 Okay. Thank you. Thanks to the organizers. Thank you to Cesar for the invitation. I will present this paper, which is done with Alexander Cano, Cesar Mantilla, Laura Prada, Meardo Restrepo, Cesar and Laura are in the floor, so if you have questions, you can do it to them. And then this is, this paper is about the trade of between liquidity and insurance. And what we do is that we apply lab in the field experiment to Colombian rural workers. So the main objective of the paper is to understand this trade off in the context of this population. And what we do is to propose this experiment, which they basically have to choose between receiving a payment in cash or in a voucher. So I will explain that in a moment. Given the limit of time that I have around eight minutes, I will skip all the slides related to regressions, outputs, and I will basically present the intuition part of the paper. So regarding the motivation, you know, Colombia is the OECD country with the highest self-employment rate, which half of the employment, roughly speaking, is an informal employment. And this somehow resembles the, you know, the dual labor market structure in which there is a primary labor market, say formal labor market, which basically pays higher salaries and higher returns to education. And then there is another sector, say the informal one, which is characterized by the absence of non-wage benefits. There are no, there is no job security, or at least it's scarce, stability and safety nets are, say, scarcer. On the other hand, rural workers are more exposed to jobs and somehow they are, the labor markets that they face are more informal, you know. And the numbers in the Colombian context say that in the rural markets the self-employment rate is as high as 80 percent, which is a lot. On the other hand, these people have access to limited constrained financial services, which are usually used to cover basic needs. And there is also evidence showing that the effects of shocks on health and education are more persistent. So taking everything together is hard to formalize rural workers and that's why it's important to understand well this tradeoff. So why formalizing rural labor, rural labor, sorry, it's hard. Well, they both, users and providers may have distorted perception of non-wage benefits. You know, universal health coverage may cause more and more loss of issues also people that live in rural areas are subject to higher transportation or transaction costs. And on the other hand, they are exposed to all the risks, different from risk related to health and most important, risk related to production, right. So production in the rural areas is riskier. And probably the risk is more important, more salient than health risks. On top of that, it's harder to enforce any agreement that we can think of or we can somehow implement to a low change. You know, Colombia is also characterized and that's part of the name of this conference by this strong inequality and that inequality is even stronger in the rural areas, when you compare workers with land tenants that the inequality is very, very large. And then you will think of the system that we have right now in Colombia, the system makes the or would make the land tenants to pay and the question then is how can we convince these land tenants to pay for the social security of their workers, right. Even if there is a change in the law such that they have to pay then how you can monitor these contracts between the land tenants and the workers. So in principle, any contract with a stronger element associated to the social security for the workers is harder to implement in the rural area. Then what this means is that we need rural labor contracts that on one hand are attracted to workers, on the other hand that they are not blocked by the tenants and besides that, that they go beyond health and pension coverage. This paper is related with point one. So in dealing with this general question on how to make more formal labor markets in the rural context, we started by analyzing what happened to workers. So what is our lab in the field experiment about? The question there is about how a voucher payment is attractive to workers in exchange for better insurance and somehow we are inspired by the European voucher system where schemes are subsidized domestic services. You know what there is known as the black market. They have this voucher system to make these domestic employees be somehow contribute to the social security system. So what we do is that we in the lab, we make subjects to perform labor activity, somehow give the idea to the people that they are going to be paid by their work. So what we do is that they have to separate beans from white and dark beans. And then basically they have to choose between either be paid by cash, which is 30,000 Colombian pesos, probably speaking a daily minimum wage. And they have to receive the comparison with different vouchers that increase or decrease in their value, the expected value from 25 to 34,000 Colombian pesos. And then there is an income shock, which is our measure of risk in which they have a chance to lose 20,000 pesos. And then this happens when they receive the cash. But if they, okay, perfect. And if they receive the voucher, then that happens with 10% of probabilities, okay. We did this with rural workers in the department of Quindio, which is in the middle of the coffee region in Colombia. So what they receive is this kind of table. As I said before, we randomized whether they started by facing, you know, from the lowest voucher to the highest voucher or the other way around. But basically they have to choose, right, whether to receive the payment in cash or voucher. This is the relationship in terms of expected values of the voucher and cash. So we start with some of the vouchers that have an expected value smaller than the cash and then others that pay more. We also randomized whether the show-up fee is paying cash or voucher, okay. And we do this just to test whether there is a transaction cost effect that makes people to not take the voucher instead of the cash. Okay, so these are some photos. We implemented this in all the municipalities in Quindio. This is, sorry, this is the order of the events within the lab. They first, of course, they have to sign on informal consent. They first make the decisions in all the comparison between the cash and all the vouchers. Then they have to separate the beans. And then we draw one of the decisions to pay. And depending on the decision, they receive a voucher or the cash. And then we implemented the final questionnaire. And probably this is the most important message from this experiment, which is that the show-up fee, I told you they either receive cash or voucher and there are no differences there. So at least for these people, this dimension of transaction cost is not important. Maybe because they are already in the urban part of the municipality. So they somehow already sunk the cost to arrive to the market. And then here, what I show you is the different decisions related to whether they receive the voucher in ascending way or a descending way. So in the horizontal axis, I have the different schemes of the voucher, and this is the cumulative probabilities. And we find that there is a difference between receiving the vouchers in a descending or an ascending way. And I think this gives also an important point related to policy implementation regarding this topic. Most important, we also did the same experiment to students in Armenia, in Kindio. And we find that in both groups, when they are exposed to the voucher, the rule of work is take the vouchers from 32% to 56%. This is the number for the more generous voucher. And for the students, these numbers are smaller. They are saying that the students are somehow value more the liquidity. But also this says how hard is to implement social security by vouchers. Because even if this payment, which is the largest one, the only half of people takes that. Even if in expected value, they receive more, they don't take the voucher as often as we thought. So just I think I already mentioned this. So just to sum up, we introduce a very simple insurance scheme. This scheme seems to be insufficient in the sense that they are not voluntarily prone to take this voucher. Only with this more generous voucher, half of people is willing to take it. The sending order is important because this means that probably if we think in a policy in this direction, we can implement first a policy, a very generous policy. And then with time, we can make it less generous. And I think this is the main message. Thank you. Thank you.