 I'll go ahead and get started. Good morning. My name is Andrew Wilder. I'm the Vice President here at USIP of the Asia Center. I'm delighted to welcome you today to today's very important and timely event. As many of you know, USIP was founded 35 years ago by members of Congress as an independent, non-partisan national institute charged with the vitally important mission of preventing, mitigating, and resolving violent conflict abroad. Today's topic is very near and dear to USIP. We've had an office in Kabul since 2002 and worked closely with the Afghan and US governments, with civil society organizations and others to address underlying causes of instability and violence. Support to the Afghan peace process is a top priority for USIP. We've dedicated considerable effort over the last two years to support research, dialogues, skill-building workshops, and policy analysis, both here in Washington and in Afghanistan. Throughout all our efforts, we have held fast to the conviction that for a peace process to be sustainable, it must be inclusive. In fact, we recently held a workshop in Istanbul with top women negotiators from Afghanistan, most of whom had each participated in various components of the peace negotiations, including many who joined the first dialogue with the Taliban in Doha a couple months ago. It has been a turbulent week in Washington, to say the least. A week ago, many of us had anticipated that there would be a US-Taliban agreement between the United States and the Taliban, which was gonna initially be the topic of today's discussion. That deal is now uncertain. While the US-Taliban talks have been ended, at least for the time being, the urgency of finding a way to reduce violence and achieve a political settlement of the conflict remains. The Taliban and the Afghan government, backed by the US and NATO allies, are in a military stalemate. Other groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda retain footholds in Afghanistan, and Afghans continue to suffer ever greater civilian casualties. The need for peace is palpable. Whatever path lies ahead, we know the way forward must provide lasting security and preserve hard-won gains earned by the people of Afghanistan. We have an exceptionally well-qualified group of people here today to discuss where things stand in the peace process and help illuminate a very complex situation and identify possible ways forward, including Afghanistan's Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Roya Romani, welcome. A distinguished panel of experts, including the new chairwoman of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Shahzad Akbar, who's joining us by video link from Kabul. Our director of Afghanistan and Central Asia program, Scott Warden, will moderate the discussion and take questions from the audience. I encourage you all to follow the conversation on Twitter at USIP with today's hashtag AFGPeace. During the Q&A period, we will also take some questions via Twitter at this hashtag. Once again, the hashtag at USIP, hashtag AFGPeace. I also encourage you to check out USIP's new podcast network at usip.org slash podcast, which will include this event and many other compelling programs featuring leading voices in peace, violent conflict prevention, and national security. Before we begin today's moderated discussion, I have the distinct pleasure of inviting Ambassador Roya Romani to the stage for some opening remarks. Ambassador Romani became the first women Ambassador of Afghanistan to the United States in December of last year, and she quickly became a friend of USIP. Not only has she been a fierce advocate for the women of Afghanistan, her own story exemplifies the resilience and perseverance of the Afghan people. Like millions of other Afghans, she and her family lived as refugees in neighboring Pakistan during the adolescence in the early 1990s. She attended a school for refugees in Peshawar, and when the classrooms overflowed with students, she studied on the roof for a year. She went on to earn a bachelor's in software engineering, worked for a number of international nonprofits, focused on human rights, and received a master's in public administration and international law from Columbia University. She has worked in the education ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and served as Afghanistan's ambassador to Indonesia and to ASEAN. Please join me in welcoming Ambassador Romani. Excellencies, distinguished guests, Mrs. Lennberg, Mr. Wilder, distinguished panelists, friends and colleagues, good morning to all of you, and assalamu alaikum. May peace be upon you. It's a pleasure to be here at the United States Institute of Peace, to speak about the prospect of peace in Afghanistan. The Afghan people have been speaking about peace for a long time. We have yearned for it, planned for it, and fought for it, with the type of commitment that comes from knowing what it is like to live without it. Beginning with the roll out of the seven-point agenda during the Kabul process in 2017, which was followed by a historic ceasefire the first in 40 years. The people of Afghanistan and their elected representatives have been eager to engage in a meaningful peace process. Since 2017, we have continued to engage the global community and our regional partners on this issue through numerous platforms, including the Tashkan Conference, the Heart of Asia and the Geneva Conference. Importantly, we have made concerted efforts to engage with our neighbors to ensure that the region is mobilized and ready to support us in this plan that we have. Despite many challenges, our progress towards peace has maintained its momentum. The past spring, I attended a lawyer, a consultative grand council in Kabul, along with 3,200 delegates from across Afghanistan who came together to lend their voices to the peace process. One of the things that struck me the most was the practicality with which the Afghans approached the idea of peace. People came to the jerk from provinces not with abstract ideas, but with clear agenda and precise demand for building a prosperous future. Among the many requests put forward to the president was an Institute of Geology to support the exploration of one province's Richmond Railway, a dam for improved farming, and another, better roads to increase connectivity all over. My experience at the jerk really confirmed something that I already knew. Peace isn't an abstract concept for Afghans. It's a tangible goal and it's grounded in three critical foundations. Democracy, economic prosperity, and security. So allow me to explain a little bit about each what I mean. Democracy, genuine peace building, the kind that brings about long-term peace and stability require consensus and widespread popular buy-in. We know that this can only be accomplished among population that is involved in seeing the terms of the agreement that they will ultimately be responsible for enforcing it. We have worked hard to create the kind of environment in Afghanistan where this necessary level of civic engagement is possible and we have seen so much progress. When young people today critique the administration for its shortcoming and demand better, I see it as a measure of how far we have come. Our citizens have come to expect democracy. They are holding us accountable and learning to trust the democratic processes. With this in mind, the government has remained steadily focused on improving governance and strengthening democratic institutions in Afghanistan. Despite steep political costs, the administration has fought against the corruption and impunity which had eaten away at our foundations. We are bringing much needed reform to the justice sector. We are delivering critical services like education and healthcare. As we work to regain the trust of the people, we are laying a necessary foundation for peace. The progress has been clear. The progress we have made in blustering Afghan democracy is safeguarded by the maintenance of constitutional order. Last October, despite seemingly overwhelming odds and vocal detractors, we held successful and peaceful parliamentary elections. Today, we have a setting and functioning parliament which, although not perfect, is able to fulfill its function. We must continue to build stability and support the continuity of the democratic processes through the elections that are scheduled for later this month. This is a priority. If we want to succeed in creating peace in Afghanistan, we must pay attention to this. At this critical juncture, we must bluster this fragile trust in Afghan's young democracy by showing Afghan citizens that their contribution matter and that their voices will not be ignored. On the economic prosperity, of course politics do not happen in vacuum. And we know that neither peace deal nor elections are enough to guarantee long-lasting peace. With the success of one inevitably tied to the other, understanding the relationship between economic growth and peace is crucial to the success of any peace process. What we have learned in Afghanistan following generations of conflict and now decades of hard work is that popular buy-in, that all important commitment that keeps people focused on building a peaceful future despite difficulties and setbacks is sustained by a single critical sentiment, hope. We also know that hope or the belief that a better future will come out of all the blood and sweat and tears that must be poured into making peace a reality is directly linked to opportunity. Afghanistan is the youngest country outside of Africa. 68% of Afghans are under the age of 25. In the 18 years since the American intervention, this young generation has come of age with aspiration that those who came before them never dared to reach for. They want education and jobs. They want the ability to connect to the rest of the world. The vision that they hold of future opportunity and prosperity is the most effective insurance we have against hopelessness, violence, and terror. Sustaining this hope by ensuring that our people continue to have opportunities has been a priority for the Afghan government and is a key pillar of our peace plan and reform agenda. It's a goal that I know we share with our international and regional partners who also want to see Afghanistan safe and self-reliant. We have made progress on these goals in a number of ways, from expanding regional trade and transit opportunities to supporting rapid technological advancements. As an example, just a few days ago on September 7th, the first train shipment carrying 41 container wagons and 1,100 tons of talc powder departed Heraton, Afghanistan, for Shijan, China via Uzbekistan. The cargo will arrive at its destination after a 12-day journey. We are prioritizing the future prospects of our young citizens by ensuring that doing business in Afghanistan is getting easier every day. We have undertaken reform to incentivize investment, including strengthening management of our public finances. The 2018 budget is the first fully transparent in the country's history. It meets international standards and is the primary tool for the policymaking and prioritization. Finally, we have introduced many new laws, including public-private partnership law, a new companies law, a new insolvency law, and a new mining