 Interesting subject for discussion this afternoon. How Donald Trump could save EU foreign policy, I think it's a very compelling headline or title. It in some ways recalls a slogan that was widespread in Ireland over 100 years ago, which went, England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity. It is certainly the case that the paralysis of the classic, a prime paralysis of the classic American position in regard to world affairs generally, but more specifically to Europe, the US conception of its place in the world since 1941, you could say, is in some sense an opportunity for the EU. But more than anything else, it's perhaps a challenge for the EU. This is the essence of Stephen Lain's thesis. And of course, it is correct. The questions that need to be answered once one accepts this thesis, it seems to me are two. Firstly, are we sufficiently aware collectively that it's in our interest to meet the challenge? And secondly, can we again collectively agree on the instruments that we need to meet the challenge? These are big questions, but of vital importance. Stephen Lain is a visiting scholar in Carnegie, Europe, one of the great think tanks. I suppose think tank is a bit too small a word for something like the Carnegie organization, which covers the globe. But he has previously served as Director General for Political Affairs in the Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs from 2009 to 2011. Before that, for six years, he served in the General Secretary of the Council of the European Union as Director for the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. So you could say that he is excellently qualified to deal with this question. We look forward to what you have to say. Thank you very much. Good afternoon. It's a great pleasure for me to be here again. I want to congratulate the Institute also for the timing of this event on the day after the most spectacular actions of the Trump administration, the bombing of the Syrian air base last night. In a way, this action contradicts all the principles of the new administration. It's not America first. It's very difficult to say that there were any American national interests at stake. You can actually say it is an application of the doctrine of responsibility to protect, which is the most progressive doctrine of the liberal world order that Donald Trump despises. But I think taking the decision, the concerns of protecting the civilian population in Syria was not at the top of the mind of Donald Trump. I think rather he thought this is a fantastic opportunity to show decisive strengths on the precise issue where his predecessor has shown weakness, basically. Still, in one way, Donald Trump kept his word. There was a speech of last summer where he said one of the biggest problems with US foreign policy is that it was so predictable. And he will change that. And he is delivering on this. Now this brings me to the subject of the talk. I owe the pleasure and honor of the invitation to an article on the same topic that I wrote together with Heather Grabey last December. And when we wrote it, we based our analysis on the potential of Trump's foreign policy on the very few speeches he made in these areas on the first appointments, but also on quite a number of tweets. But now when I was trying to prepare this lecture today, I was thinking that, really, we don't know any more than we did in December what the US foreign policy will be. It's still very much a very, very confusing picture. There is, however, very little doubt regarding Donald Trump's world view that's well-established, that hasn't changed in decades. There's this famous Playboy interview in 1990 where he basically already said the same things that he's saying now. There's a great deal of consistency. And it's not overly complicated. There's an excellent article in foreign policy by Colin Carl and Hal Brands that have termed it the Trump-Gran strategy. And accordingly, Trump sees three threats, three big strategic threats to America. One is radically slum. The second one is unfair trade arrangements. And the third one is illegally migration. And to counter these threats, America first means four policies, basically. The first policy is economic nationalism. That's a term coined by Mr. Bannon, and basically means very tough, robust protectionism using the US economic and political ways to get better deals from other countries. The second element is ramping up homeland security until you have the bans on Muslim visitors. But you also have, of course, the big project of the wall. The third one is building up military strengths. Budget proposals are impressive. I think about 10% raise in the expenditures for the military. And Trump has really said the US must be able to win wars again. And the last point is, of course, clever deal-making. Because Donald Trump believes that the previous presidents have been weak, not tough enough, and not clever. I think he thinks he's much smarter, and he believes with his business experience and with a very tough transactional approach, he can get much better deals for the US. And these are not the musings of eccentric tycoon. There is a very good article in Foreign Affairs by Walter Russell Mead, where he says there is actually a strong tendency in US foreign policy making going back to the first populist president, Andrew Jackson, that held very, very similar views. Jacksonians believe that the business of the US government is protect the economic interests and the security of American citizens. And in terms of foreign policy, that's what they're supposed to do and nothing else. So Jacksonians believe that the self-serving elite has betrayed the American