 Well, good morning everyone will I think we'll get started. There's usually a few late comers and we'll let them drift in But we'll we'll try and get underway now Welcome everybody. My name is Richard Downey Deputy Director and fellow on the Africa program here at CSIS and thanks for being with us today Talking about this the referendum forthcoming in Sudan just one month to go now Before the people of southern Sudan get the chance to determine the future course of their country Whether to remain part of Sudan or to separate and form a new nation The decision they make of course has the potential to redraw the map of Africa and break up the largest country in the continent But perhaps even more important than the choice itself on January the 9th Is the way in which it's made and the manner in which the referendum is is conducted? Will the process fairly reflect the will of the people? Because of course the answer to that question will determine how the government in the north will respond and how the government in the north Responds will help decide that the future course of Sudan whether it will tip back into violence Even civil war or whether it can finally cast off its history and truly consolidate the peace agreement signed back in 2005 It's for many of these reasons No doubt that State Department officials speaking earlier this week described the referendum in Sudan as arguably the most compelling story that the world will face in the first half of 2011 so I think for once the hyperbole perhaps is justified here The international community is deeply invested in helping Sudan through this process in a timely and an incredible Manor, but of course the challenges are enormous Not only the logistical hurdles of holding such a complex vote in one of the world's least developed regions But of course the political risks of what's what could happen if the process doesn't run smoothly and not to mention the fact of course that The separate referendum in Abye is clearly not going to proceed on January the 9th Will the deadlock over Abye derail the entire process Well our panelists this morning are all invested in this process in different ways They've all recently come back from Sudan And so they're well placed to give us an up-to-date assessment on where things stand and what remains to be done in the next 30 days Very glad this morning to be co-hosting this event with the National Democratic Institute An organization that's playing a lead role in providing technical assistance to the referendum training and also conducting some Fascinating research into the views of southerners in the run-up to the vote You might have seen their report outside as you came in So we welcome Tracy Cook on my on my far right Ndi's resident director in southern Sudan Delighted also to have with us at all Ky who's the UN assistant secretary general for peacekeeping operations So in that role overseeing all UN peacekeeping operations worldwide But for obvious reasons keeping a close eye on Unmiss and the UN missions in Sudan right now and it's just come back from the region Finally on my immediate right. We're joined very pleased to have Linda Beshai from United States Institute of Peace She was she's a senior program officer in the Academy for international conflict management and peacekeeping and Long-time expert on Sudan as well. So Great panel. I'm glad it's glad you can all be with us. I'll ask Tracy to kick things off for us this morning. Thank you Thank You Richard I know we're always hearing doomsday scenarios out of Sudan So I actually thought I would start this morning with a bit of good news And that is that technically the voter registration process has actually been quite good Particularly when you compare it to the elections the April elections and the registration for that During that time particularly in the south there were registration centers They did not open for them from three to six days until after the process had started And many were missing critical materials at important points throughout that process and much of that was repeated again Particularly in the south during the polling period where for the first two days I think it was reported that up to 50% of the polling stations did not open on time In contrast what's happened for the voter registration process for the referendum is that the vast majority of In almost all registration centers opened on time and they also had the critical critical materials They needed to actually register people That's far about the Carter Center International observation team as well as the Sudanese network for democratic elections Sunday, which is NDI's domestic Observation partner in Sudan Both have reported Relatively few technical issues related to voter registration That's not to say that the registration pot process has been technically perfect Given the logistics of Sudan that would be almost impossible to achieve So it has not been technically perfect specific things that have come up is particularly in the south in urban areas They've run out of registration materials multiple times although they do seem to have resupplied them relatively quickly Also in some centers did not have identifiers and identifiers were the people who could give oral testimony that Confirmed the identity of that that someone was actually southern Sudanese And I'm told that's a look that was a little bit more of a problem in the north than in the south Also the Carter Center reported in its preliminary statement that the Registrants who were rejected were not told of their rights of appeal Also the distribution of referendum centers was an issue In the south in rural areas there were complaints of having to walk long distances to register in the north There was complaints that the registration centers were not all located near southern Sudanese populations Also, Sundi's data its preliminary data at this point But thus far Sundi's data shows that the register the registration process was suspended multiple times both in the north and the south Throughout the registration period in the south it tended to be things like rain because sometimes the registration centers are actually outside Officials going to lunch and closing down the center some officials protesting because they weren't getting paid And in the north sorry and then in the middle of the process in the south they had the problems of running out of materials in the north There was the eat holiday issues that suspended the process multiple times and Because there were so few people registering in the north particularly toward the end of the process There were reports from our observers from Sundi observers that officials got bored and often closed the Registration centers early or open them very late Despite all of that all of those issues. I just pointed out it Appears that both the Carter Center and Sundi will be issuing final statements on the registration process next week And I anticipate that both will endorse the process as largely well-conducted And largely a successful registration process I also understand that the African Union high implementation panel on Sudan Maybe releasing a statement and that if they do it will have a positive slant on the registration process as well In general the issues that have arisen around registration are not necessarily technical issues there are other issues particularly Let's look at first the registration numbers So far there are 2.8 million confirmed registrants in the south However, that is projected to be four point four million when they get all of the information in from the registration centers Obviously because of logistics in the south some of the centers haven't been reporting their numbers on a daily basis So that is projected to be four point four million the numbers for the north are 115,411 registrants I believe that is close to a final number if not a final number and Thus far the numbers for out-of-country voting which has been extended in certain locations currently stands at fifty two thousand six hundred and twenty Now looking at the number. Excuse me looking at the numbers If the projected number of four point four million registrants in the south Stay it stands and that is that turns out to be the correct number for registrants that comes very close to matching the number of Registrants for the elect April elections in the south. I believe that was four point five four point six million So that that matches fairly closely however, the registrants in the north the southern Sudan Referendum Commission put out as part of their operational plan that they expected 207 or that there were there would be 271 162 eligible voters are eligible eligible people Southerners to register in southern Sudan With the 115,000 number Of actual registrants that means that only forty two point six percent of the total of Eligible registrants have registered in northern Sudan and actually most people think that the SSRC's original number was quite low that there are actually many more Southerners that were eligible to vote in the north than the two hundred and seventy one that the Commission anticipated NCP complained During the process about the very low turnout for registration in the north and the Commission responded by moving some of the registration centers a little bit closer to southern populations and That and then then they