law. As a result of these efforts, Afghanistan was named one of the top 10 business indicator improvers in 2018. Based on the merit of the many projects we are implementing, the IMF has agreed that Afghanistan can begin applying for concessional loans. Our plans for economic self-reliance are achievable and within reach. In the past four years, we have seen a 90% increase in our cumulative revenue versus the previous four years. Currently, we are able to pay for 50% of our expenses, and every year we would like to cut down 10% expenditure and increase 10% of our revenue. Based on this plan, even allowing for unforeseen challenges, we can expect to be economically self-reliant with three to five years. This is a solid starting point for peace, and we are extremely grateful for our partner who have invested so much in getting us here. But now we must embrace the challenge of standing on our feet. As a group of businessmen that I met during my last trip, just last week in Afghanistan, who told me that we are no longer putting our hands out to beg for aid money. Instead, we are reaching for partnerships, opportunities, and the infrastructure to support sustainable economic growth. In our quest for long-term economic prosperity, we are laying a groundwork for sustainable peace. And last but not least is security. A study of over 33 peace agreements has confirmed that a ceasefire and stabilization is a critical first step in any peace process. It's not hard to see why this is particularly relevant in Afghanistan. I have just returned from two weeks' trip in Afghanistan, during which there were 347 casualties. Over 127 of them were civilians. The frustration and sadness that President Trump expressed over the death of Surgeon First Class Elite Brighto or its encobble last week is shared very deeply by Afghan citizens. It's impossible to begin the process of rebuilding trust under these conditions. And the Taliban, of course, is not the only threat we face. In addition to the vast terror networks that the Taliban does not control, we are also engaged in a war against the narcotic industry whose fingers stretch across the ocean into the bedrooms of America. Because of this reality, the people of Afghanistan are well aware that neither security nor peace can be delivered by a settlement with any one group alone. And we are so grateful for the support we have received, particularly from our American partners and our shared efforts to confront the major threats these groups pose not only to Afghans but to the entire world. Thanks to this support and the bravery of our security forces, we have made steady progress. With tripling of our Air Force and doubling of our Commando, the Afghan security forces have been defeating every wave of Taliban's intensified attack since the beginning of the year. I want to conclude by saying that although progress isn't always easy to see, we have made significant strides in laying the groundwork for peace in Afghanistan. For the first time in generations, we have the vision, the will, and the human capital necessary to achieve our goals. We know peace is on the horizon. We also know that it will come on our terms. The kind of peace that Afghanistan's vision is very much aligned with the counter-terrorism effort that the United States wants to see. The prosperous, peaceful society that we are working to build will not only bring security to Afghanistan, it is the best insurance that the world could have against the global threat of terrorism. As Franklin Roosevelt once said, in the truest sense, freedom cannot be bestowed, it must be achieved. I believe this also applies to peace. With their dedication and the support of our partners, I know we can achieve it. I thank you. I'm Scott Worden, I'm the director of Afghanistan and Central Asia programs for the United States Institute of Peace. Thank you. Use the microphone on. I will project my voice until the microphone gets on. I'm Scott Worden, I'm the director for the Afghanistan and Central Asia program here at USIP. Thank you. Is this working now? Scott Worden, I'm the director of Afghanistan and Central Asia programs for the United States Institute of Peace. Thank you, Ambassador, for those wonderful opening remarks. We're very pleased to have a distinguished panel to discuss further the issue of the peace process in Afghanistan. I think for our Afghanistan audience, these will be well known. I will give brief introductions. Joining us on the screen behind me is Sharzad Akbar. She is currently the chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. She has experience not just as a human rights activist, but also as a civil society leader and a government official. She recently served as a deputy on the National Security Council for Afghanistan, and she was the leader of the Open Society Afghanistan NGO. She will be speaking first. I'm also joined by Michael Semple on the far right. He is a professor at the Queen's University in Belfast at the Mitchell Institute and serves as the director of the Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security, and Justice. He's worked in roles with the United Nations and NGOs in Afghanistan, and he served as the deputy for several years of the European Union Special Representatives Office. Also to his left is Dr. Barnett Rubin. He is a senior fellow and associate director of the Center for International Cooperation at New York University. He's a longtime Afghanistan scholar. He served as senior advisor to the State Department Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and has also advised the United Nations, including on the bond peace process. And then finally to my immediate right is Laurel Miller. She is the Asia Director at the International Crisis Group. Prior to that, she was the acting Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan with the State Department and has also worked in positions at RAND and at USIP. So we will first hear from Kabul, Afghanistan, and Charizadeh. Thank you for joining us. It is late in the day there. Of course, when we first sent out the invitations for this event, we were expecting to talk about the impact of a US-Taliban agreement, now that it's suspended. But I think really that agreement, if it was to occur, if it does still occur, is really just the first act of what will be a long and difficult peace process. And the true hurdle lies in Afghan-to-Afghan negotiations, including with the Taliban, with the government, and other elements of Afghan society. So for this panel, I've asked the speakers to speak from, of course, their different perspectives. But what lies ahead? How do we address the most fundamental issues of intra-Afghan negotiations and ultimately getting to a ceasefire and lasting peace? So without further ado, Charizadeh, the floor is yours. Good morning, everyone. I'm really honored to be part of this day's distinguished panel. I'll speak first a little about the reactions to the recent announcement by President Trump and then speak more to your questions about what lies ahead for the process. The reactions to President Trump's recent announcement about U.S. Taliban talks covered a range in Afghanistan. There were a lot of positive reactions that have been covered also by the media from Afghans who felt that the process was not moving forward in a way that it should, that felt frustrated about lack of involvement that had fears and concerns about the implications of the process for future Afghans. And there was also responses that highlighted a concern. I remember right after the announcement, my mom was asking me if this means that the war will go on for much longer. So there was also a set of responses coming from a place of concern about the implications of the cancellation of talks for the conflict, particularly for increase in violence and for civilian casualties. There is also a set of responses that haven't probably been covered so much by media, but there is this ambivalence. Many of us were watching the U.S. Taliban talks closely and had concerns about how the talks were going. We were concerned about the way the Taliban were being received by the international community and by the U.S., the way they were positioning themselves. And this regard for their previous human rights track record, as well as their own arrogance about engaging with the Afghans and their arrogance about their vision for the future of Afghanistan, their vagueness about their vision and their arrogance and animaliness to engage. So there were concerns about how the U.S. Taliban talks were going, but there is also, so due to that concern, these concerns were voiced repeatedly, but that doesn't mean that there isn't a growing consensus about the needs for an end to conflict through a negotiated political settlement. I think one of the things that the actions to the talks also illustrated, the reactions to the announcement also illustrated was this growing consensus about the need to end the violence and about the needs for negotiations and talks to end the violence and conflict in Afghanistan. I think moving forward from these reactions in terms of the way forward, I think the reactions had a series of messages for all stakeholders involved. For the U.S. government and for our international partners, the positive reaction to the suspension of talks should illustrate the fact that Afghans were very concerned about what the talks could mean for Afghanistan. They were very concerned about how the Taliban were treated in the sense that they're having increasing leverage as a consequence of the talks happening in the way that they were. I think moving forward, if and when the talks between the U.S. and the Taliban are assumed, there are lessons to be learned about this reaction in terms of building more confidence among Afghans more generally towards the U.S. Taliban talks and what it could mean for the future of Afghanistan, what it could mean for the future of Afghans. We cannot really have a peaceful outcome if the majority of the population mistrusts the process that's happening between U.S. and the Taliban. I think that came out in the reactions to the suspension as well. In terms of the Afghan government, I think that this is an opportunity for the government and for our political elite to regroup and to really think deeply about the concept of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process. There's a lot of emphasis from our political elite and from our government on the ownership of the Afghans. Ownership comes with a lot of responsibility. Ownership also requires consensus-building and ownership requires taking leadership and ownership requires preparedness. As a citizen, I'm concerned about the level of preparedness and the cohesion on the non-Taliban side. I think many citizens and activists are concerned about this. This is a time for the Afghan government and political elite to demonstrate real commitment to the Afghan ownership of the process through building cohesion and through preparing better for the intra-Afghan dialogue. For when it happens. I think there are also, of course, messages for Taliban from this reaction. The sense that many Afghans had from these Taliban talks was that as the talks proceed, Taliban are gaining more and more arrogance. They are becoming less and less interested in engaging the Afghans in meaningful exchange about their concerns, their worries, and worries about Taliban and their governance and their world view. And their track record is widely spread in Afghanistan. I attended my colleagues' funeral, my colleagues' memorial ceremony yesterday. