Thanks.