 Good morning, good afternoon, or good evening, depending on from where you are joining us this morning. My name is Steve Hadley, and I'm a member of the board of directors of the US Institute of Peace and the moderator for today's discussion. USIP is pleased to have with us today Tom West, the United States special representative for Afghanistan, for an hour long discussion on US engagement with Afghanistan. I'd like to thank everyone tuning in to the live stream, and you can engage with us and with each other on Twitter throughout the event using today's hashtag USIP Afghanistan. We also invite all of you to take part in today's discussion by asking a question using the chat box function located just below the video player on the USIP event page. We ask that you please include your name and specify from where you are joining us. We'll select several questions from among those we receive and use them in the second part of the discussion this morning. As many of you know, USIP was founded by the US Congress over 35 years ago as an independent, nonpartisan national institute with the goal of preventing, mitigating, and resolving violent conflict. USIP has been actively engaged in Afghanistan since 2002, focusing on research, training, and dialogues to reduce the drivers of conflict and enable a durable, inclusive, and peaceful end to the conflict. As we see from the daily headlines coming out of Afghanistan, there is still much more work to be done. USIP continues to support efforts towards an inclusive political process and settlement that will ensure lasting peace and stability in Afghanistan and in the region while protecting the security interests of the United States and our friends and allies and the fundamental rights of all Afghans. Today marks six months since the Taliban's takeover of Kabul. The changes since then have fundamentally altered the US approach to Afghanistan, although the goals of countering terrorism, maintaining regional stability, seeking an inclusive peace, and protecting Afghans' human rights remain. Afghanistan's already struggling economy has deteriorated dramatically and the Afghan people are facing a grave humanitarian crisis. Special Representative and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Afghanistan, Tom West, now has the difficult task of representing and advancing US objectives in Afghanistan. As part of his efforts, he engages in dialogue with representatives of the Taliban, regional leaders, the international community, and Afghan political, civil society, and diaspora, representatives seeking to find ways to assist the Afghan people while protecting US national security. America is lucky to have Tom in this role, given his deep experience in the region and with Afghanistan. And Special Representative West will first provide some introductory remarks on current US policies and priorities in Afghanistan. After that, I will conduct a brief conversation with Tom and then field questions to him from our online audience. So Tom, welcome to USIP. We're grateful to have you. Thank you for taking the time today. Over to you. Steve, thank you for this opportunity. Thank you to those watching virtually, and particular those from Afghanistan and the region. It's a pleasure to be here. USIP, let me first say, has been an extraordinary partner of the United States on Afghanistan issues over four American administrations. I cannot think of an organization on the planet that brings a greater depth of expertise on every enduring national priority that we have in Afghanistan and the region. And so, Steve, we look forward to continuing this partnership with you under very changed and challenging circumstances. I don't want to take up too much time with prepared remarks, but I do want to touch on a few priorities. I want to offer thoughts about, as Steve said, where we are six months after the Taliban takeover in August. First, it struck me that our goals today in Afghanistan are not too terribly different from what they were a decade ago when we had over 100,000 American troops in Afghanistan. We wish to see and to support the emergence of a peaceful state that never again harbors terrorists who threaten the United States, our allies, or others, and in which the rights of all its people, women and men, girls and boys, are upheld. And in our strong view, diplomacy with the Taliban, diplomacy with our allies, diplomacy with powers in the region, is an essential means as we seek to achieve these objectives. I want to assure this group that the most urgent priority animating diplomacy as well as American decision-making on Afghanistan is to meaningfully address the humanitarian and economic crises in Afghanistan. I think we could spend a lot of time exanimating the causes of the current humanitarian and economic collapse. It is a fact that Afghanistan is undergoing the worst drought it has seen in 30 years. It's a fact that Afghanistan is continuing to suffer from the COVID-19 pandemic that the economy has enduring structural weaknesses that we grappled with during the time of the Republic as well. But too many Afghans are starving today. Too many Afghans are cold this winter. We must all act faster. That goes for the United States. That goes for our allies. That goes for partners in the region. And that goes for the Taliban as well. United States is the leading humanitarian assistance donor. We contributed over half a billion dollars between August and December last year. We've pledged already 308 million as a means to begin to meet the $4.4 billion appeal that Martin Griffiths announced last year. We welcomed very much Pakistan's hosting of an OIC extraordinary ministerial in December. And we hope that the establishment of a trust fund led by the Islamic Development Bank will result in pledges that help to meet that $4.4 billion appeal. I want to say that humanitarian aid worker access across Afghanistan today is better than it has been in over a decade. And this is a continuing report that we