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission lost a colleague to Taliban violence last week. His name was Abdul Samad Amidi and he came from Ghur from one of the poorer provinces in Afghanistan, not from an urban community. And when I was attending the memorial yesterday, his family read the declaration which asked specifically the Afghan government and the international community to not engage and I'm quoting their words, these are not mine, with the terrorist group Taliban. So there is a lot of pressure and anxiety among Afghans towards Taliban. And I think in the process of US-Taliban talks, Taliban came to a point where they felt that they don't really need to engage with these feelings, that if they could have an agreement with the US, that could put them in a position to perhaps impose their own view. So I think the messages from the reaction is very clear. I think the message is very clear. I think the message is very clear. The messages from the reaction is very clear that if Taliban are interested in long-term peace in Afghanistan, which they say they are, they really need to engage with Afghans because in the long term they have to sit down with the Afghan government, they have to sit down with different segments of the Afghan society, including youth and women, and they better start building these relationships now. In terms of the message that the reactions had for the civil society and human rights institutions, we need to continue doing the work that we do for advocating for an inclusive peace. We also have to work on broadening the alliance for the rights and values that we believe in. This will be long-term work in Afghanistan. The values and the rights that we stand for are the values and rights of all Afghans. But we need to work harder to ensure that the alliance for this is strong and the voice for these values comes from all corners of Afghanistan and that the platform is shared with diverse groups of Afghans. And of course, I think one thing that particularly for the Human Rights Commission is very, very important for us is that in this process we believe that we need to pay attention and think deeply about addressing widespread grievances across all segments of Afghans' society, including among areas controlled by Taliban, in order to achieve lasting peace. Without addressing questions of justice, how and why of it we will not have peace for Afghans will have continued cycles of revenge and violence. So I'll stop there and I'll be happy to respond to any questions there might be. Thank you. We'll hear presentations from all the panelists and Michael Sempel, you're up next. Hello everyone. I hope I don't surprise you by saying that I'm perhaps more optimistic for the prospects of peace in Afghanistan than I was a week ago. I think that we shall see progress towards peace in Afghanistan in large part for the reasons that Shahzad and the ambassador have explained to us. I mean fundamentally, Afghans on all sides of the conflict have reached the conclusion that now this war has run its course and it's time to find a way out. There is a deep desire for peace and I believe it will be fulfilled and in this sort of crazy way that things have proceeded over the past week or two, I think that there are now maybe even better prospects for this progress. I'm also glad that the ambassador mentioned at the start the ceasefire of June 2018. I think that's a good part to reflect. Funnily enough, there was an event in USIP in the days leading up to that and I think we should have a vision that we saw scenes throughout Afghanistan from almost every province of Afghanistan where within days of announcement by the president in which he called for a unilateral cessation of violence, the Taliban were essentially bounced into following suit and we saw these absolutely crazy, chaotic in a sense, classic Afran, good-spirited, not really controlled by anybody, youngsters who'd been up in the mountains coming into town, the interior minister, out in the streets taking selfies with Taliban who basically wanted out of the conflict and in a sense, the challenge is to recapture the spirit of that and turn it into a reality so that it's not three days, so that it's forever. However, when saying that that's a good point at which to start our thinking about peace now, there are right lessons you can draw from that. One of the right lessons is that the desire for peace cuts across the sides and the conflict. It's amongst the Taliban and amongst the Afghans who live in government-controlled areas who've been part of the current political system. One of the wrong lessons that some people drew was that, aha, the Taliban command and control system is supreme and that it was the order from the Taliban sitting in Quetta, either Haibutullah or Yakub, that was sufficient to bring about these scenes. Because that, I know, has been used by some people in constructing subsequent strategies. If we only go and talk to exactly the same leadership and persuade them to come on board then they'll be fine. Because actually, when we followed in detail what was going on there, of course, the Taliban fighters who came into town, and went on Facebook and so on, they used as a cover for their actions the order which had come through, but the process was well beyond the ability of the leadership to control and much of it was in defiance of the instructions from their commanders. In fact, by day two of the ceasefire, we had Taliban commanders who were basically screaming saying we told you to stop fire not to go and make friends. It was a subversive ceasefire and in a strange sort of way I think that the progress to peace is more likely to involve some subversive elements rather than necessarily sanctions coming from the top. That's the guide. Now, I was asked to say how did the Taliban see the current situation and the deal and the developments around the suspension or collapse of the process. I mean in a sense part of the continuing good news is that the many of the Taliban are just as confused as people in this city about what on earth just happened. And you know what, sometimes confusion is good because out of the confusion can come a new way forward. One of the reasons that I say that this confusion is probably better than what we had before was that I know for example Barney and I have worked hard on this case for many years. I was thinking of how to explain to the millennials in the audience how long we've been working on this peace. I'll tell you what it was. The first time that Professor Rubin and I went down to do a little quiet discussion about what the way forward is, he had in his hand his first digital device. And I was looking at it enviously, what is this in your hand, Professor Rubin? So that's how long. It was a palm pilot. Yeah, exactly. It was a palm pilot. It was the... And wow, it was so cool and I was really impressed. And it was also, funny enough, that was also the era when Ahmed Rashid brought out his first book on the Taliban and I remember on my flight back to the region, I had a copy of it and a slightly deluded young man in the pre-911 days came and asked me, I saw the book and the title of the picture of the tour and he said, can you tell me how I can join? I didn't. Anyway, the leadership has been confused because obviously they thought they knew what was going on and they were trying to work out what was happening. The run-up to that was that throughout the year of this process, the leadership systematically avoided explaining to the membership of the Taliban movement what was anticipated for this peace process. In direct contrast to other processes with which many of us are familiar, particularly I've obviously followed the Irish process, I mean the IRA spent years and months bringing their side on board the Taliban didn't take the trouble to talk to their membership and when on the 30th of August they started to talk to their leadership to their membership about what the deal was they sort of they pivoted from a thing what the only message was the negotiations are continuation of the jihad trust the negotiators, everything they do serves the cause of the jihad they pivoted to say this deal achieves everything we ever stood for and signing this deal is a guarantee of the restoration of the Islamic emirate. Without many details to back it up they systematically avoided giving those details for those of us who spend our time trying to understand and explain that was highly problematic and I mean unless somebody finds a way it's necessary to revive this we sort of never know what they really intended because I think they certainly weren't honest with their membership I was asked to say that did they take seriously the inter-Afghan talks and even ideas of some kind of compromise political solution that's something which they certainly didn't share with their membership people vaguely knew that there was a movement towards inter-Afghan talks but there was certainly no clear understanding inside the movement of what would happen there and there certainly was no preparation for compromise and move towards an inter-Afghan settlement as opposed to talks but I would say along with this oversold message that we're getting the Islamic emirate back broadly across the movement there was something which was actually starting to play to the spirit of June 2018 I think a majority of Taliban thought that perhaps there was a move towards peace although they weren't told honestly about how that could be and perhaps their leaders didn't actually intend to do it so certainly along with the confusion there's been a lot of disappointment and I have communicated over the past few days with people on the Taliban side who thought maybe this war is about to end and they are deeply disappointed because they're told oh my god back to the grindstone I think in trying to make sense of how the Taliban see it I think we have to make a distinction between how the team in Qatar saw it and how the rest of the movement saw it because that's something my research over the past year has said there are fundamental divergences in the way there's a pretty politicised, pretty well disciplined team has grown up in Qatar that has really got behind this process and I mean some of them some of them have become professional diplomats and got quite good at doing their job they're good at trying to whether it be to co-opt or intimidate or bamboozle I mean again friends like Shahzad who go to, I'm sure they target you pretty hard while you're there I mean they they were a cool team but they're completely separate from the people who are there in Afghanistan broadly they justified what they were doing is saying we're the political front of a broad struggle the rest of which is the military front I was also asked to say are there differences inside the movement over sort of talk versus fight I have been approached by many Taliban who I believe in their commitment to ending this war whose perpetual question is when's anybody going to talk with us why do you people always end up building up the hardliners and in a sense helping reinforce the control of our hardliners over this struggle they're sort of talking back to the spirit of the ceasefire because it was a subversive element of the ceasefire which allowed it to succeed for a while at least to show the road whereas we've never been able to engage subversion and support of peacemaking over the past year so we have adequate evidence that significant factions sufficient numbers inside the Taliban movement have also reached the conclusion that this war has run its course and must end many of them have also reached the conclusion it must be based on compromise rather than on conquest the challenge in going forward would be how to capture that spirit the worst thing that the friends of Afghanistan could do in taking this forward would be to try and take up from where we left off immediately before this strange thing that happened last week I would say that we should be building on what's been achieved rather than picking up pieces and by that I mean that we should declare that the peace and security of Afghanistan succeeded in terms of the U.S.