 I'm going to cover more of an Irish dimension than Philip did, obviously. I should let you know that he is an Irish citizen. He was just telling us at lunch that he spent all of his formative years on summer holidays in County Mayo, so I was hoping he would claim that at the beginning. The audience I'm addressing today is a lot more daunting than normal. My normal audience is lecture hall of students, which is a captive audience and an acquiescent audience. So, I will try and rise for the challenge. I want to thank the IIEA, though, for agreeing to host this conference so willingly many months ago. When I mentioned this topic, they immediately said, yes, we will have a conference in May. Thank you very much. I'd also like to thank the speakers who... There's a great line-up of speakers, as you see. Trying to get a line of speakers like this recommend you ask them so far in advance, give them so many options and dates that they simply can't say no. But one thing I didn't realise is that I'm also speaking, and the trick in that situation is to invite speakers who are considerably less accomplished than I am. But I've actually done the opposite today. I've got a longer paper on the IIEA website, and I'm hoping that the presentation today might prompt you to read that, so this is a much shorter version of it. I'm going to read most of my address, I'm afraid, because the argument is too nuanced and structured to risk it otherwise. But I do have some slides to keep your attention and hopefully your interest. So, let me start then with slide one. The result of the presentation is on two specific questions. First, does entering international treaties enhance effective freedom of action for a government? That's a topic that Philip has already addressed. Second, with whom, and this is a relevance to Ireland, does the decision to enter such agreements reside? The electric government of the day or the electric via referenda? I will argue in relation to the first question that international treaties can and very often do substantially enhance the sovereign good of each participant state. I will also argue, following Pringle 2012 in particular, that the signing of such treaties is wholly within the rights of the electric government of the day, subject to certain providers. My interest in such matters arose originally from part of the karate supreme judgement in 1987, and in particular the implications of this judgement for the meaning of sovereignty and hence economic management at a European level. Peter and Gavin were going to talk a lot more detail about karate. I'll just mention it very briefly here. But arising from this judgement, as most of us here know, the advice to the government of the day has been that a referendum had to be held on almost every EU treaty change, even if the current interpretation of economic sovereignty, which I'll address later in the talk, suggests that many of these treaty changes were in fact sovereignty enhancing, not sovereignty diminishing, for the Irish state and its people. This in my opinion has three potentially serious implications or consequences. First, it meant that Ireland's veto in relation to EU treaty changes has had to be exercised not through the democratically elected Irish parliament, but via the vagaries of what was perceived as a mandatory popular referendum, the outcome of which has sometimes little to do with the question on the ballot paper. Second, the implication of this is that Ireland could have exited the eurozone, or indeed the EU, almost by default, even when over four-fifths or more of our democratically elected representatives did not wish this outcome. Third, they may have constrained the necessary and often urgent developments at an EU level, as in the case of the eurozone crisis. How often have we heard, quoting paper from a recent Financial Times article, that part of the problem is that some desirable change may have to be put to a referendum in Ireland? The quality judgement, though, was revisited in Pringle 2012, and at some length, a topic I will return to in detail later in the paper. Let me turn first, though, to the concept of economic sovereignty. The German philosopher, Emmanuel Kant, I was told a long time ago as a student, if you ever think you have a new idea, or you think somebody else has a new idea, check first with Emmanuel Kant, so I decided to do this. The German philosopher, Emmanuel Kant, of course, never used the term spillover effect, beloved of economists. But in fact, this is what he was implicitly referring to in his writings over two centuries ago. He held, as you can see on the slide, that state action that is a hindrance to freedom when properly directed, Kant said, when properly directed, support and maintain freedom if the state action is aimed at hindering actions which themselves would hinder the freedom of others. And he argued further, such state coercion does not reduce freedom, but instead provides the necessary background conditions needed to secure freedom. So my task here is to put this argument simply, Kant has really said it all, but my task is to put this argument in a modern economic setting and crucially to extend its logic which Philip had already done in the context of a heavily globalised world to nations. It has been clear for a long time that individuals, by cooperating, enhance not diminish their freedom of action. Let us take the simplest example of all, legally binding traffic control signals. As individuals, we cannot drive as we wish without endangering the lives of others and vice versa. In these circumstances, we do not seed overall individual freedom of action, as Emmanuel Kant argued, because without this pooling of decision-making, we would not be able, in the first place, to risk driving at all on the roads. Hence, the