 or a good evening, depending on where you are joining us from. My name is Rick Olson, and on behalf of the United States Institute of Peace, I welcome you to this virtual event between the TTP and the Durand Line, Pakistan's policy toward the Afghan Taliban. As many of you know, USIP was founded in 1984 by Congress as an independent, National Nonpartisan Institute dedicated to the proposition that peace is possible, practical and essential for US and global security. Through research, training, and analysis, we make peace possible. Once again, the Durand Line is in the news. The de facto boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it takes its name from Henry Mortimer Durand, British colonial official who drew the line in 1893, more or less in conjunction with the then ruler of Afghanistan, the Iron Amir of the Rahman. A fun bit of trivia Durand was rewarded for his service in the subcontinent by being made Her Majesty's Ambassador to Washington in the early part of the last century. Like all of its predecessors, the Afghan Taliban regime has refused, in principle, to accept the Durand Line as a border. Moreover, the Taliban is allowing its Pakistani counterpart, the Tariq-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP as we will refer to it today, to operate in Afghan territory. Moreover, since August 15, there have been clashes between Taliban and Pakistani forces and Pakistan continues to fence the line, effectively demarcating what the international community, or most of it, considers a border. All of this raises questions whether the Afghan Taliban intend to astound Islamabad with Durand gratitude for decades of sustenance during their fight against the U.S. and NATO. To unpack these questions and others, we have a terrific panel of experts here today. Kamran Yusuf is an Islamabad-based senior foreign affairs correspondent at the Express Tribune. With over 20 years of experience reporting in Pakistan's English press, he writes and reports on issues of Pakistan's foreign policy. Dr. Asfand Yar Mir is a senior expert in the Asia Center at USIP. Previously, Dr. Mir held various parallel ships at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His research interests include the international relations of South Asia, U.S. counterterrorism policy, and political violence, with a regional focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Elizabeth Threlkeld is a senior fellow and director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center. Before joining Stimson, she served as a foreign service officer with the U.S. Department of State and Islamabad and Peshawar, where she and I had the pleasure of working together. She is the recipient of a State Department Superior Honor Award, several Meritorious Honor Awards, and the Matilda W. Sinclair Language Award. So we will start with a panel dialogue and then try to leave some time at the end for questions and answers. So I encourage members of the audience to send in their questions through the USIP website. So without further ado, why don't we get started? I'm going to turn first to Kamran for the view from Islamabad. I would like to get a sense for you, Kamran, about what is the nature of the policy debate on Afghanistan in Pakistan right now. Is it focused on diplomatic recognition for the Taliban, which Pakistan has not yet actually formally done, and although Pakistan has encouraged the international community to make de facto arrangements for the Taliban government, or is it on the humanitarian crisis, or is it on the TTP and the Durand Line? So, Kamran, we'd love to hear your views on these thoughts. Well, first of all, thank you very much, Ambassador Olsen, after meeting you after many years, virtually. I think the sense here Pakistan is simultaneously pursuing strategy. I think on the face of it, of course, given the precarious humanitarian crisis unfolding in Afghanistan after the US exit, that is the priority. Pakistan is trying to tell the international community that this is not the time to abandon Afghanistan, even if you don't like the Afghan Taliban, but the cost would be bearing by the people of Afghanistan. And also importantly, Pakistan is also pushing for the revival of the economy, because Pakistan understands that Afghan Taliban may be now in charge, but in order to sustain this government, it is important that the economy is revived. And that is why even Pakistan has formed this APEX committee headed by Prime Minister Imran Khan, where all the key federal ministers and officials are represented, and we have recently seen a meeting of that APEX committee. But at the same time, of course, if we recall when Taliban took over, there was a sense of celebration within Pakistan, particularly Prime Minister Imran Khan when famously or infamously said that the people of Afghanistan broke the shackles of slavery. The reason for that statement was that Pakistan was hoping that the return of Afghan Taliban would serve Pakistan's interest, particularly the threat posed by Tariq-e-Taliban Pakistan and all its affiliates. Six months now, we have seen the Taliban are in charge, and we have seen that the number of attacks or the spike in the TTP attacks that we have witnessed. So in Pakistan, of course, there is a sense, of course, the critics of Pakistan's policy believe that things are not unfolding the way we have hoped for, because we thought that the Afghan Taliban would neutralize the threat posed by the TTP, but that is not happening. The sense within the Pakistani officials, I was speaking to a senior Pakistani official who was directly dealing with the Afghan Taliban, he said that or rather described the relationship between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban on the question of TTP, same as Pakistan used to have with the U.S. because the United States over the year pushed Pakistan to take action against so-called Kuwait Ashura or the Afghan Taliban leadership belief to be over the years having sanctuaries inside Pakistan, but Pakistan in return always used to tell the Americans that look that this is not our priority. Our main threat, of course, was TTP and also given the fact that Afghan Taliban in future will have a role in Afghanistan, so we will not like to antagonize a