-Afghan track huge effort has gone into it it has established that the U.S. now wants to move its troops out of Afghanistan but wants to do so responsibly protecting the peace and security in Afghanistan I think that anybody who engages with the Afghanistan in the future that conversation has been had everybody knows it, you know it everybody knows the U.S. can do so and any further conversations about troops if I were giving advice it would be those conversations should be with the Minister of Defence of Afghanistan and the Chief of Army staff and it's how the redeployments of U.S. troops can be done in a safe way and the agenda on peace is about how to jump forward towards supporting the emergence of an Afghan settlement so we don't need now to return to the foreigners talking with the Taliban it's been very important conversations have been had now it is important to jump ahead to that which is supposed to be achieved the next stage was meant to be the inter-Afghan conversation the worst thing we could do would be then just go to Qatar and carry on with the conversations and re-empower the people who did indeed get too arrogant over the past year let them reflect for a while let people think about what happened how they overplayed their hand open up the conversation to all possible addresses and so on who are prepared to get involved in peace and the touchstone of getting involved in peace is as the ambassador correctly pointed which is towards ending violence and ending the killing of Afghans and that's the passport to being part of a peace process now and I believe that there is sufficient buy-in on the old sides in the Afghan war to be able to proceed on that basis but some creative thinking lessons from the past year and moving forwards rather than moving back we will actually get there because Afghans want peace and they will achieve it thank you very much we'll see whether mission success is trending after the end of this panel let me turn over to Barney Rubin for his comments well thank you Michael for that reminiscence before I go on I just want to thank Ambassador Rahmani and Shahzad Akbar excellent statements I also have a memory which is somehow in preparing for this talk to the extent that I have prepared I recalled the first time I gave a public talk about Afghanistan in Washington DC which as I recall it was a meeting that I organized 35 years ago at the American University that I chaired and the two speakers were Zomai Khalilzad and Ashraf Ghani and at that time I wrote a report on human rights violations in Afghanistan which was entitled a nation is dying because that's what one of the Mujahideen leaders said to me he said that to me actually in 1986 so clearly that was not true Afghanistan was not dying it's not dying now but Afghans have been dying since that time and really I cannot overstate the urgency with which we need to end that process and I feel that that should take priority over virtually everything else so now I'll step back and put on my analyst's hat I've been asked to talk about regional and international issues but let me just start with some very basic facts that are often ignored very basic geography sometimes when I hear people talk about what we should do in Afghanistan my first response is please look at a map please look at a map what are you talking about Afghanistan is a landlocked country that means and no other country can have access to it without going through the territories or airspace of Pakistan Iran tiny bit of China or three Central Asian Republic which are also essentially landlocked and to which we have access only through China and Russia primarily there's a little route called Lapis Lazuli I won't go into that now but that's the main picture which means and that landlocked position is in many ways at the origin of these conflicts and the dilemma that Afghanistan finds itself in because when Afghanistan found itself in conflict with the newly formed nation of Pakistan over the various ethnic and border issues the United States was allied with Pakistan therefore the United States could not aid Afghanistan's military and it turned to the Soviet Union and the decision because of its landlocked position to turn to a distant power against to protect itself against its neighbor had the results that we know I think as a cautionary tale that Afghanistan trying to turn to the United States which unlike the Soviet Union does not have a border with it can also be a cautionary tale for the long run it means that alliance with the United States reliance on the United States security and prosperity of Afghanistan is not a long term strategy of course disengagement irresponsibly is not a short term strategy now why is that the case why does it need to turn to others because Afghanistan is not only as Ambassador Rahmani said the poorest the youngest country in the world outside of Africa it is also the poorest country in the world outside of Africa we are poorer than any other country in Asia all of the achievements that we have been talking about and rightly celebrating are not financed by Afghanistan cannot be financed by Afghanistan when Afghan government talks rightly about its achievements and increasing its revenue and becoming more self-sufficient it is talking about covering the costs of the operating budget of the Afghan state it is not talking about sustaining all of these development projects and progress and so on now therefore Afghanistan's future if it is to be sustainable will depend on developing an economy for a landlocked country that means connectivity to world markets now the Afghan public sector the military the state and so on is dependent on direct financial aid from the United States dependent on the logistical access to Afghanistan the United States gets primarily through Pakistan and until our relations with Iran undergo a U-turn or a lot more infrastructure or with Russia undergoes a U-turn that will be the only alternative for that type of relationship now for connectivity to actually get the Afghan economy moving the engine has to be trade and investment now who are Afghanistan's main trading partners there has been some change in that and one of the achievements of the current administration in Afghanistan has been to diversify Afghanistan's trading partners so it is no longer as dependent on Pakistan but Afghanistan's main trading partners are still Iran Pakistan China and India furthermore where would the engine of economic growth in Afghanistan come for a long time there wasn't any potential engine of growth there no real economic incentive for peacemaking what some people call a power of attraction like joining the European Union was for peace in certain parts of Europe the growth of India and China has meant that there is economic dynamism that if linked to the Afghan economy could lead to some kind of takeoff but China's mechanism for building connectivity is the Belt and Road Initiative including the China Pakistan Economic Carter which the United States and India oppose in fact right now the United States and China are locked in a dispute at the United Nations over whether the resolution renewing the mandate of the United Nations will mention the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative or not the U.S. opposes China is insisting same thing happened last year and it ended up gutting the resolution India's access to Afghanistan because it is cut off by land by Pakistan depends on access through Iran through the port of Chabahar and previous like Bandar Abbas sorry no and other ports that it was using previously now the United States has Iran under sanctions which despite the attempt to wave some of them for Chabahar have essentially frozen the development of Chabahar and made it impossible to expand that one of the effects of these two phenomena is that per capita GDP growth in Afghanistan for the past two years has been negative that is population growth has been faster than GDP growth so that is not a path to self-sufficiency and stability so as long as the United States as long as Afghanistan is dependent for its security on the presence of a United States which is blocking which is opposed strategically to the connectivity projects that Afghanistan needs to become self-sufficient that presence can never stabilize Afghanistan now what does this mean first of all the option of Afghanistan being stabilized through a long-term US presence is I believe as Michael accurately said it is now off the table despite what people talk about here because the alternative to the deal that is has been halted or ended whatever it may be is not a long-term US presence there is no armistice like in Korea there is no military victory like in Germany there is no unconditional surrender there is no end of hostilities between China and Taiwan the alternative is a US withdrawal on some other terms now one of the positive achievements of this diplomatic process that has not gotten that much attention here has been the development of a consensus among the US, Russia and China to some extent including Pakistan on this process and the core of that consensus is about a responsible transition to the withdrawal of US troops to Afghanistan and a political settlement it is not about a permanent US presence conducting a forever war on terror in Afghanistan and so far Russia, China and Pakistan have reiterated that position that they support a political settlement that will lead to a US withdrawal political dialogue and a political settlement in Afghanistan the US position as we all know is unclear but I think President Trump's basic position that he wants to get out of Afghanistan the Democratic candidate's basic position that they want to get out of Afghanistan is quite clear on how now let me suggest based on what I said a few things first of all if the the United States is going to get out without the agreement that was reached last week that doesn't mean it will get out without an agreement perfect first of all the Afghan government has the capacity depending on how the elections go but if the elections have a