have directly from implementers on the ground. When we began interagency dialogue with the Taliban, I remember that female humanitarian aid workers really only had access in about five or six provinces. Today that number is 34. It's country-wide. And so I think the Taliban deserve some credit for solid humanitarian aid access across the country. The United States has worked together with other leading members of the World Bank to ensure that the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund is best utilized to support Afghanistan at this time. We've ensured that over $300 million is allocated to the Sahab Mandi Health Program and we are in active discussions with World Bank leadership on the disposition of the remaining $1.2 billion. We have passed six general licenses and a UN Security Council Resolution 2615 on December 22nd with the aim of having humanitarian aid workers in their activities fundamentally eased as well as to pave the way for the provision of basic services country-wide. We have backed an arrangement with the private sector in Europe that has paved the way for the shipment of hundreds of millions in physical cash into private banks in Afghanistan explicitly for the purpose of helping humanitarian aid workers and relief organizations scale up. We are also closely tracking talks between the World Bank, the UN and private sector actors regarding the establishment of a humanitarian exchange facility that we hope will also contribute to addressing deep and concerning liquidity shortages in the economy. I want to assure this audience that we continue to look at our domestic licensing posture as well as our posture at the UN. We want to see greater illicit economic activity in the economy. And on Friday, the president signed an executive order that I frankly think is deeply misunderstood in which I think has been reported on incorrectly in some outlets. Fundamentally, this action was about protecting $3.5 billion for the Afghan people, for the benefit of the Afghan people. There remains $3.5 billion in a court process but I want to make very clear that no decisions have been made by that court on awards to litigants in that process. And I look forward to tough questions on this issue as we start the Q&A. I want to touch on just a couple other campaigns of work that we have when it comes to the economic crisis underway. The first is that from the very outside of our talks with the Taliban, they have brought professional technocrats from the Afghanistan Bank, the central bank, to engage with us on critical issues. And we welcome their presence and we welcome their continuing work. A range of senior technocrats left Kabul from that central bank after the events of August and we see saw certain functions atrophy or altogether disappear. But rather than simply admire the problem, we have engaged in a professional dialogue with these technocrats and with the Taliban leadership over steps that they can take to enhance functionality, to bring in third party contractors to both audit as well as deliver capacity building assistance and also to enhance the central bank's independence. And so that's an ongoing discussion. I also just want to highlight as a part of how we think about the economic crisis that we do run into challenges that are simply very hard to solve. And I'll mention just one. When I talk to big American banks, when I talk to foreign banks as well, they have shareholders and when they look at the market in Afghanistan, it is not just risky, it is not profitable. And so we cannot compel banks to engage in Afghanistan. We can encourage them to do so but that is an ongoing challenge for which there are no easy solutions and for which we would invite good ideas within the audience and here at USIP as well. Now I hear in this job criticism on an almost daily basis that the United States is not acting fast enough, that the World Bank is not acting fast enough, that the UN is not acting fast enough. Countries of the region need to move faster. It is truly not for a dearth of attention among the senior most American policy makers and leaders on these issues. These problems simply are quite hard to solve. And again, I would invite good ideas from the audience and from USIP as we work through this. Now together with the Treasury Department, with USAID, with intelligence community colleagues, we are in regular touch with the Taliban. We have a relatively honest and productive dialogue with the Taliban, with leaders from across their organization. So I wanna mention several priority efforts. First, on terrorism. We have an enduring interest in ensuring that the Taliban fulfill their commitments not to allow Afghan territory to be used by foreign terrorists to harm anyone. And I have to say that month on month I have found our dialogue on this subject become more honest and more candid. I believe that the Taliban are sincere in their efforts to contain ISIS-K. We have deep concerns about widespread reports of EJKs as part of that process of collective punishment. But I think their intent to contain ISIS-K is very sincere and I certainly join others in condemning the horrific attacks in Kabul and Kanduz in Kandahar and in others against Afghan civilians. Our dialogue on al-Qaida remains a challenge. I think we wanna have greater confidence in the steps that are being taken to contain AQIS as well as al-Qaida core. But we wanna see no terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan. So that includes TTP and Jaisi Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Tayvah as well. On the education of women and girls, Steve, I have to say that among the Taliban's first requests of us in October was this, help put our civil servants back to work. 500,000 strong. And there is a readiness in the international community to start with the education sector after health. We applaud very much the steps forward that the EU and Germany have taken in pledging assistance. The World Bank is currently considering a