 The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, is a group so vicious and unmanageable that al-Qaeda expelled them in February of 2014. ISIS uses the ever-expanding safe haven straddling the Iraq-Syria border to pursue a regional Sunni caliphate. Originally intent on striking the regime in Damascus, ISIS has more frequently battled an array of Syrian opposition forces who in turn suspect ISIS of colluding with President Assad. Iraqis dominate ISIS leadership, operate robust local and international funding schemes, and lead several thousand foreign fighters from more than 70 countries in their assault on Iraq's Shiite-dominated government. What do these dramatic developments mean for an already volatile Middle East in the wider world? The question the country has to think through is whether it's possible to effectively create an alternative government in Iraq without the acquiescence of Iran and the person who is really the key stakeholder now, I would say, who's the head of the Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani. Is it possible to think about pulling this country back together without Iran on that shit? And my answer would be no. That if you want to go out without Iran, you'll effectively cement the partition of Iraq without any hope worse of having a formula for overtime pulling it back together. You cannot make decisions regarding the two holiest places in Shia Islam by excluding Iranians. You cannot make decisions regarding the country that's on their border by excluding Iran. Even though Iran is in every piece of US policy, whether it be the nuclear issues, support the terrorism, energy security, economic issues, it's all out there. They have morphed from what we would call a terrorist group maybe as recently as three or four months ago into actually I would consider to be a terrorist army. So it's a problem like we haven't seen quite frankly since the towers went down in 9-11. I would offer this too is that with this morphing they also have demonstrated an extraordinary understanding of the use of propaganda in the modern world. They've done things with Twitter, with the internet, with all sorts of modern IT communication which extends their ability to create fear and intimidation in ways that no other terrorist group I think has applied so far. I think they're way ahead of al-Qaeda. But of course the question remains how do you stop ISIL since they're the ones that are actually generating this chaos and this crisis. This is my view. I would offer to you that ISIL is an evil force and I would offer to you they can only be stopped by force. And I don't think they have any interest in negotiating in any way that makes sense to us in the 21st century. It's an extension of what we see in the post 9-11 environment. Is it possible to do effective targeting? And the answer for the moment I think is no but will soon be sort of. And so I think one reason that we're sending these additional advisers is to have people on the ground who can get the kind of information that's only available when you're there. It has been reported that we have so-called ISR surveillance resources in the air over the key parts of Iraq now. And so that tells you that given the extraordinary capabilities the U.S. has, their information is on the way. So if I was an ISIS cadre, I would not be sleeping well. What accounts for the appeal of ISIS? If you're Sunni in Iraq it's pretty clear revenge against a Shia government that's alienated you, brought violence to your family, a lot of reasons. If you may be a purist and you believe in what ISIS says about re-establishing the Sunni Islamic caliphate of bringing religion and the practice of Islam back to the time of the ancestors, the salafs, the Nats appealing to you. If you are a Sunni from other parts of the world then you're a sectarian. It's the battle against the Shia. In a previous project I was in Peshawar, Pakistan. I interviewed a leading journalist who said don't forget what Zarkawi, remember the initial originator of this group, said when bin Laden and Zawahiri al-Qaeda core leadership wrote to him and said stop killing Shia, stop beheading Americans, it's not good for public relations, etc., etc. And he returned a message saying anti-Americanism is learned behavior, anti-Shiaism is innate. If you're a foreign fighter, it's adventure. It's a legitimate jihad in the eyes of many people. It gives you purpose. If you're a sectarian again, opportunity also to return home with credibility in a place where you may have been marginalized in every way and to bring violence back home. One of the great counter-terrorism tools that the United States can bring to the table around the world is jobs. I have a very strong belief that jobs and the things that we have done here in our own country make a significant difference. Because I've talked to young men, if they had a job and they had a sense they could support their family, raise their children and actually make something their lives, it becomes more difficult for them to sit there and listen over a period of three or four nights in a row to a recruiter for al-Qaeda or now ISIL. Our security response cannot be only with the central government at this time because of the complexity of what has happened in Iraq. As the immediate crisis ebbs, because right now we've got a three alarm fire to put out, but as it ebbs to lead a process drawing in the key regional powers, balancing Saudi Arabia and Iran finally, so this insane Sunni Shia fratricide will have an end point, bringing in the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, all of whom have an interest in stopping this process of disintegration and taking the lead in thinking what's this part of the world going to look like under some new structure. Without a political settlement or a progress on the political settlement, an attack alone on the ISIS can, you know, there are going to be all kinds of complications that David talked about, about knowing where they are or how mixed they are with others, how urgent, where the target is that they must be dealt with, but I believe that an airstrike alone can degrade the threat, but will not fundamentally change the situation. Kind of a marriage of diplomacy to get the political situation right, as the ambassador said, to get the people on your side to be able to win against the extremists and terrorists, and then to apply the military measure, but we all know, at least my judgment is, absent that, you would have perhaps the jury of not the fact of division and instability for some time to come. Once you get into the programmatic of what it is that you're going to do, I mean, assuming a post-assessment and the assessment comes, here is kind of the military capability that exists that we could invest in and build up and provide them this capability. I'm putting on the table that we, that assessment should include what are the local forces and elements that need to be taken into account, because in the first instance, if they switch from ISIS and work against ISIS, they, assuming the other things are in place, which is a big assumption, you would need people on the ground, because I agree with David that the central forces going back and taking all these places may be difficult. David has put some other option on the table, but putting that aside for the moment, one of the elements has got to be local forces, local leaders. Regional powers, especially Jordan, are nervous about this open U.S. military involvement in their country and would do it only if there's political cover that makes them feel comfortable. So I just would float the idea that for this stabilization force, and you could actually imagine a similar force going into the Sunni areas of Iraq, I mean, the idea that the Iraqi army is going to retake Mosul, I don't think that's going to happen folks, but it's possible that some stabilization force working with tribal leaders could begin over time to bring a degree of stability.