 I am going to make three points and two of those are essentially background ones and then the third one is longer and is mostly economic. So the first point is about what is western Balkans. This is not a political geography or economic geography concept, it's basically a group of countries connected by or countries that share common security risks. It was perceived like that by the EU and also locally. So in a way the whole EU process or process of enlargement to the western Balkans, not to the rest of the Balkans, has been driven by these security dynamics. In my opinion that was initially the mistake that was made by the EU and others that were determining this process of enlargement as essentially internally driven. As countries graduate from their animosities they then satisfy conditions to start the process of EU enlargement. So that's the first point I want to make. It's not a mystery so to speak that this has been a rather long process with not necessarily very successful results and that's my second point I want to make. I was involved very much in the preparation of the Thessaloniki Summit with then Greek France and some local governments especially the then government of Serbia and it was clear from the very beginning that it is a process that will disappoint because the level of commitment that goes to local governments but also the EU was ready to invest in this process was relatively low. So we have not been in that sense surprised that ten years hence we actually have one country joining the EU and all the other countries are very far away from joining the EU. So that's the second point I want to make. Now the third point is about economics. The first five or so years after the Thessaloniki meeting were very good from an economic point of view in these very good circumstances let's say from 2003-2004 to 2008 just before the crisis we have seen a relatively dynamic growth in this region and also throughout the Balkans including Greece. The quality of this growth has however been such that it has been developing a lot of vulnerabilities that were recognized at the time. Current account deficit of external imbalances, fiscal imbalances but most of all employment imbalances this was not an employment generating process. It was also industry destructive process so there was a deindustrialization going on. The hope was that this is the first phase that will be then superseded by a process in which then the growth, the production capacities will increase, employment will increase and so on. That was presumed on actually this region by some time becoming the member states of the EU. However in this period what you see is actually deterioration of this intra-regional political and inter-governmental relationship especially in respect of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the question of the Macedonian issue and in Serbia. So the process after Thessaloniki for about five or so years actually disappointed also in that sense that the political developments some of which are with us still have been actually going backwards. You had a greater chance of solving the Bosnian problem in 2003, 2004 and 2005 than you have now that may change tomorrow but at the moment that's how it is. And similarly it was easier, it seemed to me, we were close to solving the Macedonian problem than we are now and so on. So from an economic point of view the crisis was very detrimental because this process was interrupted at the point when the vulnerabilities were at the highest and the instruments were at the lowest. So we have now a situation in the Balkans not just western Balkans throughout the Balkans and perhaps even in a few other countries close to the Balkans that the whole strategy of growth has to be changed with relatively limited policy instruments that are available to these countries and I'll just go through this limited policy space that these countries have. When you look at usual policy instruments they are almost not available to these countries. If you look at the monetary policy most of these countries are actually using euro. So monetary policy is basically disabled. You can say that, I don't know, Bosnia has a currency and Serbia has a currency but that's only name. Basically these countries use euro as a currency. So monetary policy is extremely restricted. In theory you could change that but given that businesses, households, everybody has chosen euro that is not an easy trick to do. So that's one issue. On the fiscal policy issue these are very constrained, basically very constrained countries. They have, some of them, had a similar fate as Ireland being actually, initially, public debt being relatively low initially but now ballooning because of the overall decline or collapse in the corporate sector and also a huge increase in unemployment which obviously drives a lot of social transfers. So now most of these countries, certainly Croatia, even more probably Serbia, also Montenegro and so on, not to mention Bosnia, have a very limited fiscal space in order to do something to stimulate the economy. This also is of course the case of Greece as we all know. So this is basically a Balkan issue if it is not a more general issue. So if you read, for instance, yesterday's comment by IMF on Serbia, you see what the problem is. Monetary policy cannot act before fiscal policy doesn't act and fiscal policy has to act in a dramatic manner and then you need to have structural reforms to spur growth which means if you, the implication of that is you have more about three to four years recession looking ahead of you. That's basically the implication of that. So these are, this is the fiscal policy space. Obviously membership to EU actually helps in this respect but this is not in the cards. The third issue is the third policy is industrial policy as I said these are countries that either haven't developed industry or have deindustrialized. Industrial policy requires significant institutional capacity to be efficiently implemented. Usually when you look at even econometrically you find that countries that have institutional capacity they have successful or let's say at least not unsuccessful industrial policies. Countries with relatively bad, not to say corrupt institutions tend to actually misuse industrial policy. So if you look at the Balkans I think that the limitations of what you can expect from industrial policies are clear. Now the employment policy, if you look at the numbers of employed people in the Balkans these are miserable, if you look at the numbers of unemployed people they are frightening. So the overall social stability in the Balkans is a very serious issue especially if now these nationalistic clashes disappear one hopes that will happen then there will be a social issue to deal with. Now there is very little that these countries are doing on employment policy and there is a limited ability for them to do so. The main so far policy has been basically a passive one, unemployment benefits and retirement which is a problem in itself because you have a huge number of retired people who are a drag on the pension system and you don't have very much anything in terms of active labor market policies and also there is a huge issue of education I have no time for that. And finally the regional policy. There is always a hope that the region could get together and have some regional push. This was the idea that was behind the creation of the CEFTA, the idea essentially being the EU one not the local regional one CEFTA was essentially pushed on the region which actually is one of these good external interventions and what you see there is that the trade barriers when they are taken out which in terms of tariffs they have been with the CEFTA agreement they tend to be superseded but by non-tariff and non-trade barriers. So the hope was that you are creating a larger market which would be important for investors and then you could then you could actually expect investments that will drive the growth of the region. That has been stopped by non-tariff and non-trade barriers. So that may happen in the future but again it's a very limited space there. So if you look at all these things together it is really a region which would need some major economic reconsideration, some major economic policy reconsideration on the part of the EU. It would be clearly necessary especially because and this is my closing point is that if you look at the first five years after 2003 you see a hope that this region will develop on foreign direct investment or foreign investment in general because that was essentially the growth model that EU was exporting. This is not what you can expect for the next five years. Foreign investments in the region are falling. In fact money is running out of the region mostly. So there is a need for a rather basic research rethinking about this whole thing and I think it would be useful if the EU would start looking at this region as an economic rather than a security problem. Thank you very much.