quite large sum to support the education sector as well. We've seen positive statements from Taliban leaders about a readiness to see the enrollment of women and girls at all levels across large swaths of the country after Nauruz. At this point, statements are not enough. We wanna examine the situation after Nauruz, but again, I repeat that I detect a real readiness within the international community to support the education sector. And the last thing I would say on education is I believe the Taliban will make decisions to enroll women and girls at all levels, not out of a response to international pressure at all. I think this is a genuine domestic Afghan demand and a basic human right that we hear from across the country. On human rights, our dialogue is blunt and two-way. I welcome very much the appointment of Special Envoy Reena Amiri to her position as the lead in our government on Afghan women and girls and human rights. She has just hit the road yesterday. She brings incredible experience and credibility to this role. And she joined us in Oslo for the last round of talks. She and I raised reprisal killings and increase in disappearances. I'd say on this issue that the Taliban continue to assert that these are inconsistent with their policy of general amnesty, which we welcome, but that we wanna see greater steps to bring to justice the hold accountable those who are acting inconsistent with this policy. And our general sense is that reprisals and disappearances are underreported. Second, on media, it is positive that we see a range of outlets that are a reflection of one of the greatest pieces of our legacy, the international community's legacy in Afghanistan over the 20 years that are continuing to operate today. I know of particular outlets who since August have hired scores of additional women reporters. This is positive and they will hold the Taliban accountable and be in touch with the Afghan people. But there are widespread reports of beatings, of intimidation, of efforts to curtail honest reporting. That do give us great pause. Reena and I are extremely concerned about a rise in arbitrary detentions. I think it was positive that we saw the release of particular women protesters in recent days, but this tactic must end. I find it troubling, I think, that the Taliban don't fully appreciate the level of scrutiny by the international community on this issue. And the depth of concern and resonance around harassment of women protesters in the societies and among the parliaments and congresses of every potential supporter of Afghanistan in the future. I wanna raise just one final issue before we turn to Q&A, and that is that I find an encouraging and significant consensus within the international community, both between the West, as well as the major powers of the region, to see the richness of Afghan society reflected in Afghan's leadership. It's our collective view that that is not the case today. And I'll give you the example that obviously we have a lot of disagreements with Iran and Russia, but I think in Iran and Russia as public statements and in my knowledge of their diplomatic engagement as well, this is a consistent call by them here to see the richness of Afghan society reflected in leadership. And Afghans are calling for national dialogue. It's not for the United States, it's not for the international community, I think to be prescriptive about what steps the Taliban take as they seek to consult their people on a move from an acting government to a permanent government, on a move from a suggestion of the laws of the land to a permanent constitution. But that's a process that needs to begin and unfortunately at the moment we haven't seen it. So thank you, Steve. Tom, thank you for a very complete and detailed statement about the challenges but also what our administration, the administration is doing to meet them. I'm gonna follow up on four or five of them and then we'll turn to audience Q and A. I wanna pick up on the central bank asset question which you raised in the recent executive order. You know, you're a little bit damned if you do, damned if you don't. The litigants wonder why you've reduced a potential recovery fund from seven billion to 3.5 and the Afghans wonder why you've given way 3.5 billion of their money to potential litigants here in the United States. The reaction has been pretty vociferous within Afghanistan, not just Taliban but other aspects of society. And the Taliban I think this morning was saying that if this issue is not resolved it could cause them to reconsider the relationship between the United States and the Taliban which as you suggested has been fairly constructive in many respects. What do you say to the Afghans and do you think we can, you can reassure them to the point where this doesn't get in the way of cooperation in other areas such as you mentioned in your opening statement? Well first Steve let me say that this is an issue of extraordinary legal complexity that our administration has been grappling with for over six months at this point. I wanna talk about where we were on Thursday before the executive order and then I wanna talk about where we are today and then look ahead to a process that will include Afghan consultation on the uses of some of these monies. Now where were we on Thursday before the executive order? The Afghan people did not have access to suspended $7 billion worth of reserves that the courts had ordered the Fed as well as other banks to suspend access to while their process continued. So the action on Friday fundamentally was about making available $3.5 billion for the benefit of the Afghan people and to not wait for these court processes to conclude. Now the $3.5 billion that remains within the court process, that is simply half of what it was on Thursday. That court process now will continue and we haven't said as an administration we haven't prejudged what conclusions the court and the juries will come to on whether or not to award some or none