 The 1st Cavalry Division Air Mobile was activated in July 1965 at Fort Benning, Georgia, giving the Army five types of combat divisions, infantry, armored, mechanized, airborne, and now air mobile. In September of 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division Air Mobile was deployed to Vietnam. In the era phrasing Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the introduction of air mobility will greatly increase the Army's capability to meet all kinds of threats. It places the Army on the threshold of an entirely new approach to the conduct of land battles. The designation Air Mobile expresses the ability to move by air and is what makes this division different, its greater degree of air mobility than any other. Many of these men of the 1st Cavalry Air Mobile are the same men who participated in developing the techniques of an air mobile division. When testing the concepts of air mobility, they were members of the 11th Air Assault Test Division and the 2nd Infantry Division. The last test in which they participated and which proved that air mobility on a division scale was practicable, took place in the Carolina maneuver area in November of 1964. The Tactical Operations Center is the heart of the division's command and control capability. The tempo and great distances characteristic of air mobile operations demand flexible and continuous communication with fast moving combat units. This results in a heavy reliance on voice radio for communications. In order to maintain close control, commanders and their staffs move with as well as communicate with their forces. An aerial operations center allows a commander to accompany his units into the heat of battle. Although tactical air mobile units rely largely on voice radio for communications, scale down air transportable radio teletype facilities are used for communications between the division and major subordinate elements. Here a request for aerial surveillance gets prompt attention from the aviation group. Aerial surveillance is needed to identify, locate and report enemy targets within the division's operational area. The increased dispersion and mobility of an air mobile division increases the need for timely and accurate intelligence. To produce that intelligence, the aviation group relies largely on visual and photographic acquisition of targets. Various Mohawks, however, are also equipped with side looking airborne radar, with strobe units for night photography and with infrared devices. The majority of missions flown are for specific search, for example to reconnoiter a particular area for suspected enemy missile sites. Mission completed, the Mohawk returns home with critical photographic information that will soon be available to headquarters. While the film is being processed, the pilot is debriefed for additional information on enemy activities that he may have spotted. Within the division, imagery interpretation experts pinpoint the location and nature of enemy positions. A second major intelligence capability of air mobile divisions, which is employed at battalion, brigade and division levels, is the visual location of enemy movements. Reconnaissance patrols, slipped past enemy lines and landed by helicopter also contribute significant intelligence on enemy activities. This can also be conducted during night operation and periods of low visibility. Weather service is usually furnished to the air mobile units by the Air Force as directed by joint procedures. 24 hour and 72 hour forecasts are transmitted to subordinate Air Force elements in the area several times daily. These outlooks, together with local observations at division base, are incorporated into intelligence summaries provided the division staff four times daily. During instrument flight conditions, air traffic control elements provide en route navigation and regulation assistance around the clock. As with any division, the commander is responsible for proper use of his air space, but with air mobile units, coordination becomes more demanding. The movements of helicopter formations and surveillance aircraft within the combat zone are planned by individual headquarters and by tactical operation centers. This devices range from radar, landing point lights, panels and placed by pathfinders and radio communications. All these devices may be used in one hastily set up forward area such as this helicopter refueling pad where traffic however brief is assuredly heavy. The Air Force elements coordinate movement of their supporting craft through the corridors within the Army controlled block of air space. The tests show that Army air traffic regulation systems are sound, practicable, capable of moving large numbers of aircraft and are compatible with other services. It is now D-Day minus one. Plans have been made and operation orders issued. Final coordination is affected and instructions issued by the commander of an air mobile helicopter battalion to his staff and company commanders. They in turn brief their platoon leaders and pilots and make last minute plans for the attack. As H-hour approaches, details are checked here and by every unit commander throughout the division. This operation will move two brigades of three battalions each, more than 100 miles to seize bridgeheads 50 miles behind enemy lines. During this test exercise, troops of the 82nd Airborne Division represented the enemy. D-Day, assault helicopters arrive in their pre-designated pickup zones. Troops are loaded and within less than an hour they will be on their objectives, disrupting enemy supply and communications lines and closing his escape routes. We have seen that the Air Mobile Division has excellent capabilities for intelligence and control, two ingredients essential for success on the battlefield. Now let's look at the capability that is expressed in its name, Air Mobility. By using only its organic aircraft, the Air Mobile Division can airlift simultaneously one-third of its combat assault elements, giving it mobility unequaled by any other unit. When Army aircraft are reinforced with aircraft from the Air Force