 Okay, so basically this is what I usually just to sort of get the blood flowing a little bit here from the beginning. This usually wakes people up. So I'm basically just going to talk a little bit about how I see Britain's role in Europe after Cameron's speech and moving forward from here and a little bit also talk about the sort of the trends within the UK debate and also particularly when it comes to sort of the conservative party which of course takes a quite center role in what's going on now in the UK and when it comes to Europe debate. But just to sort of kick things off a bit, in terms of British Euroscepticism and I can say this as a non-Brit myself and I can claim neutrality, there are a couple of myths that I come across quite frequently when I talk and discuss about the UK's place in Europe around the EU and around the world and there are four of them and I will give it to you right now. I totally disagree with them but I will give it to you anyway. The first one is that Euroscepticism is in the face in Britain. It is not. British Euroscepticism runs very deep. It goes beyond the government of the day, it goes beyond political cycles and what I usually say somewhat provocatively is that the only way to turn the UK into a country of Eurofiles is to go back to 1939, replay World War II and Britain loses. That is the only way that you can turn the UK into Belgium in terms of their view of the European Union. That is for better or worse, unfortunately the case. There's never been that emotion, as you know, there's never been that emotional attachment to European project that you see on the continent. Britain joined also the EU late. It joined the EU in a state of almost despair in the 1970s where it's a corner it was not doing particularly well. Most other countries have been joining the EU at a point in their history when there's been a lot of hope going on. That's a big difference as well. It's late coming to the club. Therefore, the roots of Euroscepticism run really, really deep and they will not go away any time soon. Similarly, the second myth I would say is that Euroscepticism will go away with political leadership. This is also, I hear a lot, basically saying that if you have the political class simply making a case for Europe, then the British public will be convinced that they should stay in the EU or that they should engage more with the European Union. To some extent that is true, but it's not the entire explanation. It's not as simple as that, unfortunately. Again, British Euroscepticism goes beyond political leaders. It's something that is very deep felt and therefore will not disappear with a very pro-EU leader. It will remain. The third myth I will say is that British Euroscepticism is driven by ignorance. Again, I disagree with that. I think there's some truth in that, but it's again too simplistic. It's not the case that the UK public is particularly unaware of what's going on in Europe. I mean, there is a big knowledge gap that needs to be filled and I think the Irish public, incidentally, is actually quite well informed, not least because of your experience with referenda here, which has in tendency to educate public opinion. But I actually think that if the British public knew exactly what was going on in the European Union, if, for example, was 100% on top of cometology, this process where you implement legislation after it has been agreed by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, or if they knew exactly what was going on with the European financial stability mechanism or something like that, they might not become less Eurosceptic. They might actually become more Eurosceptic because they know, as you know, cometology isn't exactly a transparent process. So I wouldn't don't make the mistake of taking sort of the easy way out and say this is all because of your skepticism. If we can only convince the public of the benefits of the EU, again, they will become Eurofiles. That's not necessarily the case. And finally, your skepticism driven by media. It is true that a lot of papers in the UK have a, shall we call it, an editorial line, which isn't exactly Brussels-friendly, and some of that is quite frustrating at times for those of us who are involved in this debate. But again, even if you did not have the murder press there, even if you did not have the telegraph, the UK public will still be pretty Eurosceptic. Actually, if you think about it, when it comes to the British public and public opinion, the biggest problem has not been the page two leader in the sun or a big EU waste or in the front page of the Daily Mail. The biggest problem has been the Eurozone crisis. Because if you think about it, every morning over the last sort of three years, the British public has heard bad news coming out of Eurozone in broadcast media. That's the BBC primarily. That's what they've been fed almost every day. And that's now what they associate with Europe. Crisis, Greek rioting, Spanish banks going bust. Also here in Ireland, of course, there's been some problem. Thankfully, now you're on your way back. But this is what you've heard for so long in the UK. So it's not so much something that has been driven by the media per se. It's driven by reporting, particularly in broadcasts coming from the Eurozone crisis. So I think it's very important to understand these, what I would consider myths or at least sort of half truths, what everyone called it about Britain and Europe, to appreciate where cameras coming from when he gave his speech. British skepticism will not go away. It has to be managed. It