 Welcome, everyone. This is the second event in the Breakthroughs and Computing series. Yesterday, we had the event with Nick Bostrom, and we spoke about digital minds and AI. And tonight, we're going to be speaking with Ahmed Gapour and Max Techmark. We're going to be starting with a talk from Ahmed on cryptographic privacy and transparency and a fireside with Will Scott. Afterwards, Max will join and will have a fireside with me. Before we started, I wanted to walk through a little bit of the impetus for this event. So a protocol is we think about computing and the power of computing. And we think of the tremendous scale of the massive computing systems that we run and how this system is getting integrated with our daily lives. How this superpower computer, superpower granting machine, is enabling us to interact in tremendous ways, but at the same time, can be abused and subverted and potentially be a harmful system. When we think about the way in which systems have evolved across the internet, we now have many cases of, or we've seen a large swath of cases of severe abuses that when maybe individually are very bad and very significant in their totality and in their trajectory are extremely alarming. So what we wanted to do was to have a discussion with people who have a level of foresight in this arena to try and think about what the future may hold. We already have many examples and many cases of using the existing information in social networks or just available through other kinds of information gathering systems to manipulate mass groups of people. And we now have several examples of feedback loops and control theory style systems to orient and coordinate large populations. So the impetus for this event also came from a conversation that Max and I had a few months ago about how, about extra risks and the importance for lots of work on many areas, things like biotechnology, climate, AI, nuclear weapons and so on, and how the potential emergence of our William States represents an extra risk at this kind of scale. Like it might not itself be an extra risk because it itself might not lead to extinction, but it might create the conditions by which we lock in an extremely dangerous environment and from which there we might get into extra risks. So in a moment we'll start with Amit and Will and after that Max and I will speak. I want to dedicate this evening to George Orwell who gave us a little bit of a glimpse through his famous book, although it was perhaps too generous on how weak those Orwellian systems might be. In reality the technologies that we have might be extremely, extremely powerful and might get us to lead us into a position where it might be very difficult to recover from this. So let's try and prevent it. And with that I will hand off the floor to Amit who I think will speak for a bit and then we'll join. Thank you. Thanks so much, Juan. I hope everyone can hear me. Good evening. My name is Ahmed Kapoor. I am the Chief Legal Officer of NIM technologies, Swiss company that provides privacy infrastructure at the network level. I'm also an Associate Professor of Law at Boston University School of Law. I want to thank the conference organizers and especially Juan and Will for inviting me to speak about the importance of individual privacy in realizing a transparent society. It's quite humbling for me to talk about this topic because I'm quite passionate about it. And so over the next 10 minutes or so I just want to set up the backdrop for my chat with Will with some very basic defining here. So privacy and transparency seem to be at odds with each other. So on the one hand, you have privacy, which is typically defined as the control of information to the exclusion of others, where on the other hand you have transparency, which is thought to include as part of its definition almost always the openness to public scrutiny. And so transparency in the organizational sense signifies openness and is often thought of as being the antidote to corruption and hypocrisy exactly for the reason that in a democracy, the way you get rid of corruption or hypocrisy is by calling it out. And this accountability that's facilitated is what makes transparency such an important tool and why it is thought of as being the currency of trust. Now, the reason that we need individual privacy to realize a transparent society is precisely because no one should fear retaliation of any kind for revealing government or corporate abuse. And I think that nothing really exemplifies this more than whistleblowers such as my colleague, Chelsea Manning, who is now a security engineer at NIM technologies, those that are documenting government brutality as those that documented here the brutal murder of George Floyd in the United States and, of course, those that are documenting evidence of war crimes and other atrocities on a hot battlefield. So what does this have to do with crypto? What are we in crypto doing to help? And I think one way, or at least an example of the ways that we in crypto are trying to help is a project that NIM technologies and protocol labs recently partnered up on over in Ukraine at the Kiev Tech Summit. This was a hackathon, and we