interest by entering into international engagements that are not really in the US core interests, and that, therefore, America got a raw deal from the rest of the world. And this thinking was really a strong factor, probably, in getting Donald Trump elected. So if we know quite well what he wants, why don't we know what he will do? And I think a large part of it is the volatile personality of the Donald and his lack of foreign policy experience. While his fundamental beliefs are unlikely to change, they haven't changed for a long time, his position on concrete points have changed already quite radically, depending also on whom he has last had as an interlocutor. One case in point is, of course, Syria itself, where until the day before yesterday, basically, was very relaxed on Mr. Assad and his government. Another case in point is the one China policy, which he first put into question, then he reversed himself rather rapidly. And the third case in point is the European Union, of course, because if you remember the famous interview with the Times in January, where Donald Trump said Brexit is a fantastic thing, he's certain that other countries will follow the UK to the exit. And that's a very good thing. And he's completely unworried about the possible collapse of the European Union, because this is, after all, just an instrument of the Germans to beat the US at trade. Now, in the interview in the FT, a few days ago, he said, well, actually, Brexit is still a good thing, terrific thing for the UK. But he doesn't think now that others will leave because the EU is finally getting its act together. And he said this actually three times in this interview. So I think you might already see the influence of Angela Merkel. And then there is, of course, Trump's rather annoying habit of constantly sending contradictory mixed messages. Basically, he says sentences like this, NATO is obsolete, but it's very important. And I'm quite sure he believes this is a very smart way of doing this. Now, the uncertainty has, of course, to do also with the incoherent team, which includes both ideologues and very experienced practitioners. And it's entirely possible that McMaster, Mattis, and Tillerson will take over foreign and security policy leaving Donald Trump tweeting in some sort of parallel universe. And it's a unique situation that you really don't know who is speaking for the administration. Is it the officials, or is it the president, really? And it's also unique and totally unprecedented that the president's men are traveling to other capitals, basically telling the counterparts not to take seriously what the president has said. So I think this is something that we have never experienced before. I think on two critical issues that dominated European concerns just two months ago, the war has already greatly diminished. And the first is the risk of a possible big deal with Putin about Eastern Europe. And the second one is the US, in a way, disengaging from NATO. I think on both issues, we've seen that the Republican mainstream and the military industrial complex, the deep state, the intelligence services, have very, very firm positions. They're leaving the president a very limited room for maneuver. The rapid disappearance of General Flynn has shown this. And also, I think the current investigation of the Russian interference in the campaign will probably reinforce the skepticism towards Moscow. I have a friend who regularly travels to Moscow and knows the political scene there quite well. And he said there was a huge celebratory mood after the elections. And they were really incredibly happy. And the media reported every single little step that the new president took. But in the meantime, his contacts, they are very worried. They're really very anxious about the situation, I think after last night, even more so. And actually, the news reporting, which is, of course, all controlled on the US administration, has been curtailed quite drastically. I think the success or failure of that administration will be determined by its internal policies and economic policies. And of course, in this regard, the start was not very promising with the failure to abolish Obamacare and the judicial problems with the visa bans. So I could imagine that actually what you will see there might not be that much energy left to shake up foreign policy. It is possible, but I think after last night, I'm not anymore so sure, that the real problem of the administration for the world will not be radically destabilizing steps, but rather too little action and too little engagement. And you've seen these drastic cuts that have been proposed for the State Department for USAID and this very, very slow process of appointing people in the State Department. It seems that there is actually sort of a strategy to sideline the State Department altogether, and that points in this direction. Because I think we should all be aware that the US diplomats play a hugely important role around the globe in many regions. There are many countries where no government formation, no major legislative step is done without some kind of cooperation with the US embassy. Sometimes the US gets badly wrong, bad mistakes are made, but on balance, I would say this influence is a positive one and it adds to stability. If the ambassadors can no longer play this role, either because they don't have the political backup or because they don't lack the resources, because the funding is cut drastically, I think that could mean a lot of trouble. And as an example, I just would like to look for a moment at the Western Balkans, originally in Nobel from my work with Kravya Solana. And there the US enjoys tremendous