or all of that $3.5 billion to litigants, to victims of terrorism. That is a court process. You know that our system involves three branches of government that are separate. We cannot compel the courts to act in any particular way. But again, I wanna just make very clear that the administration is allowing a court process that was ongoing on Thursday to continue but with half the resources at its disposal while $3.5 billion has been protected and preserved for the benefit of the Afghan people. Now, I know in some of our rollout on Friday and Saturday that there's been discussion of a temporary finance mechanism. And I think we've been very honest that we are early in our discussions with other countries over the establishment of this mechanism. But I wanna assure folks who are listening today that as we seek to establish a mechanism that it's governance and the stewardship of this $3.5 billion, it must involve consultation, meaningful consultation with professional Afghans with deep experience in this space. Second, there's been I think a lot of speculation about uses, and this is one where some of the press coverage has not been correct. We have not made a judgment that all $3.5 billion of these dollars will be channeled through the United Nations and spent on humanitarian assistance. In fact, as I have spoken with economists as well as Afghans who've been leaders of the central bank, who've been leaders of the finance ministry over the past several weeks, the consistent opinion that I hear is that it would be not a good use of these resources to channel them through the United Nations and for humanitarian assistance. Rather, this $3.5 billion represents the potential recapitalization of a future central bank that is recognized and a future recapitalization of a financial system. So again, we are early in our discussions with other countries around the establishment of a temporary finance mechanism, and I just want to assure everyone listening here that there will be professional Afghans involved in this process as we move ahead. So this is going to be not a U.S. diktat, but this is going to be an Afghan decision. Others will participate, but it will be in the end of the day an Afghan decision about how these funds will be used. I think there will be Afghans absolutely involved in this decision. I don't want to pretend that it will be solely an Afghan decision. And when I say Afghan, I do not mean the Taliban to be very clear. I mean professional Afghans with deep experience in this space. Great. I'm going to jump around a bit if I can. I want to ask you a little bit about civil society and its current status in Afghanistan. Obviously, before the Taliban takeover, there were hundreds of U.S. programs funding Afghan media, civil society organizations. Since the Taliban takeover, most of that funding has, of course, been stopped or diverted for humanitarian assistance and basic health and education services, which is wholly appropriate. But what is the United States now doing and what can it do to continue to support Afghan civil society as a voice for those who favor an inclusive society and are not really represented by the current configuration of the Taliban regime? Steve, thank you. Before I answer your question on what the United States can do, let me commend Norway's initiative on the 24th and 25th to host a dialogue that 14 courageous members of civil society attended. Let me welcome the Taliban's honest and open engagement with that group. I think what you saw were assembled in Oslo, a group of journalists, former public servants, heads of private sector entities, as well as women rights activists, who put their differences aside and came together, organized cogently and delivered a unified message to the Taliban, that they wanna see women and girls' rights protected, that they wanna see space for media and journalists to do their work freely, that they wanna see freedom of expression protected, that they wanna see a national political process unfold. Now that is a dialogue that we very much hope will continue. We hope that it takes place inside of Afghanistan. I think it's unfortunate that this meeting took place in some ways outside of Afghanistan when a lot of these figures, a lot of these leaders continue to live in Afghanistan today. Now, when it comes to what the United States can do, I'm not able to get into a whole lot of detail, but let me just say that we ran through a diligent exercise internally to review our entire assistance portfolio after August 15th. And we greenlit a wide range of programs that today continue to support civil society actors for precisely the reasons that you outline. Now, that support will continue, and as you say, I think we will need to consult with the Congress regarding an enduring commitment to civil society actors who, as I said at the outset, represent some of the best of our legacy. Thank you for that. Let me ask you a little bit about counterterrorism commitments. The U.S. withdrawal, of course, was predicated on the Doha Agreement of February 2020, which committed the Taliban not to allow terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda and ISIS. And I quote, to use Afghan soil to shelter, train, fundraise, or plan attacks against the United States or its friends and allies. So the question is, you touched on a little bit in your remarks. How is the Taliban doing? Do they consider themselves to continue to be bound by that commitment? How would you rate their progress in making good on that commitment? And quite frankly, it's been pretty clear that ISIS continues to be, ISIS-K continues to be active, and in a little bit, the Taliban are having their hands full dealing with ISIS-K. Is this an area where the United States actually, through intelligence channels or elsewhere, might cooperate with the Taliban in dealing with the problem of ISIS-K in Afghanistan? Steve, I'll share with you that this is one issue that where I think the Taliban are frustrated with, in