eventually extended the registration period There was some bitterness about this in the south because they felt the extension was simply to benefit the north and to Allow for more registrants in the north and that it wasn't needed overall for the for the process to be successful However, ultimately those protests did not get very loud because the extension did not affect the final date The Commission at the same time they extended said that no we will still be voting on January 9th however various NCP officials have Said that they have indicated that they may not recognize the referendum because of the low turnout In the north because they blame this on the on intimidation by the SPLM who they believe have actively kept people from the From registering in the north From our evidence while it's certainly true that southern leaders actively discourage discourage Southerners in the north from registering Both our evidence from our observers and I think from other observers on the ground seems to indicate that there was no systematic active intimidation that kept Southerners in the north from registering and it certainly there certainly wasn't inside of the registration centers That could be attributed to the low turnout in the north More likely there are several reasons for low turnout among Southerners in the north Certainly in the beginning. I think lack of knowledge of where the registration centers were there was not good voter education and information on that but also some Southerners are Clearly planning and have been moving south and so they knew they would not be in cartoon in January for the vote They're already the UN estimates 50,000 people who have come down from cartoons since October And that that flow continues day by day And certainly I think there's a fear particularly with the Minister of Information statements that were made in Cartoon about Southerners not being having citizenship rights not having benefits or jobs if there was a session I think there was a fear among Southerners that of their names appearing on a list In cartoon and there was a fear that the vote could be rigged if they registered in the north Which was a message that southern leaders was were certainly giving them to discourage them from registering in the north The NCP filed an official complaint with the referendum Commission Saying that registrants of mixed heritage We're not being allowed to read to register and there were there's quite likely some validity to that claim In fact the weakest part of the referendum act is the definition of who is eligible who was eligible to register It was complicating it complicated and confusing in the law and the Commission did nothing to clarify that prior to registration Essentially the decision on who was eligible to vote inside once you got to the referendum Center was based on a judgment call that was made by the referendum Center official and And The manual actually said that it would be based on family name and appearance that that would help them make the decision And of course the identifiers who were there Could give oral testimony as to whether or not the person was a Southerner or had a connection to the south However overall despite this being a significant weakness of the law and of the Commission in terms of the registration process According to our observers the scale of the problem appears to be have been relatively small According to the Sundi data there were not large numbers of people who appeared to be eligible to vote That were turned away at the registration centers So it was certainly an issue in some individual cases Because of the lack of clarity of the definition of who was eligible But at least according to the Sundi data does not appear to have been an extremely large problem So that is sort of the registration process up until now The question is what are the issues and obstacles going forward particularly in this month? We have left until the referendum As you could tell from the numbers the out of country Voters and Southerners voting in the north will make up a very very small number of the total number of voters in the referendum If the if the registration number stands as they are today This will raise confidence in the south that rigging can occur at least around the numbers However, conversely it may lower confidence in the north that rigging couldn't occur Also the referendum Commission remains significantly underfunded Essentially the southern Sudan referendum bureau, which is based in juba Is out of money? They they used most of their recent money to get Payments to the referendum officials out in the field to get the registration numbers back So funding continues to be an issue and it has been all along both for the Commission and the bureau in juba Then there's the issue of delay Which of course is the one that everybody talks about all the time According to media reports the chairman Wrote a letter to President Bashir and to President Kier asking for a two to three week delay He he would not confirm that he had done this and But now I noticed that today he was quoted as saying that he believes a one-week delay would lead to a better referendum One reason that there may need to be a technical delay is that the chairman Requested to the UN that they reopened bidding for the ballots for the ballot printing And so a printer for the ballots was not chosen until Monday December 6th That obviously creates a very short time to get the ballots printed It also the reopening of the bid I think we dodged a bullet in a way the reopening of the bid could have The the criteria were when it was reopened the criteria was lowered So that a Sudanese company would be possible for a Sudanese company to win the bid A Sudanese company did not win the bid a UK company won the bid eventually on Monday But that could have opened up a potentially Crippling political fight if a Sudanese printer had been chosen because that may have been aligning the sand For the South in terms of who would be printing the ballots, but that didn't happen in a UK Bitter one As you as everyone in this room, I'm sure knows any type of delay is non-negotiable for the SPLM January night this sacrosanct because they have a great fear that any movement of the date would result in the referendum Never being held Currently it's now that we have a printer. It's expected that the ballots will arrive in country on December 26th The UN has estimated they need two weeks to distribute the ballots And it's exactly 14 days from December 26th to January 9th. So there's there's absolutely no Room for any further delay or no room for error and even in the shipping process If the balance cannot arrive in all of the stations by January 9th, then there's going to have to be a tough call to make on the part of the CPA partners and on the part of the Commission about whether or not it's better to open up centers and to allow voting can to go ahead in some centers that have the ballots But not go ahead and sort of rule in rural areas where they wouldn't have possibly wouldn't have the ballots By that by that time or whether they delay voting You can look at it both ways There are issues of credibility and legitimacy in terms of starting the process in some places and not in others But there's also the potential for violet reactions if they're if voting is started and there's not Ballots at some locations Particularly in the south obviously However, I'm told at least currently that the technical advisors for the Commission are very Optimistic at the moment that all of the ballots will be delivered on time Probably the biggest threat to the referendum process though is a legal challenge Or legal challenges, I should say The referendum preparations have not followed the referendum act in a number of ways But the most glaring part is that the finals voter final voters list was according to that supposed to be published three months prior to polling And it's going to be published the day before polling Also, all the materials are supposed to be in polling stations according to the acts 72 hours in advance And that also looks like it will not happen and there's there's quite a few other timing issues as well That are not being met in the act So there've been announcements by several groups that they will be filing cases either in the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court Citing the violations of these acts and asking that the referendum Preparations be halted. They're asking for an injunction or they will be asking for an injunction also apparently There's a case that says according to Machaka's protocol the referendum should actually be on July 9th and not on January 9th Although the CPA later does say in the Constitution both say January 9th the Commission chair put out a statement today that said the Constitutional Court didn't have power to review challenges to voter registration That the referendum act says that the signatories of the CPA are the ones that make the conducive environment for The referendum process and so they're the only ones that can comment on the registration process And also it's my understanding that the international community position is that the changes that have happened in the referendum process that are not What was laid out in the referendum act can be authorized or legalized by the CPA partners through an