partnered with protocol labs on a bounty for something called a non-drop. Now the intention for a non-drop, the goal, essentially, was to facilitate a safe and secure revelation of information on the ground in Ukraine in a manner that did not pose a risk of tracing, and therefore a risk of retaliation by the enemy, in this case, Russia, who was by all accounts a very sophisticated adversary, at least in cyberspace. Like, in other words, they have the capability to perhaps do traffic analysis on the whole country and trace almost any communication. And then, of course, the purpose, ultimately, was to account for war crimes and to verify existing evidence that might be in the hands of the Ukrainians. At its core, the core of the technology is essentially a mash-up of the features that the NIM network has and IPFS, of course. So the core of the core technology for NIM is a mix net, which essentially takes data from ordinary users, mixes it together using encryption, makes everything look identical, and spits out information packets in a manner that cannot be traced back to their source. In other words, it protects people, or it protects against people from watching the network along doing metadata surveillance and other forms of IP tracing. And now, while NIM provides this sort of anonymity layer that allows users to transmit data without revealing who they are, the information gets stored on the decentralized storage network of Filecoin. And in this way, it enables witnesses to upload the evidence without fear of retaliation, but also without fear that their media will be tampered with or destroyed. And the permanence of IPFS is critical to this. Now, in closing, before handing off to Will, I just want to emphasize that the existence of a hot battlefield and an illegal occupation in Ukraine only amplifies the reality that all of our network communications are exposed, all of our network communications are at risk, and they are at risk of surveillance or censorship by any sophisticated adversary, whether that be an industry competitor looking for an edge, whether that be an oppressive government or a war criminal, as is the case in Ukraine. I will mute now and hand off to Will. Thank you very much. You got into NIM a little bit and the importance of MixNet. We should probably just dive a little bit more into there so that we've got a concrete basis. You clearly see this as an opportunity. Why do we need a MixNet as a building block? And how is something like NIM going to be able to give us privacy in a way that has that unique opportunity? So the problem that the NIM network solves writ large is the problem of the God's eye view, right? And that is the all-seeing adversary that is sophisticated enough to do correlation analytics between inputs and outputs and basically through a number of various attacks that investigate the timing of packets when received by an anonymity network and when they're released by it. And the size of the packets through doing analytics on that are able to then trace back packets and identify their sources, essentially. And this was a revelation that came out during the, well, thanks to Edward Snowden and the NSA revelations of 2015. And it was at that time that we realized that the best network that we had, the best privacy network that we had at the time was Tor, the onion router. And it was subject to both of these attacks, right? The attack where the size of the packets is dynamic in the Tor network and therefore, as well as the timing of the packets exiting the Tor network. So the EU at the time, or sorry, the European Commission, I believe at the time, put out a call for a research academics to essentially build or design a network that could withstand even NSA surveillance. The mixed-net does this by essentially mixing all packets of information and making sure that they are released out of the network in similarly sized, similarly timed packets. And it does this by inserting a lot of noise. It's very expensive in terms of the resources that it takes, like any other anonymity network. And so this is coupled with another innovation. So the first is, of course, the mixed-net itself, which absolves us of these two sort of God's eye view vulnerabilities that we have in our communications. And the second is really taken from Bitcoin itself. And that is the idea where I believe it was Adam Beck mentioned to CEO of NIM, Harry Halpin that, well, one thing that the proof of work, one thing that he sort of like would do over is instead of having computers hack on and do all these impossible and meaningless math problems, wouldn't it be great if these computers that were mining were actually doing something that was going towards privacy, right? That was helping to make the internet more private and so taking that, right, we at NIM incentivize our nodes through a token, essentially. So we've got this global incentivized, permissionless, decentralized mixed-net that absolves us of two major vulnerabilities that most other networks have. So for me, it's a huge danger, you know. What are the trade-offs? You've still got latency. Do you think there's a way to make everyone use this? Is that the goal? Absolutely, yes. So the