group who would be a part of the future government in Afghanistan. So now Pakistan is also getting the same response from the Afghan Taliban. When Pakistan government asked the Afghan Taliban to take action against the TTP, the Afghan Taliban say look that our main priority is to deal with Daesh Khurasan or ISIS. And also they say that look we cannot take action against the TTP. What we can do, we can facilitate, we can mediate between you and the TTP. So this is the kind of situation that Pakistan at the moment is facing. But having said that, despite all those challenges, I feel still Pakistan feels that this is the best option at the moment that they have. They will have to work with the Afghan Taliban no matter what other challenges are at the moment. That's very interesting, Kamran. And the reversal of position for Pakistan in a way to a parallel position to what the U.S. had is, I think once again demonstrates that in international relations there's really no concept of irony. But anyway, let me turn to my colleague Esfandiar for some opening thoughts on what threat does the TTP actually constitute to Pakistan? And what is the Afghan Taliban victory's impact on the TTP as an organization? And do you think that the Afghan Taliban is enabling or restraining the TTP? Thank you Ambassador Olson for the introduction as well as for your question. It's an important question. I'm delighted to be here alongside Elizabeth and Kamran to be discussing this issue. So grateful for that opportunity. Afghanistan-based Pakistani Taliban forces are starting to inflict some real damage on Pakistan. And recently we've also seen a surge in violence by some below separatists who appear to be operating from parts of Afghanistan even now. There's been an escalation in the frequency, lethality, and even intensity of violence over the last several months. I mean, I think the reality is that the TTP has been emboldened by the Afghan Taliban's example. It is not just a cliche anymore, but I think it is evident from the TTP's activities, propaganda, even internal jihadi chatter. And most significantly, the Taliban are providing what I think is de facto political asylum to both the leadership and the large fighting force of the TTP in Afghanistan. That has substantially added to the TTP's capacity for violence. I think what should really concern Pakistani policymakers now is that some fighters of the Afghan Taliban freed from their so-called jihad against the United States and the former Afghan government are turning to the TTP. They would like to join the TTP. So that's a new dimension of the threat. The belote insurgents are an interesting case. I think many analysts had assumed that while the Taliban would be supportive of the TTP, the belote insurgents were an easy case and they would restrain them. But it turns out that even the belote are drawing strength from the Taliban's example of defeating the United States. And I have good information suggesting that the TTP has been helping the belote with some type of training and tactics for a period of time. As a result, Afghanistan-based belote insurgents still have meaningful help in Afghanistan. I mean, the threat dimension I'd really emphasize is the fact that the TTP's demonstrated alliance with the Afghan Taliban is just, you know, it really hits you in the face. I mean, for years, the Pakistani government would argue that the TTP was largely a byproduct of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, combined with external support of the former Afghan government, excuse me, in Kahoots with the Indians. And we heard here on here elaborate stories from Pakistani policymakers about the depth of Indian machinations in Afghanistan as the fundamental driver of terrorism in Afghanistan. And it was based on that assumption, Pakistani officials would often imply that the U.S. exit from Afghanistan, the return of the Taliban, really limit the TTP's threat. That has clearly not happened. The TTP chief is publicly reiterating his pledge to the Afghan Taliban. And the Afghan Taliban, for their part, are very evasive on both the current status and the future of the TTP in Afghanistan. I found Kamran's sort of comments and descriptions, you know, very interesting, very telling on how the Afghan Taliban are responding on the question of TTP to Pakistan's sort of requests and entities. I think, you know, this also demonstrates the relative hollowness and unreliability of the Afghan Taliban's counterterrorism guarantees. Taliban committed to not letting anyone use Afghan territory for overseas terrorism, but they're clearly permitting the Pakistan Taliban to direct its campaign of violence in Pakistan from Afghanistan. And so ironically, Pakistan is the only country right now, but at least since the Taliban's takeover to charge that under the Taliban of Afghan territory, it's been used for international terrorism. Thanks. Thanks for that, Esfandiar. It's very interesting. I mean, you know, first of all, you're sort of describing also, as Kamran did, a bit of buyer's remorse on the part of Pakistan. But the other question, I guess, that this raises is, you know, which maybe we can get to later is a question of the relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. When I was serving in Pakistan, it was pretty bad. And 2014, with the beginning of Zarbayev's, TTP seemed to be moving actually into opposition to the Afghan Taliban. And many of their members had actually joined Daesh. But now there's been this repair in the relationship. It's very interesting. I wonder what the dynamics are there. But I'd like to turn now to Elizabeth and get into the question of the grand line a little bit. How, you know, on this theme of fires, remorse, how surprised is Pakistan that the Taliban is challenging the grand line? And should it be surprised? I think that's exactly the question. It is far more surprised than it should be, in my view. This is a movie that we have seen before. So far, the Taliban is hewing very closely to the script that it followed back in the 1990s. When Pakistan tried on three occasions to induce and cajole the Taliban into giving recognition to the grand line, which no Afghan government has has done to date. Those appeals were rejected. And the way that