 Let me ask you to take your seats if we can get started. My name is Bill Taylor. I'm the acting executive vice president here at the United States Institute of Peace. And I'm here to welcome you to this discussion of polling results, very current polling results, from Ukraine on issues that are of interest to everyone in this room, I'm sure, and others watching on C-SPAN and others. So welcome to this group. We're very pleased to have you and the panel. And as our moderator here, we will have Kristen Carl, who is senior fellow at the Legatim Institute and a contributing editor at Foreign Policy Magazine. You're also senior fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as Newsweek's Moscow bureau chief and the Moscow bureau chief for US News and World Report. So Kristen is very well-suited, experienced, qualified to moderate this discussion. He will introduce the main polling guru here, Stephen Call, and I will turn it over to Kristen. So I will introduce from this position. I hope that's OK. So I would like to introduce Dr. Stephen Cole from the University of Maryland, where he is the director of the program for public consultation. He's also a senior research scholar at the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland. And he has a very long, illustrious career conducting public opinion surveys. He's also worked for the BBC World Service Poll of Global Opinion and the polls of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. So he has a very illustrious and long-standing record in this field. And let's give the floor to him so that he can tell us about his findings on this topic. Thank you. Thank you for that introduction, and thank you all for coming. In Ukraine, it's really the people that are taking the brunt of this current conflict, that with thousands having died. So it seems really worthwhile to hear what the Ukrainian people have to say about the issues that they're currently embroiled in. And that is what we have set out to do, and we have a new survey that, oh, I see. There we go. So we have a new survey that was conducted together with the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, which is a group we've worked with numerous times over the years, very highly regarded. The method used was face-to-face, for the most part, telephone primarily in the Donbass region. For the national sample, we had 1,005 respondents, and then we had an oversample of 403, specifically in the Donbass region. That's the Donetsk-Lohansk region where the conflict is occurring. And then for the Ukrainian-held area of Donbass, we have 330, and in the rebel-held areas of Donbass, we have a sample of 240. This shows you how we have divided up the country. I'm going to be giving you the results, not just for the nation as a whole, but for the various regions, because the differences are quite great, and there's some real tension between the different parts of the country. So we have the north and the west over there, and then over here the east, and where the white lines are, you can see the Donbass region. And then of course the south, the Crimea was not surveyed. So the biggest question that we sought to address is whether people thought that the Ukraine should move toward the European Union or Russia. This is a core dispute that is dominant and has been for some years. And we asked the question in a variety of ways. Now, first we asked in terms of what is your preferred option, more standard form of a poll question. And we said, would you prefer for relations for Ukraine to have relations that are stronger with the EU than Russia? Stronger with Russia than the EU or equally strong? And for the nation as a whole, less than half, 47% said stronger with the EU. Almost half, but less. So the largest number, but still not a majority. And 34% said equally strong, 13% stronger with Russia. Now, if you break these out by the regions, you see quite a bit of difference. Now, with the west and the north, we are generally aggregating them because they were within the margin of error. So they're really quite similar. When they are different, we will call it out. So in the west and the north, you have 68% saying they want to be closer to the European Union. While in the south and the east, the most common position is that relations should be equally strong. And in the Donbas-held area, the plurality says the relations should be stronger with Russia. So you see right here that there's a very great difference in terms of the preference. There is, and the core point here is that you do not overall have a majority in favor of moving toward the EU. And when you look at the different regions, it's only in the west and the north that you have this majority pulling for a stronger relation with the EU. Now, these attitudes about pulling toward the EU are mere attitudes about how President Petro Poroshenko is handling the crisis in the east. Overall, you have a divided response. The white space in between the people said don't know or it depends on one way or another didn't give an answer. So basically, overall, views are divided about Poroshenko on his handling of the crisis in the east. But here again, you see a 46% in the west and north approving and then in the south leaning toward the negative and the east very clearly to the negative, 61%, while in the Donbas-rebel-held areas, you have 89% disapproving. By the way, the Ukraine-held areas of Donbas were generally pretty much the same as the east as a whole. But you can have all that data is broken out in the questionnaire. So now we moved into the questions where we asked people to rate scenarios, where we give them options and we're not just asking, what is your preference, but how would you feel if that happened? And to answer this, we give them a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means completely unacceptable, 10 means very acceptable, and 5 means just tolerable. And by asking questions in this way, you can see where the potential common ground is, where the flexibilities are. And when you have these kinds of conflicts, that's the kind of thing you need to look for. And we've developed this method in other areas of the world and other conflicting parties between other conflicting parties as well. So what about Ukraine moving closer to the EU? Well, overall, 54% say, well, I can live with that. And another 18% say, okay, I can tolerate that. So you get a fairly large number saying that they could tolerate moving closer to the EU. And in the West and North, very large numbers. Now, as you move into the South, you have only 44% saying it's acceptable, but 64% saying, yeah, I could tolerate it. In the East, it gets weaker. You get up to 39% saying unacceptable and a bare majority saying they could tolerate it. Then you get into the rebel-held areas and a clear majority, 62% say, no, that's not acceptable. So right here, you see some of the core dynamics of the attitudes that are feeding into the conflict. On Ukraine joining the EU, acceptability drifts downward a bit. 52% acceptable. Overall, 15% is tolerable. Very positive attitudes in the West and the North. The South, okay, can barely, maybe you could tolerate it. And then in the East, you get half saying, no, they can't and only 42% saying it's tolerable and the rebel-held areas, clear majority saying, not acceptable for Ukraine to join the EU. Now, what about Ukraine moving closer to Russia? Well, you get 60% not acceptable and 79% in the West and the North and 55% in the South opposing moving closer to Russia. In the East, okay, you don't have a majority saying it's acceptable. It's very important to note that. There's often an assumption that in the East, they really want to move toward Russia, but that's not the case. Though, three-quarters say they could tolerate it. And in the rebel-held areas, it's a rather popular point of view. Okay, Ukraine joining the Eurasian Customs Union. Here again, larger majorities overall and in the West and the North, majority in the South, rejecting it as unacceptable, barely a majority finding it tolerable in the East, though a majority in the rebel-held areas finding it tolerable. But here again, you don't have a majority even in the rebel-held areas for joining the Eurasian Customs Union. Now, this is the area where we actually found the most consensus. Ukraine affirming a neutral position between EU and Russia. And overall, 63% say that it's at least tolerable. And 71% tolerable in the North, but views more divided in the West. This is one unusual case where the West and the North are different. So you have a kind of divided between not acceptable and tolerable in the West. So some tension there. But 65% find it tolerable in the South, 74% tolerable in the East, and 67 tolerable in the rebel-held areas. So this is quite interesting to us because this really