 Good afternoon, it's my pleasure to welcome you to this session of the global security forum in the panel Kenna US Iran deal work I'm John Alderman on the virgin ski chair and global security and Geo strategy here at CSIS and also the director of the Middle East program I Don't think this topic needs much introduction because it is clearly a topic on people's minds a pupil About a year ago since 70% of Americans Consider the Iranian nuclear program a direct threat to the United States and Now we seem to be entering a period where there's a possibility a Possibility of some sort of negotiated Solution there are people who are optimistic people who are skeptical about what a negotiated deal would look like and what we're here to talk About today is whether a Negotiation not whether it will work, but whether it could work and as I was putting together this panel I thought of my dream team of panelists. I'm happy to say that's who you're seeing today three people who I think are not only experienced Wise Observers, but also people who I'm happy to call friends to my immediate right to your left. Hala is fondi Ari Hala has been the director of the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson Center for international scholars Since 1997 98 okay, it's not quite as long a run before that from 95 to 96 She's a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center She was a fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in the first year of its fellowship program in 1995 Prior to that you taught Persian language contemporary Persian literature and courses on the woman's women's movement in Iran at Princeton University From 1980 to 94 Before leaving Iran she served as the Deputy Secretary General of the women's organization of Iran Worked as a journalist including for the paper Kehan under a somewhat different Editorial policy and she taught the College of Mass Communications her most recent book my prison my home Four years ago was based on her arrest by the Iranian security authorities in 2007 After which she spent a hundred and five days in solitary confinement It's a great book and I thank you for writing and I thank you for being on this panel Next is my former partner and cry Bob Einhorn Bob is a senior fellow the arms control initiative in the Center for 21st century security and intelligence at Brookings Before coming to Brookings in May he served as the State Department Special Advisor for non proliferation and arms control He has worked the Iran issue on the technical side for the last four years like few other people in the world between 2001-2009 In what I think we'd agree is the highlight of your career Bob was the senior advisor here at CSIS Where he directed our non proliferation prevention our proliferation prevention program and before coming he was secretary assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for political military affairs and a member of the policy planning staff at the very end Al Hunt many of you know him from his show political capital about hunt on Bloomberg television were from any of The analysis and debate shows that have aired in Washington for the last several decades He writes a column for Bloomberg view. It also appears in the International New York Times Which used to be the National Archival Tribune prior to joining Bloomberg in 2005? He spent four decades at the Wall Street Journal where he was congressional and national political reporter bureau chief Executive Washington editor and for 11 years wrote a weekly column politics and people he also directed the journals Political polls for 20 years served as president of the Dow Jones newspaper fund and was a board member of Ottawa Community newspapers now what is most remarkable about this entire panel is I could easily have had All of their spouses and had a spectacular panel as well To show Bajash Bob is of course married to Jessica Einhort I was married to Judy Woodruff all spectacular people if I couldn't have my dream team panel I will have taken my spouses of the dream team panel So thank you And thank you very much for being here. I think the question to start with is When you say can a deal work What is working look like from each perspective? What does working look like from an Iranian perspective? What does it look like from a US? Administration perspective what are the views in Congress about what working looks like? Why don't we start with holler? from an First of all, thank you very much for having me and not my spouse Although it would have been much better than me but from from an Iranian perspective A deal will an ideal deal would be Deal that will lead to lifting the sanctions, but Iran the Iranians being realists know that This is a process and it's a step-by-step process So they are willing probably to make some concessions hoping that the P5 plus one will in return make also some concession and what they have put this time on the table is a serious proposal Whether it's acceptable to the P5 plus one We just have to wait and see what will happen in the next round of Negotiations while until recently the approach was that everything can be dealt very Fastly now. They are talking about a long term And step-by-step So and we'll talk in a little while about the extent to which lifting sanctions about lifting US sanctions lifting the international Sanctions, but from an Iranian perspective the goal is somehow to escape from the financial pressure That Iran's been under as a consequence of a nuclear program. Definitely. I mean, we know that the sanctions have had really Backbreaking effect on the Iranian economy on the everyday life of the Iranian people and The goal of the government is that at the end of this negotiation or maybe halfway through the negotiation The banking sanctions and the oil sanctions can be lifted so that Iran will have access to its Money, which is now it's not accessible To them and would be able once again to raise the amount of oil exports, which is now Almost my half right. We're gonna come back to that Bob. What's a successful? Successful deal look like first of all John. It's it's great to be back at CSA as I see you've had an upgrade Since I was I was last there What what constitutes success for the US? I think Success is when Iran accepts the kind of rigorous constraints on its nuclear program That gives the US and the world confidence that it can convert its nuclear program quickly into a nuclear weapons program Specifically success is constraining Iran's so-called breakout capability breakout capability is when Iran is able to suddenly renounce constraints kick out inspectors and quickly produce enough fissile material For one or more nuclear weapons before the world has an opportunity to react including by the use of military force so the objective is to Lengthen this breakout timeline so that it's possible for the International Atomic Energy Agency to detect so-called breakout right away and have plenty of time to take effective action before Iran could have nuclear weapons and Constraining that breakout capability means limiting Iran's Programs especially its enrichment program if one is allowed in an agreement And I think it's inevitable that a domestic enrichment program will be allowed in agreement as well as to prevent Iran from using this reactor at Iraq this heavy-water plutonium production reactor to produce plutonium and it also means Putting in place very effective monitoring measures To make sure that Iran cannot have a covert program Iran has experience in building a number of facilities secretly they were discovered But you have to guard against the possibility that they will try to have a covert program again And you have to have measures in place at the declared Iranian nuclear facilities so that any attempted breakout can be detected right away instantly the date the day that it happens So the status quo would represent a failure That is unless you're able to actually lengthen the