the Afghan Taliban at the time dealt with those difficult approaches and tried to smooth things over diplomatically was to say that it was an unsettled issue, that their interim government hadn't made a final determination and in fact wasn't qualified to do so. And I think that echoes a lot of the language that we're seeing today from Taliban officials who have come out and said, you know, consultations are ongoing, that this is essentially a work in progress. And on the Pakistan side, it's been interesting to see how they've dealt with this because I think it was a surprise in many ways. And this has manifested most immediately in clashes that we've seen along the grand line where Pakistan is in the final stages of fencing that 2600 kilometer border. And there have been occasions where Taliban forces have actually prevented Pakistan from continuing that fencing process and have carried off barbed wire, made it difficult to do so. Pakistan so far has been trying to downplay those incidents, calling them isolated, calling them the work of miscreants, and essentially saying that this is not something that's coming from the higher levels. But fundamentally, you know, the Taliban are in a situation where they are trying to consolidate their control in Kabul, they are facing a host of issues. And the thought that they would take a stand and make a choice and either recognize the grand line or just kind of let the issue lie, I think is a misreading of their own incentives to want to demonstrate that they are Afghans, they are not beholden to Pakistan. And that's a difficult situation to be in. And I think we saw the recent visit of Pakistan's NSA to Kabul. It looks like there is going to be some sort of border management mechanism, which is encouraging because I think going forward beyond just the fate of the fencing process or progress, if we are to see an influx, for example, of refugees out of Afghanistan as the humanitarian situation worsens there, these are all issues that are going to put further pressure on the grand line question. So it seems to be another one where perhaps there was a misreading of why the former Afghan government had been so vociferously opposed. I think it was seen through the lens of kind of the Indian proxy conflict. You have figures like Amroh Sala coming out and saying that Peshawar is the winter capital. And so perhaps there was more of an assumption than there should have been that with the Taliban in control, that at the very least that would become less of a front page issue. But I think by virtue of the ongoing fencing campaign, we're unlikely to see it dying down anytime soon. Thanks, Elizabeth. So it does seem that, you know, all Afghan governments probably regard themselves as weak on this on this particular issue and are not able to actually take a stance that perhaps rail politic might dictate. I'd like to come back to you, Kamran. Elizabeth mentioned the recent NSA visit. Lloyd Yusuf was in Kabul. I wonder if you could give us your take on the outcome of the recent high level interactions. You know, and especially on these sort of border issues in this Grand Line question and what Pakistan is hoping will come out of this dialogue with the Taliban. Kamran, you're muted. I agree with Elizabeth when she said that despite all those recent incidents of, you know, disruption to fencing Pakistan is still trying to downplay those incidents as localized events. Although we have seen even statements from the Taliban top leadership, even their army chief, you know, objecting to the fencing. But Pakistan at the moment feels that there are larger issues to tackle with. So they are not going to bog down on these issues and they feel that the officials that I have spoken to that they have understanding at the leadership level with the Afghan Taliban. And because of this understanding, after a few incidents, now we have seen that there is relative calm as far as, you know, the border situation or this fencing is concerned. As far as the outcome of this national security advisers visit is concerned, of course, this was part of the ongoing engagement. And Dr. Mui Yusuf visited there on the instruction of Prime Minister Imran Khan. The official line was the idea behind was to get the firsthand account of the needs of the Afghan government to run the economy to help them as far as the humanitarian assistance is concerned. Because Pakistan is worried that if there is economic collapse, if there is a severe economic crisis, that may push more people to enter Pakistan. And Pakistan feels that it cannot afford. And as far as larger security issues are concerned, I believe that I don't think so that is being dealt with at the level of the NSA. I believe the military authorities are dealing with those issues. So my sense is that Pakistan still feels that it can handle these issues. If you talk about these border fencing, because they feel that if, for example, they respond to such provocation at the local level, there may be casualties on the Afghan side or Afghan Taliban side. And that exactly Pakistan feels the detractors or the critics of Pakistan policy wanted. So Pakistan will not get bogged down. So my sense is that Pakistan will still try to downplay those incidents. But at the same time, if you have the ISPR spokesperson or the chief military spokesperson stating that the fencing will complete and there will be no disruption. So Pakistan is also trying to send a message to the Afghan Taliban that this border mechanism will here to stay. Thank you, Kamran. One question is given, follow on question given the history of this region and historical ironies. Is there any possibility that Pakistan is considering a hedging strategy toward Afghanistan as it did during the previous several decades while the U.S. was in Afghanistan? There are some reports in the Afghan press that Chief of ISI, General Andrum, met with members of the Taliban's opposition. How would you interpret that if it needed? I think I believe that this is part of Pakistan's strategy to dispel the impression that Afghan Taliban are their only favorite. If you recall, this has been Pakistan's strategy even when the President Ghani's government was there. I believe Pakistan's current special envoy on Afghanistan, Ambassador