and with the use of airborne techniques to put assault units on the objective, this capability is increased tremendously. These varied mobility means are the distinctive features of Air Mobile Units. Based on the objective, their mission is the same as any combat unit, to close with and destroy the enemy. The backbone of the Division's ground-based artillery is provided by three 105 Howitzer battalions. The lightweight Howitzer is sling-lifted by UH-1D helicopters, familiar called QE, or internally loaded in CH-47 Chinooks. The Howitzers are employed in roles similar to any Division artillery. It may precede, follow, or accompany the main body of the supported force. For placing suppressive fire close to the maneuver element, aerial rocket artillery provides a highly mobile capability. These helicopters, armed with 2.75-inch rockets, can deliver effective fire support with 300-foot ceilings and one-half-mile visibility. They also assure readily available fire support when ground-based artillery is being displaced. The displacement of ground-based artillery units is rapid, with the weapon's seldom out of action for more than 28 minutes. Pre-planned night displacement of artillery batteries when supported by pathfinders can be accomplished as well and as rapidly as during daylight. With this mobility, Howitzer battalions are able to provide continuous fire support to supported brigades. While supporting fires soften up the objectives, protection for the troop columns en route is provided by armed helicopters of the aerial weapons companies. By ranging ahead of troop carriers, escort aircraft neutralize enemy anti-aircraft weapons, draw enemy fire away from helicopter formations, and divert the main force around heavily defended enemy positions. Original concern about the possible vulnerability of helicopter formations to ground fire has been eased by experience in Vietnam. The exposure time of helicopter formations is considerably reduced by the altitude and approach routes flown. The nap of the earth technique, flying only a few feet above treetops or behind treelines, gives an enemy only seconds to react before the craft disappears from view. This same technique also makes detection of helicopter formations by high-performance aircraft extremely difficult. This has shown that the average formation can be heard only 32 seconds before it comes into sight and is in view only 50 seconds before touchdown. Within 35 to 80 seconds after touchdown, the last aircraft departs the area. Also normal noise levels associated with combat units, especially armor, limit an enemy's ability to hear aircraft approaching. In one sense, however, exposure of helicopter formations can even be turned into an asset. An enemy hearing helicopters or observing apparent troop landings in several different directions has no way of knowing where the main force is without sending out patrols. He must fragment his unit to prepare for all eventualities. This capability for deception and surprise can be fully exploited during combat operations. Armed helicopters traveling with the troop-carrying helicopters disrupt enemy defenses and keep his forces disorganized until the troop carriers arrive on the objective. As air mobile operations frequently take units beyond the range of core artillery, a greater requirement is placed on the air force to provide close air support. Only 40 minutes after liftoff, the lead infantry elements arrive to secure objectives behind enemy lines. As the brigade attack gains momentum, additional units arrive as reinforcements and to seize other objectives. The versatility of air mobile units is improved by their partial airborne capability, another effective means of delivering large numbers of troops on the objective. After the initial assault, helicopters are redistributed to air-landed and air-dropped units to increase their mobility. The rain that prohibits aircraft landings is no barrier to air mobile troops. Infantry units can repel into an otherwise inaccessible area to seize vital installations and engineers can soon have a helipad operational. From the various landing zones, the units move quickly into concealment and then move out to seize objectives. Once on the ground, air mobile units still retain a mobility superior to other infantry men. They can leave behind much equipment with the assurance that it can be delivered quickly when needed. Thus unencumbered, air mobile units operate cross-country without depending on road nets. Conversely, small parties can throw up roadblocks which, backed up by suppressive aerial fires, will force enemy units off the roads. Tactical mobility is further enhanced by the ready availability of on-call helicopters to extricate and redeploy units. Whatever the means of delivery, air mobile troops have the distinct advantage of hitting the objective within minutes after liftoff. Not fatigued by a long or time-consuming ground march, they arrive fresh and ready to engage the enemy. A counter-attack by armored units, or combined arms teams, poses one of the most serious threats to air mobile units, which have dispensed with armor and heavy anti-tank weapons in favor of increased mobility. Air mobile units, however, retain effective anti-tank defenses. Organic weapons, such as the law or the 90-millimeter recoilless rifle, back up the rapid construction of tank obstacles. More importantly, bridges or crossings over natural obstacles, such as rivers, can be seized and destroyed by air mobile units, eliminating an enemy's attack or escape routes. Air mobile units, which are not dependent upon such crossing sites, can then press their attack against a constrained enemy who can be pinned against the natural obstacles. An additional anti-tank capability is provided by the air cavalry's effectiveness in locating and reporting potential threats by enemy armor. This coupled with the quick response time of armed helicopters usually allows the employment of aerial anti-tank weapons against the enemy tank columns before they close with air mobile ground forces. Organic aerial anti-tank weapons, such as