has to be confronted. It cannot be magically wished away. So having clear the air on that one, let's move on. Okay, so basically what I would say, why you can no longer freeze the issue of Europe in the UK? I think there are two very simple reasons. The first one is that the Eurozone integration is changing the rules of the game somewhat. You now have the risk or chance, depending on where you stand, for a club, within a club, where the Eurozone 17 is heading for more integration, particularly in the banking sector. Therefore, the UK has to respond. The UK cannot stand still. That's the first reason why it's not an issue. The second reason linked to what I said previously is public opinion. Now, I hope you can see this graph here, which is maybe a bit too small, but it just shows a quite, I think, extraordinary drop in support for staying in the EU over the last seven years. I think support for the EU is now at its lowest, as it has been for several decades. So therefore, I would argue absent new membership terms, absent some sort of change in the relationship between Europe and the UK. There's a very big risk that the British public does vote to leave when they're eventually being asked. So you can see a trend here that is quite worrying. However, and linked to what I said just now, whilst the majority of people in the UK is now in favour of Britain leaving the EU, in most opinion polls, when the question is being asked as if there is a chance of new membership terms, would you then vote to stay in the EU? Then all of a sudden, the majority becomes in favour of remaining inside. And that is what these two pie charts are illustrating. It's very simple. If the status quo is an offer, if you're offered with all or nothing in Europe, then a majority of British people will vote to leave. However, if you can get that change, that illusive reform in the European Union, then a majority all of a sudden will vote to stay. And again, that's where Cameron is coming from. And I think this is a real threat. And Cameron addressed that in the speech, that if we try to artificially lock in the status quo in the UK, then there's a radically increased risk that when they are finally asked, the British public will vote to leave. So therefore, it isn't everyone's interest to see some sort of change. And also, as Cameron said in the speech, this was sort of his big thing, really. He identified three reasons why EU has to change. The change in structure, which we touched on between the Eurozone and the non-European countries, we now need more differentiation probably to get EU to work. The second issue highlighted was a competitiveness crisis, where the share of world trade has gone down, for example, and Europe is facing some economic challenges around the world. And the third one is public support for the European project is going down in several countries, not only Britain. This was the three issues that he highlighted, Cameron, for why the EU has to change. So not only does the Britain's relationship with the EU change, but also the EU probably has to change itself. And again, I think he was onto something there. I think he made a very good point. So there is clearly a case for change, both from a British point of view, but also from an EU point of view. Now, so if we agree that the EU has to change in the UK's relationship with the EU may have to change in order for Britain to remain inside, what then can Britain possibly do to drive change in Europe? And what could such a settlement look like? And I've identified four, I think, points of leverage that Britain has, and that other EU partners who want to see change may have as well. And why I think Britain has the opportunity to drive change in Europe, if it wants to. The first one is that the UK is heading for some fundamental changes, and that could involve EU treaty changes. EU treaty changes will need approval of all 27 member states, including Britain. I think that is an opportunity to reshape not only the Eurozone, but also the relationship between Eurozone and non-European countries. And this is basically just a showing the various different proposals for further EU integration that are at the table at the moment. So you have Bank Resolution Fund, for example. You have a Eurozone budget. You have ECB as a single supervisor, which has already been agreed by ministers. You have debt mutualisation proposals in the Eurozone. A lot of these proposals that are on the table will all require quite some fundamental changes in Europe. And I think when those changes take place, it's right for Britain and other non-European countries to try to get in and make sure that the changes in Europe also work for them. There are other changes as well, I'm just sort of highlighting here. I think in total there are seven broad proposals for what more further Eurozone integration would look like. Seven broad proposals, some of them the Irish government seems to agree with others. The Irish government seems to disagree with. But the point here is that the Eurozone is heading for more integration, most likely. How much integration we don't know, to what extent Eurozone countries can agree amongst themselves to some of these proposals we don't know either. But clearly there are changes taking place in Europe to which Britain will need its approval. And this will be an issue that the British government will try to highlight, that if you press ahead with more integration, then you will need to have us on board. And secondly, we will ask for our own concessions. That's the first point, why I think Britain