points to a point of consensus even between the different regions where you don't have a majority in any area rejecting the idea. What about Ukraine joining NATO? This has gotten a lot of attention. There's a lot of concern about that, something that Putin's very concerned about. And you have only 51% overall saying that this would be tolerable. It's not popular. You might think, oh, a Ukrainian's fan. They're feeling really threatened by Russia. They might really want to join NATO. Well, you do find that 66%, well, 51% finding it just acceptable in the North, 62% in the West, but in the South, 55% not acceptable. East, 68% not acceptable. The rebel-held areas overwhelmingly, 82% not acceptable. Well, does that mean that maybe people would be willing to agree to not join NATO if Russia agrees to not interfere in the Ukraine? And that got, well, you know, promising. That's another question. Give me some sovereignty. The 41% saying this should not, 36 should, with a lot of people not answering. And then the West overwhelmingly, no, they should not. But in the North, only a slight plurality saying should not. And in the South, views divided, while in the East, support for the idea. So it's, again, a very mixed picture on this idea of making this commitment. But only in one area in the West do you have a majority saying that this should not happen. All right, how do people look at the conflict? First, surprising finding in my mind, how do people feel about the Ukrainian government using military force to regain territory held by the separatists? Well, only a plurality, a proof. Now, that's very large in the West and the North, but divided in the South and a large majority disapproving in the East. So you do this whole effort on the part of the Ukrainian government to regain the territory. It does not have majority support overall. Not surprising then in that, from that perspective, we get very large majorities in every area approving of the September Minsk agreement. Now, the recent update occurred the day we went into the field, so we were not able to ask about it, but basically the terms are the same. So I think we can use this as a good reference point. Now, what about the US providing military weapons and equipment to the Ukrainian government? Well, 52% favorite, and bare majority, it's not a large majority, and you get a lot of division. 70% approve in the West and the North, divided in the South, and a clear majority opposed in the East. So this is not a consensus position, and it's somewhat consistent with the ambivalence about using force to try to regain territory held by the separatists. All right, well, how do they view the outside players? Looking at Putin, his handling of the crisis in the East, 79% disapprove, very negative findings. Overwhelmingly negative in the West and the North, very negative in the South, and even majority negative in the East, only in the rebel-held areas do you find a majority that's positive. And you think, oh, now there's this whole love affair with Russia, well, we'll ask about Russia's influence in the world. Overall, you get a pretty, only in the rebel-held areas do you get a majority, say, having a positive view of Russia's influence in the world, and in the East, the views are divided. So you just underscore here there is not a pull toward Russia in the East. There's just a resistance to moving westward. What about the idea that Russia having the right to intervene, to protect Russian citizens and Russian speakers, as Putin has claimed? Well, overwhelming majority say that Russia does not have that right. And these majorities are in all the major regions, only in the rebel-held areas is there a divided response. But this argument is really basically not going down well at all. How do people view the Angela? What Merkel's doing in regard to handling the crisis? 40% approved, 20% disapproved. Kind of a lukewarm point of view that's consistent in all the regions. What about Barack Obama? Divided response overall, many people not even giving an answer, only a modest plurality in the west and the north, a negative plurality in the south and the east. In terms of US influence in the world, 45% positive, better than Russia, particularly in the west and the north, but when you get down into the east and the rebel-held areas, you get a fairly negative point of view. Okay, what about the potential outcomes of the conflict? First again, what is their preference? And the options are to have one nation and two options, Ukraine-governed as it is now, or one nation and certain Donbass rayons having more autonomy, or the Donbass of seeds and two options becomes independent or is annexed by Russia. And as you can see, the scenarios involving secession overwhelmingly, there's a tiny percentages endorsing them. By far the most popular view is that Ukraine which should stay governed as it is now, but 22% say that certain, the idea, and this is built into the Minsk agreement that certain Donbass rayons, that certain areas of Donbass would have more autonomy. That's the Donetsk and Luhansk area. But again, a lot of differences. In the west and the north, overwhelming majorities want Ukraine to stay governed as now, as does a majority of 59% in the south. In the east, you get still very small numbers want calling for secession. It's a very important number there, numbers there. Only 12% and 10% for these scenarios of secession. Overall, you get two thirds basically wanting to keep the nation together in the east with a division about whether these certain Donbass rayons should have greater autonomy. In the rebel held areas, this is also very interesting. You do not have majorities calling for secession. Only a four and 10 overall call for some kind of secession. And a majority calls for some scenario that involves the Ukraine staying as one nation. Okay, rating the scenarios. Ukraine remains as one nation governed as it is now. In all areas, you have majorities finding that acceptable, except the rebel held areas were 60%. So they are really set on having this greater autonomy for the Donbass rayons. And in the east, you, well, you'll see in a moment. So in the idea of the Ukraine remaining one nation, but greater autonomy, you have overall 57% supportive. And only 51% in the west and north find this tolerable. So there's some resistance on this idea, which is built into the Minsk agreement, as you may recall. Though that it's not a permanent thing. And only a modest plurality, majority in the south, see it as tolerable. And not very many overall see it as acceptable. In the east, here too, you only have 49% saying it's acceptable, but 72% saying it's tolerable. And in the rebel held areas, you have a more substantial support for the idea. Okay, I'll go quickly. You can see that the ideas of secession do not get much, are rejected as unacceptable, and most parts of the country divided response in the east. But few, only a quarter see it as acceptable. This is for the secession with the Donbass as independent. In the rebel held areas, again, only 45% endorse it as acceptable, though 2 thirds would find it acceptable. Tolerable, sorry. And the views are even more negative about secession and annexation by Russia. What about the Crimea? That's a, I don't know, have they pretty much written off the Crimea? Well, this answer is no. We gave them three options. Crimea being part of the Ukrainian state and getting it back should be a top priority. Second position, don't accept the loss of Crimea, but getting it back is not a top priority. And third, Ukraine should accept Crimea becoming part of Russia again. And overall, you can see, striking only 18% endorse the idea of basically writing off the Crimea. The only debate is about whether it should be a top priority or not to get it back right away. And the dominant view, 51%, is that it should not be a top priority, but not writing it off. And interestingly, in no area do you have a majority saying that the Crimea should be written off, including the East. That's the largest, the area with the largest number, with 41% rated to write it off. But 59%, even in the East, say that Crimea should continue to be part of Ukraine and that they should aspire to get it back. OK, so if you want to get a more complete report in the questionnaire, you can go to our website, publicconsultation.org, without the dash, and look forward to our discussion. Thank you for your attention. Great. Thanks very much, Dr. Kahl. So before we go to our panel, I would just like to open up the floor very briefly for technical questions about the poll. If we have larger questions, let's save them for the next section of the discussion. But if anybody would like to know about the methodology about the way the poll was conducted, technical questions, please, yes. Go ahead, sir. Go ahead and give the