their view, the lack of a recognition by the international community of the progress in their view that they have achieved since coming to power. Now, I'm not gonna tell you that that's our assessment, but I would just share with you that the Taliban assessment is that they have made very significant gains against ISIS-K over the past several months. Now, I myself am very worried that what we are seeing now, between early November and now, we haven't, thank goodness, seen a massive attack on the order of the attacks that we saw in Kabul and Kunduz and Kandahar that targeted civilians, and that is a good thing. I worry that this is a pause and that when the weather warms up, we are going to see attacks pick up, including potentially large-scale attacks. But when it comes to ISIS-K, I truly believe it's not a matter of capability, it's a matter of will, or sorry, it's not a matter of will, it's a matter of capability, and when it comes to the falseness and effectiveness of their response. And as I said, and I know there are limits to what I'm able to say, our dialogue in these issues is much more honest and much more candid today than it was during the life of the part of the negotiation that I was a part of between January and August 15th, and it's more honest than it was in September and October as well. You mentioned, Steve, the possibility of cooperation with the Taliban, and I'll tell you that the Taliban has no interest in cooperating with the United States when it comes to fulfillment of their commitments in the Doha agreement. And so we have an honest dialogue. There are limits, I think, within our system, which I can't get into regarding ways in which we can cooperate with entities in this space and certainly concerns about respect for the law of armed conflict that we have, but from their perspective, this is a program and a commitment that they will handle on their own. Interesting. I wanna ask you a little bit about Pakistan and US-Pakistan relations. Let me put it this way. How does Pakistan see the situation in Afghanistan today and their relationship with the Taliban? There have been some disagreements. In some sense, the Pakistan has not recognized the Taliban, there's been disputes about the border. There are questions about the Taliban's willingness to crack down on the TTP, which is a terrorist group that is opposed to the Pakistan government and very active in trying to disrupt it. How much influence does Pakistan have now over the Afghan Taliban? And how much alignment is there between the United States and Pakistan now with respect to our respective Afghanistan policy? Steve, during the life of the negotiation, as I said, from January until August, and as I understand it in the years beforehand as well, we were in very close touch with the leadership of Pakistan regarding steps that we urged Pakistan to take to enhance the prospects of a negotiated settlement to this conflict. And I think had Pakistan taken some of those steps in a more meaningful and consistent way, I think we would be in a different place today. I genuinely do. Now, it is a mark of our pragmatism in my view that in Washington, you are not hearing political leaders from across the spectrum spending time and energy criticizing Pakistan and looking backwards. I frankly think that that energy is not called for given the situation in Afghanistan today. And so I think when it comes to Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan today, they face challenges. They face real challenges of capacity. I think there's a recognition in Pakistan that the current leadership of the interim authorities in Afghanistan is not truly representative and potentially not sustainable. They face challenges that have to do with the Taliban's longstanding relationships with Tariki Taliban Pakistan. And so when it comes to border management, TTP, representative government, I think Pakistan faces challenges. I will say just in recent weeks, we saw significant visits, including by the national security advisor to Kabul. I think that within the leadership of the Pakistani both security and civilian establishment that they share many of our priorities. It's always a question of what kind of leverage they're willing to use in order to see those priorities advanced. Lastly, I'd say that I have productive and good and honest relationships, I think, with Pakistani leaders, and they have a huge amount of expertise in their system on these matters, and I think we don't have a choice but to work with Pakistan on the way ahead. I wanna ask you a little bit of an indelicate question. You have said some positive things about cooperation with the Taliban at this point, but the history of the Taliban, both through the conflict and during the time they were in power, is a pretty grisly history. The question is really, is there a viable opposition within Afghanistan to the Taliban at the present time? And should we, as a matter of policy, be encouraging that opposition to the Taliban, or do we really accept this as a sort of fetica plea? What's our policy on this question about opposition to the Taliban? What we wanna see, Steve, is the emergence of a stable and sustainable political dispensation via peaceful means. Now, I'll give you the example of the 14 civil society who showed up in Oslo. They told me that they are among Afghans who believe that the better way forward at the moment is to work with and seek to shape Taliban policies. That is the view of the United States today as well. So we are not supporting organized armed opposition to the Taliban, and we would discourage other powers from doing so as well. I would also tell you though that I worry as any student of Afghanistan of history would that there is a window where Afghans will make their own decisions, where powers in the regions will make their own decisions, to begin supporting armed opposition in a fundamentally more stepped up way. I'm not gonna venture a guess on when that window closes, but I worry that