will try to drive change in Europe. The second one is, and this is an interesting one and very important one for Ireland. If the change is binary, which it is, if the choice is binary between Britain staying in the EU on new terms or Britain leaving, then what will Europe choose? So David Cameron has promised a referendum by 2017-2018, an enough referendum preceded by what he says is a negotiation, a renegotiation of the UK's membership terms. That means that all of a sudden the choice for Europe has become between Britain staying in on new terms or Britain leaving altogether. It's a very big gamble, if you're the UK government, but it's also a very big gamble if you're Europe. So I'll just put this to you. If the choice is between Britain leaving and Britain staying in on new membership terms, what will EU partners choose? Well, I think that they will choose probably to work with the UK. Because if you think about it, without Britain and the EU as a note here, for example, the EU single market was shrink by 15%, 260 billion pounds or euros, it might be euros, worth of annual exports to the UK will face extra costs, including those coming from Ireland. The EU budget would be billions lighter. And as we discussed over lunch, you might even have border controls between Ireland and the UK. I mean, it will be so many negative consequences for Europe if Britain left the EU that I think faced with that choice, it will be in Europe's interest to negotiate with the UK for a new settlement. The third reason why I think Britain can drive change in Europe is that again, without the UK in the EU, the balance of power in the EU's decision-making machine will tip radically in favour of the Mediterranean bloc. And this is a real one for Ireland. Because if you look, what this graph basically shows is that in the council of ministers, where a lot of decisions are being taken, usually with the co-decision of the European Parliament, but I would argue the council of ministers, sorry, it's the most important decision-making body in the EU in many ways. With the UK at the moment, you have a blocking minority in the council of ministers here for the Norden bloc, what I call the Norden bloc. So the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Germany. I include Germany in that one. Some of that is sometimes wishful thinking, but at the same time, the Mediterranean bloc, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, also have a blocking minority in the council of ministers. But if Britain left, you see what happens here, which is the three pillars on the right. All of a sudden, the Norden bloc will lose its blocking minority, whilst the Mediterranean bloc will strengthen its blocking minority and radically strengthen its proportional power in the council of ministers. And these are all voting weights. So they are from 2014, 2017, 2014, they will be mostly based on population size. So therefore, in the council of ministers absent the UK, with respect, Ireland and Sweden could well be stuffed. And that wouldn't be good. So I think that there is a, that's of course being a bit dramatic, but clearly, if you're in Northern liberal country, you see what this is a problem. Again, therefore, I argue that, I think if you're faced with an in-out choice, faced with Britain staying in on new terms or faced with Britain leaving, a lot of countries, particularly in the North and also Germany, will definitely want Britain to stay, even if that means new membership terms. Finally, the UK has massive global reach and it's a hard power. And therefore, as we mentioned, that discussed over lunch here, Britain would always be part of security Europe. Security Europe as opposed to sort of single market Europe or social Europe, Britain will always be a key player in security Europe because it's actually one of, let's face it, two military powers in Europe. Well, Europe sort of has two and a half military powers with Germany being the half, but France and the UK are clearly accounting for the hard power in Europe. So therefore, Britain will always remain at the center of security in foreign policy Europe. And again, with Britain outside the EU, you would have the UK there sort of as a second voice in global affairs to that which the EU represents. It would be a very strange situation. I think that would hurt the EU's foreign policy credentials, which some would argue aren't necessarily that strong as they are, but it's a point that stands nonetheless. So I think there are reasons why Britain can drive change in Europe. I think it is a very sort of, it's something that is very strongly felt within the UK itself now. The UK for a very long time has suffered from a bit of a lack of diplomatic confidence, but I think lately, particularly following Cameron's speech, there is a genuine feeling that we are a big power. We can drive change in the European Union, not least because of these four reasons. So, and it's very important to understand that, to understand what the British government is set. Just moving on to domestic politics in the UK. If you just wonder, if you wonder where the UK sat at the moment and particularly conservative party, I will tell you, there is, it's a very interesting debate going on within the sort of SW1 scene, within the Westminster scene in the UK. So basically you have, as you know Cameron gave his speech where he outlined his, what he considered his new vision for the European Union. And as I said, a referendum in 2017, 2018. And there is now intense positioning going on within the UK, both within the political part of the