answers that separate out the East. The East is something like that. Can we get up? 10% of the pop get to the other numbers that sum to the national number. Do we weight them by population or are those odd numbers? No, they're weighted according to the population. So in each region, you're taking whatever that region's opinion was, then taking the population in that region times that, in essence. And then summing for the nation, its population weighted is what you're telling me. We weight the aggregated number according to the representation in the population, correct? And it's the same with the Donbass regions. Those are all weighted down. So those numbers are in the mix, but everything's weighted down proportion to the population. And for the East, we did actually weight it according to the current percentage of the population, which is significantly lower because there have been quite a few. And I'm sorry, I was remiss in my job as moderator. Please do identify yourselves when you want to speak. I believe you had a question, ma'am? Yes. Yeah, in a moment. My name is Eve Marisa Pansky, and I'm the owner of my own company, Merog LLC. My question is about sampling and the respondents. When they responded to these questions, who did they think this information was going to? It was simply stated that this was the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, and they were not given any more information. The questions that went to the country as a whole were part of an omnibus, so there were a number of sponsors for the survey as a whole, though that wasn't true of the telephone parts in the Donbass region. And I'm assuming that the questions that were posed was in the Ukrainian language. Whatever the local language was. Keep in mind that in both the South and the East, the majority speaks Russian, and in the West and the North, the majority speak Ukrainian, but whatever language they naturally spoke was the language that was used. Do you believe that there may be a relationship between the language used in the questionnaire itself and the results? That would be an interesting study to do. I doubt it. There might be a slight effect, but basically whatever language people wanna use, they could use. Oh, by the way, on the rebel held areas, how we identified the rebel held areas, that was based on where people said they were because those lines can move. Thank you very much for your good work. Thank you. And I believe there was a question here as well. Hi, I'm George Holm, a professor at Virginia Tech, and I've worked with Kies on a poll in Ukraine in December, Southeast. About Donbas rebel held. So you're breaking that out of within the East. So when we see the East, then we see Donbas rebel held. It's all aggregated, yes. Right, so the Donbas rebel held is within the East figures. Correct. What is the aggregate number of people in the Donbas rebel held? You did 200 with the phone, but in the first wave, the face to face, there was a little over 40, I think it was. Okay, so we're talking about 240 people, only 40 of whom were face to face for that particular area. Some of those may actually been by phone as well. Okay, are you confident that you can do face to face polling in an area where there's a war going on? That's one of the challenges in which is why the telephone was used as extensively as it was. They're downsides of the telephone too, but whenever you're dealing with doing surveys in a conflict area, there's some compromise involved, and you should always look at the numbers with some question in your mind, and not, if you see a robust effect, you can have some, you should have confidence in it, but if it's down to some pretty granular differences, I wouldn't stress them too much. But what we found was a rather strong readiness to distance themselves from Russia and to say that they were not wanting to move closer to Russia, even in the rebel-held areas. So that gives me more confidence that people were feeling comfortable to say what was on their mind. Okay, perhaps one more question on the technical side. Of course, this doesn't preclude asking other questions during the larger session. Yes, back here. You see anything, Bill Vaughn, on the net one in there? Hi, Michelle Aroma from the State Department. I'm very worried for the phone survey that you did. Beautiful. All right, I'm disengaged. Landline-only. Okay, and then I'm curious what the non-response rate was for the phone poll and the face-to-face. Yeah, I'm sorry, I don't have that available. We just got the date on Friday, and we have not, I mean, it was a scramble to fully finish it, but I'll get back to you on that if you want. Okay, great. Well, very, very interesting questions. So let's move on to the main panel now. And first of all, I would like to introduce Ambassador William Taylor, who is the Acting Executive Vice President of the United States Institute for Peace. Of Peace. U.S. Institute of Peace, yes. Thank you very much. From 2011 to 2013, he was the Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions in the U.S. State Department. So he was, as the title suggests, Coordinating American Support for the Revolutions of the Arab Spring. Very, very interesting job. From 2006 to 2009, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. And before that, he was part of, he was the U.S. government representative to the Middle East Quartet. He's served in a number of other very important diplomatic and government functions, which we probably don't have time to list in their entirety here. Suffice to say that he was also, there's also a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and served in the U.S. Army for a number of years as an officer. And just in time. Just in time. No thanks to Triple-A. It's been known to happen. I'd also like to introduce Dr. Catherine Kellerher, who is the College Park Professor at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. She has been in that position, I believe, since 2006. Yes. And advises in the area of international security in U.S. foreign policy. Before that, well, somewhat farther before that, she served in the Clinton administration as the President's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, and as the Secretary of Defense's representative to NATO in Brussels. And of course, she's held a number of other very prestigious positions in U.S. foreign policy before that. But again, in the interests of brevity, I think we'll just, yes, and she says I should indeed leave it at that. So we're going to have, I hope, a very spirited discussion. I'd like to call on the panel participants to each address the study for, so we give it 10 minutes for each of you. Yeah. And then we're going to have what I hope will be a very spirited discussion with the audience. We're going to go to 12.30, but if things are pretty passionate, then I think we should leave a little leeway to go on for another few minutes, perhaps as late as 12.45. But without further ado, let's get into it and let's hear the panelists' remarks. Christian, thank you. Thank you very much. Kevin, good to see you. Yes. I'm very pleased to be able to comment on this. I will pull out from the results that Stephen just described to you, some of the conclusions that I draw from this, which I hope will be controversial. I hope we can have a good spirited conversation with you. And there are some in the room I suspect who will have views about this. I have three points here that I will try to do in less than 10 minutes. One is Ukraine has decided that its future is in Europe. And we'll come back to this, but I think you can pull this. My second point is Ukraine is more united than ever in the face of Russian aggression. And my third point is one that I think Catherine will elaborate on more, and that is the Ukrainians have not forgotten Crimea and we shouldn't either. So let me do the first. Ukraine has decided that its future is in Europe. Stephen asked, if it were up to you, which course should Ukraine take? 47% of all the Ukrainians surveyed, including those in, I would say, separatist hell, and as Stephen uses, rebel hell, but we know that it's really separatist hell supported by the Russians, including that 47% would prefer stronger relations with the EU. 13% would prefer stronger relations with the Russians. So 47% for the EU, 13% for stronger relations with Russia, that's the first data point that I would pull out. Second data point is 72% of all Ukrainian surveyed would find it either acceptable or tolerable to move closer to the EU. 72% closer to the EU. 60% would find it unacceptable to move closer to the Russians. Again, a strong indication of which direction they would prefer. When you talk to them about joining the EU, 67% would find it either acceptable or tolerable for Ukraine to join the EU. 67% of all surveyed, that includes the separatists, that includes the east and the south. And finally, 51%, as I think Stephen mentioned, 51% of all Ukrainians would find it acceptable or tolerable for Ukraine to join NATO. Now, Steve mentioned that it's only 51%, well, 51% of Ukrainians having watched this movement of Ukrainian sentiment for and against NATO over the years, 51% saying now they would either prefer or would find acceptable joining NATO is remarkable. That is a change, but when I was there, it was in the 20s, 20, 25% would support joining NATO. So this is a dramatic increase, I would say. So my first point is they've clearly decided to move toward Europe, Ukraine has. Second, Ukraine's more united now than ever in the face of Russian aggression. 