the Taliban do not share a sense of great urgency around these questions. I worry that they are making the same mistake that Burhanedin Rabani made in 1992. They're making the same mistake that they made when they came to power between 96 and 98. Frankly Steve, they're making the same mistake that the United States made in the early 2000s, not to reconcile when we had a chance with the Taliban in the early 2000s, to allow them to return to Afghanistan and live in a dignified manner. But again, they are making the same mistake today, and we do wanna see genuine meaningful outreach and inclusion of Afghanistan's rich society when it comes to movement to a permanent government. I'm gonna ask you one question, and then we'll go to questions from the audience, and it's what you just talked about, the regional consensus at this point. There seems to be a consensus to not recognize the Taliban at this point, and to demand that it demonstrate greater respect for human rights, respect for women's rights, and establish, as you said, a more inclusive government that reflects all aspects of Taliban, of Afghan society. How durable is that consensus? And how long will it last, and at what point, as you suggested, do the centripetal forces in the region begin to reemerge and outside powers to start picking champions within Afghanistan's society and make it more difficult to achieve the kind of outcome you described? Our diplomacy with the powers of the region is incredibly important. So there has been an expanded Troika format in operation for years at this point that includes the United States, Russia, China, and Pakistan. Iran is an important power in the region, and so is India. These countries all have a vote on the way ahead. And as you say, I find so far an encouraging degree of unity when it comes to holding on recognition for more meaningful steps toward respect for the rights of all Afghans, for a move toward a more representative government, toward a responsible stewardship of the economy. To your question on how durable that consensus is, we are already seeing certain countries in the region take steps that I think we would not take. For instance, having Taliban diplomats serve in their capitals and at their consulates, that's not a step we would take by any stretch of the imagination. But on the whole, I do find a pretty strong degree of consensus, and the Troika Plus is a format that we do find viable and valuable, and one in which we intend to continue to invest. Let me ask you some now questions from the audience. One comes from Zilla Nouri for Voice of America. Has President Biden's decision to unfreeze the Afghan foreign assets paved the path for Taliban recognition? How far are the Taliban from being recognized by the United States and the rest of the world you touched on this? Is there something more you want to say on this subject? I think the short answer to your question is the EO, the executive order, to protect and preserve $3.5 billion for the benefit of the Afghan people a step toward recognition. The answer is no. The intent of that move is really to protect and preserve these assets, and I talked a lot about their potential uses in the future. When it comes to recognition more broadly, I think there is a consensus within the international community as well as two UN Security Council resolutions that chart up the kind of conduct we want to see. The way we think about it in our system, we do want to see the establishment of a solid record of responsible conduct before we take fundamental steps toward normalization. Got it. Sami Jabara Markel asks, do you think America's regional competitors benefit from U.S. disengagement with Afghanistan? There was some initial celebration, I think on the part of Pakistan, China, and maybe Russia, but certainly Pakistan and China, and I think a little bit of a second thought of oh my goodness now, this is our problem. What is their attitude at this point towards the U.S. disengagement? I think they do not benefit from American fundamental disengagement from the region. Now look, we can't call Afghanistan over the past 20 years basically stable. I think that's an unfair characterization. But today, is there a real possibility of seeing refugee outflows in the coming months in the hundreds of thousands or more? Yes, I think that is a worrying possibility. Is there a danger of seeing an even greater uptick in the movement of narcotics outside of Afghanistan into neighboring countries? Yes, I think there is. Is there a concern, as we said, about not the will but the capability of the Taliban to contain terrorists who may wish neighbors harm? Yes, I think there are. And so for those reasons, if I were neighbors, I might worry about American disengagement. This is a question from Naseed Hajari of Bloomberg. What else can we do to revive the Afghan private sector? Fear of sanction appears to be scaring foreign banks away from doing business with any counterparties in Afghanistan. How can the US alleviate that fear? It's an issue you touched on a little bit of it. How do we incentivize the private sector to engage in what is certainly an uncertain economic and political situation in Afghanistan? You know, one, I suspect that the Afghan private sector is in close touch with the Taliban. I suspect that they are in close touch with central bank authorities as well. But I'd say that I hope that engagement is robust and continues. We may consider steps that would signal a support for greater activity in the economy, greater listed commercial and private activity. And so that's certainly something we're continuing to deliberate on. But as for the role of the Afghan private sector, be in touch with the central bank and make clear that you have a strong demand signal from the United States for that institution's professionalization as well as steps to make it more independent. This is a question from Jennifer Hansler of CNN. I'm curious how many Afghan allies, SIV applicants and others, has the