 Hello, everyone. My name is Victor Cha. I'm the senior advisor and Korea chair here at CSIS and I'm happy to be here with Rory Metcalf, who is the director of the international security program at the Lowy Institute in Australia. Our discussion today, conversation is on North Korea and the way forward and I guess I'd like to begin the conversation, Rory, by asking you there have been a whole set of sanctions that have been placed on North Korea as a result of their three nuclear tests and their numerous ballistic missile tests. In your opinion, do these things work? Are these sanctions working or is there anything else that the UN or the Security Council should be doing? Good to be with you, Victor, and welcome to the Lowy Institute in a virtual way. Look, I think we have no choice but to continue with the sanctions path, but it's hardly the only instrument that the international community should be using. It's quite striking that every time there's an act of provocation by North Korea, whether it's a nuclear test or whether it's a missile launch or whatever it may be, there's a call for a new round of sanctions and there always seems to be some small degree of tightening that can be done. But this does not appear, in my view, to be the fundamental driver of regime behaviour in response to the international community. I think there's also a role for deterrence and ultimately without, in my view, a much stronger sense of continuous Chinese pressure. All of these interesting useful small sanctions are not going to fundamentally change the regime's behaviour, but even if we were to deny them all their luxury goods, for example, I still think they'd put regime survival and stability and their own continued power ahead of those material benefits. I would have to agree with you on this question. You've been much closer to the action when it comes to North Korea than I have. Well, I would agree with you. I think that the sanctions are a necessary thing that the UN must respond every time the North Koreans do these tests. And I think there's the hope that while they won't denuclearize North Korea, they will have some sort of impact on proliferation financing or the development of these programs. But they are only part of the larger policy, I think, with regard to North Korea. Another aspect, of course, is deterrence. And here I think the United States has been working very hard at trying to deter North Korea from undertaking more provocations under this young new leadership. This most recent effort in the spring of flying B-2s and B-52s as part of exercises out there, I think, were an attempt really to draw a red line for the North Korean leadership, this young North Korean leader, in case he didn't know where the red line was. I think this was a real effort to show them, here, we'll show you where the red line is if you have trouble figuring out where that was. And I think it was somewhat effective in terms of getting the North Koreans to quiet down a little bit. Of course, there were other factors, but I certainly think that was one of them. Rory, could you tell me what you think Australia's response to this, their role in it? I know that they've also been a strong advocate of sanctions and have been a supporter, at least when I was in government of the six-party process from the outside. What sort of the reaction there, in your view, among experts to the problem? Look, Victor, I think the Australian position is pretty clear. Not only because Australia's a US ally, but because really our security and our prosperity is hugely enmeshed with what happens in North Asia. Australia has a very deep interest in helping to manage the North Korea situation. And I say manage rather than resolve because I'm fairly pessimistic about prospects there. So Australia, including using its non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, has really been not only a strong supporter but has tried to, I think, lead the charge with tightened sanctions. Australia, interestingly, and I'm not sure I agree with this, but Australia has been reluctant to allow North Korea to re-establish its embassy in Canberra. We renewed diplomatic relations back in, I think, around 2000. But recently the North Koreans have not been able to bring in a new ambassador. I think that's a very tiny gesture by Australia. I'm not sure it's the most productive gesture we could make. More substantially, though, Australia is a serious player in the proliferation security initiative. I think that when it comes to any kind of maritime, dare I say, enforcement of sanctions, Australia would be there. But there are no illusions in this country that as a middle player of 23 million people, we can't make a fundamental difference. We can help really try and add our voice to the international community on this issue. But Australia is watching closely and I want to go back to your point about extended deterrence, if I may. Australia is watching closely how that has played out this year because one of the key questions for many U.S. allies and partners in Asia at the moment is what is the future of extended deterrence under the rebalance, under new circumstances where perhaps the U.S.-China relationship is going to be more competitive than it was. And I'm really interested in your assessment that the playbook of deterrence gestures, the B-2 flight and so forth back in March-April, that this worked and that this wasn't in fact running the risk of further provocation of North Korea. What's your sense of the response of other allies, Japan, South Korea, to that activity? And do you think there was a moment there where the U.S. did have to recalibrate its responses? Well, I think, Rory, you know, I think that the actions were taken part of regular annual U.S. military exercises. And I think the response both in Japan and South Korea was a positive one. I don't think there were feelings that this was unnecessarily escalatory. North Korea and rhetoric and actions were clearly beyond the pale on anything we've seen before. And you know, I think the United States felt that it needed to respond in a way that would show the North Koreans where the red line was and show allies in the region that the United States was not going to take this sort of sitting down. And so my understanding, at least from folks I've talked to both in South Korea and in Japan, is that they generally saw this as a positive thing. It doesn't, of course, remove the risk that North Korea could still carry out some sort of provocation, because I still think that's on the table. I think that is still a possibility. Our own research here at CSIS has shown that these inter-Korean dialogue that started in June, these sorts of things don't stop provocations by the North. And South Korean elections, new presidents often generate provocations by the North. So I don't think we're out of the woods on that. But at the same time, I think the United States has tried to keep a very close handle on maintaining a strong deterrent posture in support of its allies in the region. I guess the last topic we might discuss is China and what we think China's role in all of this is or what role they could play in some sort of solution. I tend to be as skeptical as you about whether we can actually find a solution and whether we're just managing the problem. What do you think China's role in all of this is or should be? Well, I guess I take the view that there must be, I guess, a playbook, if you like, of measures that China can take to put pressure on North Korea. I don't take the view that any increase in Chinese pressure sets us on an automatic path to regime destabilisation or collapse, which seems to me to have been sometimes the excuse used within the Chinese system not to do more. So I get the sense that we still have an opportunity here and that certainly it's been welcome to see really Chinese outrage, at least at an emotional level, about North Korea's provocations and indifference this year. The big question is where to from here. I was slightly heartened by my sense that the summit in early June in Sunnylands, the Obama-Shijian Ping summit seems to have raised the conversation about what to do about North Korea. I've even heard, I guess, hints that the discussion moved towards what would China and the US do in the event of a crisis. Not quite contingency planning, but moving there. So I think we have an opportunity, but I also think that there needs to be a fundamental shift within the Chinese debate. There certainly are still voices, serious voices in China that take the view that no amount of risk or pressure on North Korea is worth it from a Chinese point of view. So again, I'm not optimistic, but we've got the best opportunity we've had in years, I would have thought. What's your perspective on that? I'm not too far off from that. I mean, I think all of our cooperation with China thus far on North Korea has been short-term, tactical, and pretty superficial. And I agree with you. I think using Sunnylands, using Pakunae's visit to China, we need to move to the next level with China, which is a quality of cooperation that is more long-term and more strategic and more genuine. I mean, that's a tall order for all the reasons that you stated and all of China's perceived equities in North Korea. But I think that's a conversation that we need to shift towards. And hopefully the leadership in both here in the United States as well as in South Korea as well as in China through these various meetings are trying to get to that point. Yeah, for as long as things can't be reined in on the Korean Peninsula, I get the impression that the rebalance to Asia is not all about China. So I would have thought it's in China's interests to really change that situation. Yeah, I agree. Well, thanks a lot, Rory. This was a great discussion and I'm sure that we'll continue these into the future. And so thanks for being on the line and we'll see you soon. Thank you. Sadly, I'm sure we'll all be speaking about this again. That's right. It's the gift that keeps on giving.