window for breakout unless you have greater Transparency all those things would represent you can't say well they haven't exploded They haven't tested a device so the process is working instead You have to say we have not been able to lengthen that period so the process is filled Yeah, the current breakout period in my view is not acceptable. It has to be shortened considerably And if we didn't get an agreement soon And Iran could enhance its capabilities over the next three to six months It would have a much shorter breakout capability So in my view the sooner that we can get constraints on Iran's program the better now Capitol Hill Has a lot of power people paid a lot of attention looking at this issue What are the different definitions of success that you hear when you talk to people on the Hill? That assumes it's a rational institution to begin with John First of all I to appreciate and I'm honored to be here when John was putting you to this panel He he got a lead and he got Bob and he said we have to balance this panel out Let's turn to old hunt. So we had I'm gonna talk about the political hacks. That's my that's my specialty You can't talk about a Congress today in this context this issue The same way you would have talked about a Congress say 25 years ago If I think Bob Einhorn has written a brilliant paper that really outlines what a final Deal will look like or something close to that and if you take that premise if you had George Mitchell and Howard Baker and Richard Luger and John Kerry running the Senate then I think you could see how it would not be hard to come to some kind of Resolution it's much harder today to resolve anything And I think there are two conundrums to start with which affect Congress one is we ask Can can run honey deliver? What's the politics over there? And I suspect that they must ask can Obama deliver and that's where you get to Congress And I think the second conundrum in the context here is is Syria The administration basically thinks that Syria is a is a sort of roadmap of sorts for how you achieve things on Capitol Hill Republicans and a few Democrats think Syria was a bunch disaster whether it was or whether it's not They they talk different languages there it seems to me that if they come to Congress and As Bob can talk about the far greater expertise than I do they can Administratively wave a lot of these waivers and they can decide they want to try to bypass Congress the optics the politics everything's pretty bad about that It's probably not the way they're gonna go I think there are three issues that then come to the forefront number one What will be the Israeli reaction and what will be the real reaction? I assume that the yahoo will oppose anything, but what will the Israeli security apparatus? What will how will they feel can they say this really is in the in the security interest because the fact the matter is that the Concerns about Israel are paramount on Capitol Hill in both parties much more so than used to be the case I think a second question is which I blew to a moment ago is what kind of inspections what kind of Verifications do we have how intrusive are they do we have validators who say they really work as the IA signed on to the third thing comes to Obama and What Obama at some point is gonna have to do is not only say this is in the security interest of the United States But he's gonna have to say this is the choice the choice is this or war and This is a very war weary nation. I think people are that poll you cited earlier. I agree Most people are very suspicious of the Iranians. I think most people are very supportive In Israeli position, but as we saw in the case of Syria This is an incredibly war weary country And I'm not sure that Obama can frame that as well as we once thought he could but it'll be incumbent upon him to do so Bob as we go through a process and what the administration is talking about is a temporary Agreement or an interim agreement with somewhat modified Sanctions relief probably allowing the trade and precious metals and petrochemicals and something very incremental that was certainly all material offer and They say we're going for a six-month targeted negotiation How well Will people in the public people on Capitol Hill be able to judge whether the Iranians are adhering to Their obligations or will we be in the same you can't disprove a negative is You don't know what you don't know. How clean is that debate going to be picking up a one also? I think it's going to be pretty clean Because for most of the things we would want the Iranians to do in this kind of interim deal Are things that the IAEA the International Atomic Energy Agency can monitor very precisely There are things like making sure this Nuclear reactor at Iraq is not been loaded that fuel hasn't been you know transferred to the site It means perhaps ensuring that Enrichment is not taking place At more it you know at the Fordo facility or certainly not Enhanced enrichment at the Fordo facility That they Iranians have not installed more advanced centrifuges at one of their enrichment facilities So these are the kinds of things that the IAEA is very good at at monitoring and reporting to its members About so I think we could have high confidence That's such an arrangement is being kept what the one thing that is hard to monitor Is whether there are covert facilities? I don't think anyone believes that there are covert facilities of any substantial size today But over time in a final agreement you you would be concerned about that But under a final agreement you'd probably have much more extensive verification measures than you would have in place for an interim arrangement who in Iran Would be opposed either to getting an initial interim agreement were to getting a more comprehensive final agreement like Bob suggested There is a faction among the hardliners. There's a faction among the revolution regards Who are opposed to such an agreement whether it's step one or the comprehensive agreement? we know that the IAEA has been wishing or pushing for Iran joining the Additional protocol but the Iranian parliament has made it clear that this is not doable until we have a final agreement So you have elements in parliament elements among the revolution regards and elements among the Hardliners and the reason why I think the supreme leader came out two days ago and supported the Negotiation team was precisely to at least silence Some of these opposition who were talking about a Sellat I mean they said they were arguing that the reason why the negotiations were kept Confidential is that the negotiators especially the foreign minister Zarif was selling out Iran's interest So the supreme leader came out and said the negotiators are our children and the children of the revolution We have to trust them and they have a free hand although he added I don't trust the United States and many other things. So yes, there will be opposition but if the government is going to be able to put something tangible which is Acceptable as a first step for the Iranian government, I think They will the people will go along and the hardliners reluctantly will be forced to go along and then you know one of the the criticisms of Iranian negotiating behavior has been that the negotiations always get dragged out Negotiations are never over that there's always Revisiting there seems to be a sense of urgency among some of the negotiators, but do you think there's a possibility? That that there'll be a faction that wants To move ahead and conclude an interim agreement and there'll be a faction said no we can get we can do better And you can't appear too eager and it's not about the principle It's about the timing John, I don't think so. I think until Jalili the last negotiator was in charge He was a master of dragging out everything and we were told that every time the two sides So together we started going back to history and putting on the table all