agreement between the CPA partners in terms of Obstacles immediately after the vote of course, that's a 60% threshold issue and The chairman this the Commission chairman was quoted today in an Arabic language paper and cartoon is saying It's unlikely the 60% threshold will be met. I'm assuming at this point He's and it seemed from the from the text of the article Maybe he was misquoted on that but there is the 60% threshold issue and one issue will be in terms of how the results are announced in terms of citizen expectations because They're counted at the polling station then they're sent to the the county level to be aggregated those results are posted at the county I'm talking about the southern Sudan process for the moment Then it goes to the state and the aggregate for that state is posted at the state as soon as it's the counting is done Then it goes to Juba and the and the number is posted at Juba So all this has become public is becoming public as the process goes along And so people will be focused on the numbers and not on the threshold Issue because the threshold issue can't be determined until it gets to cartoon to see if 16 60% has been met or not So there will be a citizen expectation problem in terms of the results announcements particularly if the 60% threshold is not met for some reason Outside of the referendum process obviously there remains a lot of concern about the post referendum negotiations President and Becky announced that they have been suspended indefinitely, but he did not Give a reason so obviously that's cause for concern because if the agreements were in place It might be more easy to have a referendum conducted And we might all feel more comfortable about the relationships going into the referendum On the positive side there was an agreement I think it was yesterday in unity state between the north and south to protect the oil fields Regardless of the outcome of the referendum and to continue production which was forced by Employees and the companies threatened threatening to pull out there, but on the other hand aerial bombardment has continued along the north-south border by the Sudan armed forces Not clear about which side of the border, but that's destabilizing things along the border a bit and then On Abbey, I haven't said anything on Abbey because there's not a lot to say on Abbey I saw yesterday the State Department acknowledged that there won't be a vote in Abbey on January 9th And you know certainly that was known but had not been officially acknowledged The African Union high implementation panel has given both sides several formulas and President Kier and President Bashir have been meeting But still there's there's been no movement Tensions do appear to be rising in the area a Group of Abbey leaders threatened to block dry season migration of the Miseria Although I understand when miss is trying hard to address that And Abbey leaders have also talked about holding their own referendum in response Miserie Lee Leaders have said that any blockage of the dry season migration will be an act of war and that they've and they've now formed their own alternative Abbey government So in closing I will just go back to my more optimistic beginning And some people look at me like I have three heads when I say this But I actually believe the referendum will be held on time or close to on time I Again, maybe it comes from living in Sudan, but I actually am somewhat optimistic that eventually the vote will be recognized perhaps not immediately but I think there's a good chance we'll get through that sort of obstacle and then Finally, I'll say that I think the price is too high for both sides to go back to war. So There it's extremely fragile situation Obviously and anything can happen, but I think there's a reason for at least some optimism on it. So, thank you Thanks very much, Tracy. I'll hand over to assistant General Thank you, Richard. And thank you for inviting me to be part of this panel with Linda and Tracy Let me begin By first and foremost the voter registration process and I agree as Tracy said that On the whole the voter registration process was quite good In fact, the Secretary General's monitoring panel headed by President Benjamin in Kappa has also issued a statement Basically confirming that the process went well and was free of organized fraud I think the numbers which we have got are slightly in the lines of what Tracy was saying Instead of 2.8 million. We are now close to 4 million in so far as the voter registration in the south is concerned And which I think is what we had expected voter registration in Egypt has not yet ended because as you would recall it started a bit late So therefore more time is being given for voter registration in Egypt And I believe also for some parts of the US where also the registration centers open a bit late Another issue which we should note is that there was no major episode of violence during the entire registration process There were reports of so-called intimidation from one side or another But there was no major organized violence which took place during the entire registration process and which I would consider a success of of course Sudanese people first and foremost Supported of course by the international community From now on as Tracy again was mentioning it will be a race against time To ensure that the date of 9th January For holding of the referendum in southern Sudan is actually met The ballot papers, I think they will arrive a bit earlier than 26th The British company which was chosen has promised that they will be able to print and deliver both in Khartoum and Juba and Simultaneously to the eight countries where the referendum can be held within a very short time period of 14 days So therefore it is likely that the papers might arrive by 22nd or 23rd Even those three extra days would be quite critical in this current situation and we have every reason to trust that No delay will be caused to the election date on account of UN's printing of ballot papers or assisting in their delivery But We need to worry about security arrangements that would be put in place to protect the ballot boxes And the polling centers and to ensure that the vote counting the appeal and the publication processes Take place without disruption and without violence and there the fact of Lack of funding for the South Sudan referendum bureau becomes of critical importance Because you would recall that the primary agents for providing that security would be the South Sudan police and South Sudan police even for simple things like having Money for it for a meal while they are out of their regular stations and away from their families That money is still not sufficiently available Abay Which was one of the last areas mentioned by Tracy remains our major concern You are well aware that the referendum Commission for Abay has not yet been established because the parties have not yet been able to agree on its Composition a number of proposals have been put forward to break the deadlock Including those prepared by the a you high-level implementation panel led by President and Becky But so far the parties have not been able to agree on a particular formula be it The referendum the transfer of a bay to southern Sudan or partition of a bay or any other proposal In the meantime as Tracy was mentioning and I agree that the tension is rising in a bay and the people of a bay do not see progress for the fair a bay referendum or for the Talks between the parties on the future of a bay What are the United Nations doing? I think on missus doing all it can to support the referendum processes and of course you know me do love also assisting Particularly because you would recall that there are three registration There are a number of registration centers which are also open in Darfur area for voter registrations Some of them open late, but they later on they function quite well and of course as mandated by the Security Council they are Leading the international support coordinating the international support to these referendums Unmesh Particularly with other partners is providing coordinated technical support to the South Sudan referendum Commission at all levels Including its headquarters in Khartoum the operational base in juba and The subcommittees in the 10 southern states and the 79 counties Close to 300 additional International staff are being deployed to assist the referendum Commission in its activities on the technical side Second Unmesh is also providing logistical support particularly at the county level by facilitating the transportation of Referendum related materials This is critical given the lack of basic infrastructure in southern Sudan with many referendum centers located in remote and Practically inaccessible areas Unmesh has also contracted eight additional civilian helicopters for referendum specific tasks, you know where the Movement by road is practically impossible and these aircrafts are already on the ground Thirdly, Unmesh is participating in the referendum security committees established by the referendum act Consisting of as I mentioned earlier the southern Sudan police services and other both Northern and southern security agencies our uniform personnel are Co-located in the same place with these committees and provide advisory support on referendum security arrangements and policies