prestige and huge influence, particularly in the Muslim areas, in the Albanian areas, but also in the Bosnian areas. The US is seen as the protector, basically. You have the Bill Clinton avenues and the statues in Kosovo, et cetera. And now Donald Trump is a very unlikely protector of the Muslims anywhere, not even in the Balkans. So these politicians are very, very nervous and the enemies, the Serb, Slav politicians, sadly thinking, well, maybe some of the decisions of the last 20 years could be possibly reversed. So the Trump administration is creating already a lot of instability in this region without having done anything. The officials have not focused on the Balkans at all. They sometimes confuse Balkans and Baltics but they have done nothing but the result is already enormous nervousness and uncertainty. Now, what does this all mean for EU foreign policy? I've worked on this area since the early 1990s and I've often been wondering why progress has been so excruciatingly slow. To me there is a very logical argument sort of the mother of all arguments for a stronger foreign policy. We are in the midst of a massive redistribution of power and influence in the world in demographic terms, in economic terms, in military terms and it's quite clear that the weight of the EU of Europe is on the global scales is diminishing very fast. I think Germany will be the last country that will fall out of the G8 biggest economies, I think by the mid of this century. So Europeans increasingly will be faced by choice. Either they become very modest and realize that their influence will dwindle, even the bigger states will be small states and will not be able to remain relevant players on their own right or the EU sort of pulls together shares resources and invests in common institutions. So for me this was always seemed as a very plausible argument and public opinion seems to support it because the most polling, the support for a stronger foreign policy is there but still the argument doesn't seem to convince the people who count and in my thinking about what the answer to this riddle should be I came up with three answers, three factors, three constraints that make EU foreign policy so difficult. The first one is of course lies in the very nature of foreign policy. It is certainly to some extent about solving problems and promoting your values, definitely. But it is also about affirming national identity. It is about asserting a national profile, asserting a certain rank in the world. And collective action in common institutions can solve problems and promote values but it cannot do this other function of foreign policy. You cannot delegate it to Federica Mogherini and as long as this identity reaffirming role of foreign policy is so important, it is very difficult to overcome the primacy of national foreign policy. Particularly of course that is true for the bigger countries. Now that after Brexit you could say the logical step would be to turn the French permanent seat in the Security Council into an EU seat but you just might just as well ask France to send the Eiffel Tower to Brussels. It's just a completely impossible thing and will not happen. The second constraint that is more in evidence with the small and medium sized countries comes from that long period of post-modern harmony on the continent. I think during this period where most countries were surrounded by France and had very few direct security challenges, serious foreign policy and security policy simply went out of fashion. It simply, there was not sufficient investment in this area. Prime ministers and foreign ministers continue to like to talk about foreign policy and are happy that the EU gives them plenty of opportunity to do so but they frequently lack the will and the engagement to take the risks and the costs of serious foreign policy action. For many years I've been sitting in the Foreign Affairs Council and sometimes I was thinking that we are sort of acting out the textbook case of Olsen's collective action problem. Basically, hoping that somebody will act but not us basically. The third constraints and that is of course directly relevant to the topic is results from the long standing habit of relying on US leadership. Whole generations of EU politicians and diplomats were socialized with the idea that the US will take the lead. If a problem comes up, somewhere in the world the first reflexive response would be what does the US intend to do about it? The EU did and Europe did play its part in sort of a common Western policy but the lead was always with the United States. Close transatlantic consultations basically on a permanent daily basis made sure that the policies were mainly in sync. The EU's few successes in this area, the stabilization of the Balkans, the Iran nuclear deal or the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine are due to a very strong relationship with the United States. When this cooperation broke down, for instance in 2003 in the Iraq war, the EU was effectively paralyzed. There were very few EU initiatives that without this kind of American backing and even few of them were successful. The US influence sometimes visibly, sometimes behind the scenes was also crucial in building consensus among the EU member states. I remember when I was political director, Obama wanted to do this new policy towards the Iran and the EU was completely split on the question of sanctions. There were some countries in favor for stronger sanctions, others totally skeptical. And without this kind of, I saw the US ambassador and delegation from state department almost every second week in my office basically pushing very hard and succeeding. Ultimately, you