Sadik, was the one who was instrumental in reaching out to all those non-Pashtun elements because Pakistan over the years faced this allegation that we were only backing the Afghan Taliban. So I don't think so that Pakistan feels that the opposition figures or those who can resist the Taliban are strong enough that Pakistan really can bet on them. So this I believe is part of the overall strategy. And I think even during conversation or private conversation with the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan has been keep telling the Afghan Taliban that look for the larger international legitimacy. It is important that you should include all other elements within the Afghan political spectrum in the government because it is vital even for your own international legitimacy. And I believe this could be the reason that the ISI Chief also meeting with those opposition figures and this is part of the ongoing strategy. Thank you. I'd like to now pose a sort of a question to all of the panelists. I may turn to Asfandia first for some thoughts, but it's notable that the government of Pakistan at several points has suggested that its TTP problem perhaps and certainly its Balooch insurgent problem is in some way the result of Indian machinations. And certainly we've learned in Washington over the past two decades that in terms of thinking about Pakistan as policy towards Afghanistan, the question of India is first and foremost. So I'd like to get a sense whether people think that these ideas of Indian machinations behind the TTP, which seems a little far fetched on the face of it, whether there is something to that. Is this gamesmanship or is Pakistan actually really facing a renewed threat? So maybe I'll turn to Asfandia first if that's okay for your thoughts. Look, that's a very important question. And I like you, like others who watch the region have heard this talking point of the Pakistani government for a long time for almost a decade. It has been very salient in any kind of conversation about the nature of the threat about the fundamental drivers of the TTP as a threat to Pakistan. And I look very closely at the TTP and in my work research, including field research in both countries, I find that the principal external drivers of the TTP are Afghan Taliban, both as an ideological example, and as fellow jihadi brethren on the ground and al-Qaeda. I think there have been contacts between the former Afghan government and the TTP. There have been some dealings as well and some interaction has materialized into a live-let arrangement in different parts of eastern Afghanistan. But on balance, even when the former Afghan government was still in charge, the areas where the TTP was most influential were regions where the Afghan Taliban were more powerful, had more territorial control. So I think the charge that the Indian machinations have been driving the TTP and are perhaps still continuing to be a major source of support for the TTP, I think that charge is overstated. Would anyone else like to take a shot at this question? Yes, I would like to add, I think truth lies somewhere in between. I believe that I understand that primarily the TTP is a homegrown problem that Pakistan has been facing. But you know that in geo-strategic politics, there are always external factors that take advantage. And I think one view is that given the fact that India has always accused Pakistan of backing the insurgency in the disputed Kashmir region, and many people even cite the famous comment by the current Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Duval, where he talked about offensive-defensive effectively meaning raising the cost of Pakistan in case it continues so-called what they say, the cross-border terrorism. So I agree overall with Asfan that yes, primarily it is the Afghan Taliban and the TTP is primarily a homegrown problem for Pakistan. But then there are external elements, particularly with regards to Baloch separatists. There are elements where we feel that the Indian involvement is there. Even if we see recently Indian external affairs ministry making statements talking about the human rights violations, even on one occasion we saw on the Indian Republican day Indian Prime Minister directly talking about the problem of Balochistan. So there are elements, external elements, but to say that it is all because of the problem is all because of the external elements, I think that is a bit problematic. If Pakistan really pinpoints that and rectify that issue, then I believe that even the external element can be dealt with effectively. Elizabeth, did you have any thoughts on the Indian hand question? I think just briefly, Asfanya and Kamran have covered the view from the ground and kind of the nitty-gritty of it. But politically, I really do see an element of scapegoating here. And it is a way of explaining away difficulties and grievances that lie within local populations. And that is an element of this that I don't think should be overlooked in part because if you start to buy in too much to that narrative, if you start to drink your own Kool-Aid, the theories of how to deal with these conflicts, you find yourself trying to solve a problem that is a different one than really exists. And so it distracts away from thinking about governance challenges and reforms in the part of northwest Pakistan where the TTP is largely engaged. What are some of the underlying factors that are adding fuel to this movement beyond what's happening across the border with support and facilitation from the Afghan Taliban? And that's concerning to me when I see those kind of all-encompassing narratives about the Indian hand supporting something that actually does have really challenging and important local drivers that should be considered. Thanks, Elizabeth. Yeah, and speaking of local drivers, I suppose that leads me to ask Asfandiar, what do you think is the future of the Afghan Taliban mediated talks between the government of Pakistan and the TTP? And particularly since the ceasefire has lapsed and the TTP is again on the offensive, what are the prospects for some kind of political resolution? And perhaps if there isn't a political resolution, what happens then? Right. Look, a little bit on the background