goal is to provide privacy infrastructure for general traffic, right? General messaging traffic. It's not unique to any type of messaging. And I think that, you know, so just as background, you are talking to the general counsel. I do have an engineering degree, right? But at some point when we get way deep into numbers and stuff, right? I might have to defer to the team back at NIM, right? So what we have done, at least, is come up with a tokenomics in a manner that we believe the more users we get, we will be able to scale to in a manner that actually keeps data rates feasible, you know, for use. So yeah, I definitely bet the farm on this and, you know, have dropped everything to join NIM just a few months ago for this reason. So maybe you brought up your sort of general counsel role and that's probably, I guess, relates really well to the framing that we had at the beginning, which is there is abuse and how do we deal with this? So we get anonymity of communications. Who are the targets and how does this shift that balance? In the context of whether the system can be abused, is that the idea? Yeah, I mean, you add an anonymity system and now, I mean, as we've seen in Tor before, both the system itself and then participants of it get take on risk in that. You've got an incentivization system and I guess you've got a couple of things that you must have grappled with, which is how does a very concrete incentive get weighed against a very nebulous risk of being made an example of. And then yeah, absolutely. So I think, you know, I think from at least the legal standpoint, I think networks are very much in the clear. I mean, the idea of, let me start with this, right? A privacy network is not a privacy coin and is not a tumbler or a mixer, it is like a VPN, right? And in the world, there are only maybe a handful of countries that absolutely ban VPN, right? And the rest of the world is at least at the state of play where they won't cross the line where they start to actually censor a network itself, right? Because censoring a VPN, censoring an ISP, censoring something like the Tor network or censoring the NIM network, all of a sudden we're getting into the terrain where we're thinking, well, any dual-use tool that facilitates communications, now you're thinking about, now we're talking about the slippery slope of censoring telephone communications, right? So I think that one sort of brilliant or a great sort of quality that we have at NIM and our product is that it is a network, right? It abides by the principles of end-to-end point stability, and it leaves regulation, it leaves the regulators an area to focus on which is what happens after the network or what happens before the network, right? So in the network itself, I think it's in the clear from at least something like 97% of the world in terms of regulation. Whether that could change, sure. Yeah, I believe in, I think that especially in the area of where there is technical ignorance, right? And we wave scary sort of signs at people telling them that crimes are committed and folks use this new thing called the telephone. What's the telephone? Oh my God, band match it, right? That's the sort of idea, right? And so, but instead of like, we're all accustomed to what a telephone is. I just sort of hope that through education and other sort of initiatives, we can get folks to sort of back off the scare of tech. One of the things you did at the beginning of that answer that I think was interesting was drawing that clear distinction of NIM being a utility network rather than a privacy coin. Do you think there's a different set of risks? I mean, we saw the beginning of a set of sanctions where there's clearly this worry around things happening that are financial. Do you think that's going to be sort of the focus of legislation for a while over? Absolutely, yeah. So basically, and I say that not based on my role as general counsel as NIM. I say this more with my background in national security and criminal law. So for years before going into academia, I started out my career as a human rights lawyer doing Guantanamo cases. I later did work on federal criminal cases, espionage cases, hacking cases, national security cases. Through that, I kind of like began to accumulate some sort of knowledge base and intellectual capital about how these things work, right? So what happened in 2015 was we had an executive, we had a executive order by Barack Obama that essentially declared malicious cyber incidents to be a national emergency, right? The second we declared malicious cyber incidents, we elevated the risk to that of a national emergency. We put it sort of on the same page as terrorism, right? And other national emergencies. That is what allows the government to, for example, designate the Lazarus Group, right? As a specially designated national that we are not to deal with and basically equivocating something like the Lazarus Group from the perspective of sanctions with something like Al-Qaeda or Bin Laden or something like that, right? So once you have brought the problem to escalate the problem to that level, and now you've basically, you haven't yet taken out the sledgehammer, but you have