85% of Ukrainians surveyed across the whole country prefer a united Ukraine. 85% want a united Ukraine, 63% just as is governed now, another 22% when you add in some autonomy for the regions in the Donbas. So that's a pretty strong number, I would say. 85% prefer a united Ukraine. Even in the East, it's 68%. In the separatist held region, it's 51%, again, as you pointed out. So that is a strong indication of the broad support for a unified Ukraine across the country. 79% disapprove of Putin's actions. 26%, even in the rebel held area, in the separatist held area, it's 26%. Mr. Putin has not done himself any favors in Ukraine. 87%, say Putin does not have the right to protect Russian citizens or Russian speakers. And again, even in the separatist held area, 41% would agree with that. So I find this to be a pretty dramatic rejection of the Russian point of view, in particular the Mr. Putin's point of view. Last point and very short, and I, again, will defer to Catherine on this, but 82% of all Ukraine surveyed want to keep Crimea. Either they want to get it back right away, or they want to get it back, but over time. I was in Kherson, just north of Crimea in May, to observe the presidential elections there. And the presidential elections, by the way, were as free and fair as you could have hoped for. And as a consequence, the people sitting around the polling booths observing had nothing much to observe. There was no funny business, as there always has been in previous elections. So they were sitting around, and were happy to talk to foreigners. So I was able to have conversations. And one of the conversations that I had with many of the people was about Crimea. And you'll be happy, Steve, to know that the informal assessment that I got surveyed is exactly the same. That is, a lot of people said, you know, it's gonna take some time. We want Crimea, Crimea is clearly part of Ukraine. It's gonna take some time. And a lot of people said that it will take as much time as we need for the economy to recover. When the economy recovers, the Crimeans will come back. So those are my three points. And I think I'm under 10 minutes. I think so. Very good. Catherine? I apologize for being late. Batteries are odd things. But let me start with a somewhat longer view than Bill has presented to you. I think what's amazing about the survey results, particularly after the winter that we have observed and the attempt to set up a ceasefire is how clear-eyed most of the survey respondents were. They have a clear understanding about Ukraine and its independence. They reject at every point, however the question is asked or whatever the topic is, the idea that Russia has the right of regard, that it has the right of protection for Russian speaking or Russian minorities, that it has some way to make the decision for the Ukrainians. They clearly assert this, however the question is asked. They also favor an outcome, if possible, that gives them access, not necessarily equal access, but access to both the West and Russia. So that it is not something that is the black and white that is too often reflected in press accounts. They understand where they are geopolitically. They see, they know that parts of their country have had major markets with Russia. They hope that there will be a peaceful outcome to all of this and that it will be possible, perhaps even desirable to continue in the middle position they have to a degree already enjoyed between East and West. But their preference is to be an independent European country and they do not see themselves as necessarily being forced by anything to be brought into the orbit of either Russia or Europe and the United States. It's clear that Vladimir Putin is the big loser, both in terms of what I've just said and in fact of the way that he is viewed. His popularity was never 100% in Ukraine or even much more than 50%, but he did have a good regard in the period, say, up to about two years ago. Now there is an assumption, in fact, stated knowledge as far as they're concerned, that there are Russian forces, no matter where people live, no matter what they are looking at, that there are Russian forces in Ukraine. The West has not really enjoyed a huge increase, but there is clear regard for European leaders. So Angela Merkel and Francois Alon are regarded over 50% as doing positive things and that Europe, while it has not done all it could have done, and there is a stress that the EU should have done more than simply policy by assertion, but that the Europe has done what some measure of what it should do in order to help Ukraine both economically and politically. The United States, perhaps the questions are asked about how you rate President Obama's performance, how you, in fact, look at the question of weaponization. Here, the predictable results, in terms of the regional breakdown within Ukraine are to be observed. Namely, Obama is doing a strong plurality. The question of sending arms to Ukraine is given a strong plurality with particular enthusiasm in the West and in the North. It is, however, not as strong as this European accent that I've reported before. Another incident of clear-eyedness is, and perhaps cynicism, given the long march to even get to where we are today, is that the rejection of the previous president and the understanding that it was a corrupt regime, it has a fairly strong rating on a score from one to 10. It's a little over eight in the view of most Ukrainians that it was very corrupt. However, that is also a judgment made about the present government, only slightly less corrupt than the past regime. And that's true in the East for their regimes as well as in the Northwest and South about the Ukrainian regime based in Kiev. I think the whole question is that Crimea, the issue that is almost gone unnoticed in Western press reports in the last five or six months or is it almost a year now, a done deal, most people say, not worth worrying about, is still present in their consciousness. Most of them take the position that in the long term they should seek Crimea reintegration. They do not want to see either Crimea or the East somehow disentangled from Ukraine and ultimately to end up being integrated in Russia. And the result is that for now Ukraine has other worries, other things on its plate, but that this is an issue on which they wish to restore the Ukraine that was. However, new a nation, however much a conglomerate of a number of historical legacies, not all of which are necessarily terribly congruent, but it is the Ukraine that the majority of the respondents want to see reestablished. Thank you very much to both of our panelists for that. Now let's, before we open up the floor to questions, I just had a question of my own I would like to direct to the, well I guess we could say the director of the survey, no? Okay, but I'd also be of course very interested to hear your, the other participants view as well. The separatist held areas in the survey come off as quite an outlier, right? The views expressed there are really quite distinct from the rest of Ukraine. In some cases even quite distinct from Eastern Ukraine. Do we have any sense of the factors that are influencing that? Is it a matter of coercion by the separatists? Is it a matter of greater exposure to Russian information policy, which as we know is quite intense and rather virulent? Or is it something about the conduct of the war in those areas? What, do we have any sense at all of what has influenced that particular data point there? You are, yeah. I think maybe our other commentators may have more back on and insight than I. Basically this is a, I think that the strength of these attitudes are not something that could have just been created from the outside. People are not that malleable. So clearly there were some, there were feelings along those lines before recent events. And clearly there are, Russia has intensified them, has enabled them to be expressed, and created a whole narrative that's amplified it. But at the same time they have not fully bought the narrative but the attitudes are strong