the SS-11 missile, which can penetrate any known enemy tank, provide a satisfactory screen for air mobile units against enemy armor. Once an objective is taken, there follows the equally important task of holding that objective. This means sustaining operations over an extended period of time in hostile territory without an unacceptable reduction in maneuver, firepower, and logistical support. Such routine functions as the evacuation of prisoners of war and wounded personnel become especially critical with air mobile units. The capacity of helicopters is limited, and large numbers of evacuees with the resulting diversion of manpower and aircraft from other functions could have serious repercussions. This is largely solved by rushing evacuees to central locations by helicopter. From there, they are backhauled by support aircraft returning empty from supply missions. Sustained operations in hostile territory also demand adequate security of forward bases against enemy ground attack. The large number of aircraft in logger areas and near command posts makes detection from the air likely. While air mobile techniques employ minimum ground security forces, they emphasize such passive measures as dispersion of aircraft and concealment of command posts. They also rely heavily on accurate intelligence and the speed with which on-call forces can redeploy to reinforce a base under attack. Perhaps no mission within an air mobile division is more critical to sustained success than adequate resupply. All supplies originate outside the division and are handled by a logistical command. As received by the air mobile division, they are redistributed within the division by the support command. The control center determines where the inbound cargo is most urgently needed, and when the enroute pilot calls in, he is diverted to that site. POL requirements are a major concern to a division that moves fast, far, and travels by air. Resupply must be quick and plentiful. This 500-gallon rubber fuel container helps do the job. These drums can be carried by helicopters or pulled behind light vehicles over rough terrain. The ordinary challenges of resupply are further magnified in an air mobile division by the requirement for minimum stockages in forward areas. Air mobile units must travel light and cannot be burdened with supplies beyond their immediate needs. To cope with that problem, small mixed loads of supplies are tailored, pre-palatized and coated to meet the expected requirements of specific tactical units. Also supplies are put through directly to the using unit whenever possible to cut down on time and man hours. Refueling areas are established concurrently with air mobile attacks and within a short flying time of the objectives. With this combination of coordination and mobility, a barren clearing in the woods is transformed within an hour's time into a din of activity as helicopters, which had just discharged combat troops on objectives, rush in to refuel and then stand by in logger areas for redeployment. Unlike POL, the requirements for rations within an air mobile division are no greater than in standard units, but they are requirements that must be met nevertheless. Both helicopters and organic ground vehicles are used to distribute rations to and within forward areas. Scaled-down purification units, which are quickly set up and readily transportable by air, assure a plentiful supply of safe water from local sources. These lightweight luggajugs are a non-standard item used by air mobile units. In any division, the systems and functions are dependent on each other for success. Firepower is of little import without intelligence, mobility of little consequence without communications, and all of these systems will soon deteriorate without proper maintenance procedures. The normal problems associated with aircraft maintenance become potential disasters for a unit requiring high utilization of large numbers of different types of aircraft. To cope with these problems, basic Army maintenance concepts have been modified for the air mobile division. Aircraft maintenance skills at organizational level have been raised. On the spot, repair and rapid parts resupply are emphasized. At organizational level, aircraft maintenance is limited to repairs that can be completed in no more than four hours. Direct support maintenance is performed by aircraft maintenance companies organic to the division, either in forward areas or at the division base. Direct support maintenance is limited to repairs that can be completed in 72 hours. With comparable skills at all division levels, ability to do the job within the time required, not the nature of the maintenance, becomes the determining factor. Higher level maintenance is provided by a non-organic general support maintenance and supply battalion. The air mobile concept has been proven in test. Now in Vietnam, it is being proved in combat. In tactical situations, the distinctive capabilities of the air mobile division are due primarily to its greater strength in organic aircraft. Other divisions in varying degrees can be moved by air. The air mobile division, more than any of the others, can also move itself by air. This is what enables the air mobile division to move rapidly and directly to key objective areas over any kind of terrain and deliver its soldiers fresh and ready for immediate combat. To maintain operations at a rapid tempo and high intensity and respond swiftly to changes in the tactical situation, to support itself logistically within the division area by means of its organic aircraft, to operate in enemy areas using only the enemy's vertical flank to get in and out, and to exploit rapidly any opportunities presented by the enemy and any advantages achieved by other friendly forces. These capabilities will be highly valued in any kind of land warfare. They are particularly desirable for operations against guerrilla forces, including conventional military units that employ guerrilla methods. This is why the 1st Cavalry Division Air Mobile was deployed to South Vietnam soon after it was activated.