counterfactual to not pooling decision-making is in fact an almost total loss of individual freedom compared to what results from the enforcement of common traffic control rules. Let me give you another example. There is an unavoidable interdependency between you and your closest neighbours. What you do has an impact on them and what they do on you. The individual is not free, for example, to burn rubbish in his or her back garden. This is to protect a much more important freedom, namely the ability for all to enjoy the pleasure of their gardens free from severely polluting smoke fumes. And so it is with nations. Unless we wish to pursue a policy of total autarchy or self-sufficiency in economic terms. But even here, we are not protected from the actions of other countries that Philip has already mentioned. We cannot stop the wind blowing harmful particles across the Irish Sea. We cannot counteract the fact that rogue states, criminals, illegal immigrants and terrorists do not respect national boundaries and hence that their activity is international in nature. We cannot prevent the adverse consequences of the actions of others generating climate change. And without extreme restrictions on the freedom of our own citizens, we cannot cut ourselves off from, quote, interference via electronic means and satellites from the idea and influence of others outside our shores. A policy of total economic self-sufficiency, of course, has never been pursued in Ireland even in the 1930s. The Irish economy would revert to the economic conditions of the Middle Ages in months without imported energy supplies and other vital imports such as steel and machinery. I ask you to reflect if all of those were cut off what could be actually produced in this country. However, just with, for example, football, if we want to participate in the international game, we must have common rules of engagement. Imagine, for example, the chaos, and I'm using this, I saw the German ambassador here was using the parallel and the financial times had a big feature coming up to the Champions League to make football and the economy, so timing is good maybe. So imagine, for example, the chaos of two different, sorry, two football teams adopting different rules with regard to off-site, the use of the hand and our number of players allowed. We need also, for example, common rules with regard to transfer of players, pitch sides and markings, stadium safety, kit colours and markings. The FAI, to extend the parallel in this instance, pools its decision making with others for the benefit of all. The alternative is no international football at all. And so it is with the game of international economic exchange. We need agreed rules with regard to freedom of movement, freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people. Such a game can take place without a common currency, but exchange rate instability and currency wars can often make the adoption of a common currency a necessary condition for the smooth functioning or exchange between countries. A small country in particular, like Ireland, usually has to join such a currency union. Either De Uru, as with Ireland and the Euro, or de facto, as with Ireland and Stirling prior in 1979. Once adopted, though, a common currency union can impose spillover effects on others without the imposition of commonly agreed rules. Just like we need agreement on traffic or international football rules, we need commonly agreed rules in a currency union to prevent spillover and contagion from one country to another, Ireland or some other member country of the currency union. Without such commonly agreed rules, as Emanuel Kant stated, we seed not gain freedom of action. The alternative is chaos in the currency union, it's possible break up and a return to the vagaries of anonymous international financial markets. Such rules, of course, must be reached by consensus, a different issue for another day. There must also be understood, at least by those implementing them, so a slight diversion from the... I couldn't avoid showing you this slide. It seems that a great man couldn't understand the recent introduction of the black card rule in Gaelic football. So I tore that in to brighten the presentation but back to serious matters now. But sometimes you hear that people don't understand it. I was looking for images for this presentation and came across it and said, I can't resist putting this up, even if it has nothing to do with my presentation. The notion that, then, of individual or state absolute self-government is, and notice Philip has used to this term, a mirage or charade. It is recognised increasingly in the law literature that sovereignty reduces simply to the degree of self-government that your situation allows without running the risk of significant two-way negative spillover effects. The crucial question, of course, is when is this the case? What we know for sure is that the greater the interdependency between nations, the more this will apply. What we also know is that no state, no matter how large, has full freedom of action, as evidenced by the following from two eminent international lawyers at a read. Even the largest and most powerful states cannot achieve their principal purposes, security, economic well-being, and a decent level of amenity for their citizen without help and cooperation of many other participants in the international system. Sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in the perceived self-interest, but in membership in good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international life. That's really re-echoing what Philip was saying. The logic of this argument is that international institutions, especially at an EU level, are in fact the medium to which economic freedom is created