US gotten out since the US withdrawal? And what are you telling desperate Afghans who want to leave the country still? And how many SIV applicants remain in Afghanistan? You might explain what SIV is to the audience. Sure, and SIV is a special immigrant visa. So I have to say, I am not meaning to pass the buck on this one, but there is a whole office at the State Department led by my very capable colleague, Ambassador Beth Jones, called CARE, which is chiefly in charge of the entire effort both to support the continuing departure from Afghanistan of SIVs, of American citizens, of LPRs, as well as the diligent movement of Afghans who are on lily pads abroad into the United States, and then their resettlement together with DHS. Steve, the demand signal for departures from Afghanistan, if I'm speaking honestly, probably outstrips our ability to absorb them into our country, and that is a fact that we have to grapple with on a daily basis. It's something that I know members of Congress are grappling with as well as constituents reach out to them looking for support. We've certainly had to prioritize American citizens, LPRs, green card holders, and SIVs. And we have seen the Taliban not excise from any list that we have sought to have depart from Afghanistan, any SIV or American citizen or LPR who had proper documentation. And that is a good thing. It's just a question of our observative capacity and demand from the ground. I'm in touch with Afghans on a daily basis to do fear the situation, as well as coming to harm at the hands of the Taliban. And there are no easy answers to those questions. You were very eloquent about the status of women and the need for the arbitrary detention of women to end, the disappearance of women needs to end. The Taliban have talked about they will allow women's education to resume at all levels. The question really is, will it happen and how do we ensure that it's happened? And I would say there's a question really about how we will know whether it is happening or not. Because many of our international partners, as well as the United States, don't have active missions in Kabul. There's been a shrinking of media space, of civil society space. We know a lot less about what's going on in Afghanistan now than we did before. So the question is, how will we know whether these commitments are in fact being carried out throughout the country? And what do we do to enhance our ability to monitor what's going on? And then what do we do to hold the Taliban accountable for performing on their statements in these two areas? So on the first question, Steve, it's something we grapple with on an almost daily basis. To go from a situation where we had a very large embassy, one of the largest in the country, a terrific and courageous and knowledgeable local staff across the country to a situation where we do not have those assets in place. And so you're right. I think we have fundamentally lost a finger touch feel for what's happening in Afghanistan. I found it encouraging that the Taliban have said they will support an independent verification mechanism when it comes to whether or not women and girls are enrolled at all levels across the country. I think the role of the special rapporteur, a decision on that position, I think will be made within the UN in March. That person's role, how that person is staffed will be very, very important. And I think Yunama's mandate is critical in this regard too. I think Yunama's mandate needs to remain dual. It must have both a political and governance component as well as a humanitarian component. But monitoring and verification will be essential in this regard as well. And what kind of leverage do we have realistically over the Taliban if they don't perform? Well, I'll give you the example of education. Right now, we don't have terrific data on enrollment and I think we probably won't for a period of months. But if it becomes clear, and this is just one example I'll cite to you, if it becomes clear that judging on the basis of data from 2019 regarding enrollment of women and girls country-wide, if it becomes clear that we've seen just a dramatic turn backwards in certain parts of the country where during the Republic's time women and girls were in school at all levels, then I think we have to think about consequences. I think we have to think about suspension of stipends, suspension of support for that sector and see if that doesn't encourage the right kind of policy and the right kind of conduct. I mean, when it comes to respect for women and girls' rights, arbitrary pretensions, ceasing and so forth, I do think that that public pressure is important. I do think the Taliban are mindful of their reputation internationally and I do think there's a variation within the Taliban on these issues. I don't wanna go into too much detail about that, but we have forced a conversation within the Taliban between those who don't support these moves and those who do and we have to see the continuation of that conversation spurred not just by the United States or our allies, but also by the region. What are the prospects for internal pressure? There were some demonstrations, smalls to be sure, in support of women's rights, the disappearances, the detentions you talked about really have snuffed that out. How much space is there for internal pressure on the Taliban at this point? I think internal pressure can take a lot of forms. So from my time in Kunar, which admittedly was a long time ago and very different circumstances, when a local community did not like how a particular policy was being unveiled, it could be a collection of dozens of men who go to a district governor and vociferously complain about how something is happening. So I wouldn't say that public protests by women are the only form of potential internal pressure. I think that elders from across Afghanistan, women and men, are exerting pressure. But to your point on space, we are continuing to assess the degree to which that space