our grievances This time that it said the past is the past. We are going to start today so my sense is that Even if there are people in Iran who want to drag it out among the hardliner They won't succeed because they are now a bunch of Technocrats who are there who are going to carry on with the negotiation unless you know and also a very important decision was taken to move the nuclear file from the Supreme National To the foreign ministry so that Zarif will report to the president who was a nuclear negotiator himself directly rather than going through this Iran's national could you see a Sort of a tacit alliance Emerging between skeptics on the Iranian side and skeptics on the American side where each one reads the other signals and they try to derail From their own side Some sort of agreement because of a sense that that that each one feels their side is giving away too much Yes, I think you already see that part of the efforts to toughen the sanctions right now Which is there is some move in the Senate? I don't think it'll occur I think it'll be blocked, but I think in part that's That's the motive of some and surely if there's any kind of an agreement an interim agreement or Eventual agreement there will be ferocious opposition Some of it will be from people who probably genuinely think it's a bad Idea some who will oppose anything that Obama put up the Magna Carta. They would oppose it and And so that clearly will be the case. I think John and many and in many respects more interesting question is who are the people that could facilitate it and make it happen? If if there would be some kind of a some kind of a deal in the house, that's a hard question to answer It's a very hard question answer It would have to be the House Republican leadership, which is a thin read in the Senate I think the two key people not because of their positions, but just because of where they've been one Would be Corker who I think is a Luger in the making. He does not want to just oppose He doesn't fall in that category Republicans. I spoke about it right and the other has been in this Not the most respected chairman we've ever had in the Foreign Relations Committee, but he's been a hawk This was noted earlier, and if he were to continue that posture, I think it would complicate matters a great deal We focused a lot on the sort of US Politics side, but it seems to me that the part of the question from an Iranian side is not only the US sanctions But the broader international coalition That has gathered to support the US position and certainly one of the Possibilities would be the the United States for political reasons or others would seem to be extreme and Some of the more multilateral pieces of a sanctions regime Could fall away in Iran in Iranian political terms Would that be perceived as a win? Would it be acceptable if they got through an intro agreement couldn't get an international agreement, but the US was blamed For the failure of the international agreement. Is that a possible win from the Iranian side? Rhetorically, yes unless the European break away from the P5 plus one and start dealing with the Iranian You know directly But at the end of the day the Iranians know that they have to come to a man agreement with the United States And without an agreement with the US, this will not work for them. That's that's the Iranian position They know that but you so you don't think there's an instinct for for coalition busting Well, they will do I mean at this stage They are hoping that will they will come to someone to some kind of an agreement with the P5 Plus one as well, but if they don't succeed I'm sure they will try focusing on the European and they will try and create a bit. Definitely I agree with Hala. I mean a big win for Iran is to divide the P5 plus one Shatter the international sanctions coalition and get the lifting of sanctions without having to pay any Pay the cost of constraints on the nuclear program through an agreement So, you know sanctions lifting without agreement is the best outcome I think the current team in Iran the negotiating team is realistic enough to know That they really have to have an agreement to get the sanctions lifted but if Negotiations are prolonged and become difficult it could be that the Iranians would resort, you know To the tactic of trying to get the sanctions lifted without an agreement by trying to demonstrate that they're the Reasonable side that the P5 plus one have been intransigent have asked for too much unreasonable demands And so it's not their fault And you don't know if that would have much appeal. I'm sure the US administration and its P5 plus one partners We try to counteract that that tactic by demonstrating that they have, you know Try very hard to reach a compromise. Well, they would think what would I'll suggest that was that where Congress is Is not necessarily Supporting a sort of we're being the reasonable side and there's a P5 plus one negotiating position But to the extent that there are congressional spoilers that could make it more complex I think that's one of the downsides of you know piling on new draconian sanctions at this time We will look like we're the intransigent side that we that the US is sabotaging an agreement and And is responsible for a stalemate and I think that's really one of the problems of piling on with new sanctions And also this is precisely the argument that John Kerry has been making to his former colleagues over the last couple weeks that that the that the that the coalition For sanctions is is already fraying a bit and that if the United States is seen as the as the real Unreasonable hard liner it's going to create it's going to make it much harder to get the kind of deal That you want and that's why they among other things as Bob said think the thing toughening the sanctions now would be bad But in an overview sense this is the this is the message that he repeats How does that play on Capitol Hill when you talk about the need for multilateral support for sanctions? I mean is that something where people say what is making this work is that there's solidarity or people saying what makes This work is American leadership We're gonna tighten the screws and tighten tighten and everybody has to follow us because we're Where do we are John that your question supposes that Congress is a homogeneous? And no, but I mean when you make that case to Ted Cruz It's probably gonna get a different reaction than if you make that case to senator Corker I Think it's a persuasive case. I actually think some of the so-called Hawks the Lindsey Graham's of the world are Open to conversations and open the considerations on this So I I think I think that is an argument that does not is not automatically rejected by some of those people I think it goes back to what I said earlier some arguments going to be rejected by elements on Capitol Hill no matter How persuasive or how rational they might be and you mentioned earlier this sort of politics around waivers We currently have for more sanctions laws. They are in place until the end of 2016 If the administration move forward with waivers either as part of interim agreement or or as part of a Final agreement if the administration is an article in National Journal today that suggested That the administration might not enforce provisions of law especially actively How what are the kinds of reactions that would arouse on this on Iran as an issue? I'm sorry that would arouse what what kind of if the administration tried to either officially wave or implicitly wave Aspects of current legislation or current law I think John it depends on the context if it's done where they're whether it's an interim or a final agreement where there is a Consensus among a lot of people Including some of the people we talked to earlier that this is a this is not the perfect deal, but it's a good deal If it's a deal that could get through the Senate, but the House says no way I mean