scene, but also more generally, for what exactly Cameron should be asking for, when he goes to Europe to renegotiate Britain's membership terms. That is subject to intense debate. Now, a key player here will be the conservative party, because it's the biggest party at the moment. It's the biggest party in the government. And as you know, from having followed the UK debates, it does a lot of times have interesting things to say about Europe. So it's very interesting. It will be key to look at this conservative party to see where Britain will be, to see where Britain is going in Europe. And I will say there are three different groups within the conservative party. On the one hand, you have sort of a reform camp, who think that when Cameron talks about his great vision about a changed Europe, that simply means reform, you know, completing the single market, completing single market services, less regulation, better regulation, stronger filters at an early stage in the decision making process. It means reform in the working time directive, so it no longer applies to junior doctors on call, for example, and so forth and so on. It means a slimmer budget, a better focused modern budget. They're a classical sort of reform package, the liberal reform package. That's what they think. That's one group. There's a big second group within the conservative party who thinks that when Cameron talks about his new Europe, he talks about repatriation. He talks about bringing power back from Brussels over social employment law, over policing crime, over fisheries, perhaps over farming, and possibly some other areas. That's the second group. And they say that if we get some powers back, then we'll vote to stay in. If we don't get the powers back, we'll vote to leave. Then there's a third group within the conservative party who basically say we cannot do opt-outs anymore, it hasn't worked for us. It's a mess and we get stuffed anyway whenever we try to opt-out. They introduced the working time directive via Health and Safety article. Let's stop with this opt-out nonsense and let's do the clean option. Let's become like Norway or Switzerland, but primarily Norway, but with an influence, a say over the laws that have that impact on us. That's a very big difference because Norway has no impact over the laws that impact on them. So that's what I call the EA plus model. And then you have some who haven't really figured out what the hell they want to be frank. But that's sort of a, but I think those are basically the three broad groups. And I think in that third category, I would also include those who want Britain to leave altogether. Again, they don't really know what that means. Some of them talk about Switzerland, others talk about Norway, others talk about simply becoming a member of the World Trade Organization and hope for the best. But those are three groups. And there's an intense debate because it's a fascinating debate going on within the conservative party between those three groups. And the way that debate lays out and where it lands will very much depend on what the conservatives put in their manifesto going into the next general election. In other words, that will decide what is the threshold for the conservative party. When they decide, if they're going to recommend an in-vote in that referendum. So that debate should be followed. It's a fascinating debate. Sometimes you despair, sometimes you look at it with amusement, but it's a debate because of its implications that has to be taken seriously. Now, everyone always asks, you know, what do you think the Tories will do? Which is an interesting question for reasons I just outlined. But an equally interesting question is, if you want to know where Britain is heading in Europe, what will Labour do? Because Labour is ahead in all the opinion polls. The UK economy is not working particularly well with few signs of it picking up before 2015. I mean, a lot of things can happen. But there is a reasonable chance, possibility, risk, that Labour wins the next general elections. And all of the things that we're talking about when it comes to Tories and Europe, and Britain and Europe, may not materialise. Then the ball will be in Labour's court. The question is, what will Labour do? And this is a very fascinating debate as well. And in my view, Labour basically has two options. Option number one is, because now again, the cat is out of the bag. The conservatives have promised an in-vote referendum. They cannot go back on that. Cameron has said that if he wins the 2015 elections without an outright majority, he will go to the people in that referendum. There's no turning back. So Labour has two options in how to respond to this. Option one is very simple. Gamble on Europe not becoming an issue. And if you ask people in straight questions, how, where do you rank Europe as a, you know, as a, relative, when it comes to relative importance, to your voting decisions. And most people say, well, five, six, maybe seven. The economy, you know, the classical kind of taxation and spending issues always rank very high up. Europe is usually far down. So Labour may want to gamble on Europe not becoming an issue in a general election and just say, we'll stay clear of the referendum debate. We'll say that we are committed to some vague reforms in Europe, but we will not give you the public a choice. That's option one. Option two is very simple. Match the Conservatives' pledge and promise it in that referendum. Now, this is a massive gamble for Labour because Labour cannot go into an election and say that they are