of the talks that have taken place because I think that the talks themselves were very interesting. Right after the Taliban took over, Pakistan and Persia turned into a long-standing ally, Siraj Akhani, for talks with the TTP. And international negotiations certainly made some headway. These negotiations took place in Afghanistan. A ceasefire was announced, as you know, in early November. And there were reports that in the negotiations right before the ceasefire or the factors that really led to the ceasefire included Pakistan's commitment that it would release maybe over 100 TTP prisoners, including some high-profile leaders that are in detention in Pakistan. But it was suspended by December and the TTP alleged that the Pakistani government wasn't keeping its commitments in Pakistan, didn't really offer a satisfactory answer as to what really happened. I would say this was a very strange attempt at a peace process with the TTP and that's because the Pakistani public was completely caught by surprise. Pakistani government had been telling the public at large that the TTP was either a problem of the past or a function of these external designs against Pakistan. And then out of nowhere, Pakistan's top leadership, including President Alvi and then Prime Minister Khan, both were talking about Pakistan offering amnesty to the TTP. So I think the fundamental challenge on the Pakistani side remains that the Pakistani public has not been primed about the nature of the challenge that Pakistan faces and why a political settlement is important. And so I think any type of meaningful peace process with the TTP remains a real shock to the system and any type of meaningful concessions that Pakistani negotiators can offer to the TTP, I think they remain very difficult to deliver on from a purely domestic political perspective. On the side of the TTP, it's interesting to agree to a ceasefire or a political process was somewhat puzzling, less so than Pakistani government's decision to sue for peace, however. I think the TTP was using the ceasefire, much like the Afghan Taliban did against the US to gain the release of imprisoned senior leaders. It also wants to improve its battlefield position, wants to sneak in fighters into Pakistan and the ceasefire kind of offered that opportunity. And the TTP may have wanted to curry favor with the nation government of the Afghan Taliban to help it consolidate power in Afghanistan because TTP realizes that the Afghan Taliban do depend on Pakistan. I think for now, these talks remain stalled. Pakistan has tried to revive them. And there's been a new vertical, which has been opened with the help of some tribal leaders. But those discussions are not going anywhere to the extent I can tell. But that doesn't mean Pakistan is going to stop, I think, reviving some sort of a political process, dialogue, ideally with the help of the Afghan Taliban will remain a major priority on the Pakistani side. I also think Pakistan is starting to think about some cross-border military action. We could see some type of drone strikes. Pakistan has a growing fleet of Chinese armed drones. We could see more regular airstrikes. I think there's also a suggestion of a boots on the ground type operation. But the discussion appears to be fairly nascent in its strategic thinking. So I'm not convinced that Pakistan is quite there yet. But the military option appears to be increasingly on the table as well. On the military option, since you've studied the TTP extensively, I wanted to ask a couple questions about how they view themselves and their positions. One of the cliches we heard repeatedly during the Afghan war was the Taliban saying that the U.S. had watches, but they had the time. And I wonder if the Pakistani Taliban has the same sort of view with regard to Pakistan. Does it view itself as the inevitable victor? And if so, what are their goals there? And then a second question just occurs to me in our discussion today. Has the TTP ever taken a position on the grand line? I think both very interesting points on the TTP's thinking on an asymmetric strategy. I think they're also similar to the Taliban's fancy and nutritional campaign model. Ten years ago when they launched the campaign, they were much more blunt. They went after major targets in Pakistan's main cities. But this time around, they appear to have a sense that an insurgency on the low boil, which really focuses on Pakistani state targets, is most likely to deliver them some type of political leverage, strategic advantage, which then they can use to negotiate an end state that is most beneficial to them. And that end state increasingly appears to be control of the Pakistani tribal area. And that leads me to the response to your second question on TTP's position on the Durand line. I think the TTP shares some of the precepts of the Afghan Taliban on the Durand line question. They generally don't accept the border. They do not completely align with the Afghan Taliban's conception of a broader Pashtun heartland. But they generally see the border as somewhat bogus and they don't feel bound by that. Interesting. Elizabeth, on the question of the Durand line, what do you see as the possible outcomes for both for Pakistan and Afghanistan? And if I may, a little bit more broadly, is there a role for the international community on this issue? I mean, I noticed, I saw sort of a very fragmentary press report yesterday indicating that Pakistan has raised its concerns with border issues at the UNSC. And I just, many Afghans talk about a parallel between Kashmir and the Durand line. But I wonder where you would see this going both bilaterally and perhaps in a more, in a larger multilateral sense. It's a great question. I think for the reason that Asfanyar mentioned in terms of increasing chatter, increasing thought about potential cross-border operations from Pakistan into Afghanistan. That is something that would further inflame a really difficult situation right now in terms of the sensitivity of the border. The way that I would see this playing out, and I think what we've seen so far is, like I was mentioning previously, the Pakistan side attempting to downplay what we've seen, but still maintaining that it will continue border fencing. The