had a unanimity in the EU to pursue this action. So this close partnership served both sides quite well, but it added a cost, of course. There was a deficit of independent strategic thinking in the EU and also a lack of investment in foreign policy and security policy assets. For a while, the Washington fostered this dependence, but that time is long gone. I think the Obama administration almost desperately wanted a stronger participation also from the EU. So already Obama's engagement in Europe and in the region around Europe was weaker than of its predecessors. I think it's now clear that on the new administration's agenda, the EU will be even lower, no doubt about it. Focus will be on China, Russia, Iran, and ISIS. To the extent that Washington engages with Europe at all, it will much prefer to deal with individual capitals. And if there is sort of a problem with one capital, then I think Trump will try to play them off against each other. So unless the EU pulls together and speaks much more loudly together at the risk that the EU will be sidelined is quite big. One of the biggest concerns, I've already said it, sort of deal with Vladimir Putin about Eastern Europe has become much less likely, but it cannot be excluded altogether. I think the action last night will certainly damage the US-Russian relationship, but not necessarily for a long time. You remember that Turkey shot down a Russian plane and a few months later they are best friends again. So I could, I would not exclude radical reversal. I think the EU has to follow things very closely because I think a deal between Russia and the US on the Ukraine crisis could be very damaging to the EU would mean that a number of countries, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, et cetera, lose some kind of European-Western orientation and that would be quite negative from our point of view. But of course now the bigger risk is actually the opposite trend towards a much stronger confrontation between the US and Russia. You have now this new crisis over Syria, but you also have the massive US rearmament, which is not seen in a very positive way, by Moscow, and you have also in the Congress, I think rather a tendency to move towards new sanctions. But Trump might do other transactional deals with Turkey, with Arab autocrats that would run counter to the EU's engagement in these regions. But the more bigger risk is of course that the US influence and engagement in the regions around Europe will diminish not completely, no superpower can pivot away all together, but the engagement will get weaker. And the EU will need to respond to this new situation by making a qualitative shift in the priority it gives to external policies. It has to erase its game in several ways, and I'll pass over this rather quickly. The first of all, I think we should move much faster towards pooling assets and building stronger institutional capabilities. But the more important thing is probably a change in mindset. I think the EU foreign policy is still a sideshow. It is not at the center of EU foreign policy, but the way the world develops with the challenges in the East, the uncertainties regarding the US position and the turmoil in the Middle East, it should really move to the center of EU foreign policy, of EU policy all together. And there are good ways on how to move on in the global strategy, which Mogherini submitted last year. Timing was unfortunate on the day after Brexit, but there are many good and solid ideas that deserve now a second span of attention with a new situation before following the Trump elections. I think the EU is not well suited to be a geopolitical actor. We are regional power with multi-level decision-making, but in a world dominated by strong men in Russia, Turkey, Egypt, and in Washington, we cannot do without the idea to politic all together. We have to get better at this. I think the EU has to learn how to work faster on these issues and to leak less. I think only if we can have a confidential discussion within the EU will be able to, in a way, engage seriously with other countries. But we should also play to our comparative advantage, and the comparative advantage is the vast experiences in developing rules and commitments based on the careful balance of interests. Most of the real issues over the next 20, 30 years, climate change to cybersecurity can only be resolved through multilateral negotiations. And on that, the EU is really very good. Of course, in a world that is now again dominated by geopolitical thinking, it will be more difficult to play that role, but there will be even more demand for strong leadership role from the EU. I think we are always proud that we are able to tackle international problems by bringing together diplomacy, military means, development assistance and all that, the comprehensive approach, but we're really still quite bad at it. I think over the last years under Mogherini, coordination between foreign policy and the external relations led by the commissions have improved, but still neither the institutions are very good at coordinating their approach and also not the member states and the EU institutions. So there's a big deficit also in this regard. And then clearly the EU needs to upgrade its security and defense capabilities. This has received by far the most attention of all the topics of the Mogherini's strategy. There is a sense of urgency because of the turmoil in surrounding regions, the uncertainty about the US and quite a number of sort of pledges to improve things in this area, but that they have to be still followed through with a lot of political will. I think there's hardly any area where