committed to renegotiating Britain's membership terms because they're already rubbish that idea. They've spent years criticizing Tories for that approach. So they will have to offer a straight in-out referendum with the in option very much being the status quo and the out option being out. And an interesting question is, will the UK public be more or less likely to vote to stay in if they're presented with a status quo as opposed to presented with renegotiated membership terms? And to be honest, that illustrates the extent of the risk involved for Labour in calling in that referendum. So therefore they might want to stay clear of it. But these are the two options that Labour has. In my view, they don't have any other options. They have to choose between those two. And again, it would be an interesting one to watch. And of course, it would be an irony, a tragic one, if Labour is the party that pulls Britain out of the European Union. Right. So with that in mind, what would be a... The question everyone is asking, at least those who have the fortune or misfortune to look at Britain and Europe debate, what could a new sentiment look like? What would allow the UK to stay in the European Union? What can guarantee, what can be a guarantee that when that in-nav vote comes around, the UK public will vote yes and remain committed happy members of Europe ever after? And we don't know, to be true, to be honest. I mean, we don't know. We don't know exactly what such a sentiment could look like. But I think there has to be some things. There needs to be some changes in order for Britain to remain inside the EU long-term because of reasons that we just discussed. For those of you who are sort of policy geeks, lack of better expression, like I am, and sort of obsess about the details of European legislation, I think there are various ways in which you can create a feasible, credible reform package that will allow the UK to stay in the EU. Now, before I just go down this list very quickly, I want to say this, I think that by far the best outcome out of this whole Britain-Europe debate is if you have a merger between the discussion about what Britain needs in terms of new membership terms and a wider discussion in the EU, a serious, thorough discussion about what the EU should and should not be involved in, how you can reconcile user integration with, for example, the single market, a serious EU-wide discussion. That's the best option that the British debate emerges with an EU-wide debate rather than British exceptionalism because I think British exceptionalism could spill over and it could end up with Britain just being the odd one out and with opt-outs, with new arrangements and it would just be in very awkward arrangement. If we can do this at the level of 27 member states, that would be by far the preferable outcome and that's what I think Ireland is actually very important. But what can we look at? Well, I think there are several ways in which you can sort of convince the British to stay inside whilst also improving the European Union the way the EU works. First of all, I think you need some sort of single market safeguard as the eurozone is pressing ahead with more integration and this is a quite technical discussion but a very important one because if you think about it, if you're Britain or if you're Sweden of that matter, it's a bit uncomfortable situation that all of a sudden you have a banking union evolving which with the very sort of where the ECB all of a sudden becomes a very powerful supervisor and also almost a regulator. So it becomes sort of a parallel regulated supervisor. It's not meant to be a regulator but it's very difficult to separate between a supervisor and regulator. So it's almost become a parallel regulatory structure which exists with a single market structure and the interaction between those two is very tricky. So if you're Sweden or the UK, you want safeguards to make sure that all of a sudden you don't have a situation where the 17 euros on countries basically start to write the rules for all 27 member states. Let's say on capital requirements for banks, for example, where both Sweden and the UK have chosen to have higher capital requirements for their banks than the eurozone norm. So you may want some sort of safeguard there which I think is absolutely justified similarly in similar vein, if you're Britain, you want to have safeguards to make sure that there's no sort of pressure for euro denominated business to migrate inside the eurozone under the new banking union. And that's a big issue as well. It's a technical issue but it's a very important issue. For example, when it comes to London-based clearing houses which the ECB has demanded move inside the eurozone if they are to clear derivatives contracts in euros, it's a very important issue for the UK because what the British government has done is taken the ECB to court over that ECB demand. And though it sounds technical, and it's a pending court case, though it sounds very technical, it's of huge political importance because if the ECB, if the ECJ was to rule that ECB is right to require euro denominated business to move inside the eurozone in order to do business in euros, if the ECJ is to rule in favour of that, then that basically means, if you think about it, that Britain is in a situation where it's out of the euro but run by the euro, and then it becomes like Norway anyway. It will massively undermine the case for Britain's continued EU membership. You cannot have a perception in the UK where the perception is that we are run by the