we're almost back to looking at Syria as a model of sorts Then I think probably they could do it sure to that however. I think it's not just the optics I think the politics of it become very difficult and the administration in a way I hate to keep talking about Syria because I know how different the issues are but in a way Complicated they were building to do that by making the decision to go to Congress and talking about the importance of Congressional authority on an issue that's important as it may be Isn't isn't doesn't rise to the level of this issue So I think it's not an easy question to answer and I have proven that by eluding an easy answer But I but I do think it's complicated Bob your paper that that we're gonna plug again that I'll refer to You delivered in Israel a couple weeks ago Was premised on the idea that that the deal might not be great But it's better than sanctions falling apart and it's better than what war would give you Both in terms of of the sort of international coalition, but also in terms of what the Iranians do What are the? Who are the kinds of people who are very skeptical about that argument? I'm sure that that it has not found favor in every corner and and what do you think would persuade people that you know That really is kind of the best the best thing I'm not sure what will persuade them if anything will persuade some of them but Look, you just have to compare this deal to the alternatives and and look realistically at the alternatives You know military option. What what will that do? Will will it Really set back Iran's nuclear program and for how long some estimates are as short as six months eight months is it worth the risk of Triggering triggering a major regional conflict You know, and I think the the worst consequence of Military attack is that Iran could then decide to kick out the inspectors and go for nuclear weapons and Much of the world would sympathize with them and the sanctions coalition would shatter So the military option doesn't look all that very good good Others think maybe we should really push hard for regime change and if we really did that We'd have a better regime. Maybe they give up nuclear weapons Problem is that a new regime in Iran may not want to give up a nuclear weapons capability and I think, you know, we've learned that it's not so easy from the outside to change the regime that You know, if there's going to be a major change in Iran It's going to come from inside Iran and in any event if it's going to come It's not going to come on any time frame that's relevant to dealing with the nuclear issue So I think when you compare, you know, what I think is a good enough deal against the alternatives It doesn't look it doesn't look bad at all. Is it good? I mean, I'm wondering about the you know, is it good enough the Israeli defense minister Mosheya alone October 24th Sharply attacked the US leadership without mentioning it said we're saying beware to the Western leaders We say don't be seduced by the Iranian charm offensive Don't be tempted to ease the sanctions before you have a clear result in your hands clear proof that Iran has no Nuclear capability no military nuclear capability No uranium enrichment capability or anything else We're warning you because we are seeing indications from the West to the effect that oh, they're talking nice now There's been a change in Iran. Let's go meet them halfway There was talk of confidence building measures of answering calls for humanitarian aid That's exactly what the Iranians want a reduction of sanctions before they've stopped their military nuclear project true Little Israel should not be the spearhead and we always try not to be but when no one speaks the facts as they are We have to speak them. We have to speak very clearly so that naivete or wishful thinking Do not influence policy. Are you persuaded that when? Assuming we get to an interim agreement. We get to a final agreement Mosheya alone will say Good enough really is good enough I'm not I'm not persuaded. He's gonna say that but You know, I think one has to be realistic about what's achievable The conditions that Netanyahu is laid down for an acceptable agreement sure it they would be great It would be terrific if we could get that agreement, you know, the end of their enrichment program all enriched uranium sent out of the country Dismantle there are critical facilities all the rest of that would be wonderful. They but no one I know who understands the Domestic situation in Iran believes that that's an achievable outcome. It just it just isn't I mean if you I think Hala is right that the supreme leader can if he believes it's a good deal I think he can get it through But he won't be able to get through a deal if it doesn't If it doesn't embody what the Iranian leadership has called its rights It's in a lullable nuclear rights, and that means the right to pursue programs like enrichment And so I think it's simply not negotiable to try to get the maximalist positions that some including Prime Minister Netanyahu have advocated May I ask one question? I am I talked to a couple Members at Congress the last couple days who I think would like to support any kind of a reasonable deal And one of the questions that they we keep posing is that what what what sends off bad vibrations of them is they say Why are the Iranians saying they're going to build 34 new nuclear Plants when they they're sitting on the world's second largest supply of natural gas I think that's the sort of signal that Congress maybe it has no relevance at all to the substance here But that's the sort of thing that that it creates more political complication, and I don't know what the answer that is You don't talk about the the energy needs of Iran Yeah, look forward to your microphone for the Iranian the nuclear Program actually started before the revolution, so it's not the child of the revolution It's thought it existed there, and I think the most unfortunate That happened was that the Germans were building the Bushel reactor but after the revolution under the Pressure, I believe of the United States and I'm quoting Zarif who said that at the Wilson Center the Germans left and the Russian took over but the Russian were very Clever they dragged it out for 28 or 30 years, and then finally delivered the Bushel facilities, which are basically still not Working for Iran it has become a matter of pride because it is an indigenous program Number one and number two I think when they went down this road they believe and I'm not not talking about the Urbanization we assume that they are not going down that road But they wanted to have a nuclear energy, and I felt it is their right to be able to have access to Nuclear energy and now they have and it's to have access to this is a Matter of consensus among most Iranians even the Iranians who are opposed to the regime and Are in the diaspora believe that Iran has the right to Nook the nuclear energy for peaceful Purances, but they have made also certain, you know as Bob said they are not going to give up completely you know Enrichment they are not going to They don't trust any country probably to send out their 20% stockpile. I mean this is the big problem I mean who can you trust as far as they are concerned? so and They have made it clear that they will not join the additional protocol unless they have some things In addition which they have gas shortages and gas is an important natural gas is important source of imports for currency I think they're exports. I think their nuclear energy program started as a nuclear weapons program That was the rationale for it. That was the justification. I mean there wasn't just They wanted nuclear weapons. They wanted them under the Shah I think after the revolution temporarily they gave up a nuclear weapons ambitions But they were resurrected again in the early mid 1980s during the Iraq-Iran war And it's not surprising that they were interested nuclear