access to the sledgehammer, the regulatory sledgehammer to do almost anything, right? Because of the national security interests. So that's the first phase, right? Second phase is in trying to get rid of the national security emergency, right? We at least in the United States have focused on first, well, ultimately we focused on ransomware and the problem that ransomware poses for the United States. And also the fact that ransomware and it's sort of, at least the belief is that it began to snowball only after we sanctioned North Korea for certain attacks on the United States. Most of them were, all of which, sorry, were information attacks, right? Cyber attacks, right? Sony and then, well, the list goes on until the pipeline attack, right? But ultimately, it was, well, a couple of things happened. First it was like, okay, well, we've sanctioned North Korea, but they were getting millions and millions of dollars with ransomware payouts, right? And how do we deal with ransomware? Do we tell people that they're not allowed to pay ransomware? Well, we've already done that. Do we designate the group as a terror, as a specially designated national? We've done that. In fact, paying ransom to the Lazarus group is a crime punishable by 20 to 35 years in prison, depending how it's charged, right? So, and that didn't work, right? And so the next phase is, okay, well, let's go after the money, right? Let's control the money in this situation. If you sort of look back on any major sort of surveillance push, and I include financial surveillance, I'll allow the Patriot Act and the anti-money laundering statute. So basically resulted in the travel rule and the other rules that require us to, sorry, that require us to essentially have a stricter sort of retention and reporting requirements for money transfers, not from banks per se, but from something like a Huala Western Union and so on, right? So now I think the focus is on ransomware, but the problem is that we are dealing with entities, the problem is we're not dealing with the same sort of brick and mortar type of money transfer, right? And so applying that old law to this new technology is especially difficult and it's resulted in some very sort of bold moves on the part of the government. For instance, most recently the designation of an algorithm as especially designated national an algorithm with no actual humans, but I know personhood, right? So when you think of designation of something, you think of like, okay, a company, an organization, an entity, whatever it is, it's going to have something that at the very least has some sort of personhood. Now what personhood means, is there a distinction between an automated sort of smart contract and a person? I believe so. I think the automated smart contract can't make decisions. I think the automated smart contract can't challenge a designation of being especially designated natural, even though it has all the same sort of impact on the associates, sorry, on the actual code, but also all of those that sort of associate with the code. And that has had some sort of a trickle down effect, I think, and has caused very reasonable panic, I think, in not just the crypto industry, but I think also just the open software industry writ large. Yep. I guess. Sorry, that was a very long answer. I kind of lost myself halfway in there. I think it's a useful progression. And maybe the thing then that I'll sort of ask you is, money has been a source where we've seen the government go and various governments think about a lot because it's very quantifiable what they're losing and what these risks around this are. But the other thing that governments care a lot about is stability and we see this in the, there might be cyber threats to our national infrastructure, but also we see this in plenty of countries that just don't like politicians being made fun of in ways that they find embarrassing or challenged and that they will censor websites or censor voices that they see challenging that stability or that they'll put in restrictions to attempt hacking of infrastructure. And so as we see this progression of future and continued challenges, are you worried about that sort of lashing out in an attempt to preserve stability to also affect things like NIM? Yeah, I think that you can't ever be in the clear if you are in the, I don't mean to sound cheesy, but you're never in the clear if you're in the freedom game. That's why you're in it. I am at NIM because I believe in freedom of speech, freedom of association and there will always be some force against that. And so we're just at a point where we're at a point in time where the stakes are getting heavier, right? And they're hitting places that we didn't expect to hit ever like Western democracies, right? And I think at the end of the day, we can't let fear sort of control us. Like if folks in Ukraine are brave enough to take a photo of a war crime, then you and I should be brave enough to try to come up with a solution so they don't get killed. At the very least, and as long as we do things with in a transparent fashion, there's that word again, right? You do things in a transparent fashion trying to abide by the law as