decisive result which they may or may not have but if they do then the Afghan government will be in a position to regain initiative to some extent if it is willing to say to acknowledge that its future is not based on a long-term presence of the United States to turn to the United States and say we understand you are leaving talk to us about how to leave and it can also say to the Taliban we are asking the United States to leave isn't that your main demand what is your problem in addition the region still wants an agreement based on a settlement based on withdrawal of U.S. troops and a political settlement we are coming up on the U.N. General Assembly meeting which some meetings are likely to take place again the U.S. Russia China consensus position that was developed over the past few months was to some extent based on the work previously done by Russia through the Moscow process which the United States initially saw as a threat and opposed but eventually sort of participated in and it was absorbed into this process so that the U.S. and the Russian special representatives were actually working together on this. There is no reason and the model for inter-Afghan talks in that process was bringing the Afghan government and the Taliban together through the context of a regional meeting which other stakeholders of course would be represented as well that control the access to Afghanistan there is obviously it can't be happened without the United States as well that regional process, bilateral U.S. Afghan process, inter-Afghan talks and by the way could not work together and by the way one thing that this process has clarified is that the Taliban are willing to talk to the Afghan government. They agreed to do it and arrangements for doing it were under way in Norway their condition was that U.S.-Afghan bilateral agreement but that inhibition that prohibition has been broken and it's now not a question of if, it's a question of how and when it may be that U.S. Taliban talks are not the right enabling environment for it, they might be a part of it I don't know maybe the regional talks will be maybe U.S.-Afghan bilateral, maybe something we can't imagine they have found as the most frequently occurring event in Afghanistan over the past 40 years but I continue to think that the present war is not sustainable no one really wants it and there will be a lot of and somehow or other we will find another path thank you thank you very much so we've heard perspectives from Afghanistan from a variety of angles we've heard about the region and now we're going to come here and hear from Laurel Miller about some of the U.S. policy options so first a word in response to Michael's comments unfortunately if a deep desire for peace was what it took for there to be peace there would be a lot more peace in the world and so I have no doubt that there is a deep desire for peace but you still need political mechanisms to convert that deep desire for peace into actual peace and so the idea that there's going to be a ferment rising up from the bottom and that that is going to create peace is I think simply factually untrue in human existence that's not a policy recommendation that's an observation for the United States there are I would say three basic options and I might amend it to say maybe Barney has the nub of a fourth option here the three options are first of all the U.S. could simply withdraw if the U.S. wants to withdraw and that's the policy choice the U.S. makes it doesn't need to make a deal with the Taliban to do it it might still make a deal with the Taliban but it doesn't need an agreement with the Taliban to do it nor does it need an agreement with the Afghan government to do it though that along the lines of what Barney described though that would be desirable if feasible also if the U.S. decides simply to withdraw then the counter-terrorism assurances that it's already negotiated whatever exactly they look like with the Taliban are essentially worthless those assurances are only potentially meaningful in so far as the Taliban becomes part of the governance structures of Afghanistan and therefore has some interest in adhering to them and also there are mechanisms for holding them to them but otherwise those assurances are again simply papering over the exit in my view if this was the policy option the U.S. chose the consequences for Afghanistan would be quite devastating I think the likelihood of a withdrawal from Afghanistan within the next let's say some time before oh I don't know October 2020 with no peace agreement left behind would very likely lead to intensified and and wider civil war more chaotic civil war in Afghanistan not guaranteed but likely the second policy option for the United States is to simply continue doing what it's doing and this is an option that is being promoted by some here in Washington often it is said by those promoting this option that the United States can't afford let's call it 30 billion, 35 billion the actual numbers are disputed but the United States can afford that can afford to keep paying several billion dollars a year for the Afghan security forces can afford sustaining some let's say 8,000,8600 if there's a partial drawdown troops in Afghanistan technically, literally, of course the United States of America can afford the monetary cost of that however those who promote this line entirely ignore the costs that are born by Afghanistan for that scenario and the sustainability of those costs can Afghanistan continue to sustain the cost in terms of the lives of Afghan security forces and what that means for the capabilities of Afghan security forces for an indefinite period of time not to speak of the other human costs in Afghanistan and the ways in which the conflict as Barney described impedes any possibility of genuine economic growth that scenario the let's just keep doing what we're doing also I think ignores the political realities in the United States I don't think that just keeping doing what we're doing for an indefinite period of time let's just say indefiniteness is not very long in that scenario in my view politically there are just many signs on the wall as to the political unsustainability of this for much longer so the third option is therefore trying to leave some kind of political settlement in Afghanistan that is connected to a U.S. withdrawal and that means a process that is more or less like the process that Ambassador Khalilzad has been pursuing over these months I can't speak to the specifics of the deal that he's negotiated and whether that's the best that could be negotiated or not because we don't all know what is in that deal beyond a few specifics that don't quite tell us enough but in terms of what are the options as a process wise that's basically it now Barney's idea of an option where the U.S. stops negotiating with the Taliban and starts negotiating with the Afghan government about the terms of its withdrawals is theoretically possible but whether in fact there would be incentive on the Afghan government side to negotiate a U.S. withdrawal on a timeline and terms that actually fit the politics in the United States I think is an open question but one could test that what is not an option unfortunately is the kind of peace process that probably everyone in this room would prefer and that I'm sure anyone on this panel sitting at this table would prefer and that the Afghan government would prefer and it's the kind of peace process that for many years the United States sought to launch that is a peace process in which there's a ceasefire first a peace process in which the negotiations are foremost initially or at least simultaneously involving the Afghan government and not just between the US and Taliban a peace process that somehow up front guarantees that the outcome will be such that the gains for women for minorities for many of the other kinds of gains are preserved the United States of America has been unable to deliver that kind of peace process and I see no reason why this week the options and capabilities to deliver that kind of peace process are any better than they were last week or will get any better in the future if the Afghan government, the Afghan political elite, the Afghan people want to reject the kind of peace process that the United States is able to launch and try to deliver that is perfectly within their rights to do so however then I think that means that Afghanistan will be left alone to try to find peace on its own terms and I highly doubt that that will result in a peace process of the more desirable variety where the Taliban agrees to a ceasefire and negotiations immediately commence with the Afghan government again I'm not against the preferred peace process if it was my choice the preferred peace process would be the one that we had but as I said the United States of America has been unable to deliver that and will continue to be unable to deliver that I think it's important though to remember what it is that the U.S. Taliban agreement as distasteful as it may be in many ways to many people was intended to do and that is it was intended and if it revives will be intended to lead to intra-Afghan negotiations that will be the real peace process and so rather than criticizing the deal that can be had my recommendation would be to keep your eye on the prize the prize is the intra-Afghan negotiations that will be the place where Afghans are able to test the possibility of getting the kind of outcome that they prefer and the kind of compromises they can live with whether it turns out to be possible or not I don't know but I see that as the only realistic way forward just quickly to close I would say how do we move on from President Trump declaring that President Trump is dead first and foremost it requires a decision by President Trump to declare the process undead and I think President Trump has shown himself to be exceptionally agile in reframing decisions and declarations and moving on from them when it's in the interest as he sees it of the United States political interest or his desire and the desire of his administration to do so and so I see no obstacle to President Trump declaring the process undead at least in principle it will require rebuilding some of the confidence that Ambassador Khalzad has succeeded in developing of the regional countries in particular in the US commitment to negotiating I think that is a success that he had over the last year in winning confidence that the US was really serious about peace negotiations this time and the disruption of this weekend does some damage to that but I think it's not fatal damage and it's damage that's probably easiest repaired by jolting the process back to life with the electric shock therapy there as quickly as possible the longer the delay it might be harder to do that it's also necessary to de-escalate the conflict dynamics in Washington that have arisen about this and I think about this deal and the criticisms that have arisen and I think that's going to require the administration to be much more forward leaning in explaining the deal explaining what a US Taliban deal is or isn't there's still a I think a lot of misperception that this was supposed to be the peace deal and therefore it didn't deliver enough when that's not really