euro. The EU is a political extension of the eurozone. If that perception takes hold, then it becomes much more difficult to defend the UK's EU membership. So therefore, it sounds technical, but it's extremely important. I cannot stress that enough how important it is that the single market stays intact. So therefore, there maybe needs to be some single market safeguards, for example, which we had before Christmas at the so-called European Banking Authority, where you now have a requirement that you need majority, both amongst the participating countries and the non-participating countries. So basically, the eurozone and non-eurozone countries both have to have separate majorities before the decision can be passed. That's a beautiful compromise, in my view, that again, it went down really well in the UK because it did show that you can achieve fair change when you put your mind to it. And that is a very important issue if Britain is to stay in the EU. There are several different other areas that are to do with not eurozone integration, but just may need to happen anyway, which is outlined here. One interesting idea would be to go for more liberalisation in the single market, which particularly is needed in the services sector. And here, it's not possible to do at the level of all 27 member states because some countries in the south are blocking it. But it was very interesting to use this reform drive from within the UK to have a limited number of member states pressing head with it. And the so-called enhanced cooperation, which some of you will be familiar with. Let's try that. Let's see what that leads you. Let's have Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and others table a proposal for enhanced cooperation, like administering a market in professional services and see where that takes us. That will be a very pragmatic way to show to the British that look, this agenda is not dead. Services sector, the service sector has massive potential in Europe. And this is what we're doing to unlock that potential. Imagine what an irony again it will be if Cameron's referendum threat would actually trigger more liberalisation in the single market. Again, that in my view will be a great compromise and also will actually benefit Europe greatly, financially and economically. And we're doing some work on that at the moment. And I think these are the types of solution that we need to work on. And the more reform in Europe, the less demand for repatriation from the UK. The more we can do things at the EU level, the less Britain will go for unilaterally. That's the thing to remember. Similar with strengthening national parliaments. We have several ideas for how that could happen. We can go into that perhaps in discussions, but again, something that would benefit both the EU as a whole, but also Britain. And again, we'll convince the British that change is possible and it's possible to make the EU more democratic. In my view, national parliaments remain sort of the link between voters, the solid link between voters and decisions at the EU level. The European parliament is still to grow into that role. So therefore I think it's vital to strengthen national parliaments. There are several other areas that we can go into, but basically I will just say this. The JHA block opt out. So this is the justice and home affairs issue that the UK will have to tackle anyway. Because under a quirk in the Lisbon Treaty, the UK must decide before June 2014 whether to opt out of 135 EU laws in crime and policing on block or remaining side and allow the ECJ to have ultimate jurisdiction over these laws. And then they can opt back in. If they choose to opt out, they can opt back into them on a case-by-case basis. But this is an issue that is very unilateral that Britain can make without changing the common treaties because it's already provided for the Lisbon Treaty. So if you hear anything about that particular debate, it's almost separate to all these other things going on because it's happening anyway. But that's a thing that Britain cannot avoid. So that's happening anyway. And unfortunately, it's unilateral. There are other areas, EU budget, fisheries, employment law is, of course, a controversial one. And then the most controversial one is free movement of people. And I will finish on this. Now, free movement of people, in my view, has been greatly beneficial to both Britain and Europe as a whole. But it's also the one area that is constant at the front line in the UK, in the British debate about the EU. But it's also one of the areas where I think, again, Britain has benefited the most. And it has to be managed. A lot can be said about it. It's a very complicated discussion. But I will say, if you look at free movement, the single market, a lot of these areas where there clearly are a very strong case to be made for Britain to remain inside the EU and for EU as a whole, having brought a lot of benefits, the more you can do in these areas, there is sort of soft but also still meaningful in reform terms. The less pressure there will be to do stuff in the more complicated areas. So we'll finish on this note. From an Irish point of view, you have so much to gain, I think, from sort of rowing behind the UK in this reform agenda and look at areas where this could benefit the Irish government and the Irish economy and the Irish political scene as well. Because, again, if Britain is seen as having allies and getting things done in Europe in some of these reform areas, then the likelihood of it remaining inside the EU will radically increase. Thank you.