there's such a gap between the expectations and the actual delivery. And sometimes I was thinking it's a bit like somebody's putting together a slingshot and somebody comes into the room and constantly asks, is the intercontinental rocket ready? Basically. There has been now this big breakthrough on the MPCC and military planning and conduct capability, which is a unit of I think 15 people running the non-executive military missions in North Africa. And on Austrian TV, for instance, the only question was, is that the European Army? I think this is a problem in that what people expect and what is actually at stake at the moment is hugely different from each other. And also I think obviously Trump will put heavy pressure on increasing the European defense budgets. I think we had a 12% drop in budgets over the last 10 years. This is now being reversed. And clearly, there's a great deal more that needs to be done both to keep the US engaged and if that doesn't happen to get it to re-engage after Trump is gone. Now, there are also huge challenges for the global commons. Trumpian politics can undermine much of the international architecture from the UN to the WTO. And the EU, together with others, have to put up defenses to maintain this basic architecture of the liberal world order. On trade, of course, the world trade regime that ran into big troubles long before Trump arrived, the trade growth has leveled out. Many countries that were formerly free traders are now very protectionist. And the EU has not been spared from this trend at all. There's huge fights about Titi Penseta with experience shown how difficult it is to win the dispute about free trade. And it's what used to be one of our most effective foreign policy instruments is now highly contested. And you can expect Trump to put a lot of pressure on Europe in this area. He's canceled the TPP trade agreement with specific countries. He wants to renegotiate NAFTA. It's unclear which attitude he will take on the WTO. We have already, in the last few days, the beginning fight with Germany about steel dumping. And this could be the beginning of trade wars, basically. I believe that the EU needs to, in this area, to do three types of things very quickly. We have to win the case for free trade domestically, which means that we have to take the interest of those who lost out from globalization more seriously and in a way make sure that their interests are protected. We have to pursue our own agenda with bilateral trade deals that promote standards and cannot be seen as undercutting standards. I think the Japan deal, in particular, is very interesting in this regard. And we have to build an international alliance with other countries to resist protectionism and to protect the WTO system. A nonproliferation. Now, I think it's less likely than people originally thought that Trump will directly dismantle the Iran nuclear deal. I think it's more likely that he would put very heavy pressure on Iran, so Iran does not draw the economic benefits from this trip and then leave it or provoke even the hardliners to take the deal down altogether. That would be a very, very negative development. I think today, North Korea will be very high on the agenda in the talks with President Xi. This is an area where it's been stuck, how important it is for the international system and how completely marginalized the EU is in its current fragmented state. I think Trump has talked about increasing again the U.S. nuclear arsenal. There was a lot of loose talk about maybe Japanese nuclear weapons not being a bad thing at one point and that has raised a lot of concerns. I think the nonproliferation treaty is still an indispensable factor in global stability and I think the EU has to work collectively to convince the U.S. to keep on track because that would be vastly dangerous if it doesn't happen. On climate change, I think there's a big difference to nonproliferation. Nonproliferation cannot work without the U.S. Climate change will be heavily damaged, I think, if the U.S. administration, as it seems to be doing, disengages from climate diplomacy and reverses the policies to reduce emissions at home. On this area, already a big and very dangerous decision have been taken. But the EU, given its size as a carbon emitter and its role in climate diplomacy, is in a unique position to fill the vacuum in this area by working closely with others, and particularly with China, to provide leadership in this area. This also means that we need to invest more both multilaterally and also in our own action to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement. Now, all these efforts, if we want to move in this direction, this requires a huge amount of leadership and it is not evident at the present moment that the EU is capable of responding adequately. I talked with my former colleagues in Brussels on this issue and they say that there is a lot of discussion from the working group level to the European Council on the implications of the Trump administration for the EU. And there's a lot of anxiety, but you don't, at this point, really perceive mobilization, sort of an understanding that we have, things have to change radically and move forward. Now, I believe personally, the leadership cannot come from the EU institutions. They have their role. And I think Mogherini's work, particularly on the strategy, has been very helpful. But the real lead will have to come from member states. And in this regard, I think, in particular, from France and Germany. The French-German axis has been dysfunctional for a number of years. Now both countries are approaching elections. You cannot expect much from them at the moment, but