weapons then Finding a terrible bloody war with you with Iraq Iraq was assumed to have a nuclear weapons capability of their own I think it started out as a nuclear weapons program in their enrichment program What they found out it is that it wasn't Too easy to hide a nuclear weapons program and two of their major facilities were outed by Either the MEK or Western intelligence and they paid a heavy cost for being caught essentially cheating on their obligations We have good information that in 2003 a decision was made To suspend one of the elements of their nuclear weapons program the weaponization part actually constructing the device And there is also pretty good information that the leader Has not given a green light to proponents of nuclear weaponization to go forward and cross a nuclear threshold And I think that's where we are today a nuclear weapons program in suspended animation just being deferred And I think what what we need to do is to make sure That that program is backed as far as possible away from the nuclear threshold and that Moving back toward that nuclear threshold can be easily detected and we can react to it very quickly I think that's the theory of success. So one of the other pieces of this puzzle is that Iran has a long list of grievances in the way the world has treated Iran and shown disrespect to Iran and The nuclear program for better or worse has been The tool Iran has used to get the world's attention to get the world to come to the table Does there come a point where some people in Iran? Say we can't give away the nuclear program and only work on narrow aspects of sanctions if we're going to give up the nuclear program we have to have a broader agenda we have to Write Iran's place in the region Rather than then just work out from under this the smallest of economic things are there people who say where are they? What kind of voice would they have? sure there are People in the Iranian administration who believe that Iran has to play an important geopolitical role in the region But I think what this administration in Iran is doing is trying to separate at this point This presidential administration you mean president Rouhani and his administration to separate the nuclear portfolio from the rest of Iran's concerns and the role Iran wants to play Recently Zaryf said if we are invited To sit at the table during the Syrian negotiation We will welcome it and go but he didn't say it is alright to be there He said if we are invited we are going so I think they would like to focus at this stage Only on the nuclear program hoping that because of the if they can get some sort of an agreement The sanctions will be lifted and then they will start dealing with other issues But that represents that faction in the government and it doesn't represent necessarily the leaders thinking about Where the nuclear program fits in and it doesn't necessarily address what the leader may think about the role of the nuclear program as a tool as an instrument to Resolve a whole range of grievances about Iran's place in the world. That's just president Rouhani. Yeah, but John president Rouhani doesn't speak in a vacuum president Rouhani speaks now for a faction in the Iranian establishment and So far he has the support of the supreme leader How long this will last we don't know but so far he has the support of the supreme leader And he believes that if he can deliver if he can deliver Some kind of an agreement on the nuclear issue and the sanctions will be lifted then He can he's going to become much more powerful and can deal with the opposition inside Iran and deal with other issues at this stage. He has abdicated some of his power to the security Institutions he doesn't deal with them with what they do, you know, I think he's waiting for a later state that's why it's Important both for the Iranian and I think it's a unique chance for the p5 plus one Maybe to come some to some sort of an agreement, but as Bob said it has to be under very Intrusive and the exact verification and also You know inspections but I think then there's a there's a I think a Fear on the Iranian side of fear on the US side that this thing would turn into a Christmas tree Everybody would try to hang things from it Because they see this being the best opportunity to affect bilateral relations and Alice you look at the hill would there be some effort to say well if we're gonna do anything for the Iranians on nuclear stuff We can't have a clean nuclear issue because we are concerned with all of the aspects of Iranian regional behavior be it support for Hamas and Hezbollah activities in Syria support for Islam actually had So on so on so on is that does that you think that impulse? Would come and on the hill and what what would happen if If the administration needed led needed actual legislation rather than just push for a waiver Well, there's no question impulse would come it would come among other some people who just feel passionately about some of those issues and it would come from those people who would want to sandbag anything that That is sent up to the hill Whatever happens, there's one thing that I think we all can guarantee it will be messy it will be unattractive It will be complex. It'll be difficult And I want to just go back to one thing. I said earlier though In in in America It is not this is the stakes are huge here public opinion is not irrelevant And when we talk about congressional opinion that also is affected by particularly those people on the on the margins of this You might be able to predict how 80% of the people up there will react But those people the margins will be affected by public opinion And I think there's two issues that we have to keep in mind number one is that this is an incredibly war War-wearing country. I don't care where it is. This is a country that does not want another war of any sort and Secondly the sort of counter to that I think the president has lost a lot of credibility in recent months and has shown an inability to be as persuasive as we once thought he was and If he can't recapture that I think that's going to create problems How does that perception affect the president's ability to negotiate with Iranians? Well, I'm not sure Well, it affects it in the sense that that if it eventually has to go into the political arena that has to be a consideration I'm not sure that the first one. I don't think the administration would accept my premise So therefore it wouldn't affect it that much but but but but I think that Certainly there's going to be a you know a question raised in in the end any interim Or any final agreement is going to be made by the president of the United States subject to congressional approval Perhaps and how he presents that and how effective he is in persuading people This is in the security interest of the United States security interest of Israel and as Bob said it's not perfect, but it's good And his ability to persuade people of that is is is very relevant to this and Bob and I am I correct in in Getting from your comments that the president doesn't necessarily need to get Clear congressional approval that this is principally a multilateral agreement Which Congress doesn't have to approve and Congress doesn't have to be a party to I mean they have to approve it in a certain sense. They're gonna have to Agree ultimately to Repeal some of the sanctions that are on the books. They're gonna have to cast votes on that they're gonna have to Cast votes for funding some of the arrangements that that come out of the deal But whether they'll have to prove approve the deal itself is is unclear whether it would be a kind of action taken by the executive That doesn't require You know even support of both houses of Congress not to mention a treaty is not I don't know that it's been determined at this point The timing of an agreement is unpredictable. There's a sense of Iranian or people I think the negotiators perceive the