and of course Finally, we have also trained the south Sudan police services on referendum security so far about 16,500 Police officers have been so trained in southern Sudan and about 1,500 in northern Sudan so total of about 18,000 trained police officers on security for referendum But as I mentioned earlier that we must recall that the primary responsibility for security of referendum Belongs to Sudan And is the responsibility of the Sudanese authorities. I Mentioned the panel Established by the secretary general headed by former president of Tanzania, Mr. Benjamin Mekapa To monitor the referendum processes This is an exception because normally the United Nation does not monitor a referendum or a voting excise that it is Supporting logistically and technically But To ensure that the referendum is conducted in an orderly fashion and the Sudanese people Peacefully accept the results of the outcome It is extremely important for all of us that the process should be credible and transparent And must accurately and faithfully reflect the aspirations of the population and that is why this panel is working independently from UNMISS Making periodic visits to Sudan to assess the situation on the ground and to raise key issues and Concerns with the parties at a high level and of course to advise the secretary general on the referendum processes and its credibility And as I just mentioned earlier It does believe this panel that the registration process has gone off fairly well without Or rather free from any organized fraud You know that apart from support to referendum UNMISS also continues its mandated activities for the Implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement including border demarcation monitoring and verification in Abay and Within the ceasefire zone and support for the conduct of popular consultations in the South Cordova state and in the Blue Nile state We should not forget these two popular consultations are also an integral part of the CPA Again, I think while the Sudanese authorities clearly have the primary responsibility to protect its own citizens But UNMISS has also made a plan to assist in the protection of civilians both in the Pre-referendum phase in the immediate post referendum phase and thereafter Through essentially joint civil military patrols through Initiatives to foster local level reconciliation and through initiatives to ensure that the mechanisms on both sides for quick information exchange and decision-making to prevent an isolated incident becoming a configuration are actually put in place well-known practiced and Enhanced in their capacities to react Essentially UNMISS plan for protection of civilians would also involve What I would call decentralization and mainstreaming protection of civilians is not a task for military personnel alone It's not a task for police personnel alone it's a task for everybody and it's a task which is to be undertaken not only at the central levels but at all levels down the chain So that at each and every person is committed to ensuring the best way they can In the areas of their deployment I believe that to ensure a soft landing at the end of the referendum process, which would be quite critical It is critical to ensure that the parties agree on key post referendum issues including wealth sharing management of debt and assets citizenship including for southern Sudanese and northern Sudan and vice versa and Border security arrangements We have been providing support to the EU high-level implementation panel in the facilitation of these talks and of course Stand ready to provide further support Including in the implementation of whatever agreements the two parties may arrive at Tracy put it very eloquently When she spoke that there is No doomsday scenario in Sudan and we too believe that the security situation in Southern Sudan remains relatively calm though fragile The political and security environment will understandably be tense during and after the referendum period including for the reasons of announcement of the results at local at the county at the provincial and adjuba levels both Unmiss and the humanitarian community and other UN agencies I talked for the whole of the UN have developed joint contingency plans Consolidated contingency plans for northern and southern Sudan for the period November 2010 to June 2011 So roughly a eight-month period Call for approximately about US dollar sixty three million in total for a worst case scenario now we think that worst case scenario would not happen and we will make every effort to make the worst case scenario do not Does not happen, but at the same point of time It is better to be prepared for the worst case scenario rather than to have much higher cost downstream in a reactive mode And the worst case scenario I can share with you Estimates that roughly about 2.8 million people could be internally displaced or displaced to neighboring countries and Roughly about 3.2 million additional people could be affected in some way or other and This means that a total of about six million people could be affected. That's a worst case scenario As I said the parties are committed to making every effort to make sure that this worst case scenario does not happen We are committed to assisting the parties to make sure that this worst case scenario does not eventuate But at the same point of time I do believe it is better to be prepared in advance rather than to be in a reactive mode So the coming months are likely to be clearly extremely challenging For the people of Sudan first and foremost and for the international community which remains very clearly engaged there the referendum it's a no-brainer to say that it has the potential to change the future of the country and While I think the international community and the CPA parties have emphasized the importance of making unity attractive Which was one of the elements of the CPA during the past five years. They must now respect Whatever decision that the southern Sudanese people adopt I was happy that in the 24 September meeting which was chaired by the Secretary General This point was made very eloquently and was agreed to by both parties first and foremost and of course by the international community Second as we move forward We must keep in mind that the referendum as momentous as it may appear is one element of the agreement That ended a very bitter civil war I already mentioned to you the questions of a bay the popular consultations in South Côte-de-Fonds state and in the Blue Nile state But you would be aware that that same agreement the CPA also paved the way for deepening democratization and development inside whole of Sudan as well as improved regional stability and there is every reason for us to continue With the pending tasks of the CPA beyond the referendum and to encourage the parties and the neighboring countries to make sure that The vision which is enshrined in the CPA actually becomes a reality I do believe that the southern Sudan Sudanese parties both northern and southern must recognize that the vision of the new Sudan articulated in the CPA remains as valid today as it was half a decade ago regardless of the outcome of the referendum and I do believe that by renewing the trust with the achieved in 2005 the parties can develop productive models of association and cooperation and That doing so will have a seminal and positive impact Not only on the situation between north and south but also on the resolution Hopefully of the conflict in that food. Thank you very much Thank you very much and I'll pass over to Linda for her comments. Thank you Well, I think I'll Offer a slightly different view The view from the ground at least as I've had a chance to see it in the last several months The work that US IP has been doing over the last year has been focused on electoral violence prevention and Now most recently referendum violence prevention and these have been a series of programs in which we've tried to work with mid-level civil society actors a Blend of people who are able then to go back to their home communities and share the information and act as change agents Hopefully to prevent violence during these tense processes So the mix of people we've trained have included police media teachers and students both academic and both higher education and tertiary education and Some clergy Both in the north and the south a number of NGOs most typically these are NGOs representing youth and women's groups And sometimes party officials and in South Sudan We ended up having one or two southern Sudanese parliamentarians in our training program so what I proposed to to do is sort of give you a kind of a contrast between The mood and the awareness of referendum processes in juba with the mood and awareness of the referendum Processes in rumbek where I just most recently returned from because it is There are many similarities, but there is there are some striking differences between the the center the capital and And the field and juba and as Tracy well knows juba is a boom town at the moment Prices are high Traffic is dense People are active and it does not appear to be a place where there is imminent Conflict or unhappiness or tension. In fact the mood could be described as euphoric There's a giant countdown clock in one of the main Squares and taking down their days and hours and minutes