really does exist. This is a question from Sue Sosowski. She asks, with the current difficulty getting humanitarian funds into Afghanistan, how will the Biden administration increase that funding? And what are the biggest obstacles to increasing that funding? And what are the targeted solutions? When it comes to humanitarian aid? Yes, yes, humanitarian funds. What do you think funds for humanitarian assistance into the country? So right now, as far as I know, we do not face a big challenge. And I take my cues from the United Nations and from ICRC and IRC and Norwegian Refugee Council and other organizations. I don't think we face a big hurdle when it comes to getting funds into the country explicitly for humanitarian use. I think the problem is that a purely humanitarian response to what is unfolding is deeply insufficient. And so the bigger challenge is greater liquidity within the economy writ large. And there, you need to see a restoration of professional and independent central bank functions. And we also need to see the introduction of new Afghan currency, which we support by Polish and French manufacturers. That I think is the bigger challenge. Certainly humanitarian assistance, then getting the financial system up and running. But at some point to be sustainable, the economy needs to get back in operation. The private sector needs to get back in operation. The agricultural sector needs to get back in operation. Is the US government prepared and do you have plans in preparation to assist in those sort of second and third order steps that are really required for this country to get back on its feet in a more sustainable way? To be honest with you, Steve, at this stage, we are not planning, I don't wanna mislead you, we're not planning for a major bilateral program of development assistance, for instance. I think this question of how the international community supports a smaller but still sustainable Afghan economy that sees Afghanistan stay in Afghanistan is an enormous challenge that deserves our attention. This is a question from Shama Munechel and I'm gonna edit it slightly. I think he will allow me to do so. For the Taliban to have national and international legitimacy, they need to have a roadmap for governance, and I think he means the kind of inclusive governance you've been talking about. At what point will the US continue to engage with the Taliban without domestic legitimacy and without their having come up with that kind of roadmap? At what point do we say, you know, they have not kept faith with what is, what we believe is required for a really sustainable, peaceful Afghanistan to perhaps change our policy? So I think what the honorable minister is asking is, is there a point at which the United States decides to stop engaging the Taliban? And among the criteria in his contention would be whether they've pursued a national political process. You know, at the moment, I think the jury is out on what diplomacy with the Taliban produces. You know, when it comes to education, safe passage and terrorism, I'd say that our diplomacy has clarified where we stand. When it comes to human rights, a political process and reprisal killings, I'll say our diplomacy has not produced what we want it to. But as for a particular moment in time when we will decide not to engage the Taliban anymore, I don't think we will reach that conclusion in the coming weeks or months. I have two questions and then we'll call it a day. This one, you've been across the table from the Taliban when they were in insurgency and now as de facto rulers of Afghanistan. Are there changes in Taliban positions before and after the takeover? And what does that tell you about how they will rule going forward? I think that the substance of what we discussed before the takeover and after the takeover have changed and they have had to change because of the situation in the country. So, you know, we did not have a significant dialogue on going with the Taliban regarding humanitarian relief. We did not have a, before August 15th. We were not discussing central bank functionality and it has been positive that they have brought professionals to the table on that subject. On some issues, worryingly, their positions have remained obdurate. And I think particularly on the question of representative government and inclusivity, there has been a troubling commonality between August 15th and after. I'll say that on, when it comes to women's rights, again, without going into too much detail, I detect a true variation in positions among and within the Taliban. That was true before August 15th and it's true today. Last question. The UN has become a primary provider of humanitarian assistance and the UN assistance mission in Afghanistan has a robust political mission on the ground in Kabul that includes monitoring of human rights. So, for a lot of things we've been talking about, they seem to have a central role. Their mandate is up for renewal in March. Do you expect obstacles at the UN to the renewing of Yunama's current mandate? When it comes to big UN missions in countries that are either post-conflict or in ongoing conflict, I think there are very often disagreements among security council members, among those with influence on these questions. So, do I expect there to be disagreement? I expect there to be a very healthy debate. I think it's in all of our collective interests to see the UN continue to play a very robust role both on professional questions of governance as well as on monitoring and humanitarian response. And so there will be a healthy debate but I hope that's where we land. Great, we are about out of time. I just want to thank you, Tom, for being with us today and giving us time. You have a big response, but there's a lot on your shoulders and we're glad that you're in that position. So I want to thank you for being with us. I want to thank our audience for participating today. And this concludes our program. Thanks so much. Thank you, Steve. Thank you.