the case and it will require more selling of the deal here in Washington as I said which is really predominant about explanation of what it is what it isn't and what's in it I would just close by saying that you know this is in response to some of the comments that the ambassador made which I appreciated and Sharzad I think we've left her and Michael as well it's important to bear in mind that peace negotiations are not peace building they are not the same thing many of the kinds of steps that others have talked about here that will need to happen for there to be actual peace in Afghanistan are absolutely necessary once you have set a political foundation for that kind of peace building and that's going to take a very long time but I think it's not helpful to criticize a peace negotiation for not delivering what only long term peace building can deliver thank you very much for all of those comments and we will be taking questions from the audience some of the staff will have microphones please do wait until I call on you and then the microphone arrives as that is getting set up I want to start with a question of my own and Sharzad I'm glad to see we reconnected with you questions for Sharzad and maybe for others if they do want to comment but some things that you have said and the threat of the conversation has alluded to some of the questions within the Afghan political environment beyond the Taliban so they obviously have an extreme and violent grievance with the political system of Afghanistan but there is a lot of discord ethnically, politically, geographically within the country and I think the suggestion that a lot of made is that this undermines the fundamental leverage that an Afghan government has to negotiate with one voice of course also it's been mentioned there are presidential elections coming up on September 28th and those are always a competitive and maybe polarizing political event so if we look ahead beyond September 28th not knowing who will win what do you see is the need and the opportunities for the post-election political environment to either consolidate or fragment and what impact do you think that will have on the peace process sorry let us try to get the audio can we work on that yeah can you hear me now yes thank you thank you for the question Scott I think one of the responses to the President Trump's announcement was just a reminder again for all Afghans about the fact that this need in our future to an extent our future is still being decided outside of Afghanistan and this is very frustrating of course but also I think it's an important reminder for our political lead and for our government to move beyond the situation and the way to move beyond the situation is through trying to build a consensus it will not be easy and I think there are divided opinions about the impact of elections for having the non-Taliban side positions strengthened there are some who believe that having elections and having governments with renewed mandates whoever is leading this government will have a stronger mandate and that Afghans will be a stronger position to negotiate with the Taliban there are those who believe that the electoral process itself will further the fragmentation and that will lead us to a situation where we are weaker especially if there is not a decisive victory I think the elections should need to go forward but I think what we can learn from the President Trump's announcement is that this peace process will be this process will be a long-term process and it will get a while for Afghans it will take a while for Afghans to get fully involved and to it's on all of us especially on our government and the Afghan political elite to utilize this opportunity to think that the loss of one or other political segments and the none Taliban front will be the loss of all because there are shared interests and there are shared values getting to that place will not be will not be easy I personally have my concerns but I think it's created this recent announcement by President Trump created some discourse alluding to that need cohesion and for having one strong voice and for showing more leadership from all sides and that on political spectrum Thanks very much let me then take some hands the woman in the suit right there let's start with you and sorry please also just say your name and affiliation if you have one yes thank you good morning my name is Stacy Schamber I'm from the Civil Society Action Network thank you all very much for your comments this is also a question for Scheherzad you spoke about the importance and need for inclusivity of the peace process which I think many of us value and agree with both for our shared values of human rights as well as for the evidence we have around the sustainability and durability of peace processes and my question is just what can civil society activists and organizations do globally to support you and the various Afghan groups as you work to build that social cohesion and prepare for the inter-Afghan dialogue thank you go ahead Scheherzad thank you for the question I think there is the Afghan women's movement and their advocacy around the peace process was a good example of how our how global solidarity can really have an impact for amplifying the voice of civil society in the past more than a year Afghan women have been advocating for more inclusivity in the process and for protection and promotion of women's rights initially when the advocacy started targeting the global alliance for women's rights and human rights many Afghan women were very nervous about not having their voice not being amplified or being left alone and marginalized and their demands but the response from organizations and individuals outside Afghanistan for the importance of listening to women and their demands and listening to their aspirations for peace and also ensuring that the aspirations of a wide variety of Afghan women are reflected has been very encouraging and there is now this feeling that we all do the process there are concerns about the process and there are concerns about a future post settlement governments and the implications for women's rights that we feel that we are not alone in demanding inclusivity and demanding the protection of rights so I would say my call would be to keep doing what you are doing as activists and as organizations standing for human rights outside Afghanistan keep amplifying the voice of Afghan women and Afghan human rights activists and reminding everyone including the Taliban that these groups are not alone and that the aspirations for gender equality, the aspirations for human rights are not aspirations that that only the Afghans will have to fight for only the Afghan women will have to fight for Thanks very much this gentleman here in the center Jack Pagano, COO of Shamshad Radio and Television and retired Army Lieutenant Colonel spent more than 12 years in Afghanistan Shamshad is one of the few TV stations that gets into the tribal areas in Pakistan my question is if the Taliban own the land 65% of Afghanistan is ruled by the Taliban and as you know as a military guy if you own the land my question is how are you going to get the Taliban in those far remote regions that feel empowered to lay down their arms to say to everyone there's peace on the horizon when they know time is on their side Thank you I will turn to Michael Semphal to answer that first but others can join in if they want Good question and certainly I wanted to comment on the military situation because fundamentally I think we're we're all coming back we've all been making the point despite the jostlings and Laurel's firm line on what the options are ultimately what everybody is saying is that the way forward will be when there are successful intra-Afghan talks and so the challenge is what is the right framework which will set conditions for those talks and one of the tools which has of course been used is the military there has been a ramping up of violence over the past year and the Taliban have been hit hard in so far as it has been the Afghan Government and the US have been pushing pushing up that violence and it certainly looked to me from the outside as if there's been an attempt to persuade them that you are hurting hard you have to you have to get serious at the negotiating table the the impression that I have had is that the lower ranks of the Taliban have indeed been hit hard they're well aware of the mortality rates that they're facing where they're all losing comrades but I haven't seen evidence of it sort of affecting the strategic calculations that they that's persuaded anybody at the leadership level to change their change the instructions that they've been giving to the team in Qatar so that the Taliban have an awful lot of cannon fodder over there when it comes to the decisions which are being made of the people sort of out there in the sticks in the districts of Afghanistan as to whether they're prepared to fight on or not that's of course there's an issue of the the sense of the prospect of victory the prospect they're going to be able to move into the towns but also they're affected by their confidence in the movement the confidence in the leadership the confidence that the sacrifices they're making they talk very much about their sacrifices that they are being respected and honoured and as ever with Afghanistan you've got to look closely to see what's going on so there is no single story and yes we are as we said on the panel that this idea that where you get this idea that the Taliban have the time is that Afghanistan is dependent for its security and we know that withdrawal of the withdrawal of the US financial lifeline and military security would the current setup would not be able to survive that's the reality and Taliban know that but on the other hand we've had plenty plenty of parts of the country which I certainly been observing quite clearly whether the Taliban military command has found it tough to persuade the guys to go out there and fight because they don't see the point and there's some places where we've seen an echo to you know back to the period that Barney can remember at the time of the Soviet withdrawal where try as ISI might try as the Peshawar based leaders might they weren't able to up the anti to increase the violence because people were opting out a combination of disaffection in the ranks and good state craft by people on the Kabul side persuading that essentially this is a local war you're in control of your area you have Islam it is Afghanistan why are we killing each other and that's the one of the ways in which there's a lot of the dynamics in the fighting in Afghanistan so where I think that they were one of the ways to rethink it and to come back to the challenge that Laura was putting out was setting the how do you set the conditions for intra-Afghan negotiations for productive intra-Afghan negotiations which do lead to a compromise political settlement it's actually finding ways of turning the violence down and persuading the people that you are asking about that they are getting them to conclude I'm still Talib but I'm not going to be heading in to burn down our district centre again to cause further loss to the state and then to be blown up and chased out again