Taliban, meanwhile, claiming that the border is illegitimate, but also saying that it's kind of a discussion that's ongoing. Given all of the other challenges facing Afghanistan right now, facing the Taliban, it would seem to me that it is in the interest of both sides to let that issue lie to the extent that that is possible. And to focus instead on humanitarian issues, broader CT pushes. And I think that's also part of the challenge for the international community, that there is already limited attention going to Afghanistan these days. And as you rack and stack those priorities, I think it's hard to make a case that the Durand line in and of itself figures very highly. What I would say, though, is when you think about peacebuilding and USIP, goodness knows, has folks who could weigh in on this in from kind of a comparative context. But there is always the challenge with AFPAC relations of the Durand line as kind of the underlying issue that, at least to my mind, is seeding a lot of the broader instability that we're seeing play out in the counterterrorism space. You know, I think it's worth recalling that back in the early 1970s, it was Prime Minister's Ulster Kar Ali Buto, who first gave support to Islamist dissidents who would cross the border from Afghanistan in order to push back against an Afghan regime that was pushing for kind of Pashtunistan and the irredentist movement. And that was the start. That was the seed that then has grown into what we've seen in this cross border region. To my mind, the Durand line right now is more of a symptom of broader mistrust and instability between the two sides rather than the cause itself. I don't necessarily think that getting both sides to sign on the dotted line would get us anywhere. And I also think that that is pretty unlikely to happen. But it is worth keeping in mind in these broader conversations to the extent that the Taliban is looking for ways of demonstrating their legitimacy, looking for ways of trying to make the case internationally. I think this is one issue that bears some attention that I haven't seen as much in those conversations about human rights inclusivity, that sort of thing. It's recognizing international borders that the US and the rest of the international community do. Thanks. Thanks, Elizabeth. You mentioned Ali Zulfiqar Bhutto's initiative of course, you know, and of course this goes back further. You know, one of the things that certainly remembered very clearly in Islamabad is that that Afghanistan refused to accept Pakistan and it was created essentially because of this question of the Durand line. So I'm going to move to audience questions and just a reminder to the audience to please send in your questions through the website and if you could identify yourself in any affiliation if you'd like to. So the first question is from Steve Engelken who asks, do the Afghan Taliban, especially the Hakkani still maintain their business interests, illicit and illicit on the Pakistani side of the Durand line. So does anyone want to take a stab at that? I have seen no indication that those businesses have been bound up since the Taliban took over. They certainly existed during the years of the Taliban's insurgency and I see no indication that there's been any major change in those activities. Anyone else? Kamran, do you have any thoughts on that? I agree with Aswant because it's not just the Hakkani's but I think many Afghans over the years have their businesses in Pakistan. So I always believe that they always have a plan B so certainly expecting that within few months they wind up all their businesses and their interests. I think that is not happening at least in the foreseeable future. Okay, thanks. So Stephen Biddle asks, to what extent will TTP basing in Afghanistan affect the viability of their insurgency in Pakistan? Another question laden with irony given the history of the past few decades. But maybe again Aswant, do you want to take a crack at that one? Sure, it's interesting that the last time the TTP launched their offensive against Pakistan in 2008-2009. They had a safe haven but it was inside Pakistani territory mostly in the two Vizierist lands. In this time, the campaign that they're trying to run has a very different geography. They're mostly operating from Afghan territory. They tend to sneak in fighters into Pakistani territory who then go on to carry out their operation. So TTP has demonstrated that it can adapt, it can learn, it has politically adjusted. It suggests, its behavior suggests some military and tactical adaptation as well. So I think we are on track for TTP mounting more violence in the months to come, which can be extremely lethal as well. Thanks, Isfandiar. Anyone else want to offer a commentary on that? Yes, I think the one difference would be of course that we understand that in 2007 when the TTP was formed, 2008-9-10 were the worst years that I think in Islamabad even at every weekend you saw a terrorist attack. And I think this time around, I don't think so that the TTP has the capacity to carry out such big attacks. The reason was simple that earlier they had their infrastructure in the erstwhile tribal areas. They had large sweats of territory, but now Pakistan army effectively controls that territory. So they may carry out attack like the one we saw last month right at the heart of Islamabad when one police official was killed. But can they carry out major offensive, major attacks in urban centers? I think that is highly unlikely, but in the bordering areas that is very much possible. We saw one of their propaganda video recently where they were using sophisticated night vision goggles, using snipers. And interestingly, we saw a president of Pakistan recently met with Army Chief General Kamar Javed Bajwa. And the president said in one of his interviews that Army Chief told him that these were the weapons actually left behind by the Americans. And we did not even have those weapons. So this is the kind of threat that we are facing, he said. Thanks. Okay, another question concerns the PTM. And the question is on human rights violations, but I think I'd like to slightly broaden it and ask what is the status right now of the Pashtun to Hafiz movement? And how does it play into this