it's quite possible that by the end of the year, you will have poor European governments with a strong new mandate in Berlin and in Paris. And this, I think, is a chance because if the German-French axis can be revitalized, this can be then a part of the core group that really moves forward also on foreign policy and makes a strong investment in regional expertise and assets that will increase the EU capability in this area. But of course, the fact that this US influence as a kind of uniting element among the member states will be gone. Also, I think, means that there is a risk of the EU foreign policy actually being part of the collateral damage of the Trump administration. So if we get it right, then we can to some extent maybe fill the vacuum that's left from the disengaging United States. But if we get it wrong, the vacuum will fill us, basically. So I think both options are entirely possible. Finally, five areas, core areas where we have to rise to the challenge. I think the first one and probably the most important one is to take more responsibility for the neighboring regions. We have made commitments to Eastern Europe. The Middle East will remain turbulent for the foreseeable future. Africa suffers from massive demographic pressure of economic difficulties. I think it's quite likely there will be more failed states. At the moment, it seems to me that EU is very much focused on keeping people out, basically. The people running away from this instability should not come to Europe. But this cannot be the only point of foreign policy towards neighboring regions. I think we need to invest much more seriously in the stability in the region, both in the East and the South through more effective policy diplomacy and the well-coordinated use of all our instruments. The second, we must take our own security more seriously. We have to develop security and defense policy more dynamically. I think strategic autonomy, that was the keyword in Mogherini's strategy, is a very ambitious concept. I think we are very, very far at the moment from reaching that goal. But it is definitely the direction that we should take. Third, we need to take all efforts to safeguard the international order. We need to work with other stakeholders like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, but also on many other issues, on many issues with China and India. If Trump pursues America's first policy, I think this will actually motivate some of the partners around the world to work more closely with the European Union. Fourth, the EU needs to preserve a constructive transatlantic relationship with the US. The European leaders should try to talk to Trump as often as possible. I think Abe from Japan has shown how to do it and that you can actually achieve some progress in some areas. And that needs to be a very, very active engagement in this area, also with all the levels of the administration. But I think we need to move beyond the administration itself. I think the EU has always said civil society dialogue should be part of our relationship with third countries. And now we have to apply this also to the United States to explain our case, to mobilize support for our policies and concerns in American society. I think, for instance, why should not the EU work with California on climate change? I think there will be a lot of like-mindedness on this topic. Finally, the Europeans must defend liberal values. I think Trump's election gives a big boost to leaders who want to abandon the commitment to liberal democracy and reduce the constraints that it poses on their powers. The political culture in advanced democracies is changing us. Hate speech and xenophobia become normalized. Fake news affects public perceptions. And the post-war norms of tolerance and anti-racism are weakened. We have these changes also in Europe. They affect us directly. But the EU is built, basically, on openness, tolerance, and trust-building across borders. This is part of the EU's DNA. If we lose these values, we lose the European Union. Therefore, I think the European leaders have to be much more active and engaged in speaking out for human rights, for justice, and democracy. Because the defense of the achievements of the liberal order could be the real struggle of the next four years and needs to be at the very core of our foreign policy. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Stefan, for a presentation which is clearly the result of a much productive thought on the dilemmas we are all faced with after the developments in the United States. I was struck by your reference to President Andrew Jackson. And indeed, one could say that there have been oscillations in American foreign policy since the foundation of the state on the question of the extent to which the United States should be involved with the rest of the world. And Andrew Jackson was one of the earlier ones. But the reaction to Woodrow Wilson in 1919 was also very striking. This was withdrawal of the United States from the world, which lasted for, you could say, 22 years. And indeed, it took an extraordinary effort on the part of Franklin Delano Roosevelt to move the United States off this dead point in its relations with the rest of the world. Looking at the title of your talk, how Donald Trump would save you EU foreign policy, I think it would be fair to say that the burden of what you had to say is that only we can save EU foreign policy. Donald Trump can't do this. Wake us up. Wake us up. Wake us up. And the question which was posed in some detail and some productive detail in your presentation was whether, in fact, we can do all the things that are needed to be serious about foreign policy.