Iranians fuel an urgency to make a deal But let's say we sort of get Kind of a partial interim something is there any point At which we should say you know what? We shouldn't try negotiating this that either Rouhani's not serious Rouhani doesn't have the juice to make the final deal The Iranians are playing an elaborate game, and it's not really leading to a conclusion Can you conceive of a point where we would say we're not going to negotiate this at all and What would the indicators of reaching that point be? during the last Iranian administration when Saeed Jalili was negotiator in January 2011 at an Istanbul meeting The Iranians took the position that they were not prepared to talk substance with us until The p5 plus one explicitly recognized the right to enrich uranium and immediately lifted all sanctions Even the Russians and Chinese essentially threw their hands up and say this is not serious This is ridiculous and in effect we called off negotiations at that point. We didn't resume them for over a year And you know I can I think that would would be what would happen if we Discovered that the Iranians really weren't in the end of the day serious with their their actions didn't match their moderate rhetoric You know then I think the recourse would be to suspend negotiations and to seek a ratcheting up of the sanctions and to use Iran's stubborn behavior at the negotiating table to seek international support for a ratcheting up of sanctions We wouldn't have to work very hard with the US Congress to get the US Congress also to strengthen the sanctions I think that would be the recourse. I don't anticipate that happening frankly I think so far the Iranians have seemed to be very serious about reaching an early agreement but You know if it you know if it turned out that at the end of the day They weren't prepared to accept the kinds of constraints that would make a deal acceptable to us I can imagine simply suspending the talks and going resuming the pressure strategy and that would either lead to More crippling sanctions that would really try to either bring down the government to work the military option Well, you know in part it would depend on how the international community perceived it if they thought that We were being overly demanding and we were causing an impasse I think it could lead to an unraveling of the sanctions and if we used military force in those circumstances It might not be seen as legitimate and it would we generate a lot of sympathy for the Iranians So it'd be dependent. They would depend on how it was perceived at the time Matthew Laji has pointed out that that a lot of Iranian presidents have come in With energy and a positive attitude and sense that here they really have a chance To lead things in the right direction at the end of their second term They leave in disgrace realizing that they actually didn't have a fraction of the power They had hoped you seem to think that Hassan Rouhani is in a different position Why why is that? If Hassan if Rouhani is smart He would have watched every president before him and would always remember that the supreme leader cooperates and supports the president in the first term, but If that president does not deliver Then in the second term he starts withdrawing his support and they leave in the disgrace or whatever And I think because he's an insider because for 30 years He has been sitting there and watching how the Iranian politics has evolved He will try and we and will give them a sense of urgency That we need to settle this problem But if he does not and his success depends also on how much the p5 plus one is willing to give to Iran It's not a one-sided road. I mean they have to make concessions But the other side has to also make some concession But if these concessions are acceptable for the supreme leader, I think he will continue supporting Rouhani If not, then Rouhani will have the fate of all the other presidents before him How you've talked about the war weiriness. I think about four times Is there a way for this to come out on the hill Where there's something other than just a sort of grudging acceptance is there a way for this to unfold where people feel they've actually gotten something they've improved the security of the world And and we should take it as a win and move on Yeah, but that's going to be very hard I think I suppose the scenario would come close to what you laid out in that in that paper And it would you know, perhaps it would be accompanied by some kind of authorization for force if they if they cheat Maybe that'll give give their give most factions what they want I think again, it would it would certainly be predicated upon The Israelis at least not vehemently Objecting or Netanyahu not vehemently objecting. I think it's possible to see that I wouldn't I wouldn't want to bet a great deal on it Bob you think that at the end of the day The the center of Israeli public opinion will say Even if it's imperfect It's realistic. It's the best we could do and we can live with it. Was that I think so. I mean You know Israel Israelis have been very realistic They have to they live on a narrow security margin and they they haven't had luxury being able to see the world in Ideological terms and I think they'll take a look at the situation at the time They will see how much support that might be for the use of force the downsides of it And they'll make their calculation and I think if the deal is you know is is credible I think they'll go they'll go along with it. I think it's essential. They don't have to be enthusiastic about it but they just have to Not Stimulate, you know, their supporters on Capitol Hill to go after it because if they if they do that's going to make life Very difficult for the administration But if they don't if they're prepared to live with it Then I think it's gonna be possible to get sufficient support on the Hill Does the view or reaction of any of the other Gulf States matter? My sense is you know and John, you know more as much about this as anyone You know the sad this the the current difficulties we're having with the Saudis, you know are a problem But I think if the Israelis are okay and are prepared to go along with the deal I think You know the Saudis would would not independently try to agitate against it That you know the Saudis have a different kind of problem, you know The Israelis are concerned with the contents of the deal. They want to make sure that you know prevents an Iranian nuclear weapon The Saudis aren't terribly concerned with the contents of the deal. They're concerned that that in order to get a deal We are prepared to give Iran Essentially hegemony in the region that we will grant them great influence in the region if they're make concessions on the nuclear issue That's what the Saudis most fear and so they're gonna judge the deal from from a different basis I think they fear two things one is is that The Iranians would Would implicitly get regional hegemony in a way that would be to their disadvantage and the other somewhat related but still distinct point is I think a fear that the United States would naturally rather have a strong relationship with Iranians like we had for much of the 20th century and that their alliance would weaken and As the US Iranian alliance would strengthen that there would be a zero-sum Dynamic and that would be distinctly to their disadvantage at a time when they are they remain much as it causes them discomfort Relying on a US security guarantee As long as Iran's attitude towards Israel does not change There is no way that the relations between the United States and Iran will go back to pre-revolution and I don't see any change in that attitude towards Israel So I don't think the Saudis should worry about that not this week not this I Would love to bring you in we have some wireless microphones If you could just wait for somebody to come if you could do me a favor follow my three rules One is that you