cross-border dynamic? Is there any indication of the TTP or the Afghan Taliban playing a role with regard to PTM? I think some discussion of the PTM would be very interesting. Any thoughts? I can kick things off, at least, and then curious what Asfandiar and Kamran have to say. So getting back to some of those governance and political grievances that we had discussed briefly earlier, I think this is really where the PTM comes in. It's a group that has been around for three or four years now and came up in response to frustrations over EJKs and mistreatment more broadly of the Pashtun community. And I think especially specifically in the context of what used to be known as FATA, the federally administered tribal areas, and is now after a process of political reform part of Pakistan's constitutional mainstream. So this is a group that I think has been broadly vilified by the state, but is careful for the most part in its public statements to say that it is not anti-state, that it is simply a rights organization looking for Pakistan to make good on the constitutional guarantees that all of its citizens are entitled to. In terms of its current status, it is a shadow of what it once was when it was massing large protests in large part in response to the pressure that it has faced from the state. One of its leaders, Ali Wazir, is a serving member of parliament who is currently jailed and has been for some time. This is just part of a strategy of ensuring that it is a group that is unable to to mass the sort of large scale protests that we had seen some years ago. That said, I think the seed of those grievances, what PTM was tapping into is still there. And as cell phone service and the internet increasingly come to these very remote and peripheral areas, I would anticipate that this sort of movement could potentially gain ground going forward. What PTM claims is that there have been instances where reformed members of the so-called good Taliban have come on side with the states and have essentially tried to control territory and carry out acts of violence against them in order to prevent the movement from gaining ground or from operating. So there is certainly at least an alleged overlap there or areas where they interact. But PTM more broadly, I think is less the group itself, but more just the sense of grievance and frustration that it was able to tap into is something that I think we're likely to see continue to play out going forward. Thanks, Elizabeth. Gentlemen, any additional thoughts? Yes, I agree with, of course, Elizabeth that the kind of momentum that the PTM had a few years back, that is not there. But one of the reasons that they did not have the momentum at least in the Pakistani media, usually PTM activities were certainly black out. That was also one of the reasons. And I think when Pakistan tried to negotiate with the TTP and many people have actually asked questions that if you could negotiate with the group who carried out massacre at the army run public school and carried out several other deadly attacks, why can't you also negotiate with the PTM, which is nonviolent, which is organic movement and also in a way in the long run can serve as to counter the ideology that is being propagated by the groups like the TTP. Because we have to understand that Pakistan is not only facing the issue of terrorism, but the real challenge is facing the extremist ideology. And many Saint voices believe that the groups like PTM, if they are mainstreamed, they can serve as a bullwalk against groups like TTP and all other extremist organizations, particularly in the KPK province where we know that it is considered at least the erstwhile tribal areas, a hotbed of all kinds of these militant groups. Thank you Kamran. Yes, so I think Kamran and Elizabeth have covered a lot of important ground and I agree with all that both of them said Pakistani crackdown against the PTM was short-sighted. It has sent a very wrong political signal to the aggrieved populations, conflict-affected populations of the former tribal areas. But I would also sort of extend it to broader Afghanistan-Pakistan region. I think the Afghan Taliban are actively hostile to the PTM, they see the PTM as having affinity with the former Afghan government. And that's probably one sort of additional reason as to why the Afghan Taliban support the TTP. They do not, the Afghan Taliban do not want a movement like the PTM taking hold on the Pakistan side of the border. Very interesting. So there's, I'm going to just ask one more question from the audience and then maybe we'll go to some sort of closing questions. But someone has asked what the impact is on China of all of this activity. As we know, the Baluch separatists in particular have been hitting Chinese targets in Baluchistan, which is of course one of the principal places where CPEC has investment. But I believe the TTP has also hit some of the CPEC projects. So I guess the concern is what does Beijing's take on all of this and how is this likely to impact relations between China and Pakistan going forward? Tamran, do you want to take a shot at that? Yeah, yes. Okay, I think China is very worried, very concerned. As you talked about that recently, we saw that Baluch separatists carried out and targeted the Chinese interests and they have a Majid Berge that was particularly formed to target the Chinese interests inside Pakistan. So certainly this is one of the main talking points between the Pakistani government and the Chinese officials. And even they are concerned that unless and until security situation improves, the progress on CPEC can be undermined. And also we have to understand this is where Pakistan can also have some leverage over the Afghan Taliban because the TTP and also Chinese are concerned with regards to the East Turkistan Islamic movement. We have seen a recent report by the UN monitoring team where it stated that about 200 and 400 ETIM fighters or members were actually relocated from border from China to other provinces. So it appears while Afghan Taliban are reluctant to take care of Pakistan's interests, at the moment they are keen to address the concerns of China. But at the same time the worry is they are at the moment trying to restrain ETIM but at the same time