enough that you should assume that it is something that is homegrown to some extent, that it isn't something that was simply created from the outside. Mr. Taylor, did you want to? The other thing I would say is that we have some evidence on this question in Crimea. Where there was a referendum they say. And according to the official results of the referendum it was what, 98% support for seceding and becoming part of Russia. And that was during a time when the Russian army occupied Crimea. And so that was not a free and fair election. But I'm prepared to believe that had it been a free and fair election or a referendum in Crimea at that time, over half would have said the same thing. So I would agree, there's clearly discontent in that part of Ukraine. I would just like to add that I, and this is spoken as a fan of USIA of the past. I think it shows the effect particularly among Russian speakers who depend on Russian television in those areas as the source of information. Their view of the world is a constant 24 hour bath in Russian information policies. The effect of television, particularly monopoly television and the fact that as the crisis started there was almost nothing comparable to the organized information transmission that was going on in that part which was voluntarily chosen. It's possible to get radio and others but for Russian speakers already discontented this has been truly I think a study in how television and particularly the virulent images that have been used does affect attitude. And I think it's something that we need to look at and to think about what lessons that should have for us as a country and perhaps even just as individual. Excellent point. Let me add one more thing. Oh, yes. What we see in the East is more resistance to moving westward than desire for some kind of political restructuring in relation to Russia. There is not a clear desire to move closer to Russia but there's more resistance to moving westward with all that that implies. It's a cultural, and I think that at its core there's a cultural phenomenon more than it is a political phenomenon. Sure, very interesting. So let's go to the audience. I believe I see a hand right here. And of course let's identify ourselves. And thank you very much. This is very interesting. Anders Oslo and Petersen Institute. I wanted to follow up on Christian's question here to you Steve. And I see two additional biases in the direction suggested. One is that half the population here have fled. The best number I've had for the half the population have fled from this area. The best number I have on how many who live in the rebel health areas is dragon capital that is assisted to 3.3 million people originally. And we have now 1.6 million people have fled. One million are displaced in Ukraine, half a million in Russia at least and 100,000 in other countries. So you have everybody who's a pro-Ukrainian have left. They are in Ukraine. And then the second bias is that you use landlines. All young people use mobile phones in Ukraine. So you get an old age cohort. Did you try to check that when asking? And we all the people are by and large much more Stalinist in this part of Ukraine. While the younger ones tend to be more Ukrainian in their outlook. Thank you. In the Donbass, it was weighted by age. So that factor was countered. And in various ways, the Kievan seeks to adjust any kind of bias that comes from the use of landline phones. What about the refugee issue? Yes, that is definitely a factor. My understanding was that 19% of the whole Donbass region has left and you might well imagine that those who have stayed behind have a different attitude. So that tells you what's going on in the Donbass region right now. And it also had the effect of decreasing the presence of the East in the national aggregate. And first we got the numbers with it weighted by the older distribution. And then we got the new distribution and had to redo the numbers. But yes, the data factors that the East has a significantly lesser effect on the aggregate national numbers. Right, again, conducting a poll in a conflict zone is not the easiest. It always has, you have to have a, you know, quotation marks around it, but you have to view them carefully. But I think it's a good read of the people that are there now that are responding. Okay, so can we go over here, please? Yes. Karina Karastelina, George Mason University School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. Thank you very much. It's really interesting research and interesting to see facts and it's really encouraging results. But I have to bring two points. First of all, that what we see here is attitudes and position of people, but we don't know how possible, how there's a possibility. So the issue of, and also issue of meaning, what they mean by joining European Union and being together is one point. And second point concerning the sustainability, how to sustain these particular attitudes which we see in Ukraine. So concerning the meaning, if we speak about joining of European Union, we have to see reality in Ukraine. Now, mostly of all people living in Ukraine receive only 80% of their salary because of economic crisis, like a salary will cut. We really also speak about the huge issue exactly with refugees, where Ukraine have very little capacity to deal with settlement, with post-traumatic stress disorder which the experienced students just do not go to school. There are a lot of issues connected with it. Moreover, if we look at Bosnia-Herzegovina, which recently had a lot of uprising connected with it, with joining European Union and being there. If we look at Turkey with all frustration with joining European Union, we know that membership is not on the table at all. We know it's just some discussion of association, which will be frustrating for people then they realize because they still have this paternalistic perception we go to European Union and European Union will give us everything. It will not happen. Actually it will be more restrictions restructuring of economy, restructuring of pension system, so which will bring more frustration. How to sustain this particular positive relationship with European Union which probably will change with ongoing processes? Regarding unity of nation, it's again, it's a huge problem. You just discussed here that a lot of issues connected what you already told but also this huge cultural, historic and other divide because history really plays a huge role in Ukraine culture of Ukraine. So... Well, let's have a... Yeah, yeah, just finish this second question. It's bomb sustainability and this one. And what we see there that we really need to bring these issues of reconciliation into Ukraine. So my position is a question for you. What should we do because we see again compare with Bosnia and others where European Union and international community left Bosnia and we see growing discontent there. So what to do with Ukraine to sustain this unity there? All right. Well, that is really the kind of question that we were trying to answer by going beyond the standard poll question that just says, which do you favor and ask, well, if this happened, how would you feel on a very, very good scale? If this happened, and if this happened, and this happened. So that you... And then breaking that out by region. So we have in our way, tried to find out what, you know, how robust is the support? How robust is the resistance? And what we see is that if you look across all the areas, the one where you get the least resistance, the most convergence, the most consensus is a kind of neutral position. You know, you get a fair number who say that they could tolerate moving toward the EU, but there is also trepidation about it that shows up in numbers in a variety of ways, obviously, particularly in the East and very much in the rebel-held areas. So that is the kind of thing that we're trying to get at. And yes, there's some pretty intense resistance. So these kinds of decisions are not made simply by referendum, so that if you choose between the EU and the European Customs Union, okay, more people would say the EU, but you don't, I'm sorry, Eurasian customs, yes. But in other polls, you do not have a majority favoring going toward the EU either. So I would quite agree with you that you'd need to not simply look at the top line response and what's the majority, but what are the levels of resistance in different parts of the country? Because a small number of people, as we know, can create a lot of trouble in the effort to create a coherent country, and Ukraine is already a pretty precarious country, and Catholic would probably speak to this better than I with the mixed language, mixed religion, mixed links to Europe and Russia and so on. So it's not as coherent a nation as most European nations. I believe