and seconds So there's definitely a mood of anticipation and of quite happy Anticipation and that was reflected by some of our participants who seemed to say to us I can't believe you think there's gonna be violence. Why would there be violence? We're all so happy about this process But that particular mood was also countered by some fear and apprehension by others in the group who said no No, we understand that this is Although we're happy about the opportunity that the referendum presents for us. We understand that this is tense We understand that there are disagreements and we are and we're nervous and anxious about them So that was definitely the mood in juba in in rumbach the the obvious Anticipation for the referendum is far less visible rumbach appears not to have evolved at all in the past five years None of the roads is paved yet It's very quiet almost a sleepy kind of rural place it it is almost Oddly since it's got it since it has a history as the sort of the heartland of the SPLM It almost seems unaffected by the process But that said those who participated in our training program were drawn from throughout Lake State including heavily from the rumbach town area and they actually were quite well aware of many of the Details of the referendum act and the referendum process sometimes better aware on some issues better aware Then the juba counterparts, which I found quite interesting They were knowledgeable about for example the symbols the the joined hand symbol for unity and the single hand symbol for separation They knew exactly what those symbols were we didn't we just asked and they said oh, yeah It's gonna be you know, they knew right away In juba, they didn't know that They were unaware of some of the other details of the referendum act, which are included in our presentation in Both juba and rumbach. There was some confusion Justifiably over exactly what were the qualifications to be allowed to register especially qualifications for those who are mixed race North and south and we did our best to clarify that conclusion although given the lack of clarity in the act itself I'm not sure how well we did But there was some concern and some anxiety about Whether or not northerners Would would be able to somehow Register in the north and then vote their own way. Let's say there was a little concern about that But not I wouldn't say it's an overwhelming concern. I would say that it was a fear. They had there's a fear To the extent that I could identify a mood event of anxiety It's anxiety bred from confusion or lack of understanding of exactly how the process is supposed to go There's a real desire to learn more There's a real desire to try to counteract their anxiety by Having a clearer understanding of both the internal South Sudan referendum Commission process but also the actions of unmask and the international actors and the CPA partners and They are Very anxious to get some clarity on the process understandably we also Kind of part of our programming in addition to using case studies of previous referenda such as East Timor, Eritrea, Western Sahara we also talk about the the skills that All Sudanese are going to need in their transformation that their country is going through and we talk about responsibilities of citizenship and decision-making and In the decision-making exercise which requires that the participants role play a Responsible Municipal body which has to take into account the needs of all of its citizens Muslim and Christian alike There is quite that was the most stark difference in terms of the way our program was received between Juba and Rumbick and Juba The participants took that obligation extremely seriously Debated for 45 minutes and were unable wanted more time wanted more information We're unable to actually come up with a response that they felt really reflected the complexities of the issue In Rumbick that took them five minutes and they came back with You know a no which was a no to the needs of the Muslim population and we we questioned them We pushed back on that and and asked why And it was interesting because I think that part of that response was simply a lack of experience and unfamiliarity with very complex Decision-making in a pluralistic society So in a way it was unfair of us to challenge them that way But in another way, I think it was good because they actually showed I think a very promising willingness to to think about the way we pushed back on that particular exercise And to spend some time talking with us afterwards You know thinking and processing and learning about the difference between saying that The South is going to be an accepting Tolerant society that of course there's a role for all of the northerners in the south of course everyone says that And then when it push comes to shove and you actually have to make governing choices that Put the that include the rights of the northern population or the Muslim population in the south How well are you able to actually do that? And I think the tension between those two things was a valuable Moment for them, and I think that they're responding rather well Despite the the initial impact Also, there was a difference in the in the population of our of our program between Juba and rumbek because in rumbek many of our participants actually had come from the refugee populations And had been educated in Kenya and Uganda So we were able to conduct that particular program in English, which is a rarity for us even in southern Sudan We often have to include a translator and speak And have an Arabic translation of our of our programs But in rumbek it was entirely in English with a group of you know 30 35 participants And that was interesting and it actually I I concluded could be wrongly But I concluded that that may partly explain their lack of familiarity or their lack of of elasticity with considering the rights of the Muslim population that they had Spent too much time outside of the south and had not been familiar with With really dealing with northerners very much as children. They really hadn't had to deal with northern Sudanese Whereas in juba there's far more pragmatism You know the the northern population in juba is very visible very present the Juba population is very used to dealing with them and seeing them as part of their community and therefore there's a very different Relationship to them and I think a far more pragmatic positive working relationship that that bears well for the future So I won't say that there's no chance of Retributive violence should there be some kind of tit for tat punishment against southerners in the north And northern and then it would be Some kind of balancing punishment against northerners in the south I won't say that that's not possible, but I will say that it doesn't have to happen It's one of those risks that could could remain a small risk if if the populations are Again given proper information and are not Pushed to do certain things, but there is there is prejudice Present so there is there are as always that kind of possibility another interesting Thing as since we brought up George Clooney earlier. We were talking about the the surge of interest in the United States about the risk of civil war and extreme violence the worst-case scenario as The assistant secretary general mentioned and and in fact interestingly enough that worst-case scenario seems not to have occurred To that many people in the south because they were asking us We're hearing from international media that we're about to go to a really bad war and and we're nervous What is that true? So there's an echo chamber and we have to be careful You know they got nervous because we got nervous and I'm not sure why we got nervous Well, I know why we are nervous, but I'm not sure why we were quite so Vocal about it in main editorial Pages for example So that news actually trickles all the way back into this sleepy little rural town of Rumback And they were anxious and they want because we come from Washington DC. We must know They asked us what well, you know, will the UN come in and help us will the United States come in and help us and we said you know, that's not a question we can answer and and you know there there was some some anxiety because the news had made them nervous and made them anxious we tried to At least give them the tools to be able to analyze their own situation with a little more clarity on that I think that Most of the you know, I was going to talk a little bit about what I saw as the triggers and the risks of possible violence But I think many of those have already been mentioned by my colleagues. So I will I'll conclude here and look forward to your questions. Thanks Thanks very much. Thanks for all of the all of you for the great presentations I'm and in sort of encouraging that by the upbeat Assessments by all of you in your own ways Maybe I can start off with a question and then throw it open to everyone else It seems at least in the technical aspects that things remain stress, but at least on track and Have gone relatively well so far Maybe you could talk a little bit about sort of the political side of things and the political will For the process particularly from the northern side reading the media every day I mean depending on your your point of view you can sort of read read within the media Signs of impending doom or sort