identify yourself Second is that you only ask one question and third is that you ask your question in the form of a question Which is not to make a statement and ask our distinguished panelists. What do you think of my statement a question right here? Steve Benson from CSIS I think about the complex dangerous task of ridding a region of thousands of tons of chemical weapons And then I think about it in a conflict zone And then I think about it with influence from Iran and troops and for and and just influence political influence and I wonder about a potential misstep another action of mass destruction in the area with chemical weapons and I think about how Iran might have to be involved in the guarantee that that wouldn't happen is this something that plays on the Negotiation table is this something that is within the thought process of the folks that are making these decisions There's a lot of capital involved Political capital involved in making sure this Syrian thing comes out right I think if Iran is seen to be supportive of the chemical disarmament of Syria cooperating if it can cooperate but being generally supportive I think that's a positive factor and I think the Iranians do have motivation to be a positive factor The Iranians clearly have a you know concern about CW in the region Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran during their war and There are many, you know, they're there. I don't know tens of thousands of Iranians are still, you know, you know, we're feeling the aftermath of that use So I think they sincerely would like to see Bashar implement this deal conscientiously and I think you know to the extent that they're perceived as being supportive I think it'll have a positive effect on people's perceptions of Iran's willingness to implement a nuclear deal Question over there Joe Mohammed Baharoun from Bahouth Center in Dubai We're talking about Sanctions as if there one where there are three types of sections the UN the EU and US and if we assume that we're talking about the US sanctions It already has got the sunset provision which says these sanctions would go away if Iran does one two three Which begs the question. Why do we are why are we talking about a deal? Everything is is is obvious and unless the deal actually Requires compromise on both sides So where is that compromise is going to happen? And is it going to be related to the role Iran wants to play and the national community and The playground in which Iran is going to play on. Thank you. You know, honestly, it was hard to hear with the sound So it's a brand-new building and we're still working on a few found in an imperfection in this building Remarkable, it's also no red wine on the white marble. Just so everybody knows it would stain Okay The sanctions has got sunset provisions, right? That says if Iran does this and this and that the sanctions goes away Why is there a need for a deal if the provisions are okay? So the question is that this the current round of the current legislation Has a sunset provision at the end of 2016 and the question is can't the Iranians just wait out the clock and then In on January 1st 2017 all the sanctions go away I don't I don't think any of us think that's what would happen on January 1st 2017 Yeah I'm not sure that all of them sunset at that point I think there's some that would continue but even if they were to sunset and the requirements for lifting them have not been met I can guarantee that the US Congress will adopt a new law that will extend those sanctions. I don't see there's any Risk of that ever happening. You're on sanctions. That was it was in 1994 actively, right? Yeah, but but renewing it in the absence of the conditions that would enable it to be you know Ended would be hard to imagine, you know, I said earlier that the current effort to toughen sanctions I don't think we'll succeed it won't succeed because it won't get to the floor if it got to the floor And there was a vote it would succeed And the new sanctions want to expire if there are new sanctions Andrew Pierre question for our best right horn Bob you touched very briefly on the possibility of a division among the p5 plus one and This has gotten really very little attention as he seems to me in the public debate at least and I'd like to get a sense of Your sense of where the Russians and Chinese stand How anxious are they to have a deal? How would there possibly a serious division between them and the Europeans? I'm gonna assume for the moment that there wouldn't be between the Europeans and I States and Then if the negotiations don't work out and there's question of a of a war as to use the word of our hunt but I would prefer to say a clean surgical strike against the Iranian facilities with with that to become a major factor of unraveling Among the p5 plus one Thank you, Andrew. I Mean so far. I think the US administration has been very much impressed with the extent to which the Russians and Chinese have joined with the others in a unified position and putting pressure on the Iranians I think probably Russia's and China's Requirements for an acceptable deal are somewhat less, you know, than US requirements. I think Russia and China would be prepared to settle for significantly less but if there was no deal and Iran were seen as the responsible party for the for the stalemate And and we decided or anyone decided to use military force Clearly Russia and China would not be on board. I can you know, I can't imagine Russian China supporting the use of military force I can't imagine if they really believed Iran was responsible for the impasse that they would acquiesce in stronger sanctions You know, Russia and China have not been advocates of sanctions But they've mostly opposed sanctions that affected their own companies and and their own persons But that I think they recognize both of them that pressure has what brought has what has brought Iran to the table so far and if they were responsible for an impasse I think they would go along with the further strengthening of of sanctions But we've been impressed the extent to which Russian and Chinese diplomats have, you know Supported the collective efforts of the P5 plus one and that's one reason Iran. I think has become more serious about negotiations Bob Coppegan an independent energy consultant first of all congratulations on the new building John my question is for mr. Einhorn you talked about a interim agreement Versus a comprehensive one and I'm frankly not in my own mind clear what the connection is between the two You said that their program is a nuclear weapons program in suspended animation Could you elucidate what the connection is and how we get? From the interim to the comprehensive program. Yeah, I think the interim deal Would be I think there'd be two two elements agreed in a framework when we'd be an interim deal Putting interim constraints for about six months on Iran's program The other would be the general outlines of a final deal that would be concluded at the same time as the details of the interim deal The interim deal then would be implemented for about six months during which time you would negotiate the details of the comprehensive Arrangement why do you need these two parts? Why don't you go directly to a comprehensive deal the reason is that would be very detailed arrangement the monitoring and all the rest The constraints on an enrichment program. It would take a long time a year or so to negotiate perhaps In that time Iran can make substantial progress on its nuclear program I think they have they're at the verge of making a substantial gain in their program the things They could do now that would really get them closer to the nuclear threshold I think it's in our interest to have an interim deal immediately very soon that could cap that program Essentially freeze further progress while we're negotiating a comprehensive deal and there's another reason for that We'll have to demonstrate