Dr. Keller also wanted to address your point. I believe if I'm not mistaken, you were at the Defense Department during the Bosnian War. And at NATO as well. So you might have an interesting perspective on that angle of the question. Let me say they're right to have questions about the future in an association with the EU and because, quite frankly, when the choice was posed at any point in the last two decades, there are several European nations who steadfastly oppose any further expansion of membership, particularly to the Ukraine. I think it's, in some case, simple greed of the Southern states that don't feel they've had their share of the benefits yet, and they fear Ukraine as a compelling competitor in that way. But there are also others who stress other themes, particularly the religious question. The real problem, though, is I think it's a false analogy to look at Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia. That's a very different set of wars and leadership and histories than Ukraine is. I think while Ukraine is an amalgam, there's no question out of various historical periods and backgrounds, what strikes me as encouraging, particularly out of the survey that Steve has done, is in fact this enthusiasm for Ukraine as a separate entity, as an identifiable entity, as one with which individuals identify themselves. I think the analogy is probably better made to Germany, where even in a divided country, one that's reinforced in every way that the leadership could, there still was the sense of fundamental Germanness as a bound of unity. I think to some extent it's also true in Ireland. So I think that, at least, is a competing model of what happens to divided societies, particularly divided societies that are divided by conflict or tension. And I think whatever else you take from the survey, you should take that sense that even after all the things that have happened, there is the sense Ukrainians belong together and an interesting openness to various forms of association, including perhaps more independence. We asked one set of questions that specifically address the idea of limited autonomy for some of the Eastern Rayons. And it is, in fact, while people don't see it as the favorite alternative, they're at least willing to look at it. And that strikes me as in opposed to the Bosnian war or the war of the Yugoslav succession, if you prefer, is it a very different attitude about what the future might involve? So I believe Ambassador Taylor will be able to... To your question about how to sustain the enthusiasm. First of all, now there is a broad civil society enthusiasm that we saw in the Maidan that we haven't really seen before. So I think that's new. I think that is something that can sustain. Some members of that civil society are now in the Rada. You know, they've been elected, they're part of the politics now, they can move that. Second thing about the point about there have been nations in the EU who have opposed expansion, both in the EU as well as in NATO. It's going to take time for the Ukrainians to develop the capabilities, the characteristics, the norms, the standards required in order to be a real applicant, a real serious membership applicant for both EU and NATO. And so, and attitudes can change in Europe. They have changed. And so we don't have to worry, we should be concerned about what today's attitude is, but it need not be that way forever. Excellent point. So, well, this gentleman, please. Sorry, I didn't introduce myself before. My name's Ernie Robson. This is kind of a technical question and kind of a policy question. Where did Kharkov, Nebo-Petrovsk and Muriopol fall in your east, west, north, south? And the reason I'm asking it is because if there was a center of Russianism in Ukraine, it was Kharkov. Although when the 91, 92 time happened, there was a massive exodus back to Russia. But still, it strikes me that those areas that I'm asking about had strong leadership that was not interested in Russia. And the others did not. And we can get to the passion part later. I'm sorry that my answer is going to be very short. We just don't have enough. Clay, did you have something to add? Clay Ramsey is our director of research. Excuse me, I'm Clay Ramsey. I'm the research director. And the lasts you refer to are included in the region of the east as we have it demarcated. When you see numbers for the east, there is hardly ever any difference beyond the margin of error between those oblasts and what you see for the whole region. But the other point on this is that Kherson, also in that area of Myopol, Odessa, Kharkov, farthest to the east was the target of these little green men, of the Russians attempted to move into Kherson at about the same time they were going into Donbas where they had already invaded Crimea. And the people in Kherson resisted. They got no traction. They were pushed back. The Russians were pushed back. And again, we say as you've indicated, you've indicated that people in Kharkiv also have not been eager to move in that direction. So again, this is an indication. Kherson, Kherson is a real, that's a real different Kherson than even when I was there in 2008 and when Colin Cleary was there. This is a different Ukraine now. Could I just, there also is just a considerable difference. Let me take the military. Many of the military who served in my time, namely the first decade in Ukraine, were in fact retiring in place, if you will, from the Russian army. They were Russian. There was no question. A major form of communication was in the Russian language. Everyone thought that was fine. That's not the case today. There may be still individuals. But it's an entire change of generation. It has been 20 years. It has been this long period, not a peaceful period certainly, and with lots and lots of turbulence and change. But in that process, the formation of the identity around language in part, but mostly about the way in which the nation has operated, even on the individual level, I think has changed what was true in the 90s, particularly the early 90s, to a quite different profile at the moment. So we had a hand up over here, yes? And then over there. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I also found fascinating Professor Callagher's reference to Germany that, despite all the years separately, there was this sense of being one nation. The question that arises, what kind of nation does Donbas area believe they are? Isn't there a sense of, after everything that has happened, remaining Russians? You see, and that actually brings me to the huge difference from what I see between the opinions of non-occupied areas and occupied areas as to what to do next, because people are there being bombed, dying, lost all their properties, many of them. So that actually explains their outlook, I guess to a great extent. It would certainly for me. And I see that 55% would not mind even being annexed by Russia in the Donbas rebel-held areas, page 19. 65% would love to secede from Ukraine in the Donbas rebel-held areas. On the other hand, if you look at it, 41% of the same people say that Russia does not have the right to interfere to protect their citizens. So you think, and they disapprove of what Putin does in the area to a great extent. So I think there is a great confusion in the minds. And I guess Russian propaganda contributes to a great extent to this. And the reason I think so is because on page 20, it says that the East believes the most in the fact that the West will support Ukraine in transformation. To translate it into Russian, they are sold. They sold themselves to the West. So the question is? So the question is, do we know what indeed these areas want? And are they more like Chechnya or Germany or Bosnia? Who are they? It's really very unclear. Is it clear to them as well? That's what I don't understand. Well, I would emphasize that I think even in the eastern part of the country, the notion of the nation still obtaining, still existing, still being a, and even an expectation that it will continue, the signs to me are that that is present. And it's more that there's an insistence on some changes and greater autonomy for these regions. And again, I see it as more culturally rooted rather than a desire for secession. Sort of as I see it read it, looking at all the numbers, you have to look at them as a totality, that any talk about secession is at this point more of an expression of the intensity of feeling, of wanting that sense of autonomy and of resistance to this whole westward movement than it is a formulated desire to really secede which could be a very complicated thing for such a small little area. And annexation by Russia, the numbers that people, even the rebel held areas expressed about Russia are not overwhelmingly positive. So it's a, so I don't read it