of plenty of course for optimism one way or the other So what's your what's your take on on what's happening at the moment? There's obviously a lot of rhetoric and grandstanding from from both sides, but how do we interpret this? That's a pretty difficult question I realize unless While you think about your answer, let me throw it out to the people out here and see what other questions We have as well. Maybe some easier ones A gentleman at the back there, maybe you can introduce yourself as well Hello, my name is Paul Larson. I'm with L3 MPRI I would like to look a little bit more in the future beyond the referendum and can you speak to South Sudan's capability of standing up as an independent state. Thank you Jennifer Cook with CSIS. I don't want to go too much into the worst-case scenario But I as the assistant secretary said we do have to be prepared for that and I wonder if you might Speculate a little bit about how the most likely worst-case scenario might unfold What is it? Yeah, you know where is it is a small localized situation than then metastasizes Is it outright rejection by cartoon? Just how and where and then how is the how is the UN? Peacekeeping operation kind of prepositioning for those possibilities One more question and then we'll go to our panel Lady there in the front Thank you, Zorica Manichwiti Embassy of Montenegro Shortly, how you Plan to address the funding problem Are you going to help South Sudanese government? Is there any way that international community can come up and help because the violence prevention and Free of violence referendum is very important and follow-up question. How do you see the day after that? Thank you the day after referendum the day after referendum, which is important You mentioned its citizenship its border demarcation its wealth sharing and from the perspective of Montenegro We can tell you that We have a successful independence without resolving all those questions yet. We have a citizen Issue with Serbia still open. We have a border demarcation with Croatia in a very peaceful way Intermediate level and Some other issues and we still have a very successful independence. Thank you very much Let me Begin first by the question with Richard post the political assessment of the situation and I must say that Instead of media, I would take into account the pronouncements which are made by leaders On record in important meetings and of course particularly in meetings where both sides are present together and The last such meeting was 24th of September in New York as I told you organized by the secretary general Where both sides Retreated their responsibility with they have Retreated again and again to hold peaceful Referendums to ensure that there is no violence to ensure that the referendum is held on 9th of January In a free fair and credible manner And I see no reason why we should doubt the commitment which was so well articulated Including in a joint communique which was adopted At the United Nations in presence of President Obama and several other heads of state government Who were represented there? which links up with the question from Jennifer on You asked me to speculate in in some ways twice one the reasons for the worst-case scenario and two how the worst-case scenario would actually Unfold and and both these speculations. I am unwilling to conduct But because I do believe but I will tell you something else How will those worst-case scenarios be addressed? first and foremost by effective communication between the two parties and by mechanisms to address any Isolated incident that may arise between the two parties. How will it be done? Maybe meetings of the joint defense boards. Let me give you an example of Kodiva just now, you know Kodiva is also in a bit of a crisis But at the same point of time with our assistance the four generals You know, there is a small African force there called Lycon So it's general the general which is supporting Mr. Al Sanwathara the president-elect General Baka Yoko from the north general mango from the FD's SCI and Our own force commanders who is also a general so these four generals we organized a meeting and All the four generals came and they agreed that Option for war is not even an option on the table and that they must remain in regular contact to avoid Any isolated incident on part of their respective security agencies? So this is the type of mechanism which I think which needs to be put in place And I think it is being done second, I think there is need for better information and communication with the With the people with the supporters. So therefore all leaders must refrain from any Statement which either Makes for what I would call unreasonable expectations on part of their supporters or Which incites violence which is inflammatory in nature. There's absolutely essential and the people have to be told very clearly because There was this question from the distinguished delegate of Montenegro the day after referendum and I'll come to that in detail but The day after referendum no matter what be the outcome. It will still be one country Southern Sudan we have to remember that there is a transition period of six months till 9th of July 2011 So day after referendum is not going to change much Except that need for to prepare better to deal with whatever the outcome is Whether in favor of unity or in favor of decision Another thing which we we must do to address the worst case scenario as I said is to be prepared because large scale Population movements do not take place only on account of war They take place on account of imminent threat with the people perceive a robust position of Military or peacekeepers on the ground is a mental attitude not simply a number of military boots on the ground and Insecurity also is a mental perception not necessarily the insecurity on the ground I was special representative in Timor for three years from 2006 to 2009 Before that in the same country where I have I've been very closely associated with East Timor I was the deputy special representative between 2002 to 2005 and you know there was a tsunami in Which struck many countries including Indonesia Sri Lanka India and so on So one day there was a high tide in East Timor There was a tsunami, but then suddenly people thought that there was tsunami So they all ran to the hills in the middle of the night I mean between 8 o'clock and 12 o'clock in the night We had to use mega phones to try and bring them down It took them took a nearly three days before they came down There was no tsunami, but nearly eight people got fractures or broken bones in this mass Exoders which took place towards the hills So we need to explain very clearly to the people that they should not be insecure But at the same point of time we have to deal with their feeling of insecurity Which as Linda says does not exist luckily now in in Roomba Kenjuba But may exist in other parts of Sudan and also in the neighboring countries on The funding problem. I think the international community I must say that we are very grateful to the international community before The funding was provided for by the government of Sudan and by the government of southern Sudan There was no funding for the referendum at all and a basket fund was created by the United Nations And in this basket fund many countries including of course United States contributed very generously The first country to contribute and to fully disperse its contribution was Japan And this basket fund actually helped in taking the process forward There are many countries which are still contributing for the United States the European Union Through assistance in kind not not through cash through assistance in kind But then again some more assistance would be required and we I think the first and foremost We should call on the government of southern Sudan to make sure that the required amount of Sudanese pounds is made available for their own police in on the day of the referendum and to make sure that these Challenges can be overcome At the same point of time whatever we can do within our difficult economic crisis I realize very well that the world is facing a financial crisis, but whatever we can do To assist them would of course be beneficial There's a very critical question and I want to I took some time before coming to it that was Southern Sudan's capability as an independent state and this was a question which Since I have been very intimately associated with Timor-Leste, I have answered on many occasions the attributes of a state Capability is not one of those attributes so therefore Because we don't say that a state cannot exist because it is capable or not capable Secondly, I don't want to decide Or be in the seat which decides which is a state which is capable and how exactly does it become capable because there would be different Answers which we would arrive at What do we need to do? We need to strengthen the capacity of Southern Sudan whether it remains part of Sudan or whether it becomes independent. We still want to Enhance its capacity for administration for governance for rule of law improvements in the justice sector improvement in the correctional system Better policing. These are the Kantian aspects of the state, you know the the duty But then there are Weberian aspects of a state where also we need to help them better creation of better