the next day let's just sit where we are the more that we move the more that people are persuaded to take that decision the more actually you set favourable conditions for the intra-Afghan negotiations which ultimately are the solution and I say we have documentary evidence that that is happening in parts of Afghanistan but it's not the narrative which has been captured I know others want to weigh in Sharzad if you heard the question I'll give you a chance but I also want to add my spin because the fundamental issue that was raised is that there are different experiences in Afghanistan there are areas whatever the percentage is that are under Taliban control and so as the conversation has been in Washington as well as Afghanistan about preserving the gains of course some have gained and others have gained in the environment and I wonder if you have perspectives or thoughts on the different experiences within Afghanistan and whether that's attention or an advantage for a peace process thank you I think first about the areas under control and the statistics we have to be very careful about separating from control and influence and you know when we talk about percentages and in terms of time we have to be up for all Afghans in terms of ending the violence as Michael also said the mortality is high on both sides Afghans, young Afghans are dying everyday and this is impacting not only Afghans today but Afghans future we are dealing with huge groups of orphaned children dealing with many families that have a single head many woman-headed families we have increased exhaustion with the war it's impacting social cohesion it's impacting our ability to become economically self-reliance it's impacting the future of every woman across Afghanistan I think the sense is shared among fighters certainly from what we saw in the ceasefire but also from some interactions that happen at the local level that maybe for leadership they think they have the time on their side but for people who are actually dying on a daily basis fighting on a daily basis the time was perhaps several years ago in terms of the different life experiences of Afghans in the past 18 years and what that could mean for peace I think for all Afghans the desire is that the opportunities that existed for some of us and don't exist for others should expand peace would mean that you would have the possibility for all Afghans to benefit from access to education access to health care services to free media to the ability to vote and elect political leaders many Afghans that I know and I interact with want to have the possibility to experience the opportunities that some Afghans have had this desire for increased opportunities is partly shaped by the fact that Afghans are a very young country and now a very connected country we have had the opportunity in the past 18 years to not only for large segments of the Afghans to experience freedoms and rights but also to learn more about how people live in countries around us and around the world and learn about different ways of life different possibilities different aspirations and if you look at the kind of media products if you look at the kind of lifestyles that attract Afghans I think the general desire is for a country that will have more space for people to exercise their rights not less more space for people to make decisions about their lives not less and so I think there might be attention in the sense that areas that are most hardly hit by the conflict have a greater sense of urgency and wanting an inch to it but security is just the first step people across Afghanistan want more than security they want lives that will allow them to have aspirations to live life similar to people in other countries and across the world to have access to freedoms, to services that they think they deserve thank you very much yeah just a quick response to the narrower original question which was how do you get far flung Taliban to lay down their arms if in fact there is a peace deal two quick points one, I think you can be confident that the Taliban leadership will not sign a deal that they can't deliver on that their followers won't follow because they are very attentive to maintaining their cohesion and if they sign a deal that's going to divide the Taliban and that their followers won't follow that would be devastating to them and they're not going to sign a deal that's devastating to them that's not a point of optimism because I think that's one real reason why deal making is going to be very hard because they won't agree to a deal that they don't think they can deliver on and sell to their rank and file and the second quick point is there's not going to be any peace enforcement mission there's not going to be a scenario where a deal is signed and the Taliban leadership enforces it vis-a-vis the Taliban rank and file the implementation of a deal is going to depend on the Taliban leadership enforcing it vis-a-vis the rank and file there's not going to be a UN peacekeeping mission you're not going to have the United States enforcing the deal and the Afghan government will be hard pressed to enforce the deal in areas such as you described the Taliban perspective no deal is probably preferable to a deal I shouldn't say probably is preferable to a deal that splits the Taliban the narrative that because the government is dependent on outside assistance therefore if the outside assistance is taken away the Taliban will win is wrong and it's based on zero-sum thinking it explains why the Taliban are negotiating because the Taliban don't want to it's not only the current government that needs foreign aid it's the future government even if it's run by the Taliban because the Taliban were not highly successful when they were in control of the capital they want to be part of a legitimized government that receives foreign assistance and the term control is also deceptive it gives you the idea like there's some border many areas there are now I can't give you any numbers but there are areas of Afghanistan now from which we have had consistent reporting where the security forces police administration is in the hands of the Taliban but they do not abolish all the institutions of the Afghan state in fact schools health clinics continue running under their directions and they're much harsher about teacher absenteeism than the government in fact there is a kind of coexistence already in place what we need to do is create the political conditions for that coexistence which will enable people to expand their exercise of their rights to expand and enlarge okay we'll take a few questions at once the gentleman right there with the pen in the air thank you Sean Carberry with the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General and I want to pick up on something that Laurel just raised about the Taliban not agreeing to a deal that they can't sell to their people and that gets to the whole question of what is the zone of possible agreement between the parties here and how big or how small is it in terms of what the Taliban can sell to their people what the Afghan elite can sell on their side what the US can sell and what international constituencies can sell to their people and how much is the Taliban going to get their maximalist position so I'd like to get some sense of a little bit more of the specifics of what are some of the areas where there is possible agreement where are some of the things where there might not be that would cause fragmentation that could pull this whole thing apart let's take one other question from the woman in the back in the striped shirt my name is Pajma Iqbarzai and my question is directed towards a situation declared operation enduring freedom in 2001 and war on terrorism in Afghanistan that then first lady Laura Bush also called it the process of liberation of women and this process has proved to be transformative and we witnessed 18 gradually progressive years in Afghanistan Miss Sharzad Iqbar is one of the highlights of the process but now after a very long course of time we are again at the critical juncture we the women of Afghanistan not the entire society I'm concerned about women a lot and more than anything else we the women of Afghanistan are at the critical juncture of social and political existential threat in taking the conservative society of Afghanistan and the addition of Taliban's share over it there is a fair that the democratic ideals of liberty, equality, pertaining women rights may fold back with the drought of US and the disengagement of United States in Afghanistan can we say that women are yet again at stake of getting back to the darkest phase of the history of Afghanistan thank you thank you and as mentioned before people are following us on twitter I want to read one other question that came through that platform and that's about Pakistan what are the chances of prevailing upon Pakistan to stop supporting the Taliban which this commenter suggests is one of the only ways to get the Taliban to buy into democracy so let's just go starting with Laurel to address one of those questions and then another round in before we close those are all good questions and unfortunately I don't have time to do them all justice to the one that was directed towards me I think it is entirely understandable why women in Afghanistan would be concerned about a peace process and what might come out of it I completely understand that from a personal perspective and from a policy perspective but I think it's great from the perspective of analyzing what the U.S. policy options as the U.S. perceives it are and what the U.S. is likely to do it is important to remember number one the United States did not invade Afghanistan to liberate Afghan women number two the United States will not make a decision about its exit from Afghanistan based fundamentally based on considerations regarding Afghan women I am not saying that as a policy proposal prescription recommendation I'm stating it as a policy reality in the United States there will be many here who will desire to minimize the impact on Afghan women preserve the protections for Afghan women but at the end of the day the decision making will be fundamentally about other issues related to the security of the United States and not considerations related to women I'm sorry I don't have time to address Sean's comment but I would just say very briefly that it's a difficult question to answer in large part because both sides but more particularly the Taliban are not going into this negotiation if this negotiation happens there are already developed political platforms unlike other peace processes around the world and so the zone of the possible is going to have to emerge as the negotiations develop and the positions as they develop confront each other and chances of Pakistan stopping well slim but I think the more important point is the United States simply withdraws from Afghanistan starts to withdraw abandons a peace process the chances of Pakistan ramping up its relationship with the Taliban increase considerably look Laura Bush never gave such a speech before 9-11 if the United States were going to invade Afghanistan to liberate Afghan women and had many opportunities to do so 9-11 that speech was to legitimate something that