much as humanly possible, like what are you gonna do? Yeah, I mean, I think there's this challenge and you've studied issues around the dark web and issues where jurisdictional boundaries start to break down. And I think that's the thing that we can expect to continue to see increasing. And so there's this challenge of these very place-based states trying to understand their jurisdiction and their reach online as this sort of notion of a state is continuing to evolve around us. And that struggle seems like one that is going to be a significant challenge for crime and privacy and access. Yeah, I think one of the major sort of... So it used to be the case where you had... So internet regulation, maybe like 1.0, right? Where it used to have different countries regulating the internet, right? And so you could have one... You could, for instance, let's say you ban gambling in the United States, right? You ban online gambling, but somebody starts up a server in Greece and it's accessible over here, right? And so they are technically committing a crime in the United States by having the server, right? But, and we actually have a law, let's say, that says this is unlawful, right? But the thing that, in other states might have laws that say this is lawful or is not lawful and so on, right? And these sort of overlapping effects, one of the things that sort of took care or one of the reasons why we didn't have to really worry about these overlapping effects was that they were sort of balanced off by enforcement jurisdiction. So all these countries can prescribe the law. They can say, this is a bad thing, don't do this, it's against the law, but it's another thing for the country to actually cross the border over into Greece and like march in there and actually arrest somebody for that, right? That is an infringement of sovereignty on Greece that requires much, much more than just calling the act unlawful in your home, right? And that's why over in North Korea, they could call it an act of terrorism to make fun of the Supreme Leader and that means that I guess Seth Rogen is a terrorist in the eyes of North Korea, but that doesn't matter because they are not going to march in and arrest him, right? That's the idea. Now, one of the things that sort of complicates this a little bit on the internet or specifically in born cyberspace is the fact that oftentimes some of this enforcement happens online, right? So if you're going to hack a computer online in order to effectuate some sort of search, right? That might go overseas into someone else's sovereign territory, some other country's sovereign territory. In the same way, if you are going to, let's say you have a judgment for X amount of cryptocurrency, whether that judgment is something that was a judgment of an administrative agency like OFAC or a judgment of, I don't know, like a court, a district court, et cetera, right? One way, well, we have methods now to actually reach in, to reach out and actually change or in my view enforce, sorry, actually assert your jurisdiction over something that is overseas or belongs to somebody overseas. So I think it's becoming a lot more tricky now. And I think the dark web obviously makes it tricky. I think privacy tools generally make things tricky. And it'll be interesting to see how it unfolds. Maybe the other aspect of that same issue of sovereignty is that we're seeing increased vulcanization, most recently with Russia, beginning to sort of enforce and establish the walls around its national internet, but we've seen this previously with Iran and China and various levels. NIM is betting that there's going to be a sufficiently interconnected network between countries that you have the anonymity of mixing towards jurisdictions that include ones where your outbound traffic is legal. How do you think about that risk? Because if I, as I understand it, if I end up in a local intranet for my country, there's ones that are laws that are going to affect all of the providers there. And I go back to a very different risk model. Yeah, no, that's exactly right. So if you have a closed internet, okay, so are we in agreement that there is no actual enforceable, completely closed society, or, sorry, completely closed internet, or a country that's completely closed the internet, or do we disagree on that? Because even I think Iran and China and Russia, you can still communicate outside of their networks. Most people in North Korea can't. Ah, so North Korea is the exception, right? So I think North Korea would be a good exception. Yeah, most people in North Korea cannot. Yes, so if you have, yeah. So what, I think that all you can do, well, not all you can do, there are at least, so for instance, the ways that you might filter out an entry node, something, let's say equivalent of an entry node, or VPN, or a gateway for NIM, right? There are ways for us to sort of, it is a cat and mouse game, right? But essentially, there are ways for people in a closed country to communicate with a server, at least for a short period of time before the powers that be realized that it's a gateway to the outside, right? And I'm counting on folks like you will, frankly, to define, to design a