 Due to the lack of time, may I raise my question and my handing over to you, Peter, a little bit more aggressive and more emotional. Why should Europe promote domestic mining when it could originally or can rely on well-established cheaper global supply chains? Is that the future? I think the future is complex. If you look through history, you'll see that certain raw materials have been critical, which means by definition they've been geopolitical. Looking back, you've had salt, you've had copper, you've had gold, silver, more recently the hydrocarbons, uranium, silicon, and now it's the raw materials needed for the green and digital transition. And who knows what will be critical for quantum computing, an answered question. So let's not forget that Europe started its project around sharing governance for dealing with two important raw materials, coal and steel. And that's the basis of the project we established together shortly after the Second World War. Now if you go forward to the first oil crisis in 1973, it was a wake-up call for Europe at the time. And one of the things that we did was come out with our first raw materials strategy and our first internal governance, the raw materials supply group. It was also the decade in which the then Chinese president said, the Middle East has oil, but China has rare earths. And that was the starting signal for China to build a strong position in the metals and minerals value chain, a process which has taken it from a virtual non-player to an extremely dominant player practically across the whole periodic table. So we got the first idea of what that meant in geopolitical terms in 2010 when there was tensions between Japan and China, and China shut off the supply of rare earths. And that's when Japan, the European Union and the Americans set up the trilateral conference on critical raw materials, which continues to this day to discuss issues about security of supply and diversification of sourcing. And we very recently invited Canada and Australia to join us in this forum. Now, for come more recently, 2018, we saw that China was racing ahead in the game to develop battery vehicles. And we thought, uh-oh, our automotive sector is based on the combustion engine. We could be kissing goodbye to its future. So we actually developed very fast a new way of doing industrial policy. We created the European Batteries Alliance, we brought together all the partners, we identified the key investments throughout the value chain, starting from battery raw materials and their refining and their recycling, and we put the investments in place. We put together two big public-private partnerships amounting to over 20 billion euros of investment of which approximately six comes from national state aid and the rest is from the market. And this has been an inspiration to us in the new, uh, Von der Leyen Commission. The first decision taken by this commission was the overarching framework of action, the European Green Deal. How Europe can achieve its 2030 and 2050 climate and energy goals while transforming the economy and making sure that this is a fair and just transition for the population. And in that Green Deal, there is a statement which says there is no Green Deal without access to a sustainable supply of critical raw materials. Raw materials have become a security issue for the European Union. And that's taken forward in the industrial strategy of March 2020, where there's a chapter which says Europe can no longer afford to be excessively dependent on others for things which are vital to its own future. We need to develop resilience and strategic autonomy in the framework of open global markets. And that's the context in which we produced, as you said, in 2020, we revisited our assessment of criticality, but this time we also included a forward look. We forecast what we think we'll need for 2030, 2050 for all the key technologies. And we came up with an action plan. I'm not going to go through it, but one action was we set up an industrial alliance for raw materials. It's been running now a year. It has members from Europe, from our neighbours, from Canada, from Australia, from America. And it's open to any company from around the world that shares the goals of developing open, diversified and sustainable value chains. And in its first year, this alliance has delivered an investment pipeline of 10.7 billion euros from mining through to recycling and everything in between in most countries of the European Union. And just two days ago, it delivered an action plan on rare earths and permanent magnets, which are the headline area of concern for Japan, European Union and the United States of America. China has 100% control over the rare earth value chain and the permanent magnets that go into all electric motors, whether it's in the digital sector, the automotive, go into spaceships, aircraft, defence equipment. There couldn't be anything more strategic for the future or more likely to become a geopolitical issue. Now, that's one action. And we've also decided that investment is an issue. So we've just set up what we call the Clean Technology Materials Task Force with the European Investment Bank, the Bank of Reconstruction and Development and both the Batteries and Royal Materials Alliances to identify the tools and conditions under which those banks will de-risk strategic projects. We're also looking at the domestic side, circular economy, getting projects off the ground. But I just want to focus now on the international because we really need to diversify. And here we've developed a first strategic partnership with Canada. That was in June. And in July we signed off on one with Ukraine around batteries as well as raw materials. And we're just beginning with strong political support to offer one in the Western Balkans. We're starting to negotiate with Serbia. And to our friends from Africa here, we're very interested in developing a new kind of partnership which will allow African countries to use their resource riches or resource curse, if you like, in a way which is going to give you a better economic and social development and help us to partner with you. But as President Varanda was saying yesterday, we will not come with ready-made investment proposals. We want to listen to your needs and help you to deliver them. To close, I'm just going to say four challenges that I see. The first is there is a race for resources. And the challenge will be, can we manage this in a civilized way in a world which is becoming increasingly uncivilized? And there are new frontiers where the rules don't exist. The deep seabed, a de-iced Arctic region, and the moon and beyond in space. Second challenge, there is a deficit of investment. It's too long to get investments. And we can see that there are forecasts of future demand going up, but the supply will not be there in certain areas. Also commercial banks are nervous about investing in this sector. That's where the public banks can help to de-risk. And we may need strategic investments because the markets are not normal markets because of the market dominations. You need patient strategic investment. Third, you need a new social contract. There's a lot of opposition to mining. There's a lot of expectations that mining cleans up its act, that there's more transparent supply chains. You heard Commissioner Reinders, due diligence, he's preparing a corporate responsibility proposal on that later this year. Final challenge, as this is a governance conference, there is a deficit in global governance on how we manage the world's metals and minerals. Is there going to be something multilateral in the United Nations system? I heard Ifri the other day propose there should be a new agency sitting alongside the OECD and the International Energy Agency called the International Minerals Agency. But is there an appetite on behalf of the Great Palace to come together and deal with the challenges within a multilateral framework or are we in the sphere of palace? I just close on that note. Thank you. Peter, thank you very much for this wonderful overview on European politics.