took place for other reasons and that basic reality is still real today Sean on the question of what the Taliban leadership would sign off on unfortunately I think nobody still knows we seem to be very close to getting to know that but we don't know that we do know some of their considerations for the leadership is maintaining the unity of the movement they also want to project themselves as being on course to establishment of an Islamic Emirate or something like that and whatever deal they want to do they want to project themselves as being on course to achieving a full withdrawal of US forces these seem to be the three things that seem to have most concern of but one of the problems I'm almost like which is that yes negotiations and negotiated outcome are important but they're not the whole thing in peacemaking and I suspect that in Afghanistan they're setting the conditions for a negotiated outcome that that may be something that we have to now is a good time for everybody to reflect on what more options there are to make progress on setting the conditions that we refer to now about the existence of this zone inside Afghanistan where the war has sort of moved on that violence levels have started to come down there are zones of government and Taliban control but that they've been developing some kind of modus vivendi that too is something which is reminiscent of the post 1989 period and I think that the clever people who are trying to plot a way forward now should be looking at what can be done to set the conditions without assuming that within one month or two months or three months you can actually jump straight to the negotiated solution or even the negotiations which definitely produce the solution maybe you're not going to jump quickly to the elite bargain but there are still important things which can be done to alter the dynamics of the conflict in Afghanistan on the progress towards conditions in which it is safe for the U.S. to withdraw. We'll take one more round of questions and let me start the gentleman in the blue shirt. Zafar Hashmi with Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction will holding how will holding or not holding the upcoming Afghan presidential election will change the dynamics of political positioning and potential inter-Afghan dialogue if there is going to be any. Thank you. I see the gentleman with the white shirt there. Jeff Stacey, UNDP just back from Kabul with everything that happened with the Camp David cancellation it seems that the appropriate that was dumped on the administration and the fallout is what mostly the press and the international a few other positives bear your reflection possibly one Pompeo had just said he wouldn't sign the agreement just a few days before but here was Trump fully engaged the Taliban officially have not agreed to meet with the government they'd done so informally in recent rounds in Qatar but there they were about to do so and you had the Taliban also indicate for the first time in the last round in round nine that they would reduce and end the violence plus we now have a situation where Trump needs a deal he needs to be re-elected he's just gotten rid of Bolton and so things are actually a little more conducive with that respect but my key question is the elections if the Taliban especially in light of what you've been saying Professor Semple about very important considerations from the lower ranks but we all know when elections happen in Afghanistan the Taliban usually increase violence right in the run up to will that not be cross-cutting how will that play out and then let's take one more in the front row here and we'll close it with that hi my name is Abdul Nijrabi I am director of a local NGO I PDD my question is from Laurel you seem so pessimistic about Pakistan yeah you seem so pessimistic about Pakistan in case of peace process but I think Pakistan is a fundamental problem Taliban were born in Pakistan they were harbored in Pakistan they are being supported by Pakistan to just speak like ISIS mainly main authority for Taliban in my recent visit to Afghanistan I had interviewed with a couple of Afghan dialogue participants of Doha they said Taliban leadership were in Doha like Mullah but whenever we had offer for them they just need to go outside and they were like we have to speak with our leadership but they were leadership so that means they had to speak with ISIS, with Pakistan so what's your proposal I mean there have to be a solution for Pakistan and the table to honestly work for a peaceful outcome of the process for Afghanistan thank you great we start with Michael and we'll work our way back down I think that the work which has been done to put together regional consensus is important and that's got to be that's one of the points that I'm saying has got to be built on rather than just scrapping our keep not just Pakistan but the other regional players at the table as Borny told us but most of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan are pretty close to being as resentful of the control from masters sitting in Quetta and Peshawar as perhaps you might be yourself but nobody yet has come up with a bright strategic level in the way of making use of that and I think if we do see progress towards reduction of violence over the next year or so it will be some more attention to that I think that the I mean I listened very hurt to the Laura was like slapping me on the wrist saying that the I mean I was saying that war fatigue isn't a strategy it's not it's not sufficient but it's a very it's an important ingredient which with the right policy framework and institutions is something which can be exploited so that there is when pro-Afghan sentiment inside the ranks of the Taliban when that is capitalised on in ways reminiscent of what happened in the in the period 89 and 92 then perhaps levels will come down because over the past year we have seen a we've seen an attempt to capitalise on the cohesiveness of the movement and the strategic decisions making me a wise strategic decisions from the Taliban leadership to embrace peace and a compromise settlement and we've gambled on that now it hasn't happened yet and maybe they will do it which I hope that they will be subjected to again and again but the more that they are forced to worry that our our ranks the people who've kept the fighting going the people that give us our leverage that they're starting to opt out that they're going cool on the war as has happened in previous stages the more that they worry about that the more is a chance that actually the conditions are set and they actually embrace a compromise solution that is the main variable about the elections that will affect the process is not Taliban violence the Taliban never gave any indication that they would reduce violence if the elections were postponed or cancelled and that's one of the reasons that we're having the elections and in the past there has been Taliban violence but it has not been decisive the question about the elections is there may be voting but will there be an election that is if the voting leads to a relatively quick choice of a president which is accepted by the major non-Taliban political forces in the country then it will strengthen the government as President Ghani envisages but that has not been the history of election presidential elections in Afghanistan thus far if the election once again is contested and there are charges of corruption and it is not accepted by major political forces then there could be a relatively long several months period of contestation perhaps demands for a second round which the government may or may not accept in which case the divisions within the coalition opposing the Taliban the constitutional coalition will become stronger so really a lot depends on the outcome and conduct of the elections as far as Pakistan is concerned I think Pakistan remains Pakistan and it is not going to change into another country that does not have antagonism with India or problems with Afghanistan Afghanistan remains landlocked and Afghanistan cannot have a future that is based on strategic antagonism with Pakistan so somehow or other hopefully through regional cooperation and the involvement of third parties notably China because China is there permanently unlike the United States Afghanistan and China Afghanistan and Pakistan will find a way of living with their differences but it will not be because Pakistan is transformed into a country that does not have any issues with Afghanistan I fully agree with Barney's comments on Pakistan to say I'm not at all dismissive of the problem the problems that are raised by the interests that Pakistan perceives in Afghanistan I am dismissive of the idea that all it takes is for the United States to say no or to impose some sanctions on Pakistan that that's what's going to take to fundamentally change their strategic calculations the question of whether Secretary Pompeo would sign or not I think that story was mischaracterized and got out of control it was not it was not that he wasn't going to sign off on the deal it was that there were questions as to the formalities of who would be signing on behalf of the United States and it's more than formalities it's also symbolism if I were in the State Department I would recommend that Secretary Pompeo not sign the deal I don't think that this is an agreement that should be signed at the level of Secretary of State and I think that would only be another feather in the cap for the Taliban to have a podium like this where Secretary Pompeo is sitting next to Mullah Baradar whoever this is an agreement that should be signed in a more low key way by the envoy who negotiated it so I don't think there was a substantive issue there great thank you Shahzad I'm sorry we lost you I'm glad you're back I don't know if you heard the questions there are more about elections but in Pakistan why don't we just give you a minute as we close for any final thoughts thank you I'm sorry I missed on some of the questions I think I think the recent developments have created some concern but also they create an opportunity and I think the main opportunity here is for the Afghans especially the Taliban if they are serious about becoming part of a political process if they are serious about engaging with majority of Afghans they really need to re-evaluate their approach and their rhetoric and they really need to especially re-evaluate their engagement with various constituencies and Afghans on improving women in need well thank you very much please join me in thanking this great panel for a deep discussion on the Afghanistan peace process let me close by saying that one sign of progress is that we can have a nearly continuous to our video link with somebody with high quality in Afghanistan so things are improving thank you very much Shahzad for staying up late to talk to us and then finally the conversation here on the news on Afghanistan next Thursday from 11 to 1230 we will host the launch of Cigar's new lessons learned report on reintegration of Taliban fighters what happened in the past this will be hopefully useful lessons for the future because there will be fighters to reintegrate so with that thank you very much for joining us and see you at the next one