the administration will have to demonstrate to the Congress that Iran is prepared to live up to its Obligations, I think if you put an interim deal in place while you You still have not concluded a final deal you have the opportunity during that period to demonstrate Whether the Iranians are prepared to be conscientious and if they are if they're to live up there to their commitments I think that's a much stronger argument that the administration can make for congressional approval of a final deal So I think it there's a good reason sound relationship between the two and my understanding just to clarify My understanding is the interim deal essentially has the mothballing a lot of equipment shutting a lot of equipment down in a verifiable way So it represents a clear freezing and not just a treading water. Yeah Now there You know now we look we have our own means Intelligence means to get a handle on you know whether they're pursuing covert Program and I think it's the view that I mean that we are not aware of any covert activities and I think even Intelligence communities like the Israelis doubt they're pursuing covert on the basis of their own national technical intelligence means So we have a basis to do that now in a final agreement We'd have much more robust verification in place and I think much greater confidence that they didn't have a covert program But this would be a six-month period a relatively short period Thank You Edward F Georgetown University. I think it's worth asking Who has time on its side in this situation? Clearly Iran is hurting because of the sanctions, but if you look at it from our point of view I mean consider other controversial agreements law of the sea CTBT new start Not only can the opponent say we can live comfortably without this they actually prefer a world without that agreement Here the situation is completely different. I don't think you can find anybody who would say the current situation is fine I Mean no agreement for us means more centrifuges more enriched uranium closer to a weapons capability closer to war Doesn't that make a difference in how the issue is posed here in Washington? I think one of the Positive aspects of the current situation is that both sides seem to have an Interest in early conclusion of a deal I think it's fairly symmetrical and that hasn't always been the case and you know US Iranian history in terms of incentives for reaching any agreement I think here you're right Ed But you know we would like to see constraints put on that program soon They would like to see sanctions eased on their economy soon And I think that gives both sides incentives for an early deal Kind of follow up on that and also on Bob's point. Is it catastrophic for either side if they judge the other side's Intentions wrongly that is is it catastrophic for the Iranians if they misjudged the United States And there's really no deal available as a catastrophic for the United States if we misjudge the Iranians I think it's It's going to be catastrophic if they misjudge the United States because they have put so much on the table and their own Reputation their own survival. I mean but their own I mean this group the negotiating team in President Yeah, I mean it's Rouhani Zaryf and his whole team. So it is going to be catastrophic and some of them may not even survive Do there would be a lot of pressure on them to resign and have a new team and also the hard trainers would say Well, we did tell you that the United States is not serious and so on. So that's how I definitely but you have a team who is Who is quite aware of what the possibilities are I? Don't know how sophisticated the Iranians are and looking at American politics, but if they are even reasonably sophisticated They would conclude things ain't going to get a lot better The next president is either going to be probably a Republican or Hillary Clinton if I'm them I'm not going to say boy, that'll be terrific. I'll be a lot better and I don't pretend to be sophisticated about Iran And I don't know if Rouhani really is that that Iranian moderate We've been looking for for 35 years, but it's pretty hard to imagine someone who'll be a lot better So it seems to me that it that that either side That they make a calculation that and they misread as John said that things are going to get better That that really would be a rather stupid miscalculation Two more over here and then finally Thank you Bill Murray with energy intelligence group a slightly different question But this has to do with a meeting taking place in Switzerland I guess during the past week concerning potential Middle East nuclear free zone and there was actually it's a bit below the table but there was both Israeli and Arab representatives there although they may not have been talking is that The administration is obviously cares about this a lot and is paying attention to this and may be on a pushing Below the radar. Is this how does this relate? Obviously? It's tangential to the direct question, but it doesn't seem so since this is the Middle East in its own one It wasn't just Israeli and Arab Delegates there there were Iranians there as well But I think it is tangential to this Negotiation on the Iran nuclear issue. This is a long-standing proposal To turn the Middle East into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction You know Israel hasn't been enthusiastic about going forward with this Arrangement as long as it doesn't have peace with all its neighbors and it has concerns about some of the nuclear weapons programs of its neighbors This been ongoing since 1974 when the Egyptians and Iranians jointly put this forward at the NPT Conference in 2010 they called the NPT review comes they called for a Middle East conference of regional states to Negotiate this zone. There's no practical possibility that this is going to make any headway And this has become a matter of kind of you know political theater With a number of countries pointed finger at Israel because of its nuclear program and trying to put it in the hot seat the Israelis not wanting to to be put in the hot seat and Refusing to have this session the Iranians even though they've been You know accused by the IA Board of Governors of violating their you know, non-proliferation obligations Are trying to you know You know act as if they're the strongest supporter of this Middle East zone So it's you know, it's a lot of political theater But it's not going to result in anything and I would very much doubt there's going to be this conference anytime soon Don't poke tickets yet Thanks so much John Chris Nelson. I'm an Asian is so please forgive a really naive question It relates to the to in a sense the congressional Israeli questions Is it naive to say you know at a certain point to have a deal that is successful? implicitly there must be some Opening for a rapprochement between Israel and Iran That is it possible to talk about you know, Israeli Egypt Egypt style working agreement Is that something that we should include because as you guys were saying To get the Capitol Hill signed off, you know the Israeli reaction But also the the Iranian existential threat question It strikes me as as essential to the messaging and the selling of the agreement. Should we be thinking in terms of of the the Israeli Iranian conundrum as part of the nuclear deal because we have really talked about that. Thanks Well, I would defer to the two experts that I'm sure that would make it much easier on Capitol Hill But I anything I've read suggest that's not going to happen Look in Israeli Iranian rapprochement with With guarantee supported US Congress, all right, but it's not going to happen. It's how that you know pointed out It was a hopeful question At least you didn't ask about unicorns Thank you very much for your participation. Thank you very much to our terrific panelists I appreciate your coming. We look forward to seeing you for the rest of the afternoon