infrastructure better health facilities better education Better utilization of oil wealth. In fact, actually all that I'm saying is absolutely comparable to Timor-Leste Which is also an oil and gas producing country and which became independent from Indonesia The good part is that the southern Sudanese themselves are aware of these requirements They themselves have priorities. They made approximately 18 priorities which were discussed in a meeting jointly organized by the United Nations and World Bank in Brussels in the middle of October and We are making plans to see how the United Nations acting as a representative of all of you The international community can be of assistance to them for a period of two three or a few more years Beyond 9th of July 2011 that has not been the topic of discussion today, but that is that in itself is a very big discussion what beyond not 9th January, but what beyond 9th July and That of course deals with southern Sudan, but I made a reference. We need to continue our efforts to ensure that there is peace in Darfur and to ensure that there is the what I would call Enhanced participation in decision-making a feeling of inclusiveness on part of all the people whether from northern Sudan or from southern Sudan, which is the only guarantee for Peace and security and for regional stability So I hope I have answered all the questions of course except for the Speculation on the worst case scenario, which I would leave Yeah, I just wanted to add to to the last answer Beyond the capacity issue the workforce capacity and other issues The one of the main challenges in southern Sudan will be citizens expectations And if you look at the Report that is outside you'll see that it's very clear that southern Sudanese have extremely high Expectations for what an independent southern Sudan would look like they expect to be just like Uganda or Kenya in 10 years And when I told that to a government of southern Sudan official all they could do was Shake their head because it's it's not Realizable for the most part Also, there are significant issues and this all comes from citizens views. It's not it's not our NDI personal opinion But citizen views in terms of concerns about corruption concerns about tribalism and the issue a specific issue that the government of southern Sudan will have to deal with is that Citizens in our study were very strongly against sharing any continuing to share any oil revenue in an If they become independent And so that's not politically or economically feasible But one of the reasons they have such high expectations for development is they believe they will all of a sudden after independence beginning 100% of the oil revenues and therefore they'll have schools and roads and hospitals And sort of a boom in development. So from the citizen aspect, I think the government of southern Sudan has a number of challenges as well I just want to address the The capacity question and the what to make of the rhetoric question I think that it can be disconcerting for the international community that Sudanese negotiators have brought brinksmanship to the highest art form and I think that in some senses. That's that's just something we have to get used to but also that we shouldn't assume that these conversations are happening where The momentum towards war is in the ascendant. In fact In the last six years the momentum of peace has has actually got a certain amount of weight to it And it will actually have to be pushed against the momentum of peace in order to start a war That's certainly not saying that war is not possible Under certain conditions even probable But I think that there is of course an interest amongst both sides not to engage in Serious hostilities organized serious hostilities And I think that we just have to you know look on the bright side the glasses half full and that doesn't make it You know easy, but it means that we should assume that these Negotiators really do have the best interests of their communities at heart and there should be a way for them to you know At the last possible moment come up with something that makes sense for them Of course, we need to we need to be prepared of course. We need to not be caught scrambling I completely agree with that as well The future of South Sudan its capacity for me Yes, many of the issues that I see as major challenges have been mentioned I would also add the challenge of the migration the return All of these people thousands and thousands of returnees who are you know, we'll be welcomed I'm sure in many ways, but also will be a challenge on very limited resources Very limited capacity to deal with them and to offer them any kind of services And and these challenges I think are not the They're not going to be the indicator about whether South Sudan can succeed as a state the indicator will be how they're dealt with all states have very serious challenges some of them more serious than these and the real the real indicator of the success of the south will become clearer and clearer as It is forced to deal on its own although with support for sure with very very significant challenges and above all I think to resist what will be an Inevitable impulse to to close in and to to hide certain decisions that it's making That's a very natural impulse when faced with severe challenges to not not be clear about some of the difficult choices you're making We have that problem In this country when we make difficult choices You know fortunately for us. We have a very rigorous Set of institutions that make it possible for us to find out what's going on, but there will be a very serious I think temptation to to Close down and to to not be transparent and that transparency lack of transparency will trigger lack of trust will trigger all of the other issues tribalism and fear and in South South competition and and so that's That's the risk But I believe that there's a great deal of possibility that the will and the the capacity of the leaders of the south Make success as a state quite possible Thank you. Let's take another couple of questions. Just one at the front there Oh, just wait for the microphone to come your way. Thank you Steve landing Manchester trade I Haven't told that one of the real Challenges now in the Sudan is the Pythora of NGOs working to try to promote the election and the absolute lack of effective coordination There's a couple of groups there that it gets to fighting over who's going to get the SUV All of the permanent places have been taken. So then you have to set up your temporary places and so on I Know that we always make a big argument in economics that Sometimes you just have to let the market forces operate and beyond that, you know You're going to see what results and so on with some changes What is the coordinate? How many NGOs are there now in Sudan? And what is their coordination as we get closer and closer to the election? The real question is is it effective coordination or is it a lot of duplication going on? Thank you Keep Jennings with the National Democratic Institute Richard you started out by saying that this would be important to Africa Regardless of the outcome and I'd like to pose a question to the panelists What role do you see for the the surrounding states? Are they Playing any particular role right now? I know Ethiopia is hosting the IBA discussion, but Are they getting more concerned or less concerned? Could you please speak to that? Let's take one more. How about from this side the lady at the front there? Thank you so much for your remarks. They were very informative And my name is Abigail Long. I'm with Humanity United And I just have a kind of general off-topic question as to what you think the impact of the right Referendum will be on the Darfur region Yeah, I'll take the NGO question though. I'm not sure I have probably Good information for you in some ways. I guess it one it depends on if you're talking about international or domestic NGOs Certainly, there are many many international NGOs. I don't know the number I know that in the NGO form of which we're a member there are over a hundred members so however the number working on Democracy and governance and referendum related issues is not that large We work with Unared, which is the UN miss UNDP. We have coordinated on civic education civic and voter education efforts Within the USAID funded partners. We're sharing Materials that we've developed so the same types of materials are getting out in terms of voter across the board in terms of voter information so I would say that overall the Coordination has been quite good among the small number that work specifically on the referendum type issues in terms of You know, we have weekly meetings with Unared and also with Ifas who is another technical advisor on the Commission There have been some with domestic NGOs. There have been some complaints about How many are included in the the voter information? Process, I don't know if that will be changed this time around as we lead up to polling So there have been some of those issues, but overall I think coordination has been fairly good Okay Let me also add my bit to the NGO question before I go on to others. I think there is a There is an additional challenge not so much with NGOs related with election But with NGOs who are doing very good work in the field of humanitarian assistance