better way to do that, right? But I see no, like, do I see a legal issue there? If a country makes it unlawful to run a node, like, or imposes requirements, like data retention requirements on running a node, right? Making it feasibly impossible to run a mixed node, or a poor mode, or even a VPN for that matter, right? What we have seen happening is a lot of folks are actually moving out of those countries, but really, I think you gotta figure this stuff out, though, like, because, you know, on my end, I think it, like, fine, we can violate the law in China by having a gateway, maybe. I'll think about that, right? But it's really on you to make it a functional gateway. It's really on the tech side, really, right? Because I didn't- And there is a community of circumvention tech and circumvention development that I guess is tackling that problem. But a Balkanized Internet, I mean, I think actually NIM does better than a Tor in this world. It does, yeah. Because as long as you've got the nodes in country, you're still getting your anonymity guarantees. That is correct, yeah. Cool. I guess maybe then... So we've looked at sort of a bunch of these, like, dystopic potential futures, and sort of how privacy plays a role for advocacy and communication within them. Do you think it's like, if you have this voice that brings accountability, is that going to be enough or does the increasing surveillance around us still win? I think this is like a longer philosophical question, but it's sort of the broad framing that we went into this with, in some sense. We get this voice of accountability. That's great. How does that, I don't know, maximize its potential? Yeah, and I feel like maybe 10 years ago, I would have been much more optimistic about things, right? But I feel like all we can do is facilitate the existence and the publication of information about brutal atrocities. And we have to let the world then sort of take over and do something about it, right? And whether that is through institution building or utilization of existing institutions or that got a million ideas as to how to do that, right? But I feel like the cool thing about tech is that we can look at our goals kind of in a vacuum, right? So the goal is very simply to allow people to upload files without having those files get them in trouble through, sorry, without having that upload essentially result in their tracing, result in retaliation against them, and so on, right? So can we make that happen? I think so, right? I think there's some technical problems that arise that have to do with, okay, well, how do we authenticate the evidence, right? And I think that's more interesting, right? Like how do we authenticate the evidence? Maybe we use a little bit of a little bit of a little bit of the evidence. Maybe we use an open library that Adobe has, right? Maybe that Adobe is developing for image providence. Maybe we partner up with institutions that are sort of subject matter experts, stuff like that. I think that's really interesting, right? But as far as do I have faith that transparency will win, it's really tough. I think you can continue to have a transparent society. I think ultimately we are trending towards total surveillance, right? Ultimately, like the high density cameras that were once only available in places like China and North Korea are now, for example, all over the Middle East, right? I'm not, the United Kingdom, for instance, has more CCTV cameras than almost anything, right? So the reality is that we are trending towards total collection of information. I don't think that privacy per se is the solution. When we think about privacy as in terms of control of your information and that alone, I think that things like anonymity are quite helpful, right? So if you're surfing the web and chatting, doing whatever you do, you're leaving fingerprints everywhere with all these third parties that are then accessible by the government and governments, right? They're also hackable, right? So you're basically leaving all these digital footprints, right? And the way I think about it is, you know, NSA level surveillance doesn't have to happen. That doesn't have to be your threat model. Your threat model can be a simple subpoena, right? A subpoena in the United States is the most used law enforcement tool out of any of the instruments of surveillance, right? And a subpoena is basically does not require judicial review. All it requires is relevance to an investigation. So for example, if I was investigating, if I was investigating one and I want to subpoena all of Will's records, all I would have to say to justify that subpoena is, well, I'm trying to figure out if this guy, Will, is involved in this crime. And that's relevant to the investigation, right? And from that, I can get all of your financial records. From that, I can get anything, almost anything, that's been stored with the third party, right? And so when we had computers come up and network computers and emails and stuff like that, the government for the longest time was thinking, well, this is all information that's been abandoned with third parties. We don't need warrants to get this information, right? Eventually, a court