that the nation has essentially fragmented as much as there is within it intense conflict about which way to go. And I think it is very important to keep it in mind that there were these swings, that Yanukovych was elected. And if I may, I wanted to show one other, the number that I thought might come up, how people feel about the ending of Yanukovych's presidential term. And you can see that majorities in the South and a large majority in the East disapprove of Yanukovych's departure in an overwhelming majority in the rebel held areas. So this, you know, what Yanukovych represented isn't simply debt. It isn't like, oh, now everybody's ready to move East. So it is still alive. But it is, but when I put all the factors together, I still, I see a readiness to assume that there's some way that this can be, can ultimately be pulled together. And the way it's pulled together is through having a regular set of elections in that part of the country. I mean, we haven't had elections in that part of the country that have been in any way serious. And once they do, once they elect people to make these kinds of decisions, then that kind of negotiation can go on with the government in Kiev. I would also say, perhaps referring to my earlier comment, that this is one of the talking points that has been most strongly emphasized in on Russian television. A drum beat. This is possible. This is desirable. You find this tracking of the points of Russian propaganda. Wait, what's desirable? That secession and annexation to Russia is desirable. I would only like to draw on you, if you'll permit me an example from my home city, which is Boston. After the Revolutionary War, they lost 25% of their population who went either back to England or to Canada because they didn't like the result. And there's always voting with your feet. I think, though, and this is where I feel it's closer to the German example, very few East Germans went anyplace else. They did not leave. They did not go all mass to other places because, ultimately, they felt this was their homeland. Well, a lot of them went West, of course. Yes, but within the country. Yes. Within the country. I mean, you don't see massive out-migration. You don't see people even changing their address within the European Union. One other point, the support for the Minsk Agreement being large majorities in every region, I think, is a very strong indicator that they're still trying to work it out. Let's try to get as many questions as possible. You, sir, and then, yeah, we've got a lot of questions. Now, let's try to get through them because I think there's still a lot of questions out there. Hi, thanks. Can you identify yourself? My name is Chad Nagel. I'm an attorney and a blogger. I was going to ask this question in the first round, but I decided it probably didn't qualify. You had a question about, one question about the opinion of Ukrainians toward Putin. But it related specifically to his handling of the war. And I was wondering, I mean, although in a box popular type of exercise where you're asking ordinary people who are most concerned about how they're going to pay their next utility bill, this might not qualify, but maybe it would be interesting to someone, perhaps you did get a sense of opinions toward the Russian political regime, as opposed to Putin, and he is the center of it. And by that, I mean the concept of what's come to be called the power vertical. So that it seems that Putin's popularity within Russia, if we're to believe their official published results, is not in spite of, but because of this perception that there is this strongman who ultimately is ultimately responsible for the fate of the whole nation. And Ukraine's history, ancient history, but also in the post-Soviet period, has also been a sort of pendulum swing between these two phenomena. You've had Kuchma and Yanukovych. So sorry, I don't mean to interrupt you, but we're having very long questions today. Let's just get a question. You get a sense of the extent to which Ukrainians favor a dispersal of power in their political system that where there are checks on the power of a leader, like you see with Parshenko, that many of the checks are informal and from the street, as well as formal and constitutional. And whether they actually do pine for this sort of strongman. The strongman. Thank you very much. The negative attitudes toward Putin certainly suggest to the contrary, and the rejection of his claim of a right to intervene to protect Russian speakers speaks to that as well. And by the way, Russian speakers, we pulled them out, or reject the idea as well. As for views of Russia more broadly, we did have the question about Russia's role and influence in the world more broadly, and Russia did not do very well, except someone in the rebel-held areas. So overall, the overall finding of the survey is that we're not seeing a clear attraction to Russia in the East as much as a resistance to moving westward. So the idea that they look over there and say, oh, that, what they have over there in Russia with a strong leader and so on, that's appealing. I do not interpret it that way. So can we go over here to the gentleman in the blue tie? Hello, my name is Yan Zi, and I'm a visiting fellow at the CTR. My question is actually, there's been a lot of talk about criticizing Russia's actions, but do you know in what way the Western Ukrainians are ready to sacrifice themselves or their loved ones in Eastern Ukraine? Thank you. I'm not sure how to speak to that. Certainly there's a strong desire to move westward, but in many questions, particularly in the North, we find a readiness to have neutrality. Only a 48% in the West said that that wasn't acceptable. So would that translate into readiness? Well, there's not a lot of enthusiasm for using military force to regain territory, more so in the West and North, but still trepidation, not overwhelming, and support for the Minsk Agreement, which implies it has built into it the implication of some accommodation to provide greater autonomy in the Donbass rounds. So I think putting that all together, I see stronger signs of a desire to find some agreement than a readiness to use force to get a maximal outcome. Okay, so this lady here with the glasses, and then after her we'll go to the gentleman there. Hi, I'm Theresa Hitchens, and I'm a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland Center for International Security Studies at Maryland. And I have a very quick question. Given all this data and what you've found about the attitudes in Ukraine, what are your recommendations for the direction of U.S. policy? Short question. Short question. Thank you very much. Yeah. So I have some recommendations. Yes. I think we should support Ukraine very strongly financially. I think we should support Ukraine very strongly militarily. I think the international community should do both of those things. Anders Oslin knows better than anyone about the financial problems that Ukraine faces, and so we, along with the IMF and other bilateral donors, ought to be there supporting them. We should also defend and beef up the defenses in the NATO nations that border Russia. So that's an important, if we're trying to deter the Russians from doing what they've been doing, that is first invading Crimea and then invading the southeastern part of Ukraine, and we don't want them to do that more, then we need to push back, and we need to push back by reinforcing militarily the countries that are in NATO on the periphery. We need to support Ukraine, and we need to provide them the Ukrainians' weapons in order to resist. There you go. Would you like to weigh in? Yes, I'd like to add, in addition to Bill's prescription, a different perspective, and here I think my position is somewhat like that of Angela Merkel. We have to realize that what has happened is the undermining of the European security system. It isn't just Ukraine. It is the question of all of the agreements that have been broken, all of the solemn commitments, and quite frankly, a lot of the eases with which we have lived in the last 20 or 25 years has led to an expectation that this would continue forever, and we have to realize this is a political problem that is of enormous significance and that will only be solved when we come to a political solution. And that, so far as I can see at the moment, is not on the horizon. So we'd better think very hard if only because we will have lost an enormous amount of effort, and we may, in the process, destroy the economy of both Ukraine and Russia after we have spent 25 years trying to bring them into the community of nations. So this gentleman here on the aisle, please, and then we'll go in there. My name is Alex Haydnowsky. I'm a student at the Elliott School. I want to bring it back to the point that the lady from