development of children Promoting health and there I find two challenges. In fact, I don't find the challenge so much of Many NGOs I find the challenge of rather a lack of NGO capability particularly because if there is a feeling of insecurity then many NGOs might want to reduce their presence Just prior to the referendum and that would be the time when they would actually be most needed to help the people the migrants as Linda was saying who are trying to come back or other population movements, which take place In fact, I'll be quite frank quite a lot of UN humanitarian agencies are working with the Council of Churches in southern Sudan and I was more worried about the Absorptive and delivery capacity of those churches because everybody says that they are working with the Council of Churches So the WHO the UNICEF that everybody has found one answer council of churches. So it's not only a question of Multiplicity of NGOs, but also rather a lack of NGOs particularly on the socio-economic side of the equation on the humanitarian side On role of surrounding states, I think the surrounding states and indeed the African Union are concerned This would be an event of momentous importance for for Africa as a whole no matter how the decision of the southern Sudanese people goes and They are also concerned particularly the neighbors about the challenges with they might have to face if they encountered some population movements across the borders into their own areas, you know that Egypt is already hosting a large number of Sudanese as migrants Then I'm coming down then we have Eritrea we have Ethiopia which is which of course has played a major role Ethiopia is also a guarantor of the CPA and President Meles I must say is playing a very critical role apart from hosting the other stocks on a bay Then we come down we have Kenya the border. Well, the Kenya border is comparatively small but then we have a comparatively long border with DRC which really speaking the DRC government is trying its best But it faces a challenge of what I would call extension of legitimate state authority in the north and in the eastern parts of its own country Then we have the Central African Republic which would be a major border But Central African Republic will face its own challenges particularly because it would be an electoral mood, you know the next election The presidential election in Central African Republic would be held on 20th of January So that country would also be in an electoral mode at the time when the referendum is held and the referendum Results are announced then we come to charge which will also be in an electoral mode at the same point of time So there are challenges, but I think some countries particularly charge which does not have a border with southern Sudan It has a border basically with Darfur But it has got now for the last few months nearly half a year a very good mechanism with the government of Sudan to have joined border patrols It has come to a good understanding with the government of Sudan And I think that has decreased rebel activity on both sides of the border So yes, the surrounding states are concerned. They will have Uganda. Yes, of course. Sorry. I forgot But Uganda that is I mean in a slightly different category from the countries which I mentioned and Uganda is It will also play an important role Particularly through Uganda and Ethiopia and Egypt will also play very important roles through the provision of troops to the UN Operations, you know already the troops from these countries are playing a very very critical role in Darfur as also in Sudan impact of referendum on Darfur More than the impact of referendum, I think the challenge is that Would the government of Sudan be in a position to make meaningful concessions which will provide for Better participation in decision-making by the Darfurians before the referendum The answer to that I think is somewhat unclear at this stage Similarly, would the movements and then there is a there is a bigger challenge there Would SLA Abdul Wahid and Jam negotiate meaningfully and constructively with the international community has called upon them on numerous occasions to do But that also I find a bit challenging I think it's unlikely and that is why it certainly worries me I just hope that whatever be the outcome of the referendum These rebel movements come to the negotiating table at the earliest possible so that a comprehensive inclusive agreement on Darfur can become a reality I'll take on the Darfur question perhaps against my better judgment I think that there's a potential for the impact of the referendum on Darfur Actually from my perspective I read it the other way around the impact of Darfur on the outcome of the referendum Or rather in the post referendum period Assuming that there is a vote for independence and that there is the formation of an independent South I think that there is a strong possibility of either a best-case scenario or a worst-case scenario The best-case scenario is that the new southern government can play an honest broker role If it has managed to come out of the referendum and separation process With a good working relationship with the north then it can in fact Through vacating its position as a partner in the government of national unity perhaps leave open some possibility For the Darfurians to have a power-sharing arrangement of their own That is something that will there's a lot of ducks that have to be put in a row before that outcome is Going to be possible on the other hand a newly independent South that Has an acrimonious working relationship with its northern neighbor could be seen as a Focal point for Darfurian rebel movements to look for support. That's a natural Incentive for them and that I believe that the assumption is that that's going to happen regardless of whether it has or will And then then you have a worst-case scenario because the north will in fact see the south as a target Legitimately if it's harboring Darfurian rebels who have not come to the table and started a peace negotiation So there there's there are a lot of moving parts to that analysis But I see it as not all bad news for the resolution of the Darfurian conflict assuming that the quite high barriers to To a strong southern role are met in the next six months to a year Thanks very much. I'm afraid we were pretty much out of time now So we'll have to end the questions there, but I just want to give our panelists Maybe just a chance to for a quick couple of sentences each to finish us off I'm going to encourage you to sort of gaze into your crystal balls now and and two questions are we going to have a referendum on January the 9th and Will it be a referendum which accurately reflects the will of the voters who take part in it? There you go. Who wants to go first Tracy? I think I gave away my answer to that already but yes, and yes, I Again, it's extremely fragile situation And anything could happen, but I think I think there's reasons to be optimistic. I think the momentum That has been built. It will be hard to stop And I think if it's not January 9th, it will be quite close to January the 9th And there will be many bumps in the next month and there will be mumps after the vote But again, I think we will ultimately get there where the vote will be recognized Well, let me give you The same answer but it's likely different words Which is that we the Sudanese parties first and foremost the international community and the United Nations Representing the international community. We must do everything which is possible to make sure that the answer to those two questions is yes So right now I don't speculate whether the answer will be yes or no But the point is that we must continue working as if through our work the answer would really become yes. Thank you I also say yes, although again with the qualification that if it's not on January 9th It will be shortly after Hopefully for the reason that the it's recognized that the process is as important as the event itself because the outcome needs to be seen To be accurate and free and fair And I think that there's an awareness a growing awareness that that is in fact the case I think that at this stage there are just too many people for whom the referendum is a Critical matter for it to not occur and to not occur very close if not on January 9th, and I do agree with Tracy that That it will be probably Almost inevitable that that a result will be recognized if not right away at least some time after and I do think that the international community is is They're helping and I think that that's one of the many reasons for for some optimism Thanks very much to all of you. Um, we're making our own preparations for the referendum here at CSIS We've just started this week a page on referendum preparations on our website on the CSIS Africa program site will have audio of events around the referendum commentaries and other Audio bits and pieces as well. So I've written down the address to tell you here It's a CS dot is forward slash Sudan dash referendum But I'm sure you've remembered that and please look it up for when you get back Well, look, I'd like to thank all three of our panelists Linda Beshai at Tokare Tracy Cook for taking time out In such a busy period to come and join us today and please join me in thanking them for their time this morning