decided that you do need a warrant, but just to get emails. Still to get the session information, the account, all of this stuff is basically another version of a subpoena. Some of them might require judicial review, but ultimately the burden for them is so low that you have to assume that all of your data is being accessed, right? Or can be accessed. So to go back to your original question, will surveillance win? I don't think surveillance wins if we hide in plain sight, basically. How do you hide in plain sight? Well, maybe it's a misdomer. I don't think surveillance wins if we make it hard for surveillance to happen. How do we make it hard for surveillance to happen? We use anonymity tools. We encrypt our contents, right? If all the data that you have about your, all these digital footprints that I'm talking about, if they only tell the person who has subpoenaed your records that you're using NIM or that you're using Tor that you're using a VPN, then yeah, I think that surveillance is lost, right? They've collected all the data they believe they can get. They have authority to get, but it's not actionable, right? So in that moment, you win, right? It's very, very complicated. But there's a big gap in what you just drew, which was you started at saying, we've got the chance with anonymity to get a view of brutal war atrocities. Yeah. That's not going to change the norm to everyone using Tor and surveillance technology so that we get to this utopia that we don't fall out of. We've fallen pretty far. Like, do we have a chance of recovering the norms up to a place where that becomes expected? My actual opinion, not representing my company at all, right? I think it would take a miracle, right? And I think it would take mainstream adoption of anonymity. Like, how does that happen? Does it take Elon Musk, like, buying Twitter, getting really high one night and deciding that, well, I think we could secure Twitter and make it censorship-proof by using the name Mixtap? Maybe it does. Maybe it takes that, right? But once you have a big mainstream player like that kind of shift, I think that's really the move that we're waiting for. Maybe it's Signal. Maybe it's Twitter. Do you think it's a positive example of someone taking an initiative to bring it mainstream? Or do you think it's a negative example of something, you know, taking that next step in a surveillance state that becomes the example that people want to actually avoid in the same way that 1984 is something we point to as that's a bad thing. Let's not go to an Orwellian future. Like, we have these views of bad things, but do you think it's one of the examples of moving towards a better norm that is what we should be hoping for? To mainstream anonymous communications? Yeah, no, I don't, yes, absolutely I do. I do think that it's moving towards a better norm. What do you think? It's curious. Oh, I mean, I think we absolutely need it. I think we're a long ways away. But we'll see if it's cryptography versus continued systems developments that, I don't know, get it to versus liability or surveillance that are the things that push it more, right? Like there's a set of technical forces and then there's a set of norms and societal forces. And I don't know if I know or have opinions on which of those two is gonna be more powerful over the next years. And the question is at some point when they converge, right? So when societal forces actually influence tech and tell tech what to do, right? So, and it depends which part, which pocket of society is doing that. So if you have law enforcement telling tech what to do, for example, it might be like a government OS with the Apple, iPhone, FBI, and debacle a few years ago, right? If you have, I don't know, freedom seekers writ large telling a tech what to do, then you might have more private privacy preserving technology. It's interesting. Do you think that gets easier as we progress into the future and there's other bigger problems and tech has sort of more space to build these things without the government, I don't know. Seeing that as the problem that it has to control. Yes, absolutely. I definitely think that it will become easier. I think that privacy is normal. It's just a question of people realizing that and what that means, right? On the flip side, we are trending towards this like individual transparency and organizational privacy, right? So like kids wanna tell the world everything about each other and all of their, they wanna basically reveal every, they want to be scrutinized by the public for everything, right? If social media is any indicator, whereas corporations and companies are becoming more closed, right? And private and having privacy, right? So I don't know. That's sort of the other side of the coin, right? If you really think about it. All right, well, we've got 30 more seconds. It's been great talking to you on it. This was fantastic. Yeah, it was such a pleasure. I don't know if you have any final words. I'll give the last few seconds to you if you want it. Hello, Lisbon. I wonder if people can hear back. They could and they said hello back. All right, I think with that, I'll hand it back over to Juan and we will continue.