or practised rather than a restraint upon it. Indeed, without entering international agreements, the government could be failing to discharge its responsibility to protect the sovereign good. Let me now turn to the second question I posed at the start, namely with whom does the decision to enter international agreements reside? The judgments by Clark Jay and Donald Jay in Pringle 2012 are of particular interest. As they set out the most recent Supreme Court positions on this matter, and both address the issue of sovereignty and their interpretation of this term as expressed in the Constitution. Neither judge is in any doubt that the Irish government has the power to ratify international treaties, including those at an EU level, without recourse to a mandatory referendum. Clark Jay states, the overall position is quite clear. The government enjoys a wide discretion under Article 29.4 to enter international treaties subject only to the obligation to obtain the approval of the DAWL and certain circumstances that of the Eroctor's. Clark Jay then articulates the key limits to such discretion. The limit on the discretion which the government holds arises where the relevant treaty involves Ireland in committing itself to undefined policies not specified in the treaty. The key issue again is when does this apply. The wording in Clark Jay is it must involve a commitment to undefined policies and where such policies subsequently are to be determined by the government. The corollary of this then seems clear to me where policies arising from the treaty change are defined. There is no need for a referendum, a mandatory referendum. It seems then to me that the discretion of the government to commit to international treaties is a lot more expansive than previously thought. As Donald Jay argues forcefully, and I have this on the slide, it is indeed in the nature of international relations and expressly contemplated by the constitution that states will make treaties, enter into trade agreements, form alliances. It is the decision to enter into an agreement or alliance which is the exercise of sovereignty. Donald Jay also makes the important point which arises in relation to article 6 of the constitution and this has always fascinated me. Namely, why is it that the power of the people is invoked so much in relation to EU treaties but not to other treaties or to other areas of vital national interest? Donald Jay again, and the quote is here. Governments have made decisions involving both the expenditure and borrowing of enormous sums of money. In none of these cases has it been suggested that the approval of the people in a referendum is required. Under the constitution, governments are expected and required to make decisions which on occasion may be momentous, including indeed the declaration of war, albeit in that case, with the agreement of Donald Aaron. I'm talking here about a Supreme Court, this is a quote from the Supreme Court judgement 2012. In a represented of democracy, the powers vested in the government, in my opinion, do derive from the people through elections, where each and every person has an equal right to vote. Nowhere can I see that article 3 of the constitution must be interpreted as this power having to derive from a direct purpose. That it appears to me to apply only in the case where there is a clear breach of the constitution. So let me conclude by summarising the key messages perhaps of this presentation. First, there is little doubt that by entering international agreements treaties, the state potentially hugely enhances, not diminishes its freedom of action in pursuit of the sovereign good. Second, it is clear that sovereign economic power or freedom of action is one degree only, depending on the size of the country and its interdependency with the international economy. Third, for a small country like Ireland, such interdependency is both extensive and crucial to economic well-being, and usually involves belonging to a currency union either as I said earlier, or a factory or a factory. Fourth, in the light of greatly increased globalisation, the more realistic legal interpretation of economic-fired freedom outlined in the Pringle judgment must apply. Otherwise, it could have put at risk Ireland's involvement in the European Union with potentially very serious economic consequences. It may also act as a break on the necessary European action, especially in dealing with the currency crisis. Fifth and last, by all means, let the government call voluntary referendum from time to time, not just in relation to EU treaties, but also other treaties and in relation to other major economic decisions. Such referendum, though, should not be mandatory except where there is a non-ambiguous conflict with the constitution. So let me finish with a plea, and like Philip, I'm a strong pro European integration advocate. I have to admit. So it's on your screen. No matter what the current difficulties in the Eurozone, we should never lose sight of the goal of international cooperation and integration. Namely, as Philip says, dealing with the inevitable huge interdependency between nations in the modern world. This interdependency, not just in the economics finance area, but also in terms of climate change, illegal immigration and trafficking of people, and most seriously, the threat of terrorism or military aggression will not go away by forsaking the objective of extensive European cooperation and integration. To do so, in my opinion, would be as delusional as abandoning democracy because it also has some deficiencies. The challenge, therefore, is for Ireland to make the currency union work, especially now in relation to employment, not to abandon it, and thereby hugely undermine the economic and political stability of Europe. Thank you.