George Mason had regarding sustainability and reform in the progress of the situation. The EU and us, kind of as NATO and the European Union as a total, have been using a carrot stick in the Balkans to kind of, you know, EU membership to push for reforms and things like that. My question is, how do we, in a lot of those countries that in the past 10 years has been extreme backsliding regarding those situations, how do we avoid that in regard to Ukraine and how do we re-approach that situation in the Balkans? Thank you. I think perhaps just to continue my earlier, my last comment, what we did was we relaxed. We thought if we paid them enough money, they would simply, in their prosperity, do what we wanted them to do sort of naturally. It doesn't work like that. And nobody has spent either the time or quite frankly the commitment of their own defense budgets or their overseas aid budgets to the extent that was necessary to sustain the commitments that we made. And until we do that, we can't be surprised at the results. So the Ukrainian reforms are difficult. They're going to be very difficult for the Ukrainian government to undertake. And so they're exactly as you say, there needs to be something out there. There needs to be a carrot out there. And one thing that could be out there, which Europeans don't like to hear is EU membership. Another thing that could be out there for military reform is NATO membership. And so those two things, if they are real, if we can seriously have them as something out there, not immediately, because as we say earlier, it's going to take a lot of time for them to meet the standards. But that was the motivation for a lot of the East Europeans to do the very difficult economic reforms in order to get into the EU. Ukraine could be offered the same. So over here, please. Sam Jarrett, International Institute for Strategic Studies. I have a question for Professor Kahl. How strong in a regional and global context are the regional divides that you demonstrated to us today? Is this... Do you see divisions like this based on regions of other countries on big issues that countries are facing? Is Ukraine particularly regionally divided if you look at either regional or global context based on your experience working in other countries? We have done surveys around the world as part of the worldpublicopinion.org network. And Ukraine has been part of that network and surveyed over 20 nations. And as we were going along, we always were surprised at how heterogeneous Ukraine was. So this is very unusual. If you go look around the United States, you'd be amazed at how homogeneous the United States is. People have this idea of all this heterogeneity in different parts of the country, but there's a tremendous amount of similarity. And that is normal. And so this is extremely unusual. And it has always looked to us like a precarious state. And so it's really not surprising that things are breaking out the way they are. And that can only underscore in terms of policy implications that that should really be understood how precarious it is. And that just getting a majority or something like that isn't, that's probably not gonna create consensus because across the nation as a whole because if there are different parts of the country, chunks of the country where majorities are really opposed that then you really have potential for instability. Excellent point. So, this gentleman on the on please. Jim Goodby from the Hoover Institution. Question for Steve, I think mainly. In that the numbers that you have shown us suggest to me that the most likely outcome is a frozen conflict. Like all those others we've seen before around the borders of Russia. So why isn't the model something more like Moldova, something more like Ukraine, not like Georgia and all those other places where these frozen conflicts are going on and on without any real resolution? And of course the implications of that are fairly clear. You don't need to be sketched out. Well, I think others here may be able to better comment. But yes, the majorities across the country supporting the Minsk Agreement suggest that this is going to be some kind of framework and the emphasis in the Eastern regions on having some kind of autonomy along the lines that are referenced there. I don't know if you need to think of it as strictly frozen. I see the elements of basically some kind of agreement, not necessarily full scale federalism, but just some kind of greater autonomy so that one of the key questions, why do people in the East, what is it they're really afraid of, right? And I'd say we haven't fully defined that. But the numbers to me suggest that they could get to comfort with that. And those in the West could get to comfort with this greater autonomy so that the elements are here of some agreement that is organic, that there were people who could get to something that feels like something like normalcy. Yeah, I would agree. It doesn't have to be a frozen conflict. I mean, just as Steve says, the Minsk Agreement, if fully implemented, fully implemented, would not lead to a frozen conflict. That is, there would be some additional autonomy not yet defined, not just for Donbass, by the way, for all of the oblasts in the country would have additional, and Mr. Porchenko's talking about that and there have been those kinds of discussions. But also in the Minsk Agreement is the withdrawal of foreign forces. And that means Russian forces. If that happens, then there can also be the OSCE controlling the border, monitoring the border between Russia and Ukraine so that the Russian forces can't continue to come in. And that means then that the government in Kiev would control the entire area. And then you can have the elections that I talked about earlier. So it doesn't have to be a frozen conflict. Now, there is skepticism about whether or not the Minsk-2 agreement will last. Nonetheless, if it were fully implemented, it wouldn't have to be a frozen conflict. So if you couldn't hear what he said, the point is there will be continuing Russian interference. Dr. Kamil? Yeah, Jim, this is what I mean about the political solution. That there has to be an overarching political solution that perhaps would give to take bill scenario, OSCE, different powers or to be backed by a firmer consensus than it is at the moment. But it is going to take a long time. I also think this theme of Ukraine-ness that I mentioned before is what said, which is different from Moldova-Transnistria. Transnistria is not stressing Moldovaness. It's barely acknowledged. It's a Russian outpost as far as most of the inhabitants are concerned. I also think in the Ossetia question, you're talking again about enormous religious and cultural differences that have been there and recognized for a very long time. This isn't the case. This isn't that kind of huge walls that have been there for three centuries. It's, I think we have reason to be more optimistic, but we're going to have to work at it. Okay, well, nobody seems to be rushing for the exit, so I think we can get away with one more question. How about here on the aisle? Hi, Katrina Leggett, US Mission to the OSCE. Going along his point, I completely agree. I have a little bit more of a pessimistic view on this and that Russia's goal is to have a federalized Ukraine where they can de facto influence the East to kind of use as a veto to control the region. What do you think about that? So that may be Russia's goal, but that doesn't mean they get there. Well, when I view these statistics to me, that's actually why I'm a little bit pessimistic because I see more of this neutrality where people aren't really quite sure where they want to go and I'm worried that we're going to see a lack of will from the West and where they also say, well, they don't really know where they're going to go and Ukraine or Russia can use this and leverage this to influence the country. I would emphasize that the more Ukraine moves westward, the greater the opportunities are for Russia to try to influence the Eastern part of the country because you're going to have more alienated people in the Eastern part of the country. To the extent that people in the East have assurances that they're not going to be pulled, kicking and screaming into Europe, the less Russia will have a source or means of leverage. All right, well, thank you very much. I think we'll probably leave it at that. We've gone a little bit over the time, but not too much. Thank you very much for coming today. I think we can all agree that we've learned a great deal, a great deal of very substantive information about this situation and I thank our panelists for giving us a very, very solid and informed view. And please, we welcome your comments on social media and any feedback you want to give us. Thanks very much for coming.