protecting them. So that is where I think Pakistan and China together can put pressure on Afghan Taliban that look that if you want economic assistance, if you want our help, then you need to deal with these elements. So this is an interesting equation going forward. Elizabeth, any thoughts on China? I think this is, I fully agree with Kamran and it's a fascinating dynamic to see unfold. One question for me that I think is worth watching going forward is what the TTP strategy is like with a B. We were talking about kind of the impact and how the next few months and years might play out. Are we going to see a return to these large scale attacks against civilians? So far it seems to be a slightly different strategy perhaps where it's a lot of targeting its security officials. We have seen these attacks against Chinese installations and really those are points of extreme pressure for the Pakistani government. Those are the pressure points. And so if you are looking to exert that pressure and make things difficult for Pakistan, those CPEC installations are a point of vulnerability. And we see in readouts, for example, from Prime Minister Ron Han's recent visit to Beijing where he met with Xi Jinping, this issue was highlighted. And Pakistan said it was going to redouble its efforts. And so I think it's very clear that the Chinese are focused on this issue. And Pakistan finds itself in a bit of a challenging situation where it feels perhaps unable to take all of the steps that would be necessary to fully protect CPEC installations. Thanks, Elizabeth. I think we've got just about a minute left. So I'm going to ask everyone to give a few closing thoughts on what they think the future of Pakistan-Taliban relations will be. And specifically whether all the dynamics we've discussed this morning are going to cause Pakistan to rethink its relationship with the Afghan Taliban. I'll start with this fund here. If you want to say anything on China, of course, I didn't give you a chance as well. So welcome your thoughts on the big final question, but anything you might want to say on China. I think Kamran and Elizabeth have sort of said, some of the points that I would have made that seem to have made them. I'll turn to the final question on Pakistan's policy towards the Taliban. I think the initial enthusiasm in Pakistan on the Taliban has weaned. You could even argue that it has mostly disappeared. Yet overall Pakistan remains committed to the Taliban. I'm not expecting a major policy shift. I think the fundamental calculus of Pakistan that a so-called pro-Pakistan entity should rule in Afghanistan. I think that calculus remains intact. And Pakistan wants Indian political influence in Afghanistan to be marginalized. So these days, I imagine Pakistani policymakers are asking themselves the question that what happens if the Taliban are weakened specifically in terms of Indian influence in Afghanistan? Will it go up or will it stay the same? I think the answer they're coming down to is that if the Taliban are weakened, the Indians are going to gain somehow. And that for them is reason enough to stick with the Taliban for the foreseeable future. That doesn't mean that Pakistan's commitment to the Taliban is set in stone. I'd say I think back to Pakistan cooling off on the Mujahideen government in the 1990s in a year or so. So more in terms of instability in Afghanistan can alter Pakistan's calculus. And finally, if the DDP start hitting some of these more sensitive targets, especially Chinese infrastructure in Pakistan, I think that can alter Pakistan calculus very quickly. Thanks, Isfandiar. Elizabeth, any final thoughts? Yeah, first of all, I just really enjoyed this conversation. Thanks so much for including me. And maybe if I could take things back to that great analogy that Kamran started us out with, where Pakistan now finds itself on the other side of the table in having these discussions with the Afghan Taliban, I think I might extend that in another direction too, where, similar to at least as I saw it, the U.S. was very invested in trying to help support and facilitate a stable and prosperous Pakistan. But in so doing and putting brand USA on projects and developments, that was really difficult in a place where public opinion of the U.S. was largely in the single digits. I think Pakistan now is in a similar situation in a way, perhaps less severe. Pakistan needs a strong Taliban. It doesn't want Afghanistan to fall into civil war or to become a failed state. But the question of how you get there, how you provide that support without recognizing the Taliban, but also just something as simple as providing assistance and technical support, I found it so telling that in response to a comment that Prime Minister Khan had made, of having instructed his officials to kind of work with the international community and provide skilled manpower to Afghanistan, there was this response from, I think it was the Taliban's deputy information minister who said, essentially there's no dearth of educated and skilled manpower in Afghanistan. So you're going to keep running into this sovereignty consideration. And that's where I think the Duran line dynamic discussion comes into play. So lots to be seen going forward. But I think this is an issue that will continue to resonate. Okay. And last word, Kamran. Yes. I think a couple of days back, a U.S. special representative on Afghanistan was on U.S. IP. He stated that the U.S. has no option but to work with Pakistan on the question of Afghanistan. And I believe that given the current scenario, I think Pakistan also has no option but to work with the government in Afghanistan and with the Afghan Taliban because they have paid a huge price, many people believe. And I don't think so that Pakistan will revisit or rethink its strategy. They may continue to tolerate the issue of TTP or few incidents here and there of Duran line, unless and until if there is something huge and big happens, I don't see that Pakistan dramatically changing its attitude towards Afghan Taliban. Okay. Well, let me thank all of the panelists for a fascinating discussion. I think we covered a lot of ground here. And thanks very much to our audience for tuning in and joining us this morning. Thanks very much.